UNITED STATES AND THE POLITICS OF A NON-NUCLEAR POWER NORTH KOREA

Abstract

The regrettable devastating effects of the first atomic bomb thrown at Japan’s Hiroshima and Nagasaki during the Second World War saw to the increased urge by countries to acquire nuclear weapons especially by the world powers as a sure way of deterrence and consequently maintaining power balance. However, the United Nations as a way out of maintaining peaceful co-existence brought the resolution on nuclear non-proliferation. Despite this resolution, most countries have renewed efforts at developing nuclear capability but which are being rebuffed by the United Nations championed principally by the United States of America. Utilizing the theory of Deterrence as a framework, this paper therefore interrogates the painstaking efforts of the United States in ensuring that North Korea does not achieve nuclear capability with a view to proffering necessary panacea to obviate the ensuing worrisome logjam. The paper views that a nuclear power North Korea may not significantly present danger to the world but may lead to a comprehensive balance of power and deterrence. The paper recommends amongst others a negotiation-oriented engagement with North Korea rather than the ongoing ineffective strangulating sanctions; stoppage of provocative security threats (such as incessant USA-South Korea military maneuvers near North Korea) as well as drastic reduction (if not total elimination) of nuclear warheads by the world powers (like USA and Russia) to prevent the ambition of other threatened countries to acquire nuclear technology for national survival.