
World Orders and Violation of African Sovereignty: Reflections on Africa Union Security Architecture

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Abstract

The study interrogated the interface between world order and the violation of African sovereignty focusing on African union security architecture. The new world order is often seen as a way or means through which the security challenges of the third world are noted after the collapse of the old world order. In the face of this order, the state sovereignty has to a large extent been compromised. The study noted that the doctrine of sovereignty developed as part of the transformation of the medieval system in Europe into the modern state system, a process that culminated in the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 after the thirty years war...internationally, sovereignty served as the basis for exchanges of recognition on the basis of legal equality and thus on that premise is the theory of the study consolidated. Information accrued from documentary evidence was deductively analysed and the paper concluded that African Union has not been sleeping all but they are still limited by domineering influence of the west. The study recommends that there is need for the amendment of UN Charter and AU constitutive Act so as to bring African Security and defence policies strategies in congruity with the realities.

Key words: African Union, Security Architecture, Sovereignty, World order.

Introduction

This paper focused on World Orders and African Security challenges with the view of exploring the role of the African Union as a continental security actor. The research noted that the foundational problem of Africa is deeply rooted in the historical past that has to do with their contact with the western metro-pole. Records hold that most European states experienced numerous wars and other security challenges in her political history. These included the 30years war, Napoleonic war, the first and second world wars that claimed a total of over 75 million lives, as well as the devastation of economies of European Countries, and the cold war that lasted for 45 years (1945-1990) (Nye, 2013: 70 and Watson 1979).

Therefore, to address these security challenges confronting Europe, various world orders were established by European great powers. These included; the Treaty Tordesillas 1494, the Treaty of Westphalia after the thirty years war (1618-1648), the Congress of Vienna world order after the Napoleonic wars (1815), the Treaty of

Versailles after World War 1, and at San Francisco world order after World War II (1945) and Cold War World Order (1947- 1989). Nonetheless, either by deliberate omission or oversight, European scholars in their list of world orders avoided orders that had definite consequences on African Security and its socio-economic development in both the colonial and post-colonial eras. It is therefore very important to include the omitted world orders; European world order of Tordesillas that triggered African slave trade (17th – 19th Century), Berlin Conference Agreement Order (1885) that resulted in the partition, effective possession and legitimization of colonization of African continent; the Bretton Woods System World Order (1944) that established the institutions responsible for global Economic Management among nations – (the IMF, the World Banks, 1946, and WTO (From GATT) in 1993 and including the Globalization World Order. It means the erosion of national boundaries and the significant reduction of national governments. This means moving from a world with borders to one without borders (Khor, 2002).

Studies shows that the world orders listed laid the foundation of African security challenges of post-cold war era and aggravated the problems of socio-economic development of Africa. Nnoli (2006) and Udombana (2003) present alarming data which show that Africa accounts for about forty percent of all wars in the world in the post cold war period with nearly forty three percent of states in the continent experiencing warfare. As at 1994, a minimum of twelve African states were at war, while fourteen states experienced high levels of violence. Before the final transcendence of OAU into the African Union in 2002, Africa held the record of interstate wars and conflicts, which produced influx of refugees and displaced persons, and resulted in economic devastation and almost non – social welfare infrastructures. The Arab spring which was a serious pointer that traversed through Northern states of Africa to include: Egypt, Tunisia and later Libya shook African political structure and security to the foundation (Yaounde, Declaration, 1996 & African Union Report 2020).

Thus, the major focus of this study interrogates the place African Union in the new world order in relation to African security vis a vis violation of state sovereignty. This is

important in positioning the dynamics of Africa in the emerging socio-political and economic world.

Conceptual Clarification

World Orders

Trends in the transformation of world orders had shown how leaders of great power nations over the centuries had tried to entrench peace, security, stability and development in the international system. The avowed desire of these great leaders was based on their experiences from the devastations of various conflicts and wars, as well as other major events with defining impacts on the matrices of global security which the international community and humanity experienced in the past.

However, from historical records, scholars had argued that world orders have emerged most times from debris of wars - (Momah, 1994:109; Goldstein 2003:48; Nye JR, 2007: 11-12). It was in line with this view that Nye (2007), observed that after world war, a new treaty sets the new framework of order.

This Literature review covered the critical research questions posed after the statement of problem. We begin by answering the question: What is a new world order? How has various World Orders impacted on African security?. The term “world order” though a nebulous and contested concept like most political science concepts, is not just a new catch – phrase but had always recurred in the efforts of man from time to find solutions to the scourge of wars that had devastated mankind and society over the centuries.

According to Longin (2004), “ new world order” means defining the long – term economic, technological, military and socio - political trends that will decide the pattern of future international relations. The concept, according to Longin, includes all the dramatic transformations that had taken place as a result of the end of the cold war- the disintegration of the bipolar world system of conflict and co-operation between the two ideological adversaries. He stresses that the term ‘new world order’ also covers the emerging international system and the need to create a new balance of power, as well as new structures and institutions. Longin goes beyond the definition of the new world

order and predicts that it will only be operationalized with a reformed United Nations adapted to the new world balance of power, and new challenges and threats as well as equipped with an effective instrument in the form of an international military force, strong enough to constitute a reliable deterrent to any potential aggressor who might think of using his army as a tool for pursuing political objectives. In summary, the new world order is often seen as a way or means of providing the world with more stability and security after the collapse of the old world order.

In one of the 'popular issues' publications titled "New World Order Peace or Evil" (<http://www.allabout.popularissues.org> downloaded 14th July, 2007), the influential board of editors of the paper conceptualizes the term as an accord of the world's super powers to rule, secure and maintain the premise of "Global peace". The concept is designed to bring the world under submission to one Supreme Government, enforce one controlled common religion and one worldwide economic system. If applied to the western world, this definition seems to be in tandem with contemporary world dominated by the United States and its allies and premised on liberal democratic ideology, and capitalist economic growth strategy both encapsulated in the new wave of an all-encompassing "globalization" revolution which is driving the entire world towards a single- world society. Under the globalization regime, which some scholars have termed the new world order, the conventional autonomy of states and local societies was not eliminated, but "set aside" to ensure that the common directions and options were implemented through uniformity of practice.

Writing on the changing world order, Goldstein (2003:48) defines the term comprehensively as the rules that Govern important relationship of the interstates system in general and the world's great powers in particular. He further highlighted aspects of world order to include, balance of power, sphere of influence, shared beliefs, key treaties, principles like sovereignty, practices like free trade, and so forth. He concluded by asserting that the rise of new world order have occurred after terrible great wars. Goldstein (2003: 48) argues that historically, transformations of the world orders and the rise of new guiding principles have occurred after terrible great wars.

The new guiding principles constitute the norms and ethical standard of behaviour of states in international politics. The end of the cold war, asserts Goldstein, brought a more powerful transition in world order than the aggressive policies of the United States -Soviet relations.

According to Momah (1994), world order encompasses the political, social, economic and cultural rules of global international community or major global actors to govern them after major changes had taken place in international system. In this vein, Longin (2004) defined new world order as the long-term economic, technological, military and Socio-political trends that will decide the shape of future international relations.

Sovereignty

No concept has raised so many conflicting issues and involved nineteenth-century jurists and political theorists in so desperate a maze as the concept of Sovereignty. The reason is perhaps that the original, genuine and philosophical meaning of the concept had not been from the very start sufficiently examined and seriously tested by them. In the same measure as crucial and practical problems dealing with international law developed, the controversies about State Sovereignty (when considered in its external aspect - relations between states) grew deeper and more extended. A question was asked whether the international community as a whole is the true holder of Sovereignty, rather than the individual states. In some quarters, the very notion of Sovereignty was challenged. Such was the stand taken first by Triepel, then by several other international lawyers, including Willoughby and Foulke (Maritain, 1950:343). He analysed sovereignty from the view of political philosophy. Just as the words *civitas* are often translated by "state" (though the most appropriate name is "commonwealth" or "body politic," not "state"), so the words *principatus* and *suprema potestas* are often translated by "sovereignty" and the words *princeps* ("ruler") by "sovereign. To him, this is a misleading translation, which muddles the issue from the start. *Principatus* ("principality") and *suprema potestas* ("supreme power") simply mean "highest ruling authority," not "sovereignty as has been conceived since the moment when this word made its first appearance in the vocabulary of political theory. Conversely, "sovereignty" was rendered at that moment by *majestas* in Latin, as was recognized at the time of Jean

Bodin. According to Maritain (1950: 344), Jean Bodin who is considered as the father of the modern theory of Sovereignty rightly stated in his words,

It is my contention that political philosophy must eliminate Sovereignty both as a word and as a concept not because it is an antiquated concept, or by virtue of a sociological-juridical theory of "objective law"; and not because the concept of Sovereignty creates insuperable difficulties and theoretical entanglements in the field of international law; but because, considered in its genuine meaning, and in the perspective of the proper scientific realm to which it belongs (which is political philosophy). This concept is intrinsically wrong, and bound to mislead us if we continue using it (Maritain, 1950: 344).

In articulating the above, Maritain argues that we are confronted with that which is basically wrong with the concept of Sovereignty and the original error of the theorists of Sovereignty. They knew that the right to self government is naturally possessed by the people, but for the consideration of this right, they substituted that of the total power with that of the commonwealth. They knew that the "prince" receives from the people the authority with which he is invested.

Furthermore, within the International system, sovereignty is the claim by the independent state to attain full self-government, and the mutual recognition of claims to sovereignty is the basis of international society (Mclean, 1996: 464). He also says that sovereignty should not be confused with freedom of action: sovereign actors may find themselves exercising freedom of decision within circumstances that are highly constrained by relations of unequal power.

At this point the understanding of sovereignty assumes a different turn. Sovereignty is the claim to be ultimate political authority, subject to no higher power as regards the making and enforcing of political decisions. In the International system, sovereignty is the claim by the independent state to attain full self-government, and the mutual recognition of claims to sovereignty is the basis of international society (Mclean, 1996: 464). He also says that sovereignty is the other side of the coin of international anarchy, for if states claim sovereignty, then the structure of the international system is by definition anarchic. Sovereignty should not be confused with freedom of action:

sovereign actors may find themselves exercising freedom of decision within circumstances that are highly constrained by relations of unequal power.

According to Mclean, the doctrine of sovereignty developed as part of the transformation of the medieval system in Europe into the modern state system, a process that culminated in the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 after the thirty years war...internationally, sovereignty served as the basis for exchanges of recognition on the basis of legal equality and therefore, as the basis of diplomacy and international law. In agreement to the above position taken by Mclean (1996:246) and Hobbes in Maritian (1950:345), Sovereignty means two things: First, a right to supreme independence and supreme power which is a natural and inalienable right and, second, a right to independence and a power which, in their proper sphere, are supreme, absolutely or transcendently, not comparatively or as a topmost part in the whole.

This is the Generation of the great LEVIATHAN, or rather (to speak more reverently) of that MORTAL GOD, to which we owe under the Immortal God, our peace and defence. For by this Authoritie (Authority) given him by every particular man in the Commonwealth, he hath the use of so much Power and Strength conferred on him, that by terror thereof, he is unable to form the wills of them all, to Peace at home, and mutually against their enemies abroad. And in him consistent, the Essence of the Commonwealth; which (to define it) is One Person, of whose Acts a great Multitude, by natural Covenants one with another, have made themselves every one the Author, to the end he may use the strength and means of them all, as he shall think expedient, for their Peace and Common Defence (Hobbes quoted in Maritian 1950). The long and short of Hobbes argument provides a clue on how the concept of sovereignty was conceived by the people and handed over to the supreme authority (the Leviathan) to protect and administer the state. It is not a will exercised against an inferior will, merely as an exhibition of legal competence. It is a will exercised because those who urge the need for reform in the control of some delegated authority have been able to persuade the government either to undertake inquiry or to attempt deliberate change. Again, the will of government is very large to compromise between opposing views; and that compromise rarely

involves the direct control of the given function by the government. It rather means that the social interests of the community are not held and adequately protected under some existing scheme; and the direction of change is towards a new experiment in which, as it thought, that social interest may be more fully realised (Laski, 2006). Laski presents philosophical, legal and political aspect of sovereignty.

Laski thus, presents philosophical, legal and political aspect of sovereignty. Laski (2006; 57-60) argues that in such a perspective as this, the theory of sovereignty in its political aspect begins to assume a very different shape from what its orthodox claims imply. It becomes clear that if the state is to be a moral entity, it must be built upon the organised acquiescence of its members. It must be powerless to touch certain fundamentals (of which freedom of speech is the supreme example) without which the benefits of social life will not, as a matter of history, be legally responsible for its mistakes. He is of the view that the people surrendered their rights and sovereignty to the state (the Leviathan) to protect, provide coordinated and regulate the activities that revolves in the state (Hobbes in Tuck, 1991).

On a similar note, Laski (2006) and Hobbes in Tuck (1991) insist that no man can be a good citizen unless he personally expresses or shows interest in the affair of the state. That conception is important if we are to realise, in any organised way, the notion of an equal interest in the result of the political process. While it is too much to say that minority-action is always selfish action, it is beyond doubt, the unhampered enjoyment of power. That is why the conception that authority is not merely, but ought to be limited and fundamental to political philosophy. The implication is that if we once admit that a body of men can enjoy unlimited power, we are in geographical fact exalting the local divisions of mankind above all other aspects of the human fellowship. That is illegitimate exaltation. Locally, there is no reason to suppose that any one set of men is likely to be right as against any other. The real constraining force upon ourselves is not the legal obligation to obey government, but the moral obligation to follow what we regard as justice. There is no a priori conduct implied by such a moral obligation. All that can be said is that the individual is, ultimately, the supreme arbiter of his

behaviour; and that he must fully realise the purpose of the state when he offers to it the substance, whatever that may be, of his judgement.

Summarily, sovereignty is “the supreme, irresistible, absolute, uncontrolled authority in which the ‘jurist summi imperi’ reside”. The sovereignty is “legally supreme over an individual or group, says Laski, he possesses “supreme coercive power”. The implication of the above assertion is that in every political system there must be some absolute power of final decision exercised by some persons or body recognised both as competent to decide as well as able to enforce the decision.

African Security and the violation of sovereignty of states

The African state system is, and has been, very different from the “western” type of state systems. One of the most important reasons for this may be the way the states are constituted, which differs substantially from the way the “western” states were built. In Africa the issue was never scarcity of land, like for instance in Europe (Herbst 2000: 13). The challenges of a state leader in African states before the colonial period, was governing the people, rather than governing a limited area of land. “The fundamental problem facing state-builders in Africa – be they pre-colonial kings, colonial governors, or presidents from the independent era – has been to project authority over inhospitable territories that contain relative low densities of people”(Herbst: 11). The need for borders was therefore mainly to protect the people inside them, not to mark the end of one leaders reign. There were states, and political culture, but it was not built on the same structures and rules as the ones we know from Europe (Herbst: 37). The mere criteria for consolidating power was different, inter alia because there was no need to occupy more land in order to enhance ones power; it was how many people that were in your tribe or kingdom (Herbst: 55). The cost of expanding was simply too high compared to the gain of it (p56). And protecting borders was only necessary all the while there were people within them. There was rarely any need to protect territory as such, for the mere purpose of keeping land. Thus, prior to the colonies there was really no substantial state-building in Africa that could be compared to the European model (p 37) When the Europeans colonized the continent they developed a need to divide it

between them (p 66). This was done, as is commonly known, not to govern the territory most efficiently or to cooperate with the indigenous population, but to avoid further conflict between the occupying forces. The Berlin Conference of 1884/5 is one of the reasons why many of the state borders in Africa look like they do. In fact as much as 44% of the borders today are correlating with astrological lines or are parallels to some other set of lines.

State Politics in Pre-Colonial Africa

Pre-colonial African states had precisely the opposite physiology of many in Europe: The power of assets was concentrated in the centre with gradations to the hinterland. The European model of placing significant assets in the hinterland to protect against outsiders and to make the boundaries real was neither viable nor relevant (Herbst, 2000: 57). As stated above, costs of extending power over inhospitable areas with relative low densities of people has confined this type of politics on the pre-colonial African leaders. Herbst (2000:13) argues that leaders confront three sets of issues when building their states: the cost of expanding the domestic power infrastructure; the nature of national boundaries; and the design of state systems. In Europe, from the start of the fifteenth century, the population density had increased in such a way that states were beginning to fight over land to expand themselves and make room for their population. The scarcity for land made the state politics very different in Europe than in Africa, much because the need to centralize power, raise taxes, recruit new soldiers and fiercely controlling the states hinterland became an absolute criteria for existence. The struggle for the survival of the state was formed by the increasing density of the population. The state building was thus formed after the need for protection and expansion; the states became warrior states. These principles of necessity that created the European states are not applicable to describe the African state building, nor the politics between African state leaders. Because determining factors such as scarcity of land and population growth were vastly different, there were not any contesters over bits of land (p 39). The consequence of this was that the power of the state and its independence was not dependent on controlling the hinterland of the state. It was, of course necessary to reach the frontiers and it was necessary to execute power, but there were rarely any plans or need for expansion or developing of roads or any other means

for reaching the hinterland faster or more efficient (p28). The cost of extending the power was often much higher than the benefit, since the need was not present. For that reason there were not many roads to the outer skirts of a kingdom in Africa.

Colonisation and State Consolidation in Africa

When the Europeans colonized the Continent, they divided the land, as already stated, for practical purposes and to ensure the peace between them. Many of the dividing lines were in unexplored parts of the continent. Some in what was already scarcely populated land, and some dividing tribes or old kingdoms (Dunn & Shaw 2001: 15). The colonists ruled with the principles of respecting these borders, as was natural since they were artificially created for this exact purpose (Herbst 2000: 71). When they then left the continent, the question of what was to become of the old colonies and what one was to do about the separating borders that divided the continent, in what now had to be seen as arbitrary lines arose. The decision to maintain the borders and emphasize the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention may have been a practical way of avoiding mayhem and anarchy on the continent (Bøås & Dokken 2002: 78).

The new leaders of the liberated African states, realizing that they lacked the capacity to govern their states in their full extension, and even more so the capacity to protect their borders against potential aggressors, agreed on these principles in order to maintain balance and stability on the continent. They formed the Organization of African Union (O.A.U) where the official purpose was to promote unity and solidarity between the member states. The organization was constructed around the principles of state sovereignty and non-intervention to achieve this purpose (p 80). This development did in part secure some stability on the continent, save for power struggles and civil wars within the countries, and many of the problems Africa is facing today is related to this state structure (p 78). The principles of sovereignty and non-intervention were upheld, and thus wars between countries were not the problem it might have been. This is not of course to say that everything was in perfect order. It was not. Consolidating state power by maintaining artificially made borders in Africa has disregarded nationality and ethnicity within those borders (Dunn & Shaw 2001: 15). Specifically, the departing colonial powers selected a group of post-colonial African leaders drawn from upper

elites who had more in common with their former colonial masters than the people they would govern. The OAU has been referred to as a “dictators club”, and the agreement of non-intervention has seemed to function as a cushion for the dictators by giving them the space they need to execute the power they want, by any means they see fit (BBC 2002).

On the other hand these principles might have been the lesser of two evils at the time they were chosen. As Clapham (1996: 35) notes, “both models of administration and languages of rule followed the colonial pattern. There was, in short, no alternative”. It might be that the decision to keep the borders of the colonial powers and thus enforcing the principle of non-intervention as a securing means was the safest way of keeping stability on the continent as previously noted (Bøås & Dokken 2002: 78). But as Bøås and Dokken suggest, this should perhaps not be seen as a conscious collective decision, but rather as an implicit agreement not to voice the pan-African ideas too loud.

The Aberration of State Sovereignty in Africa

Article 4 (h), as it was originally written in the Constitutive Act stated that the AU had the “right to intervene in a member state pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely; war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.” Though human rights violations are not mentioned and the article has a passive rather than an active mandate to the Union; it has a right, not a duty, article 4 (h) constituted a major change against the former practice of the AU. That the Assembly could decide to intervene autonomously gave the AU an authority her predecessor the OAU never had. It became an independent actor on a whole new level, and it had political measures unprecedented in the history of pan-African politics. This meant that Africa had a theoretical possibility of never seeing another tragedy like the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 that “demonstrated the virtual impotence of the OAU in the face of violent conflict within its member states” (Murithi 2008: 72). The AU act is the first international treaty to recognize the right to intervene for a humanitarian purpose (Humanitarian intervention) (Baimu & Sturman 2003:40). These points make it easy to understand, from a humanitarian and from a peace promoting view why the AU would

adapt this principle. It had been demonstrated in the past that the rigid non-intervention policy of the OAU, though well intended, was one of the principles that crippled the organizations ability to act (Murithi 2008: 72).

Nevertheless, a state leader that agrees to these terms surrenders sovereignty on some level. If the AU is granted the right to intervene without the consent of a member state, though dependent on the Assembly, the state has effectively given up the right to defend herself from at least some exterior factors. Even though the criteria under which the resolution is bound are meant to help the people of the state, it is the state leader, and thus the government that has to consent to the resolution. Regardless of how a state is organized, be it democracy or autocracy, this seems like abandoning power and so came the amendments. Thus, at the Heads of State and Government of the AU's first extraordinary session on 3 February 2003 Libya, especially, proposed a number of amendments, many to make the AU stronger and to unite the continent further. This was all in the spirit of the earlier proposal by Libya of the United States of Africa (Baimu & Sturman 2003: 38). The most important one in this context is the amendment to Article 4 (h). This amendment, which was adapted at the session, extended the AU's rights of intervention. The right was extended to include "serious threat to legitimate order to restore peace and stability to the Member State of the Union upon the recommendation of the Peace and Security Council;" as a criteria for intervention. As Baimu and Sturman (2003: 42) points out this last ground for intervention has little to do with the former ones. The original grounds for intervention – war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide – are all designated in the Rome statute as crimes of "greatest concern to the international community". Furthermore they are all grounds that are on accord with the Declaration of Human Rights and thus designed to protect people from some gruesome and coercive force. This new ground seems to be a shift in "emphasis of the grounds of the AU's ground to intervene, from humanitarian justification to the rationale of preserving "order""(Baimu & Sturman 2004: 38). The fact that the proposal came from Libya's leader Ghadafi and that the advancement of human rights, democracy and good governance was "the antithesis of how [he] had

ruled his country for the last three decades”, induces the idea that the new emphasis was intended to serve the government rather than the people in the states.

Of course these are not necessarily mutually exclusive intentions. It is possible to restore legitimate order with the people’s best interest in mind. It may, as Baimu & Sturman (2003: 41) again point out, rest upon how “legitimate order” is defined. In their analysis Baimu and Sturman (2003) assume that a “*legitimate order* can only result from a free and fair election”, based on an OAU definition. However, a fair and free election is not an uncontested term. African states, African regional organizations (e.g. The Southern African Development Community (SADC)), international NGOs and the international community differ in their conception of this principle. The Zimbabwean presidential election of 2002 is one example where there have been different opinions of the legitimacy of the election. Baimu and Sturman (2003:41) notes that “ AU and SADC observers as well as observers from African countries such as South Africa and Tanzania were prepared to conclude that even if they were not free and fair they were at least legitimate” in regards to the Zimbabwean election (2002). This uncertainty of what constitutes legitimate order does shake the motivations for the grounds of intervention. It might suddenly seem as though the amendment is creating a loophole for the AU’s first attempt to an article to actually protect the people of Africa, after more than 40 years of protecting the governments. Not only are the intentions questionable, but also the amendment seems to be passed out of pragmatic and political reasons, thus abandoning ideology completely. If keeping Libya onboard was so important that one could abandon one of the principles that are truly contrasting the AU from the OAU, then the article might almost seem unnecessary. While the original Article 4 (h) looked to be the remedy for OAU’s impotence in disputes in their member states, the amendment could in fact put this impotence right back. Even though the AU now has the right to intervene, it could be possible for the government to dismiss whatever problem would cause the AU to intervene as a “serious threat to legitimate order”. In which case, the intervention could be toothless with regard to the people in the state. Though this thesis will not discuss the actual effects of the constitutive act, it is interesting to note in such a radical ratification as Article 4 (h) that the theoretical possibility of an

autonomous intervention from the AU remains however, ***the change stands and history has changed.***

Reflection on African Union Security Architecture and the place of Africa

Importantly, during the 50th Anniversary of the Organization of African Unity/African Union (OAU/AU) in May 2013, the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government adopted a landmark declaration. They vowed that Africa would not bequeath the burden of conflicts to the next generation and made a commitment to end violent conflict on the continent by 2020. This was translated into the AU initiative: Silencing the Guns by 2020.

In fulfilment of this, the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC), at its 648th meeting held on 16 January 2017, considered the Draft African Union Master Roadmap of Practical Steps to Silence the Guns in Africa by the Year 2020. The roadmap guides the fulfilment of this mandate through focusing on initiatives and practical steps for 'Silencing the guns by 2020'. Council further decides to submit the Master Roadmap to the AU Assembly of Heads of States and Government during its 28th Ordinary Session to be held from 30 to 31 January 2017, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, for endorsement.

Again, with the continued AU engagement with Member States on conflict prevention, management, resolution and post conflict reconstruction and development as well as peace-building initiatives, progress is made in the signing and implementation of peace agreements between countries not at peace, or those emerging from decades of conflict and instability. The human and economic costs of these conflicts had adverse national and cross-border consequences: Increased numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons; the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, and many more.

In response, and in line with the provisions of the Constitutive Act of the African Union and the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC Protocol), the AU assumed political responsibility to address these challenges and developed its African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). Over the last decade, the

extent of violent conflict on the continent has reduced, despite the emergence of new security threats (Climate Emergency Institute, 2015).

In furtherance to the above, the Commission has recently published the APSA Roadmap 2016 – 2020, a strategic document, which builds on the achievements and challenges resulting from the implementation of the previous APSA Roadmaps (2011-2013). The Roadmap manifests the continued determination to ensure further progress, and paves the way for future collaboration between the AU, the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and Regional Mechanisms (RMs) to effectively address security issues and contribute to a more peaceful Africa.

Even though the key components of APSA are now more or less fully operational and the number of violent conflicts has been significantly reduced in the past few years, a number of countries still remain trapped in a vicious cycle of violent conflict and its deadly consequences. With a view to realizing the goal of a conflict-free Africa, the discussion during the Summit will focus on conflict and crisis situations in Africa namely, Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic, Somalia, Sahel/Mali, South Sudan, Burundi, Guinea Bissau, Libya among others (Bakare, 2015).

A continued strong engagement in support of implementation of peace agreements in Member States emerging from conflict and the fight against terrorism, will remain the priorities for the AU. Somalia could be sighted as an example that has made significant progress against Al Shabaab with support from the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). On its part, AMISOM continues to provide guidance on capacity building, and sensitisation of communities on countering violent extremism, as part of its comprehensive strategy for reviving policing activities in Somalia.

In the context of conflict prevention, Bakare (2014) noted that the AU and its sub-regional organizations have developed significant institutional capacity over the past decade to undertake early warning analysis and conflict prevention. In this regard, the AU has built up an impressive toolbox for prevention and peacemaking. These include

the Continental Early Warning System, the Panel of the Wise, Special Envoys, and ad hoc mediation panels, often comprised of sitting and former Heads of State. The AU also has experience in deploying liaison offices and "special political missions" in countries at risk of, or emerging from, conflict. The Commission has focused on operational conflict prevention with regular Horizon Scanning briefings provided to the AUPSC on potential threats and emerging peace and security challenges on the continent; production of early warning reports and the conduct of preventive diplomacy missions in Member States at risk of conflict. The Commission has also continued to provide technical assistance to Member States in the establishment and strengthening of national infrastructures for peace, including early warning systems and Situation Rooms.

In the context of post-conflict reconstruction and support of countries, the Commission deploys mission to assess the priority needs of the country in need. These include identification of joint activities in support of implementation of peace agreements in Member States emerging from conflict; conducting needs assessment missions; consolidating and scaling up security sector reform and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration initiatives; technical and operational support to control the illicit proliferation of small arms and light weapons, and sustained collaboration with RECs/RMs and civil society organizations. The engagements have also been geared towards developing and implementing Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) and Peace Strengthening Projects (PSPs) in areas of deployment of AU Peace Support Operations, and through the AU Liaison Offices. Furthermore, the AU took a number of initiatives to prevent the post-electoral situation from degenerating into a generalized crisis through the deployment of observers (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2015).

The AU Commission also provides strategic, political, technical, and planning support to operations authorized by the Peace and Security Council and carried out by regional coalitions of Member States, Regional Economic Communities (RECs), or Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (RMs).

Such support includes: The Regional Cooperation Initiative against the Lord's Resistance Army (RCI-LRA) and the operation against Boko Haram undertaken by the Lake Chad Basin Commission and Benin- the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF).

It is important to highlight the critical nature of the partnerships the AU has developed within the framework of APSA. The European Union (EU), United Nations (UN) and bilateral partners have all played a key role. There has been significant innovation and creative problem solving, which has been pivotal in meeting the continent's peace and security challenges. In summary, a cursory look at the above revealed that African Union has in so many ways responded to the problems of African development occasioned by world order as could be seen from the above submissions.

Conclusion

The most important feature of the current globalization process (World Order) is the globalization of national policies and policy-making mechanism. National policies (including in economic, social, cultural and technological areas) that until recently were under the jurisdiction of State and people within a country have increasingly come under the influences of international agencies and processes or by big private corporations and economic/financial players. This has led to the erosion of national sovereignty and narrowed the ability of governments and people to make choice from options in economic, social and cultural policies.

Conclusively, it is germane to note that African Union has not been sleeping all the while as immense efforts have been made to contain the effect of world orders informed by the series of development and wars in Europe. At every point in the past, the European states through their contact with African states introduced the prevailing world order. This has in many ways truncated the depth of development in Africa changing their narratives and cultural values. Nevertheless, AU has been challenged to make impact in Africa especially as it concerns security of African states. Unfortunately, those efforts still suffer defeat in the hands of the western schisms. Thus, at this point it is instructive to note that most of the operating standards in Africa are products of borrowed or exported values from the west. The manifestations are seen in various divisions and

polarization of people along ethnic, race, religious and factional lines. This has informed so many crises and conflicts in the states leaving the people with no option than to resort to the take of arms and ammunition. The use of small and medium arms has come to stay. They have become a potent force in the hands of terrorists of which African experience remains primitive and shocking due to the effects of series of attacks. Consequently, all these pose serious socio-political and economic challenges to African security due to the fact that Africa lacked the basic technology and capacities to contain them.

Recommendations

Going by the above discourse, the study thus, recommends that

1. There is need for the amendment of UN Charter and AU constitutive Act so as to bring African Security and defence policies strategies in congruity with the realities, complexities, nature and pattern of conflicts and wars that scattered the political landscape of Africa at the 20th century new world order and beginning of 21st Century.
2. Africa Union should on the United Nations, world big Powers to include also in their Arms control agreement, small arms; such as rockets, grenade, landmine and mortal which cause most of the casualties of internal conflict as we have experienced in most part of Africa in the post-cold war era.

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