

SOCIAL MEDIA AND PRESSURE GROUPS POLITICS DURING THE 2011 UPRISINGS IN EGYPT

Eberechukwu Faith OBANI

Department of Political Science Federal College of Education Eha-Amufu, Enugu State, NIGERIA.

Abstract

The importance of social media in our society today cannot be over emphasized. It is increasingly shaping developments in almost all aspects of human activities including education, communication, sports, lifestyle and particularly, politics. Individuals and groups have employed the instrumentality of the social media to effect changes in governance and society. This study therefore, examines the roles social media played in providing platform and empowering groups to fight against repressive regime in Egypt. In the light of this, the study therefore is guided by two research questions: (1) Did effective use of social media facilitate the mobilization of pressure groups during the 2011 uprising in Egypt? (2) Did the activities of pressure groups on social media led to changes in Egypt's political structure? The study adopts qualitative method of data collection and invariable the qualitative content method of data analysis. The study utilizes the communication theory as its theoretical framework of analysis. It shows that the effective use of social media facilitated pressure groups activities in Egypt during the 2011 uprising. It also demonstrates that the activities of pressure groups on social media led to changes in Egypt's political structure. The study concludes that social activism, reinforced by social media played crucial roles in bringing political changes in Egypt during the 2011 uprising.

Keywords: Egypt, Face book, Politics, Pressure Group, Social Media, We All are Khaliad Said (WAAK),

Introduction

The Middle East and the North Africa (MENA) have been regions with decades of authoritarian regimes. The states of these regions are characterized by revolutions and popular unrest. Dating back to the 1950s and 1960s for instance, the Egyptian government systematically suppressed civil society and opposition political parties for much of the last half century. Such oppression had been justified by a declared state of emergency that has lasted since 1967. The Emergency Law as it is known, formally concentrated powers in the President's offices and limits freedoms of expression and association. Since political opposition was brutally suppressed and forced to go underground, the deep discontentment existing among the pressure groups were not recognized by the Egyptian regime. All that it took was a spark and that was provided by the successful uprising in Tunisia engineered by social media.

The emergent of social media in the Arab World, precisely Egyptian society, influenced the way Egyptians perceive and discuss issues affecting them. Social media as an online interaction has encouraged Egyptians to circumvent censorship and has been heralded as an effective weapon for the weak and disenfranchised against their authoritarian leaders, resulting in what New York Times columnist, Nicholas Kristof labeled the "quintessential 21st- century conflict," in which "on one side are government thugs firing bullets...[and] on the other side are young protesters firing 'tweets' (Kristof, 2011). The social media tools such as Facebook, Twitter, Blog, YouTube, have reshaped the nature of politics and challenged the way authoritarian regimes operate in Arab world, especially in Egypt. Most of the

opposition groups created their own websites where they interacted with their members on political matters.

The focus of this study is to analyze the role social media played in providing platform and empowering pressure groups to fight against repressive regime in Egypt during the 2011 uprisings. Since the literature on social media and pressure groups politics is wide, this period is chosen in order to present a summary of more recent findings on the subject matter. The work is divided into the following headings: introduction, literature review theoretical framework, methodology, discussion of findings, and summary and conclusion.

Political Development in Egypt before the Uprising

Since the military coup of 1952, the formal political structure in Egypt changed considerably. Like many Africa leaders after independence, Nasser established a populist-socialist single party state (Kassem, 2004); using Law 32 of the 1964 constitution, he banned political parties and regulated civil associations. Nasser however institutionalized a formal system of personal political control over individual groupings and state institution (Kassem, 2004). Nasser through the 1964 constitution sealed the presidency from any form of political competition as pertains in democracies. The president is officially instated by referendum; based on Article 78, the Legislature is responsible for nominating the presidential candidate, and once nominated, the candidate must then obtain two-third of the votes of the legislature before being “referred to the citizens for a plebiscite. Kassem (2004) posits that since the assembly can only refer one person to a national plebiscite, the President does not compete for his position with other candidates.

Also, Article 115 shows that, the president is further vested with the power to draft the state budget, formulate state’s general policy. Cook (2011) stated that, rule by decree is a feature of the military, it is clear that in most democracies, promulgation of laws are within the purview of the legislature and so are the drafting of a state budget within the orbits of an economic ministry. But, in Egypt all the powers of the most important institutions of state were usurped by the presidency. Even, the Judicial arm of government was effectively compromised by Law 46 of 1972 which empowered the president to appoint and promote judges, public prosecutors, the attorney general, and court. Likewise, the appointment of state council courts which specialized in the settlement of administrative dispute and disciplinary case are presided over by the president. It is obvious that no judge would rule against his appointing authority in case involving the government. Going by this, the ideals of separation of power, independence of the judiciary and checks and balance which guaranteed that no arm of government should interfere in the function of the other is not observed. The point is that, Nasser and Sadat regime usurped the powers of the Legislature which is reflected in percentage of bills passed by the legislature between 1970 and 1981 (Kassem, 2004).

Under Mubarak, the legislature was overburdened based on the number of bills passed into law. The executive initiated close to 427 bills while members of parliament initiated meager 27 bills. In 1987, the discrepancy was even starker with the executive initiating 659 bills in comparison with 10 from the legislature. Thus, the control enjoyed by the President and his party, the National Democratic Party (NDP), over the legislature, known as the People’s Assembly (*majlis al-sha’ab*) cannot be questioned. According to Article 108 of 1971 Egyptian constitution, provides that; both the President and the People’s Assembly shall share equally in the right to propose legislation. This normative goal however fails to fully reflect the reality of lawmaking in Egypt, where the Executive has become the chief engine of legislation: legislation proposed by the Executive is far more likely to be codified as law by the Assembly than proposal emanating from the Assembly itself. A study published in 1995 by the Cairo-based Ibn Khaldun Center for Development Studies illustrates this point. In 1990, 214 laws proposed by the executive were passed, while during the same period, only seven were proposed by the Assembly itself, of which only one was adopted. Similarly, in 1991, 451 executive proposed laws were adopted and only one proposed by the Assembly was passed out of a total of seven originally presented (Larry, P.1990). This is hardly surprising

given the control wielded by the executive branch over the legislature; as one constitutional scholar noted, “with 96% of the seats, the NDP has ceded all legislative powers to the executive (Hirst 1999).

Moreover, the People’s Assembly is also charged with the nomination of the President, thereby perpetuating the recurrent cycle of presidential dominion, re-election and subsequent legislative domination which promises to be enduring feature of Egyptian politics. Further indication of closing of political space to opponent was the introduction of the 1983 electoral Law, which outlawed independent candidates from contesting election for parliament (Brownlee, 2002: 6-14). According to Kassem (2004) the police maintained prominent role in supervision of voting and ballot counting in legislative and local election as well as presidential referendum. The police are actually on record to have prevented voter entry to polling stations in constituencies and areas that had popular opposition candidates. Kassem (2004) shows that police role of arresting potential popular opposition leaders, reflect the degree of the police backed interference and bias towards the regime. Moreover, electoral irregularities were alleged to be widespread and calls by opposition parties for international election monitors were rejected by the government as inviting foreign “meddling” in internal affairs (Saad Eddin 1996:133).

Some analysts have argued that socio-economic cum political environment did not start with Mubarak’s administration. According to Tarek (2010), every President after Nasser came from a military background and state repression of the citizens and governmental institutions became a standard. He illustrated that, after the emergency law (law 162 of 1958) was enacted, Nasser became obsessed with the media, mostly because he conquered the Arab world through the radio. Steve (2011) opines that he placed heavy censorship on the media, as well as restrictions on union activities and political organization. He further institutionalized state repression through torture and political coercion of members of the Muslim brotherhood and other organizations existing in the state. Suppression of the opposition and civil organization became the order of the day under Mubarak’s administration who continued in the established platform. According to Paciello (2011), Mubarak’s administration restricted civil and political rights as well as press freedom. Also, one of Egyptian laws stated that, citizens who have been incarcerated cannot stand for elective office, and authorities have used this provision to target groups.

Goodson and Soha (1997: 1-21) maintain that because Mubarak’s regime lacked deep public support and genuine political legitimacy, his administration depends heavily on the military. For example the military provides President Mubarak with security supports and guards his interest in the society. As a result, many officers came to play an increasing role, enriching themselves and becoming more a vital part of the state elites. In his observation on the role of the military in maintaining stability in Egypt, Stiftung (2010) posits that, “as a consequence of terrorism, the military and security apparatus play a crucial role as a guarantor of regime stability. Stiftung (2010) opines that oppression, no matter the form it takes and the assumed benefits, will definitely result in negativism when the oppressed recognize the need to change the status quo. Hosni Mubarak, it must be stated, built a fearsome political environment that sustained him in power for a long time and eventually destroyed him.

Social media and Pressure Group Politics in Egypt

A major significance of the Egyptian uprising, as being widely discussed by analysts and commentators, is the effect of the social media on the long standing authoritarian government in Egypt. According to Almond (2001) “Egyptian government has a direct control of the media and exercises supervisory power over periodicals and daily newspapers”. He went further to state that, Nasser’s regime nationalized the radio, Middle East News Agency, Daily Newspapers, Magazines and Television (TV) in 1960.

Lynch (2011:1) stated that, state authorities used the media industry as a platform to propagate the Arab unity approach. Almond (2001) concurring with this stated that, the political culture of Egypt is transmitted through the media. Lynch (2011: 301-310) argued that, the state used the media to shape public opinion to their own convenience. Lynch (2011:1) claimed that films, radio stations and music production, among other means of communication were used to promote state policies. The point is that state control over the media has been continuous and evident in the Arab World especially, Egypt. As a political

scientist and Arab media expert, Lynch (2006), declares, censorship “closed down most public avenues of political debate” and reduced the public sphere of Egyptian citizens. He further stated that the press and broadcast media were directly controlled by the leading elites and had no space for political opposition.

Rinnawi (2006) joining the debate said that, “state officials have strictly controlled broadcasting media in the Arab world, which almost exclusively served Arab regimes self interests”. He argued that constant programme devoted to political information and propaganda, was done through censorship, self- censorship, the use of emergency laws and other ways of pressure. He stated further, during the 60 years period that preceded the satellite era (1920-1980s), television and radio systems in the Arab world – what Khalil Rinnawi calls “tribal broadcasting systems were literally in the hands of and manipulated by state leaders who deliberately attempted not only to maintain socio-cultural order and cultural religious values, but also to prevent external messages to interfere into their business”.

Notwithstanding its severe application, Arab regimes’ censorship has not always gone in line with post- independence constitutions, which paradoxically give high importance to freedom of speech. Based on this, Mellor (2011), argued that this has made Arab countries to enforce laws that regulate media, which has diminished free speech. Almond (2001) noted that government often acts to limit public debate. To achieve this, government passed a bill into law restricting public debate. In 1996, the government strengthened the penalties for libel against government officials and enhanced the executive’s authority over the press. He further stated that, the government used military and security courts to try nonviolent critics as well as opponents of the government. He throws more light with the 1994 state security and military prosecutors who filed several cases against Egyptian journalists for slandering the Prime Minister, publishing military secrets, and fomenting a riot because of their reports on a labor dispute. The government prefers to use those courts, in part because civilian courts are less likely to impose death sentences.

Almond (2001) further argued that, looking at the situation on ground, the organization of group interest became weak and ineffective. He stated that, interest groups vary in their degree of autonomy from the state. This variation affects their ability to articulate the views and needs of their members. On the other hand, political activities and non government organizations are heavily regulated; and have made it impossible for vibrant civil society to emerge. He highlighted, organized associations as social service organization, labor unions, professional associations, business groups, and religious associations as well as informal associations as community networks and apparently anomic protests.

According to Eaton (2011:7-9) by 2005, Egypt was home to a thriving and diverse blog-sphere of committed and insightful political commentators who began to challenge the narrative of the state-run media, uncovering major stories that the state-controlled sector either couldn’t or wouldn’t run. The internet has benefited grassroots movements by providing new possibilities for citizens to organize even under authoritarian regimes. He re-echoed that with the inclusion of internet in the framework of social movement, there has been a qualitative change “represented in the experiences of being a potential speaker, as opposed to simply a listener”. Furthermore, internet allows people to assemble and protest against a target from all works of life.

Etling (2010) postulates that in authoritarian regimes, different forms of social media can provide alternative sources of news and information. This demonstrated that new technological tools have strengthened the power of citizens who, often more quickly than professional journalists themselves, can report news as they happen. Analysts have argued that citizen journalism can be extremely useful in contexts of oppression or state control over mainstream media. Citizen journalism can function as a proxy free press, a medium that can uncover and challenge falsehoods and misinformation. Vegh (2003:71-96), writes that internet activism is a politically motivated movement relying on the internet, using strategies that are either internet-enhanced or internet based. The first generation of internet activists was also integral to the ground breaking “kefaya” movement ahead of 2005 presidential elections in Egypt. But, the patterns of activists’ online shifted with development in technology. The entrance on the scene of

social media from 2004 (Face book), 2006 (Twitter) etc, onwards brought a new generation of internet activists.

As Internet access has proliferated across the Arab region, specifically Egypt, a “highly ambivalent and complex relationship between media and governments” has developed, in which autocratic regime in Egypt encouraged internet penetration in the name of economic development but maintain control over the spread of information and media sources (Khamis, 2011:3). These activists were less interested in the long treatises on political development that the blogger community had tirelessly created. In addition to the intense political climate, geographic features, such as close proximity to Tunisia, as well as the location of Tahrir Square in the heart of Cairo, contributed to the development of the January 25th protests. Looking at the political and economic situation in Egypt, several politically motivated groups with strong support of Muslim Brotherhood (MB) emerged to challenge Mubarak’s regime.

Methodological Issues

The paper adopts ex-post facto research design which is based on the examination of the independent and dependent variables after the events have taken place and the data already in existence. Based on this, the test of hypothesis involves observing the independent and dependent variables simultaneously. Since the effects of the former on the later had already taken place prior to the investigation. This method is very relevant to our study given the nature of phenomenon under investigation.

Data was collected through qualitative method of data collection. The method is appropriate for this study because, it is well suited for contextual analysis. This method helps us to draw inferences from the available data. According to Biereenu-Nnabugwu (2006:181-182), qualitative method enables the researcher to gain access or generate information from government or organizational documents such as the world Bank, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Statistical Department that contain information on the effective use of social media and mobilization of pressure groups activities in 2011 Egypt uprising. We also sourced information from other secondary sources such as books, journal, Conference Papers, Newspaper, Magazine, Internet materials which were used as empirical data.

This study adopts qualitative content analysis based on the phenomenon under investigation. Content analysis is a method for studying the content of those types of empirical documentation which can be briefly referred to as “mute evidence”, that is written texts and artifacts”. The method enables the researcher to include large amount of textual information and systematically identify its properties, such as the frequencies of most used keywords. The point is that, qualitative content analysis allows researcher to treat social action and human activity as text; which means, human action can be seen as a collection of symbols expressing layers of meaning. Interviews and observational data can be transcribed into written text for analysis.

Theoretical Framework of Analysis


This work adopts communication theory as its theoretical framework to investigate the nexus between effective use of social media and pressure groups politics in Egypt. It also examines the impact of the activities of pressure groups through social media on the 2011 uprising in Egypt. The proponents of this theory were Norbert Miller and Karl Deutsch. But, Karl Deutsch applied it to the study of politics, in his work “the Nerves of Government: Models of Political Communication and Control, (1963). He introduced the techniques of cybernetics to the sphere of political analysis. Communication is the center of all political activity and political system is regarded as network of communication channels, which is self-regulating. The coming into being information and communication technology has made it possible for political activists and government to get their messages across to different segments in a fast and efficient manner. Thus, members of the political system acquire mechanisms for transmission of messages. The paper argued that pressure groups existing in Egypt anchored on social media to circumvent the long established media censorship instituted by the Egyptian government and exposed

the activities of the government to the world. Their unflinching reliance on social media was able bring down Mubarak’s government in just 18 days.

Discussions and Findings

Mobilization force of social media and political change in Egypt The creation of a Face-book page, “We are all Khaled Said” (WAAK) defied security forces and circumvents the media censorship in Egypt. This page was established on June, 2010 after the brutal beating of Khaled Said by police. His death initiated protest against the Egyptian police from the youths who were already sick of the police action against the citizen. Gruesome photos posted online of Khaled Said went viral and created an emotional collective reaction, “We Are All Khaled Said” had more than 800,000 members (Shah and Sardar, 2011:63-66), 70,000 of whom indicated their intent to partake in the January 25th demonstrations, the first day of the Egyptian Revolution (Cook,2011:86).

FIGURE 1: THE MAIN USAGE OF FACEBOOK THROUGHOUT DEMONSTRATION



Source: Dubai School of Government (2011).

According to Tarrow (2007:112), “the culture of collective action is built on frames and emotions oriented toward mobilizing people out of their compliance and into action in conflicting setting”. The page allowed different activists network like, Muslim Brotherhood (MB), Kefeya, April 6 movement to communicate with one another. Most pressure groups and activists maintained Face book page, Twitter account, Blog and YouTube channels to spread their ideals. The groups supported the uprising and mobilized their followers through their presence in the social media. The figure 1; above shows social media usage among the Egyptians. It was used to circumvent media censorship and campaign against police brutality which served as a build up to the protest.


Interestingly as reported by the Dubai School of Government (2011), almost two million new users joined Face book in Egypt between 5th January, 2011 and 5th April, 2011. Based on this, by April 2011, Egypt had 6.5 million Face-book users, representing a 7.86% of the country’s total population as opposed to the 4.5 million of users in January, 2011.

Furthermore, a study was conducted to investigate the sources of information by Egyptians during the 2011 uprising. The result of the study is reflected in a histogram presented in figure below.

Appendix B¹⁰¹

Figure 11: Where did you get your news/information on the events during the civil movements?

FIG 2: WHERE DO YOU GET YOUR INFORMATION DURING THE PROTEST?



SOURCE: Arab Social Media Report, 2011

The diagram above shows that, most of the Egyptian citizens got their information from social media; about 94% of Egyptian citizens relied on social media for their daily news. According to Lerner (2010: 555-574), “when political space for protest is lacking, cyberspace creates different opportunities for expression”. When a country’s regime controls resource mobilization, the World Wide Web can connect likeminded individuals and help them pool together funds for action; Egypt fits Lerner’s criteria as a nation with authoritarian leadership and accordingly, social media enabled Egyptians to express themselves, communicate with one another and bind together under common frustration and goal.

Figure 3: CARTONNICAL DISPLAY OF COMMON FORCE.



Source: Discovery Guides: ProQuest (2012)


Images that depicted the rejection of Mubarak by the youths were posted in different social media platforms. An example of such is as shown in figure 3; Cartonnical Display of Common Force. The point is that, none of the above mentioned movement could claim a decisive victory but together they have succeeded in changing the agenda for political action under conditions of sustained authoritarianism.

Dissemination of Information and Anonymity

It is no surprise that authoritarian governments in the Middle East have tried to restrict social media freedom. “Arab leaders have long recognized the threat posed by the social media, and most have instituted filters and legal restrictions in attempts to control online activities” (Ghannam, 2011:12). By cutting off Egypt’s internet and wireless communication in the face of huge protests, President Hosni Mubarak betrayed his own fear—that Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and Blog could empower his opponent, expose his weakness to the world and topple his regime.

However, there was a limit to which the people could be restricted; hence they opened up social media which spread information more rapidly in densely connected social networks. The WAAK page, in popularity reached around 470,000 “Fan” in parallel YouTube video sharing, Khalid Said beaten by police was viewed by more than 500,000 people. The information spread like wide fire because through social media, the user’s voice was amplified and transmitted in the form of online word of mouth. The user talked to similar people in terms of demographics and interest. Users were able to add others as friends, posted and shared information (including videos and photos), comment, chat, exchange messages, and join common interest groups. The user was free to self-express his/her concerns, opinion. The average number of twitter users in Egypt between January 25 and 30, 2011 was 1,131. The most popular trending hashtag in Egypt towards the beginning of the uprising was #egypt (with 1.4 million mentions in the tweets generated during this period) #Jan25 (with 1.2 million). The point is that, twitter allowed each user to send 250 direct messages per day, 1,000 updates per day. See the diagram below

FIGURE 4: DAILY TWEET VOLUME AND MENTIONS OF #JAN 25 IN EGYPT



Source: Dubai School of Government (2011).

This diagram is the daily tweets during the uprising; twitter was estimated to have 200 million users, and generating 65 million tweets a day. The diagram displayed the daily tweets from the beginning of the uprising to the last day. On the other hand; YouTube allowed people to watch videos uploaded on the website. Egyptian users viewed 8.7 million pages which depicted economy situation- like rate of unemployment, poverty level, police brutality, corruption etc. The picture uploaded on YouTube created intellectual and emotionally compelling digital artifacts that told stories of injustice interpret history and

advocated for political outcomes. For instance, young Egyptian Alaa Abd El Fattah runs manalaa.net, an aggregator for more than 1,500 blogs and also individually blogs about torture and politics in Egypt. Like many others, police detained and tortured Fattah more than once but he nevertheless continued to blog once released. Ghonim Wael, also acted anonymously as the administrator of WAAK page that planned the January 25th, 2011 march with just a message; “to the ultras of Ahly, Zamalik, Ismaili, and Itihad soccer teams... if you exert the same effort you do for any soccer march on the 25th Jan, you will help Egypt change..... Let us all be ultras of Egypt..... Let us all take action and take to the streets.... Who among us is an ultras member and prepares to cheer for Egypt” (Ghonim, 2012:8-13). This message spread like fire and gained over 100,000 confirmed attendees in just ten days.

Thus, contrary to other revolutions where a faction of the elite or military conspirators supported the uprising or where external pressure was critical in weakening the state, this does not seem to have been the case in Egypt in view of the power of social media. On account of this, Mubarak’s deteriorating ability to provide basic services and seeming indifference to widespread unemployment and poverty infuriated the Egyptian people. According to Anderson (2011:322-328), this feeling was exacerbated by growing conspicuous consumption among a business elite connected to Mubarak’s son, Gamal. January 25 protests were started by urban and cosmopolitan young people in the major cities. Characteristic of these first protests was the lack of a real organization of the events and the lack of a clear leader. The protests were spontaneous and unexpected. Although there had been many protests and strikes in the past, January 25 was the first time that such a large-scale mass mobilization against the Mubarak regime had taken place.

After 18 days of unprecedented spontaneous protests in Egypt, Mubarak had little choice other than to hand over power, on 11 February, to the High Command of the Armed Forces, led by his Defence Minister Mohamed Hussein Tantawi. Mubarak’s rule, thirty years of peace and security, but without meaningful democratic reforms, socio-economic development and successful foreign policy, had suddenly come to an end. After Mubarak resigned, the military took on itself the task to manage Egypt’s transition to a democracy.

Conclusion

In an attempt to probe the relationship between social media and pressure groups activities during the 2011 Egyptian uprising, the work revealed that social media facilitated mobilization of pressure groups in Egypt during the period under review. Also, social media had effect on the creation and mobilization of social movements against Mubarak such as Kefeya Movement, April 6 youth Movement and “We All Are Khalid Said”. The work recognized other factors that also had impact on the outcome of the uprising. The 25 January uprising was a product of the Egyptian disgruntled citizens; their motivation, dedication, passion and creativity generated one of the most important democratic movements, or a world historical events, in the Arab world. What happened in Egypt was the result of many factors interfacing each other including existing grievances against the government, socioeconomic factors and effective activism led by people who maximized the benefits of social media. We also found that social media allowed Egyptians, precisely youths, to circumvent state censorship, encouraged every citizens to self-publish online videos, blogs, facebook, tweets etc., exposed the regimes atrocities (Online pictures and videos of Khaled Said), and helped to disseminate information easily and facilitated interaction among like-minded individuals who have common grievances (MB, Kefaya, April 6th Movement etc) at a low transactional cost.

Recommendations

-) Social media can be used as a means of reporting or analysizing political issues especially during elections and other events making wave in the country. This will make the political leaders and party representatives to discharge their duties effectively and ensure accountability. -) Social media can be effective instrument for Independent National Electoral Commission in Nigeria to sensitize the citizens

on the importance of voters' registration and voting. Developed world like USA use electronic voting system in which a voter can vote from any part of the world and report electoral discrepancies. -) Political activism against any political authority working unconstitutional originates from the mind and social media serves as a vehicle for bringing likeminded people together. The consciousness that informed their coming together gears them towards achieving set goals and objectives. The members of public can rely on such instrument to oppose the government working unconstitutionally. -) Civil society groups , political parties, pressure groups and other associations can depend on the speed in which information disseminated through social media can reach its target group to educate and recruit new members.

Reference

- Anderson, L. (2011). Demystifying the Arab Spring: Parsing the Differences Between Tunisia, Egypt and Libya in Rose, G. (ed.), 2011, *The New Arab Revolt: What Happened, What It Means and What Comes Next*, New York: The Council on Foreign Relations.
- Biereenu-Nnabugwu, M. (2006). *Methodology of Political inquiry: Issues and Techniques of Research Methods in Political Science*. Enugu: Quintagon Publishers
- Brownlee, J. (2002). "The Decline of Pluralism in Mubarak's Egypt". *Journal of Democracy*.13 (4):6-14
- Cook, S. (2011). *The Struggle for Egypt: from Nasser to Tahrir Square*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Dubai School of Government (2011), Civil Movements: The Impact of Face- book and Twitter. *Arab Social Media Report* 1(2). Available at: www.arabsocial-mediareport.com (accessed June 2017).
- Easton T. (2013). "Internet Activism and The Egyptian Uprising: Transforming Online Dissent Into The Offline World", *Westminster Papers In Communication and Culture*.9 (2):7-9
- Gauba, O.P. (2003). *An introduction to political Theory* (4th ed.). New Delhi; Macmillan India Ltd.
- Gabriel, A. and et'al (2001). *Comparative Politics Today:A World View*. 7th Edition. New Delhi: India
- Ghannam, J. (2011). *Social Media in the Arab World: Leading up to the Uprising of 2011*, Report Published by the Center for International Media Assistance, 3 February.
- Ghonim, Wael.(2011) Interview by Harry Smith February 13 in Maha T. & Lorenzo, C.(2013) *Westminster Paper in Communication and Culture* 9(2) 8-13.
- Goodson, L.P. and Soha, R (1997). Democratization in Egypt in the 1990s: Stagnant or Merely Stalled? *Arab Stud. Quarterly*, 19(2) 1-21
- Khamis, Saher and Katherine Vaughn (2011). "Cyberactivism in the Egyptian Revolution: How Civic Engagement and Citizen Journalism Tilted the Balance," *Arab Media and Society* (13) 3
- Kristof, N. (2011). Tears Down This Cyberwall! The New York Times, 17 June, 2009. Retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/18/opinion/18kristof.html>. Accessed 30 June, 2017.
- Lerner, Melissa (2010). "Connection the Actual with the Virtual: the Internet and Social Movement Theory in the Muslim World- The Cases of Iran and Egypt". *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 30(4):555-574
- Lynch, M. (2011). After Egypt: The Limits and Promises of Online Challenges to the Authoritarian Arab State, *Reflections* 9 (2) 301-310.
- _____ (2012). *The Arab Uprising: The Unfinished Revolution of the New Middle East*. New York: Public Affairs.
- _____.(2006). *Voices of the New Arab Public: Iraq, Al-Jazeera, and Middle East Politics Today*. New York: Columbia University Press
- Mellor, N. and et'al (2011): *Globalization and Emerging Media Industries*. Cambridge Polity Press Ltd.
- Saad, E.(1996). "Reforms and Frustration in Egypt". *Journal of Democracy* 7(4):133
- Shah and Sardar (2011). *Sandstorm: A Leaderless Revolution in the Digital Age*. USA: Global Executive Board LLC.
- Stifung, B.(2010). *Egypt Country Report*. Gutersloh: Bertelsmann Stifung
- Tarek, M. (2011). The Road to (and from) Liberation Square, *Journal of Democracy*, 2 (21).
- Tarrow, Sidney (1998), *Power in Movement: Social Movement and Contentious Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Vegh S. (2003), Classifying forms of online activism: the case of cyberprotests against the World Bank. In: McCaughey M and Ayers MD (eds) *Cyberactivism: Online Activism in Theory and Practice*. London: Routledge.

UNDP (2008), Egyptian Human Development Report

Biographical Note

Eberechukwu Faith OBANI is a lecturer in the Department of Political Science, Federal College of Education Eha-Amufu, Enugu State, NIGERIA [E-mail-eberebeautiful@gmail.com](mailto:eberebeautiful@gmail.com) (08064289949, 07016429683 & 09080003064)