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Security Sector Reforms and Nigeria's Defense Strategy in the 21st Century

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Abstract
The main thrust of this study is to examine the nature of security sector reforms in not only Third World countries, but essentially to interrogate the dynamics and workings of Nigeria's security architecture, and hence, demonstrate the extent to which the security system of the Nigerian state has impinged on the existence of its citizens using defense strategies as a point of departure. To most critics argue that the nation's security system has under performed. This is in spite of humongous budgetary allocations to the defense sub-sector as well as the procurement of high-tech armory in several of the nation's military and paramilitary locations across the country. Of particular interest to this work is the weak security outlook of the nation's security base and the corresponding failure of the security network to live its usefulness in adequately manning and controlling increasing security breaches across troubled spots in Nigeria. The Nigerian state has been overrun by a number of insurgency attacks, banditry, terrorism; inter and intra-ethnic conflicts, herders-farmer's conflicts, kidnapping for ransom, and several myriads of vices in recent times and, still counting. Undoubtedly, the government's response to this menace through security sector reforms namely, security sector governance, provision of security oversights and the management of security frames, have hardly yielded any meaningful results. This study is an exploratory study and relies on works of experts and intelligentsias as source of data collection and evaluation, particularly in the broader area of security studies. The paper sums up with recommendations to the effect that government and other stakeholders can improve more on matters of security as way of ameliorating the unhealthy security situation in the country as is currently being experienced.
Keywords: Defense, Democratic survival, Reforms, Security and Strategies.

Introduction
The issue of security and how it impacts on individuals, groups and governmental institutions have aroused tremendous scholarly interest of late. Of particular importance in many intellectual discourses is the concern for human security, which to public analysts and critics, is fundamental to every society in particular, and the world system in general. McCartney, Fischer and Wils (2004) have noted that globally, and particularly in Sub-

Saharan Africa, there has been preponderance of violence and internal conflicts which in turn, have had devastating effects on the continent and its people. Again, the state which is supposed to, as a matter of responsibility, protect its citizens, in times of crisis has for want of appropriate adjective, 'refused' to live up to its social responsibilities. Thus the inability of governmental institutions and structures such as the military and para-military agencies and several other strands of security architecture that have been established to cater for the security needs has given rise to a clarion call for reforms. These reforms in the security circle encapsulates the essential elements of security sector governance and reforms, provisions of security oversights as well as the management of a formidable security framework in tandem with democratic ethos, fundamental human rights and the rule of law. Essentially, however, the reforms envisaged in the security sector is premised on the idea that security sector should be given the same measure of priority as is the case with other government bureaucratic institutions and public administration.

From the classic works of Hendrickson and Karkoszka (2002) argue that the end of the erstwhile Cold War lends credence to the desire of a liberalized world system both in relation to world politics or the economic structures. It goes to explain here that countries of the world who wished to go democratic required corresponding administrative and political edifices upon which to operate. One of the critical prerequisite to achieve this is to ensure that there is a well-articulated and formidable security sector. Unarguably, the said security sector governance encompasses efficient civil populace, political institutions and functional government system to guarantee the protection and delivery of its human community. To this end, we can conveniently say that security sector reform or transformation is considered an integral part of a nation's democratic process where emerging countries transit from one form of social, political and economic system to the other. For the benefit of hindsight, critics have argued that the failure of the United Nations Organization (UNO) or the roles played by regional organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or other influential super powers to mitigate global conflicts since the 1990s have proved rather moribund and hence, ineffective. The increasing failure to tackle security challenges by some of these supersonic entities using superior military paradigms has informed the quest for nation-states to seek more plausible alternatives. In the main, we can unequivocally say that the import of security sector reforms therefore evolves to help states strengthen and reinvigorate their respective and collective security needs adequate enough to address emerging internal security challenges. The movement or the paradigm shift from a more militaristic approach to security of nations to a somewhat flexible democratic system, with a focus on citizens largely underscores the very essence of civil governance where the people have a say in what affects them directly. What this means is that the centrality of security reforms finds expression in the nature of policies available to the government, the processes of security legislation, pronouncement and implementation and the overall interests of the target groups who are the direct beneficiaries of the policies in question. Corroborating the views above on the fact that the dynamics and application of security legislations are critical to the reform of the sector, Ijide (2020) alluded that to be able to address the seemingly intractable problems of security, there should be the availability of the right kind of strategy in place. Aside from

this, the general approach to overcome security challenges should be holistic, with a high sense of professionalism and financial backings, and all what nots.

Conversely, since the emergence of the current democratic project in May 29, 1999, the Nigerian state has witnessed a retinue of security threats and breaches. Some of these challenges to peaceful co-existence includes, but not limited to the inglorious Niger-Delta imbroglio, oil theft, pipeline vandalism, bunkering, ethno-religious strife (for instance the Ife-Modakeke, Jukun-Tiv crisis, riots in Kaduna, Bauchi; the Alago-Tiv conflicts in Nasarawa state, North Central geo-political zone, among others. Again, of late, the nation had witnessed, and have continued to grapple with the notorious Boko Haram terrorism, herder-farmers conflicts, banditry, sectional agitations and counter agitations (the Independent Peoples of Biafra, IPOB saga comes to mind here), and several others. It does appear that the nation's security architecture – military, police, Department of State Security (DSS), the Nigerian Civil Defense authorities, among other security outfits are enormously overwhelmed due to incessant insecurity. The drive towards reforms have therefore become pertinent, the purpose of which is to nip this ugly trend in the bud.

Conceptual Issues in Security Sector Reforms

A security sector reform is a fluid concept and so defies unanimity in terms of what scholars have taken it to be. According to Eckhard (2016) the concept has been misused in many intellectual quarters. While most scholars look at SSR from the point of view of how to build capacity among security forces, others consider it as an integral element of state building. Again, in most developed climes, security sector reforms means the extent to which government can reduce inherent risks associated with its population. This is what has generally come to be known and referred to as security governance. What all of these means, in the view of this study is that SSR revolves around all tasks that can be carried out using political instruments, devolution and decentralization of power as well as evolving cogent democratic approaches efficient enough to encapsulate broader group and/or social interests in line with laid down democratic principles. Nonetheless, the United Nations (2008) cited in Ebo and Powell (2010) noted that what has come to be known as security sector reform is a concept widely applied to denote those structural, institutional and bureaucratic endeavors that provides broad-based security oversights for a nation state. Some of these structures, to Ebo and Powell includes, but not limited to issues bordering on defense policies, organs of the law enforcement agencies, all kind of intelligence functions and structures across the nation's socio-economic and political landscape. These institutions, no doubt, keep tabs on the security and corporate existence of a nation's territorial integrity in all its ramifications. The notion and definition of SSR as rightly captured by Eckhard (2016), United Nations (2008) and Ebo and Powell (2010), has however been heavily criticized as being too simplistic, and hence, lack the vigor to clearly give accurate understanding of the subject matter in question.

Hence, the position earlier held by McCartney, Pischer and Wils (2004) becomes appropriate. According to McCartney et al stated inter alia that SSR is unarguably, the transformation of the security system. The type of transformation here involves all the roles, responsibilities and actions of political actors in the management and operations of

a nation's security network consistent with international best practices, democratic injunctions and norms as well as, and in conformity with generally acceptable principles and dictates of accountability and good corporate governance.

Security Sector Reforms and Nigeria's Defense Strategies: A Discourse

The Nigerian security sector consists primarily of the armed forces, the prisons, police, intelligence outfits and several other arms that may be in their embryonic forms as bills initiated by sections of the Nigerian state for legislative debates and subsequent ratification. While the army, for example, has the responsibility to deal with security aggression around and beyond the nation's territorial boundaries as entrenched in the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999) (as amended), other para-military structures act differently. The police, for instance, play the role of checkmating internal wranglings such as conflict, breakout of violence, insurgency, and any form of skirmishes that seem to point to any breach of peace. However, due to the increasing security threats and the rising tide of new forms of insecurity in Nigeria, it does appear that the military regiments have become available tools for use in order to foil imminent insurrections. The changing nature of constitutional responsibility such the aforementioned calls for questioning as to why the Nigerian state has suddenly lost its national flavor and pride. The attendance consequence of this state of affairs in the country has called to task the dire need to reform the security system and place it on a pedestal solid enough to contain emerging challenges in society.

To be sure, the laws establishing the Nigerian Armed forces, under section 217 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended) has vested the armed forces with the powers to defend the nation from external forces. Section 217(2) specifically enumerates its functions ranging from defending Nigeria from external aggression as the case may be. Again, with staff strength of over 181,000, with a lot more of the number peaked at 124,000 as active combatants within the rank and file, and over 57,000 as reserve forces (GFI, 2019). These figures and personnel have been literally overrun by burgeoning security problems in recent times. Again, it has been reported that the Nigeria Police, a para-military outfit established under enabling legislation as can be found in Section 214(3) of the Constitution. The police force, nonetheless with the responsibility to maintain law and order, has not fared any better in the face of escalating insecurity. GFI (2019) has stated that the police force has a cumulative staff of over 371,000 personnel across the nation. The initial expectation was that out of this number, every Nigerian citizen should have an officer of the law attached to his or herself in the ratio of 1:662 citizens. This number as stated not only falls short of the United Nation's prescription of 1:400 citizens' ratio. It also speaks more to the challenges of how this figure could effectively manage the increasing variants of insecurity across all the six geo-politics of the nation.

Undoubtedly, the Nigerian state as stated earlier in this study has been battling with a colossus of security concerns since the convocation of its democratic project way back in 1999. The wave of insecurity in Nigeria since then, in the main, has been unprecedented. To many security experts, Nigeria is currently in distress due to the growing spate of insecurity. The most worrisome is the Boko Haram terrorism, killer herdsmen and the

recent banditry attacks orchestrated by a number of belligerent groups in some parts of Kaduna, Benue, Zamfara, Plateau, Sokoto and Nasarawa states, among others. Empirical statistics from various sources have alluded that Nigeria ranks 3rd position in the global terrorism index in terms of related deaths. This is after highbrow nation-states who are enmeshed in terror attacks such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Somalia, Yemen, Pakistan and India. On herdsmen attacks, hundreds of thousands of people have been killed since 2015 and several others displaced in several communities in Benue, Zamfara and Sokoto states (International Crisis Group (2018). Arising from the above, the United Nations organization has claimed that the increasing tension globally, and particularly in Nigeria as elsewhere, accounts for the despicable and deplorable socio-economic conditions of people. The most affected from the report are women, children and the aged. In line with the assertion above, United Nations Children Education Fund (UNICEF) (2018) posits that the vulnerable groups, especially children, have been the most devastated and affected due to the menace of insecurity. Stating its position on the widespread impacts of insecurity on vulnerable children, UNICEF opined that since 2013, over 1000 children (high school teenage boys and girls) have been kidnapped, and still counting. This development is further aggravated by the degree of freedom terrorists and bandits enjoy because of the seemingly loose ends in the nation's security policies and institution of governance.

From a number of investigations undertaken by scholars and security experts such as Ijide (2020) argue that Nigeria's security challenges are quite humongous as they are enormous. What however, remains a major inhibiting factor is the level of political will and commitment aimed at stamping out the challenge. Besides this fact is the attendant capacity of the security agents to brace up to the challenge. It was Seercey and Akinwotu (2018), Ogunmide, Akinwale and Akinloye (2018) who queried that in spite of the efforts made by stakeholders in the Nigerian security sector reforms, the spate of insecurity has remained remarkably intractable. Citing concrete examples from the abduction of the legendary Chibok teenage school girls in Borno state sometime in April 14, 2014, and the follow up abduction of another group of students in Dapchi village in Yobe state on February 19, 2018. These series of kidnap incidences occur almost spontaneously in these Nigerian states in the midst of technical meetings of government and its agencies designed to identify the gaps that can address the problems. To be sure, quite a number of legislative Bills have been proposed and communicated to the erstwhile 8th and 9th National Assembly comprising the nation's Upper (Senate) and Lower (House of Representative) arms of government for consideration and preliminary debates. Reports from the Policy and Legal Advocacy Centre (PLAC) (2018) has claimed that while some of the said Bills are in consonance with the security needs of the nation, others see it to be at variance with the core ethics and dictates of the security imbroglio currently sweeping across the length and breadth of the nation's landscape. This is why most critics have said and unequivocally too, that the nation's approach to security reforms lacks the needed vigor and dexterity to be able to provide succour to the ravaging insecurity bedeviling the country.

In a study carried out by Uzuagbu-Wilson (n.d) the Nigerian government and particularly the first democratically elected civilian administration manned by the former President, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, took a more ambitious step in kick-starting the

Nigerian security reform. While most critics such as Aiyede (2015) applauded the strategic and bold steps in rejigging the sector by the former President, a number of other writers have argued that rather than add strategic security value and importance to the process, the administration, in the twilight of 1999, employed a more or less political tool meant to serve personal aggrandizement, egocentrism and idiosyncrasies. Thus one can conveniently say that during the period under review, several international corporations and assistance were sought from for example, the American government where the US private entities as well as military professionals were integrated into the mainstream defense plans as a way of bolstering the process. However, this move was jettisoned primarily due to lack of clear cut implementation drive. Besides this fact, the Obasanjo's attempt and push to foist his third term bid as president of Nigeria further sounded a death knell on the security sector reform initiative at that point in time. However, in spite of these inherent shortcomings in the Obasanjo administration to institutionalize viable security sector reform, Aiyede (2015) cited in Uzuefbu-Wilson (n.d) went ahead to list some of the remarkable inroads the administration had made. They include the deliberate attempts to appoint and remove the Nigerian Service Chiefs, transforming the nation's Defence Ministry into a more or less civil entity, establishment of Human Rights Violation Investigation Commission (HRVIC), otherwise popularly referred to the 'Oputa Panel', aligning all known military justice system with jurisprudence, and subject to cross-examination and review by the appalet court of the land, the Supreme Court. Similarly, the government at the time embarked on reform of civil-military relations, a situation where the latter institution sees and considers itself as an integral part of the civil society, rather than an isolated regiment! During the Obasanjo administration, the government also ensured that the legislative oversights of the National Assembly gave special attention to the defense budget in every fiscal year by scrutinizing and passing appropriate legislation using its constitutional oversight powers whatsoever. These ambitions steps by the administration gave rise to the formulation and enactment of the National Defense Policy of the nation in 2006, though, with attendant pit-falls. It should be recalled here that successive administrations in Nigeria have also tried to reform the security sector and place it on a strategic pedestal for the attainment of the nation's security objectives. For instance, it is on record that the late President Umaru Musa Yar'adua/ Goodluck Ebele Jonathan's joint presidency tinkered into the reforms to a reasonable extent. However, the administration of the duo did not achieve much due to the ill-health and the subsequent passing of the president on May 5, 2010. Again, the succeeding Vice President then president Jonathan could not do much. The reason was essentially premised on the rising cases of Boko Haram insurgency. Much of the attention of government as well as the nation's scarce resources was expended to execute the war against terrorism. Although, it can be said that the said administration achieved insignificant results in security sector reform, the government itself can be said to have given less attention to the Luther Agwai Change Management Committee designed to examine the structure, equipment and training needs of the armed forces of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

Taking the argument further, Bala and Ouedraogo (2018) have insisted that public opinions have generally claimed that the Yar'adua/Jonathan presidency may not have

done much in relation to security sector reforms. However, the fact still remains that the so-called National Security Strategy (NSS), a blue-print meant to aggressively deal with all impending security challenges was the brain child of the Jonathan/Sambo presidency. That was during the heat of the Boko Haram insurgency when the Nigerian state was literally over-run by the rampaging terrorists in parts of the nation's north east geo-political zone. According to President Jonathan then, the Boko Haram insurgency at the time remained about the greatest of Nigeria's threat to national collective security of the nation. The option available to government, therefore, was to establish a security framework with which to help stamp out the challenge.

The National Security Strategy of Nigeria as earlier stated was conceptualized and published by the Office of the Nigerian Security Adviser to government in 2014. The strategy, among other things, is designed to assist and guide in the operations and conduct of Nigeria's security network. The centrality of the strategy focuses on how best the nation can create a peaceful nation that is self-reliant, development-oriented and strong among its peers in the comity of nations (Bala & Ouedrago, 2018). Conversely, the National Security Strategy addresses itself to two critical concerns relevant to the nation's security framework. The first is what is termed 'national security interest'. The second looks at all aspects of threat to national security.

The Nigeria national security interest as epitomized by the strategy document underscores the generality of security and welfare of the Nigerian populace. It also encapsulates other important variants of Nigeria's territorial integrity, justice system, equity, democratic consolidation and sustenance as well as increased economic growth. While greater emphasis of this strand of the security sector reform document speaks much about Nigeria's internal security dynamics, it should at the same time be noted that, though peripheral in outlook, all other forms of sub-regional African and global strategic interests are of immense concern to Nigeria as a big player in Africa. Nma (2018), Idakula and Erunke (2018) cited in Tsuwa (2018) have maintained that national security constitutes the most critical asset a nation such as Nigeria cannot afford to compromise. As noted by Nma (2018) averred that:

> Where people are insecure, the economy would also be insecure. What this portends is that the state would be characterize by all forms of social vices capable of destabilizing or truncating the overall national interest of the people (emphasis added) (2018, p.54).

As a corollary to what Nma has alluded about the consequences of insecurity on Nigeria's national interest, Idakula and Erunke (2018) have insisted that in view of the enormous onslaughts of diverse security threats the nation has suffered ever since the inception of democracy in 1999, the nation can rightly or wrongly be adjudged to have climaxed into a breaking point.

On the second phase of the nation's security strategy is the threat to security. As it stands currently, the Nigerian polity is in a dire condition, with its temperature far about

the required boiling point! Not only is the nation going through the global pandemic caused by the corona virus epidemic (Covid-19) sometime in February 2020(in the case of Nigeria). The nation currently faces climate change, cross-border and trans-border crimes, arms trade and proliferation of arms; money laundering, cyber security threats, advanced free fraud (419), child trafficking, teenage slavery and/or prostitutions, rape, child molestation, domestic violence, kidnapping for ransom, mass abduction of persons and groups; banditry and several economic challenges namely, hyper-inflation, shortage of Premium Motor Spirit (PMS) otherwise known as fuel; the rising tides of sectional agitations, corruption in both high and low places, incessant industrial actions by academic institutions such as the ongoing one embarked upon by the Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU) ever since February 12, 2022.

It was Akpor (2013) cited in Tsuwa, Ikyase and Nwagbo (2018) who had expressed worries that the suffocating nature of insecurity as exemplified in the aforementioned could have dangerous implications on not only the nation's domestic peculiarities, but also on its external relations with other countries. On the internal domestic front, rising insecurity could propel fear and high rate of political apathy on the people. It could also evict people from their respective abode, with corresponding effects on food insecurity, hunger and malnutrition, internal displacement of persons in rural communities, increased crime rates, among other social vices. On the other hand, insecurity could discourage business investments, especially Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Of late, the news items available from various sources were quoted as saying that as a result of the uncertainties that have permeated the Nigerian socio-economic and political space, coupled with the prevailing nature of lack of efficient energy sources with which to run large-scale business conglomerates, most industrialists and multinational corporations have left for Ghana. This goes to corroborate what Ujah and Eboh (2006) had earlier said when they confirmed that the World Bank had initially reported that 36% of business owners have expressed fears of lack of security as reason why they are hardly attracted to the Nigerian state.

Strategies for Implementation of Security Sector Reforms in Nigeria
The national security strategy of Nigeria is broad-based. It essentially encapsulates all other sectional strategies such as the Grand strategy and the National Security Strategy itself. The security documents are structured and prepared in line with emerging security threats that may arise from time to time within and outside nation's geo-politics (NDC, n.d). For example, the National Defense Policy (NDP) of Nigeria which is nonetheless, an off-shoot of the National Security Strategy (NSS) is designed to among other things cater for the nation's safety and preservation of its sovereignty, people and critical assets both home and abroad. Some of the nation's assets according to Udo (2016) includes the Nigeria Liquefied Natural Gas (NLNG), the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporations (NNPC), the Port Harcourt Refining Company Limited (PHRC), Kaduna Refining and Petrochemical Company (KRPC), Warri Refining Petrochemical Company Limited, the Africa Finance Corporation (AFC), the East-West Rail Lines, Air Ports and air strips, the West African Gas Pipeline, Nigeria's Presidential Air Fleets, among others.

All of these items are unarguably the life wire of the Nigerian state where oil and gas, transportation and other financial services are rendered or derived. Again, the federal government of Nigeria has, over the years, invested heavily on these assets with financial implications running into trillions of naira. The protection of these national assets, going by extant laws and the provision of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) rests squarely on the nation's armed forces, both military and para-military. The notion of external aggression and/or internal rancor plays out here. The armed forces are therefore mandated under the enabling laws to quash any form of violation of Nigeria's sovereignty having close affinity with any of those be it on land, sea or air.

Similarly, one of Nigeria's strategic plans in the broader area of security sector reform is the National Counter Terrorism Strategy (NACTEST). This is the brain child of Counter Terrorism Department directly under the auspices of the Nigerian National Security Adviser. The document takes its roots from the 2013 security sector initiative. It was reinforced later in 2016 by the incumbent President Muhammadu Buhari administration as part of the strategic plan to contain the increasing tempo of insecurity in the nation. The strategy undoubtedly, sought to unravel and confront terrorism and the violent extremism, a situation that had literally held the nation's north east geo-politics hostage for an umpteenth time (NCTS, 2016). Under the NACTEST scheme, the overall interest and policy thrust of government was to stop or forestall the indoctrination and initiation or conscription of teenage boys and girls, and even adults into terrorism and terrorist acts. Besides, the strategy aimed to project, prepare, strengthen and mitigate the impacts of terror attacks where it became necessary that such attacks occurred based on circumstances beyond the immediate control of government and its subsidiary security apparatuses. It should be recalled that under the NACTEST arrangement, the critical roles of ministries, departments and agencies have become essential organogram for security checks. This is in tandem with the specifications and dictates of the National Policy on Public and Security (NPPSS), an inter-ministerial as well as an inter-disciplinary initiative under the umbrella of the Federal Ministry of Interior (FMI). The NPPSS is predicated on the reduction and the possible elimination of potential threats to the safety and security of persons or groups in the country.

The type of safety envisaged by the NPPSS cuts across the socio-economic and mental well-being of all Nigerian citizens as well as persons or groups who fall directly under the protective cover of the government of Nigeria, their property rights and even the environmental conditions whatsoever (NPPSS, 2016). Consequently, what we should leave outside of the mainstream of the nation's security strategy is the cyber security strategy. The guiding principles of the National Cyber Security Strategy NCSS) of the government focuses on addressing cyber security and its related incident in the country. The cyber security strategy aims to tackle all forms of cyber crimes, cyber terrorism, matters relating to espionage, online sexual abuse and exploitation of minors (under-age children), cases of money laundering, and all what nots (Bala & Ouedraogo, 2018).

All of the above strategies enlisted give rise to what is generally known as national security architecture. The latter is composed of the Nigerian Security Council established

to render essential security expertise and advisory to the president of the Federal Republic. They are president of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (the president serves as Chair of the Council), the Vice President, Chief of Defense staff, Minister of Internal Affairs, Foreign Affairs Minister, National Security Adviser as well as the Inspector General of Police of the federation. It should, again, be noted that the National Security Adviser houses the central coordinating unit of the entire national security. All other arms such as the National Security Council (NSC), the Joint Intelligence Board (JIB) and the Intelligence Community Committee (ICC) fall under the jurisdiction of the National Security Adviser of the nation. As the principal officer of the Council, the onus is on him to properly advise Mr President on critical matters bordering on the security of the nation. As a matter of responsibility, the government, along sides its security organ reserve the right to review and implement the nation's security strategies in collaboration with major national security stakeholders such as Joint Intelligence Board, the armed forces, the police and other para-military organs, specialized security agencies namely, the State Security Service (SSS), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the National Intelligence Agency (NIA), among others. These organs are specifically mandated to not only collect, but also to provide security services to the nation both internally and externally.

In view of the nation's complexity in terms of security and the peculiar exigencies that follow, there has been the call for provision of avenues for monitoring. The National Assembly, the country's apex law making institution, more or less has been constitutionally empowered to monitor using its oversight functions for effectiveness. The National Assembly to a very greater or lesser extent, influences the Nigerian security process through effective decision making and implementation. Through its robust parliamentary debates, the National Assembly acts as watch-dog over the national security theatre, the purpose of which to forestall any form of infraction. Aside from the National Assembly, the Civil Society Organization (CSO) also plays important role as security arbiter between the populace and handlers of the nation's security. However, due to the frosty relationship between the civil society and major defense establishments, past and present, it has become pretty difficult to see in clear terms the all-important roles and contributions of the civil society to the transformation of the nation's security policy and reform strategies. Nonetheless, it can be said that the CSO has remained a formidable partner in the peer-review process, and hence are readily available to engage the appropriate quarters on matters of security so as to put the nation on track for national tranquility, peace, progress and sustainability.

Factors inhibiting Security Sector Reforms and Defense Strategies in Nigeria
Most of the writings that have been carried out by historians and political scientists points to the fact that the character of the Nigerian state is contingent on the kind of security governance in place and vise versa. By security governance, it meant the structures, institutions and personnel who are responsible for the management and provision of security oversights in Nigeria (Sandra, 2010). From the point of view of Abdu (2013) there exists a fundamental departure from the historical status quo of what Nigeria's security system was over and above what is being witnessed currently. Abdu has insisted that the

major shift away from the institutional foundation of security structures and institutions and the concept of national security of the Nigerian state are poles apart. This clearly demonstrates the separation between the theory and practice of security operation, with each seeking for relevance in a largely contestable socio-economic and political landscape of the Nigerian state. Abdu went further to argue that since the inception of the present democratic project, the nation has suffered, and have continue to suffer from the general crisis of governance, militarization of security issues, poor decision making and implementation approaches and strategies; lack of accountability, corruption, sectional interests, nepotism, among others. It does appear that the case of nepotism far outweighs the rest of the problems. The reason is based on the fact that the nation's security architecture has been swindled and made to tilt to a section of the nation's geo-politics. This tendency, coupled with the factor of ethnicity and ethnic sentiments makes it a bit difficult to sufficiently strategize and confront the various uprisings in certain parts of the country.

On the issue of the fight against terrorism as part of the security sector strategic plan, the Associated Press (2016) quoted the incumbent Minister of Information of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Mr Lai Mohammed as saying that scores of Nigerian elites, including former governors of the respective states, cabinet ministers and others, have stolen a whooping sum of $6.8 billion dollars. In the words of Mohammed (2016) insist that: "The stolen money, which amounts to ₦1.3 trillion naira could have built 86 hospitals or educated 4,000 children through the university… (2016, n.p). From what has been said, the stolen funds includes the over $2 billion dollars earmarked by the government to purchase weapons to contain the Boko Haram scourge, which was said to have consumed over 20,000 people at the time. The pictures depicted above shows the inherent problems of leadership and how well to handle security questions in a nation such as Nigeria. In this direction, Bryden, N'Diaye and Olonisakin (2008) had earlier contended that the greatest challenge bedeviling the Nigerian state is the leadership deficits. To these scholars, there is the dearth of leadership forceful enough to implement a comprehensive process of reform devoid of avarice, greed and corruption. A review of security sector reforms in Nigeria further reveal that the processes are somewhat ad-hoc in outlook. These strategies hardly attach greater importance to the internal security conditions of the nation. Instead, the process is military-oriented with all kinds of forceful means of conflict resolution strategies which may not be appropriate at every given time.

In Nigeria at it were, the security system suffers the menace of lack of proper agenda for reform, lack of political will and commitment to the course of collective national security devoid of bias and sentiments, lack of capacity and motivation on the actors in the theatre of war across several locations where conflicts exists, among others. Some or all of these factors congeal to mitigate against not only the security sector reform, but also on the models and strategies that have been enunciated by the government to move the nation to the next level of peace, stability and development in the 21st century and beyond.

Conclusion

This paper has examined security sector reforms in Nigeria in the context of the nation's defense strategies. The work relies on a number of theoretical arguments and writings of scholars as essential part of the ongoing debates to be able to drive home its points. The overall contention and opinions of scholars in the work suggests one major thematic view point – the lack of leadership commitment and security governance to the effective conception, monitoring and execution of reform processes in the nation's security sub-sector. Besides, it does appear that history has continued to repeat itself in Nigeria when it comes to how much sentiment the leadership question and several centrifugal and ethnic considerations have come to define the basis for reforms in our dear country, Nigeria.

Without any iota of contradiction, the Nigerian state requires more than what is already available for us as a nation. It is on this premise that the whole reform strategies need a new lease of life. For us to move forward as a nation there is the dire need to revisit our past, reconstruct some of the structural and institutional loopholes and then, tailor our collective resolve towards a direction that places national interest truly above parochial regarding. There is also the need to re-orient our minds either as leaders or followers. The re-orientation here is two-pronged. Leadership is critical in reforms. The followers are likely to emulate what the leaders do. What this means is that there is need for vertical and horizontal re-examination and re-orientation.

The Degree of accuracy or acceptability of the two produces a viable future reform framework where justice, equity, responsiveness and integrity prevail as national watchword. When this happens, it becomes easy to effectively strike a balance between theory and practice where reforms, not just in security sector of Nigeria, but also in other critical social, political and economic sector will be given the ultimate pride of place to blossom. The attendance boomerang effect of this state of affairs will no doubt, snowball into all-round rejuvenation and re-invigoration of the nation's security dynamics in the current 21st century and beyond.

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