

DEMOCRACY AND THE STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRATISATION IN LIBYA

Donald OMAGU¹ and Jude ODIGBO²

^{1,2}Department of Political Science, Kwararafa University, Wukari, NIGERIA

Abstract

The history of Libya for more than four decades revolved around Muammar Gaddafi and his regime. Noticeably, frosty relations between Gaddafi and the majority of Libyan people seemed not to have hindered the State's ability and willingness to provide social goods needed for prosperity and development in Libya. Yet, demand for decentralization of governance structure, opening democratic space for popular participation, freedom, redressing human rights violation appeared to have instigated the popular uprising against the Gaddafi's government. This paper argued that the persistence of the seemingly unresolved political crisis in Libya is attributable to the fact that the Libyan uprising was intended to collapse Gaddafi's leadership without domestic democratic alternative platforms that possess the residue and are prepared to provide leadership. The paper concluded that the failure to conceive a democratic architecture and develop a civil society with internalised democratic values necessary for replacing the dismantled government and the State's inability to contain the activities of Gaddafi's loyalists' couple with awful western economic interests have sustained violence and stultified democratisation in Libya. Documentary method of data collection is employed, while using qualitative descriptive analysis, the study relied on rentier theory of the state. It recommended national rebirth based on democratic principles and re-orientation to end frequent slide back to conflicts. This would serve as a prerequisite condition for the Libyan state to follow the path of national transformation.

Keywords: Human rights, Democracy, Democratization.

Introduction

The Libyan State is known to be the first country to have gained independence through the United Nations resolution. In 1951, Libya declared its independence as a constitutional, hereditary monarchy under the leadership of Sanusi Said Muhammad Idris (King Idris I) (Library of Congress 2005). The United Kingdom of Libya," adopted a federal system of government comprising three provinces: Tripoli, Burqa, and Fazan

(Grifa 2012; Nwanegbo and Odigbo, 2015). Though, with the constitutional amendment in 1963, the Libyan State terminated the federal system of government, turning Libya into a unified country under the new name “The Kingdom of Libya” (Library of Congress, 2005).

However, it is important to note that the post – colonial African societies were confronted with military incursions. Libya is not an exception hence it witnessed decades of military dictatorship, despotic and autocratic leadership. In fact, between 1960 till the late 1980s a reasonable number of States in Africa had recorded more than two incidences of military coups. In September 1969, Muammar al-Qaddafi led a bloodless coup and took over the country, an event till his death he insisted on calling a revolution (Martinez 2011; Grifa 2012; Vandewalle and Tuck 2011; Vira and Cordesman 2011; Baldinetti, 2010).

As can be seen, for more than four decades (till his death in 2011) the history of Libya revolves around Muammar Gaddafi regime. Libya under Qaddafi is governed according to the "Third Universal Theory," which Muammar al-Qaddafi developed and published in his three volume work known as the *Green Book* (Library of Congress 2005). The book presented what tends to be the blueprint of his regime or his unique vision of reconciled socialist and Islamic theories that created a new political system known as “state of the masses,” or *Jamahiriya*.

Thus, the above tends to be the blueprint upon which Libya is governed until very recently when the spread of democracy begins to pile pressure on authoritarian leaders especially in Africa and the Middle East. Essentially, the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s accentuated the idea of democracy as a universal commitment which, according to Nwanegbo and Odigbo (2012) has continued to evolve as the most acceptable form of governance globally. Indeed, the Libyan revolution seems to have challenged the prevailing socioeconomic and political order in Libya. Secondly, it triggered a violence that collapsed decades of the Qaddafi regime. The death of Qaddafi subsequently ended the civil war in Libya. The National Transition Council saddled with administrative responsibilities during and after the war conducted elections that saw President Mohammed Yousef el-Magariief emerged as the new Libyan leader.

In spite of the fact that Libya conducted her first ever election that produced a democratically elected leader, violence has persisted in the post-Qaddafi era. Thus, assassinations and kidnappings of police, military, government officials, and their families occur nearly daily, especially in Benghazi (Sohn and Froude, 2014). For instance, in mid-April 2014, the Jordanian ambassador to Libya and a Tunisian diplomat were both kidnapped in Tripoli by armed groups with likely ties to Islamists or other criminal networks (Sohn and Froude, 2014). Also, Libyan political leaders have been under constant threat of attack, as displayed most dramatically in the October 2013 kidnapping of Prime Minister Ali Zeidan (Chivvis and Martini, 2014). Apart from general insecurity,

the oil wealth generates another form of instability. The seizure and confiscation of oil facilities by militia groups in the Libya city of Cyrenaica and the existence of seemingly two governments (one in Tripoli, the other in Tobruk) claiming authentic authority of the State, appears to have increased democratisation crisis in Libya. While these instances may not necessarily be related, they have the combined effect of showing the weakness of the central government and its security services. In fact, the history of democratization in Libya appears to have remained the history of violence. It is within this context that this study examines the travails of democracy in Libya and the democratisation struggle by the Libyan State in the post-Qaddafi era.

Theoretical Explanation

The rentier state theory is primarily state-centred, but none the less comes in different forms and emphasises different causal links between resource rents and poor economic governance, as well as authoritarian rule (Ross 2001; Rosser 2006). According to Yates (1996), the concept of rentiers is derivative of the classical economic idea of rent which is described as excess value or surplus left over after the cost of production had met, and was paid to the owners of the land for the use of its natural resources.

The proponents of this theory (Yates 1996; Ross, 2001; Schwarz, 2004; Smith, 2004) used the concept to describe most of the governments of the Middle East and North Africa since they derive a large fraction of their revenues from external rents while at the same time pointed at the conflicts and instability arising from wealth distribution in these societies. Indeed, rents not only determine the characteristics of the national economy but also determined the patterned functionality of the state institutions and perhaps the government attitude towards society (Odigbo, 2015). The intensification of crude oil exports in most third world societies especially in the Middle-East and Africa produced a rentier state, a government that relies principally on revenues from resource rents.

Understandably, Libya seems to be a replica of a rentier society in Africa. As can be seen, by 2004 the Libyan government continued to dominate its socialist-oriented economy and government completely controlled oil exports, which provided about 95 percent of its export earnings, 75 percent of government receipts, and 30 percent of the gross domestic product (Library of Congress 2005). Unfortunately, the emergence of the oil economy in Libya seems to have significantly increased the political hurdles to development. In fact, the *fons et origo* of some high profile violent confrontations in post-Qaddafi Libya could be linked to the recalcitrant dispositions of some armed groups in Libya to hold sway on oil facilities within their areas of influence. This could not be divorced from the role played by some Western capitalist societies who are hitherto providing surreptitious support for these groups in the realization of their economic interest.

In dealing with this challenge, the Libyan government in 2012 created the Petroleum Facilities Guards to protect Libya's oil facilities from external forces (Sohn and Froude, 2014). In spite of this, Jedhran and his several thousand men who joined for a period with the eastern federalist movement seized several eastern Libyan ports and cut off oil exports for several months (Sohn and Froude, 2014). Consequently, Libyan oil dropped nationally at times to roughly 15% of peak production in 2014. Meanwhile, groups in the eastern province of Cyrenaica have seized control of oil facilities there and threatened to create an autonomous state-within-a-state (Chivvis and Martini, 2014). With the armed takeover of many of Libya's oil facilities in 2013, however, the stability of Libya's economy—including the ability of the government to continue to pay salaries indefinitely was drawn into question (Chivvis and Martini, 2014).

Thus, oil played a crucial role in the sustenance of Libyan economy. The Libyan revolution and subsequent civil war created the complex problem of control over State-owned resources including crude oil. As a result, militia groups who had some influence and reasonable control over these resources during the crisis, especially crude oil, find it difficult relinquishing control of these resources to legitimate authority. More confusing is the present situation where two governments exist in Libya and each claims ownership and control of the oil sales. Azikiwe (2014) explained that unrest has erupted again surrounding which political group claiming authority in Libya would control the proceeds from oil sales. According to him, both the parties controlling the governments in the capital of Tripoli and Tobruk often labeled as "Islamists" and the "government in exile" in the Eastern city of Tobruk, say they are entitled to the revenue generated from the trade in crude oil. Indeed, the implication is devastating. The more Libya struggle to democratise, the more it democratises violence. With the prevailing instability and conflictual situation in Libya, democratisation will still remain elusive at least for the nearest future.

Conceptualising Democracy and Democratisation

The extant literature is replete with kaleidoscope scholarly commentaries which sometimes seem to be described as cacophonous in nature, especially on the global spread of democracy since the end of Cold War in the late 1980s and the benefits accompany the trend. Though, there seems to be consensus among scholars that in spite of the seemingly global cultural differences, peculiarities and societal dynamics, democracy still remains the most acceptable form of governance (Nnoli, 1986; Diamond, 1990b; Schumpeter, 1990; Diamond and Plattner 1993b; Unah, 1993; Owolabi, 1999; Dahl 2000; Ndulo, 2003; Appadorai, 2004; Nwanegbo and Odigbo, 2013; Nwanegbo, Odigbo and Nnorom 2014). In this regard, Owolabi (1999) rightly contends that democracy has become in current usage, another word for political decency and civilisation.

Thus, Schumpeter (1990) argued that democracy should be seen as an institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide, by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote. It is a system of government usually involving freedom of individuals in various aspects of political life, equality among citizens and justice in the relations between the people and the government and the participation of the people in choosing those in government (Nnoli, 2003). In his view, Diamond (1990b) argued that democracy is a:

system of government that meets three essential conditions: meaningful and extensive competition among individuals and groups (especially political parties) for all effective positions of government power, at regular intervals and excluding the use of force; a highly inclusive level of political participation in the selection of leaders and policies, at least through regular and fair elections, such that no major (adult) social group is excluded; and a level of civil and political liberties - freedom of expression, freedom of the press, freedom to form and join organisations- sufficient to ensure the integrity of political competition and participation" (Diamond, 1990b:2-3).

As contended by Nwanegbo, Odigbo and Nnorom, (2014) what gives democracy meaning and substance is participation and authority of the people to determine who rules. For them, the extent of involvement encompasses the power to decide who rules, what policy to support and which decision would benefit the greatest number of people. Indeed, in spite of the claims on commonly acceptable benefits inherently embedded in democratic practice, it appears that democracy has provided contradictory outcomes. For instance, various societies especially in Africa and the Middle East that have been under authoritarian regimes for decades seem to have witnessed negative results. In fact, democracy in Libya seems unable to integrate the people. It tends to have invalidated the position of McPherson as in (Guaba 2005) who argued that third world countries, which have no experience of western individualism, could also conform to the ideals of some historical theories of democracy as far as their governments are legitimised by mass enthusiasm.

However, neither the acceptability by the majority of people nor the legitimacy of President Mohammed Yousef el-Magarif government has doused political tensions, unrest and confrontations in Libya. In fact, one of the reasons for the democratic debacle in Libya may be attributed to the attitude of the people towards democracy. Accordingly, Ndulo (2003) argues that:

Where citizens of a country have no sense of democracy and are unwilling or unable to insist that their leaders deliver democracy ... a written constitution,

however eloquently it proclaims democracy, will be insufficient to guarantee it. Additionally, democracy depends on certain values, such as tolerance and trust, which cannot be secured in a written constitution. Rather, in order to gain a foothold in a given country, these values depend on the political will of a nation. The lack of these values can seriously undermine the democratic enterprise (Ndulo, 2003: 341).

Essentially, the continued instability, war situations and violent clashes in Libya have severe implications on the present democratisation process in Libya. This is important, especially when put into cognizance the fact that democratisation is mainly seen as a process that represents a combination of democratic transition and democratic consolidation. Indeed, democratisation is more appropriately viewed as the institutionalisation of democratic principles and ethos as common, conventional and integral elements of the society. Practically, democratisation can be appreciated mostly on its capacity to tailor, adapt and direct people's thoughts, behaviour, belief and values towards democratic ethos.

Interestingly, the concept of democratisation gained greater relevance in the parlance of politics in the 1990s. Scholars like (Nwabueze, 1993; Samarasinghe, 1994; Osaghae, 1999; Yahaya, 2007) see democratisation as a process, concatenation of political activities geared towards developing, deepening institutions of the state and institutionalisation of people as agents that legitimise state authority. Specifically, Osaghae, (1999) argues that democratisation is "the process of establishing, strengthening, or extending the principles, mechanisms and institutions that define a democratic regime. It is a process of political change that moves the political system of any given society towards a system of government that ensures peaceful competitive political participation in an environment that guarantees political and civil liberties (Samarasinghe, 1994). However, Joseph (1997) had earlier posited that democratisation ought not to have occurred in Africa as a result of its peculiar nature. He further located problems associated with democratisation process in Africa to poverty, culture, political and economic underdevelopment. According to him:

Democratisation was not supposed to happen in Africa. It had little of what seemed necessary for constitutional democratic politics. African countries were too poor, too culturally fragmented, and insufficiently capitalist; they...lacked the requisite civic culture. Middle classes are usually weak and more bureaucratic than entrepreneurial; they were often co-opted into authoritarian political structures. The working classes, except in a few cases, such as in Zambia and South Africa, is at the embryonic stage of development (Joseph, 1997:363).

Thus, some African states such as Nigeria, Sudan, South Sudan, Ivory Coast, and Libya etc who have embraced democracy either as one of the conditionalities to access financial aid, compulsion or sheer admiration of democratic ingredients appear to have been struggling to democratise. In fact, some seem to have been throttled in the process. In his view, Omotola (2013) argued that these democracies and specifically Nigeria's democracy is trapped in transition. For him, a trapped democratisation is one that fails, for whatever reasons, to improve its democratic qualities, measured by its procedure, content, and results. He further stated that

The democratic trapping manifests mainly not only in terms of the shallowness of the procedure, content, and results of the democratisation process but also in the disconnect among these ordinarily interdependent qualities of democracy. It is a process characterised by democratic motion without democratic movement, a sort of cause without an effect and if the procedural qualities falter, the democratic content will be shallow. This in turn, will negatively affect the democratic results. An unmitigated cycle of the continual failure of the procedure-content-result chain approximates a trapped (Omotola 2013: 199).

The above conditions are abundantly evident in Libya. This is because of a virtually non-existence or personalisation of state institutions over the last four decades. In fact, the challenge that hurts the Libyan State at present could be seen from the struggle to create democratic institutions. Thus, repositioning the few existing agencies of the state in conformity with democratic ethos and principles seems to have remained the greatest undoing of the Libyan State. The frequent violent confrontations among groups and most a times against the state have generated a complex security situation and instability. In fact, complex war situations have rather succeeded to democratised violence in Libya.

Libya and the Paradox of Oil Economy

At independence in 1951, Libya was one of the poorest countries in the world (Vandewalle, 1996). According to El azz Abi as in Alafi and Bruijn, (2009) Libya mainly relied on agriculture and foreign aid from the UK, the US, the UN, the United Arab Republic (UAR) and Italy. This is in addition to revenues from the sale of scrap metal left behind by the belligerents during the war and rents from military bases used by the US and the UK (Alafi and Bruijn, 2009).


However, with the discovery of crude oil in 1959, the Libyan State appeared to have redirected attention on oil as a major source of income generation. The territory of Libya holds the largest oil reserves in Africa, which are also among the most expensive in the

world and the country's economy is heavily dependent on oil production, a highly capital-intensive industry that offers limited opportunities for employment expansion (Abuhadra and Ajaali 2014). According to OPEC, Libya contains the 9th largest oil reserves in the world and derives 40% of its economic output and 95% of its exports from its nationalised energy sector (see Ali and Harvie, 2013). The appeal of Libya's oil is that it is of relatively high quality, fairly cheap to extract, and close to Europe (indeed, 80% of Libya's oil is exported to the EU) (Ali and Harvie, 2013)

Following from the above, Mc Whorter (2013) explained that France and its European cohorts had a strong interest in developing influence with Libya's new government and the National Oil Corporation via removal of Qaddafi. In fact, the European Union interest in Libya is mainly economical. This may not be unconnected with their immediate military response to Libya. Arguably, external influences only deteriorated the crisis and plunged Libya into months of the fratricidal war. Thus, the collapse of Qaddafi's long years of rulership seems to be the achievement or justification for the war, yet Libya is still struggling from the negative impacts of the conflict.

Indeed, thousands of Libyans lost their lives, especially women and children, infrastructures destroyed and the economy shattered following the reduction of production as a result of the war. In fact, during the civil war, oil production had slowed from peak production of 1.6mil barrels/day to only 50,000 barrels per day (Ali and Harvie, 2013; Rivlin 2011). Also, in the aftermath of the civil war production has remained low and specifically several months during 2014 oil production in Libya was considerably low. Conflicts between various labour organisations in addition to clashes among the militia resulted in the decline of barrels-per-day extraction to almost nil (Azikiwe, 2014). The figure below shows continues decrease in oil production in Libya especially between 2013 and 2014.

Figure 1: LIBYAN OIL PRODUCTION IN 2013 AND 2014



Source: Sohn and Froude, (2014: 45).


With the decline in production of oil especially since the beginning of war in 2011, the situation involving the struggle over the control of oil in Libya seems to have prompted and indeed exacerbated conflicts in the post-Qaddafi era. The recent Libyan peace talks backed by United Nations were deadlocked and efforts by five western countries designated by the United Nations to reach a political settlement seem to have also failed. Implicitly, these conflict situations and lack of compromise may stultify the realization of people’s expectations. In fact, it has threatened to reverse progressive growth which Libya has recorded over the years under an authoritarian regime. For instance, the figure below shows that Libya over the years has been progressive in the areas of life expectancy, years of schooling and gross domestic product.

Figure 2: LIBYA’S HDI TRENDS BASED ON CONSISTENT TIME SERIES DATA AND NEW GOALPOSTS

	Life expectancy at birth	Expected years of schooling	Mean years of schooling	GNI per capita (2011 PPP\$)	HDI value
1980	64.2	12.5	2.2	44,124	0.641
1985	66.6	13.1	2.9	27,903	0.654
1990	68.5	14.0	3.8	24,922	0.684
1995	70.2	14.9	4.7	24,134	0.715
2000	71.9	15.8	5.6	23,969	0.745
2005	73.5	16.1	6.4	27,159	0.772
2010	74.7	16.1	7.5	31,218	0.799
2011	74.9	16.1	7.5	11,967	0.753
2012	75.1	16.1	7.5	24,266	0.789
2013	75.3	16.1	7.5	21,666	0.784

Source: UNDP, (2014: 2)

Figure 3: TRENDS IN LIBYA'S HDI COMPONENT INDICES 1980-2013



Source: UNDP, (2014: 2).

The above human development index figures show a progressive improvement in life expectancy and other indicators of development. Comparatively, the Qaddafi regime tends to have elevated Libya above so many African societies. The living standard was far from what is obtainable in many states in Africa. Yet, in totality, the Libyans tend to feel that in respect to issues of freedom, Qaddafi's regime performed below expectation. Also, when put into cognizance huge revenue accrued from oil proceeds over the years it appears Libyan has not been managed effectively for the betterment of all. After Qaddafi's demise, the state runs into more conflictual and confused march towards democratisation. It appears that the new democratic regime led by President Mohammed Yousef el-Magariief quickly succumbed to group polarisation, political conflict, and ubiquitous social strife.

From Consolidated Authoritarianism to Turbulence Democratic Governance

For the past four decades (since 1969) when Mu'ammār Qaddafi took over the mantle of leadership in Libya, most activities of the Libyan government under Qaddafi increasingly appears to be associated with evil, despicable acts and brutality. The government relied on severe reprisals against any perceived opponents, through political killing – including Libyans in exile – imprisonment, torture and other ill-treatment, harassment and intimidation, not only of his perceived critics but also of their families (Amnesty International Report 2011). For instance, in 1996, up to 1,200 detainees in Abu Salim Prison were extra-judicially executed by security forces following a riot by detainees protesting against appalling prison conditions (Amnesty International 2011).

Mostly, in the 1980s and 1990s the history of Libya seems to be the history of violence. Domestically, the regime appears dreadful. Beyond its borders, the Qaddafi's regime was implicated in several criminal activities and inhuman atrocities. Libya was implicated in several terrorist activities in the 80s and 90s. Among these are:

the murder of a British policewoman, Yvonne Fletcher, outside Libya's embassy in London in 1984, the terrorist bombing of a West Berlin discotheque frequented by American military personnel and the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, in 1988, with the loss of 270 lives, and the bombing of a French flight over Niger in 1989, with the loss of 177 lives (Army Area Hand Book Program 2006: 9).

Consequently, the United Kingdom severed all diplomatic relations with Libya and in 1986, economic sanctions were imposed on Libya by the United States, Libya's largest single customer for crude oil after the Qaddafi regime was also implicated in the 1988 bombing of West Berlin. Thus, the United Nations imposed sanctions on Libya in 1992–93 after Libya was implicated in 1989 for a terrorist act. The sanctions and trade embargoes brought about rising import costs and inflation in Libya's domestic economy, resulting in a deteriorating standard of living for most of its citizens.

As can be seen, the reign of impunity, intimidation, extra-judicial murder, terror and other forms of transgression place the Libyan State and indeed Qaddafi on frosty relations with some Libyan people and most capitalist societies. Despite the lack of freedom of expression, freedom of association, lack of liberty, administrative highhandedness of Qaddafi regime, Libya was relatively stable economically and in terms of security. Though, disillusionment arising from these inhuman postures of the regime tends to have increased accumulated grievances to an unbearable level. In fact, such domestic grievances as seen by some scholars may not be unconnected to the 17th February 2011 revolt following the successes recorded in Tunisia and Egypt by the

revolutionary forces (Lacher, 2011; Grifa 2012; Nwanegbo and Odigbo, 2012; Nwanegbo and Odigbo, 2015).

Thus, the death of Qaddafi marked the end of an era in Libya. But truly, the traumatic political and economic upheaval arising from an eight-month-long civil war that led to the ending of 42 years of dictatorship under Muammar Gaddafi in October 2011 seems to have enormous cost on the Libyan state. For instance, about 30,000 lives were lost, major economic dysfunction, destruction of the country's infrastructure, reduced oil production, the country's major source of revenue generation and exports, from 1.6 million barrels per day before the war to 50,000 barrels a day during it as well as destroying much of the sector's support infrastructure (Ali and Harvie, 2013).

In spite of the debacle of Qaddafi regime, post-Qaddafi era tends to have remained more conflictual. According to Chivvis and Martini, (2014) since the 2011 overthrow of the Qaddafi regime, Libya's path has been tumultuous. For them, despite a number of advantages compared with other post-conflict societies, progress on political, economic, and security fronts has fallen far behind, generating frustration and threatening the recovery altogether. In fact, Libya has teetered on the brink of a relapse into civil war on more than one occasion in the past year (Chivvis and Martini, 2014).

As can be seen, the rising trend of conflicts, clashes, threats of disintegration and violence underscores the deep division in the Libyan society and the continuing impasse of national cohesion. The continuation of clashes and violence is an indication that Libya accidentally dabbled into democratisation. This could be seen from the ostensibly undemocratic culture imbibed and internalised over the decades. For instance, it appears more glaring that most of the societies in North Africa and Middle East (eg Saudi-Arabia, Egypt, Morocco, Bahrain and Iraq etc) are more stable and amenable to economic reforms, an improvement of human rights than an outright change of the form of government. The failure of the last election to achieve political unity in Libya was most evident when Fajr Libya or "Libya Dawn" a diverse coalition of armed groups that included an array of Islamist militias rejected the election's outcome and seized control of Tripoli (Wagner and Cafiero, 2015). The internationally recognised government relocated to Tobruk, situated in Eastern Libya along the Mediterranean coast near the Egyptian border, while Libya Dawn set up a rival government, known as the new General National Congress, in the capital (Wagner and Cafiero, 2015).

These challenges are attributable to series of domestic administrative loopholes. Indeed, the failure of the Transition National Government or the immediate democratic government to engage a programme of demobilization of the rebels, the inability of the state to contain the activities of Qaddafi's loyalists, the alien nature of democracy to the Libyan people and the increasing growth of dissident and militia groups seem to have been threatening the democratic practice in Libya. The resolution of the conflict in Libya is now deadlock between the pro-secular army and Islamist militants, which has led to

security emptiness for home-based extremism to develop. While there is still optimism that the UN-backed Libya political talks would end months of clashes between the country's rival parties, it appears that more concerted effort is needed to restore peace and unity among Libyans.

Conclusion

Following from the analysis, the study concluded that though democracy appears to be the most acceptable form of governance, its adoption and practice should not be imposed. It is our position that the imposition of Western preferred puppets under the pretense of democratisation is mostly responsible for the post-Qaddafi crisis in Libya. The revolutionary forces in Libya pinched each other at the end of the revolution, in reaction to a perceived Western conspiracy to hijack the Libyan oil. Consequently, the society that fought for freedom seems to have got nothing. The polarisation of Libya and subsequent emergence of two groups claiming authentic authority of the state is not only threatening stability but has created a complex leadership and security situation in the state. The paper, therefore, recommended a national rebirth that would be pioneered by the Libyan people. This will be based on democratic principles and should be anchored on their cultural values. Finally, the state should engage massive house-to-house and institutional re-orientation to end frequent relapse to conflicts.

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Bibliographical Notes

Donald OMAGU, PhD is a Lecturer in the Department of Political Science, Kwararafa University, Wukari, Taraba State, Northeast, NIGERIA.

Jude ODIGBO is a Lecturer in the Department of Political Science, Kwararafa University, Wukari, Taraba State, Northeast, NIGERIA.