

Nigeria's Foreign Policy, 1960-2015: An Appraisal

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Abstract

The study appraised thematically Nigeria's foreign policy engagements in the past five and half decades. The justification for adopting this approach is that instead of reviewing how each Nigerian government undertook the conduct of Nigeria's foreign policy, the performance of all the government since independence till 2015 would be collectively set in row against the common issues and shared views so that it would be possible to judge the practical realities against the presumptions. For this purpose, the study is concern with high point of Nigeria's foreign policy from independence till 2015 and how it has translated to economic security and prosperity of the Nigerian state. The central proposition of the study is that for Nigeria's foreign policy to be perceived as legitimate, its implementation must be seen by Nigerians to advance the domestic national development. The theoretical explication of the discourse is political realism. The utility of the theory to the study is that states in international relations are always possessed by the national interest which nations attain only by improving upon the elements of their national power relative to other states. That is it emphasize the interconnection between the domestic economy of any country and its foreign policy. Findings from the study revealed, that Nigeria allowed the system goals to take precedence over actors goals that would have reverberate in greater economic opportunity and prosperity for the people. The study recommended, among other things, that Nigeria's foreign policy should be more inward-focused, aimed at adding value to the nation's development.

Keywords: Afrocentricism, Citizen Diplomacy, Debt relief, Economic Diplomacy, Foreign policy, National development Peace-keeping operations.

Introduction

In understanding the concept of Nigeria's foreign policy, there is the need to define the term foreign policy. The term foreign policy is nebulous in the sense that scholars of international relations have not been able to formulate a universally acceptable definition of the concept given the changing nature of power politics in the international system. But the consensus among scholars is that foreign policy is that conscious behaviour of a nation state towards the external environment. That is the set of domestic responses to external stimuli. The stimuli emanate from the structure and dynamics of the international system, while the responses is shaped by the elements in the domestic environment, including significantly, the perceptive prisms of the policy-makers. In view of this, the study look at foreign policy as that instrumentality through which states seek to influence at the international arena in order to attain those objectives that are in consonance with their

perceived national interest. Nigeria's foreign policy can be conceived as those explicit objectives which Nigeria seek to pursue and achieved in her external relations. Nigeria's external relations since 1960 till 2015, has not been generally remarkable in terms of its productivity and overall impact on people's well-being especially when assessed in the context of the economic dividends it has generated by way of attracting foreign investment, wealth creation and poverty reduction or political dividend in Africa where greater investment has been made.

One of the compelling and agonizing problem that have beset the Nigerian governments since independence is making choices and setting priorities (Aluko, 1980). Foreign policy of any nation must be based on the premise of national interest. This is because; it is the yardstick that one could use in assessing the success or failure of any foreign policy. An exploration of Nigeria's foreign policy in the past decades reveals that Nigeria has consistently been pursuing her domestic development goals independently of its foreign policy. The conduct of the nation's foreign policy has not been translated into a source of national development. Consequently, the nation suffered serious development challenges. Though Nigeria's development or transformation plans emphasized the promotion of economic development, its policy makers have failed in their attempt to use the country's foreign policy as an instrument to promote domestic economic transformation. It is not surprising, therefore, that in the years since independence; most governments often adopt policies in their foreign policy that appeared inconsistent and contradictory to the country's domestic development.

Nigeria's foreign policy since independence until the greater part of the 21st century was not specifically designed to be an instrument of national development but to facilitate the political objectives of leadership role in African affairs. It appears that national interest was not institutionalized in such a way that although the peculiar inclinations of who to be president can sometimes influence things marginally, they can never cause a substantive change in the country's core national interest. Ate (2011) opined that Nigeria's foreign policy since independence was marked by two prominent characteristics: (a) The political leadership conducted foreign policy as if the exercise were merely an external manifestation of its sovereign states of Nigeria following independence (i.e. a channel for interaction with other sovereign nations) (b) Nigeria's foreign policy tended to react to external forces rather than serve as a conscious set of policy measures to address crucial national problems. For Ate, this feature appears to be a function of historical antecedent that Nigeria's first foreign policy engagement were instigated by the great issue of the East-West conflict, which did not give Nigeria's political leadership an opportunity to think of the positive use of foreign policy as a strategic instrument for engineering national economic transformation. The pattern did not change until the end of the 20th century.

In the same vein, Gambari (2008) in his article "From Balewa to Obasanjo: The Theory and Practice of Nigeria's Foreign Policy" argued that Nigeria's foreign policy has never been directly related to the needs of the masses of its people. Rather, this policy has been formulated, articulated and implemented in highly elitist circles, reflecting the needs and aspiration of national elite. Hence, the history of Nigeria's foreign policy has been related to some extent, a quest for national consensus behind the major goals and objectives of its external relations. Similarly, Mustapha (2008) in his article "The Three Faces of Nigeria's

Foreign Policy: Nationhood, Identity and External Relations” argues that the cultural geography of colonialism clearly assumed a fragmented population of natives superintended and held together by imperial benevolence. For him, what is the issue here is therefore not the existence of the Nigerian nation-state as an entity but its inability to develop sufficient consensus on vital domestic and foreign policy issues due to conflicting interests and perceptions. In this climate, the national interest which the formal foreign policy machinery seeks to promote is often subverted internally.

Aremu (2010) opined that elementary foreign literature classify foreign policy objectives into primary, secondary and tertiary goals. Primary objectives concern those interests that relate directly to the security and survival of the state (or any part thereof) and its nationals irrespective of their domicile. For him, the security and survival of the state and its people would include the physical security and economic well-being of the citizenry. These are interests over which the government may not be willing to compromise and are indeed ready to deploy all the necessary resources and instruments towards its attainment (including war). Secondary objectives comprise of interests which a state may pursue with vigour but could be amenable to certain degree of compromise. They include objectives over which the government might be prepared to negotiate some trade-offs and are less likely to deploy all the resources of the state in its pursuit. Tertiary objectives consist of goals that state pursue to enhance their status, visibility and prestige in the international system.

A perusal of Nigeria’s foreign policy since 1960 till 2015, shows an inversion of tertiary objectives over primary objectives that would have resulted in greater economic opportunity and prosperity for the people and the state. This has accounted for the huge deficits in the overall Nigeria’s foreign policy over the years. From the Balewa to Yar’Adua – Jonathan administration, whether under civilian or military dispensation, the leader’s disposition significantly affected the outcome of foreign policy decisions. Pronounced policies were zealously executed with hardly any review or input from professionals in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and less-inclined leaders have presided over more inert foreign policy formulations.

It is within this context that the study seek to appraise thematically Nigeria’s foreign policy since 1960 till 2015. The justification for adopting this approach is that instead of reviewing how each Nigerian government undertook the conduct of Nigeria’s foreign policy, the performance of all the government since independence till 2015 would be collectively set in row against the common issues and shared views so that it would be possible to judge the practical realities against the presumptions. For this purpose, the study is only concern with high point (i.e. the good outing) of Nigerian foreign policy from independence till 2015 and how it has translated to economic security and prosperity of the Nigerian state in general and average citizenry in particular, whose interest foreign policy is expected to serve. The central proposition of this study is that for Nigeria’s foreign policy to be perceived as legitimate and supported at home, its implementation of the policy must be seen by Nigerians to advance the domestic national development agenda. In view of these, the study seek to answer this question, to what extent has Nigeria’s foreign policy influenced its domestic development goals.

Theoretical Explication of the Discourse

The study adopted two theoretical framework, political realism otherwise known as the power approach and linkage theory in the analysis of the subject matter. The power approach is the school of thought that explains international relations in terms of power politics. Realism as the traditional orthodoxy in the understanding of international relations from the point of view of the national interest has an intellectual pedigree in classical scholars like Hans Morgenthau, Machiavelli, Hobbes and Thucydides. They see power as the prime motivation of political life in international relations. It derives its relevance from two basic assumptions: human weakness and the anarchical nature of the international system. Given the structure of the international system which is devoid of any effective enforcement authorities, every state must always be in the business of accumulating power. Its arsenal must be continually updated as that is the only assurance for its existence to achieve its national interests. For this theory, power can be possessed for actual deployment or deterrent purposes in defence of national interest.

The utility of the theory to the study is that states in international relations are always possessed by the national interest which nations attain only by improving upon the elements of their national power relative to other states. The utility of the linkage theory is that political analysis is greatly facilitated because propositions that link the stability, functioning, institution and goals of national political systems to variables in the external environments is systematically developed. That is it emphasize the interconnection between the domestic economy of any country and its foreign policy.

High Points of Nigeria's Foreign Policy from 1960-2015

Afrocentricism One theme that has dominated discussions on Nigerian foreign policy is the African centre-piece policy. It was adopted after Nigeria's independence in 1960 base on certain considerations. These were the population of the country which still remains the highest in Africa, global pressures requiring the country to take a lead in Africa, relatively better resource profile of the country, geographical factors and of course, the crave for regional hegemonic role (Saliu, 2005). It is not uncommon for analyst to ascribe the strong Afrocentric bent in Nigeria's external relations which derives from and is fed by the prestige of continental leadership to the legacy of the radicalization of the 1970s. Nigeria immediately after independence, began to display some firm posting in championing the cause of Africa which crested with the suspension of relations with France in 1961, ostensibly to protest the French atomic test in the Sahara (Aremu, 2005). One obvious source of the prestige illusion derives from Nigeria's role in offering and mobilizing support for the liberation struggles across Southern Africa in the mid-1970s and beyond. Whether Nigeria's support was actually decisive in shaping the eventual outcome and/or the extent to which Nigeria's support was really valued or appreciated by the recipients is yet to be fully established in literature (Aremu, 2010). Some achievements with respect to this policy has been recorded which include: the eradication of colonialism and apartheid from Africa, expansion in Nigeria's diplomatic space, global recognition as a leading nation in peacekeeping operations, commensurate influence in international organization

such as ECOWAS and AU and first country of choice in resolving African's conflicts (Saliu, 2018).

The impact of the Afrocentric policy has been the subject of contention. While some see nothing wrong in such commitment, others see it as having negative impact on Nigeria's national interest. For protagonist of the school of thought that see nothing wrong in such commitment argues that African centre-piece policy is in line with our national interest. Chibundu, one of the proponent of this school argued that:

It is of course obvious that Nigeria's geopolitical, historical and demographic circumstances have trapped her in the African predicament. As already indicated, previous Federal Governments had caused to justify the continued relevance of Afrocentric policy in Nigeria's foreign policy objectives. Consequently, this central philosophy that Nigeria should continue to champion the cause of black and African peoples cannot now be de-emphasized, dislodged or dismantle without doing grievous damage to the national psyche. Therefore, Nigerians, Africans and the world at large must continue to understand and appreciate that whatever the situation, the Afrocentric policy is not negotiable (Chibuadu, 2002).

For those scholars, who see such commitments as having a negative impact on Nigeria's national interest, argued that African alone should no longer be the one and only reason for the existence of a foreign policy in Nigeria. Their argument is predicated on the fact that Nigeria has sacrificed a lot for African countries without anything in return (Okpokpo, 2002). On his path, Reuben Abati, posits that Nigeria has been extra ordinarily naïve by restricting its foreign policy to Africa as its cornerstone. For him, Nigeria has given so much to ensure the implementation of that foreign policy. The implication according to him, has been the sacrificing of the true national interest of Nigeria on the altar of regional leadership role. The central line of argument of this school of thought is that there has been displeasure with Nigeria's African policy and Nigerians had expressed concern on what they considered the unrewarding African policy of the Nigerian state, not being erected on any firm principle of reciprocity. Ate corroborated this position by arguing that Nigeria at independence did not have the means to sustain an assertive-cum-robust foreign policy but rather was playing adjunct leadership role for the West. For him, the notion of an African-centredness of Nigerian foreign policy as such did not stem from a strategic choice made by Nigeria's new political leadership on the basis of the fundamental national interests of the country, but was indeed a derivative of the enormous influence exerted on it by the Western powers, principally Britain and the United States in the context of their cold war priorities in Africa. The point being emphasized here, is that, the pre-occupation by Nigerian government on regional issues of political liberation, peace keeping operations, conflict resolution, institutionalized the Africa-centredness syndrome without the leadership ever assessing seriously, the development benefits to Nigeria's economy arising from its foreign policy decisions. In other words, foreign policy initiatives were never linked originally, to the requirements of transforming the national economy, nor were the reality of a weak domestic economic capacity ever considered as a fundamental constraint on such initiatives.

Nigerian foreign policy during this period was remarkable because of the energies, resources and commitment shown to the total liberation of Africa. Both apartheid and colonialism were engaged, confronted and liquidated. It was Nigeria's initiatives that produced direct consequences on the process of liberation. In the case of southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) after the unilateral declaration of independence by the rebel leader Ian Smith, and it appeared that the "kit and kin" sentiment befuddled British vision on the matter, the UK government was confronted with the nationalization of Britain petroleum. The denationalization occurred only after Rhodesia's independence (Eze, 2011). Eze equally argued that in the Angolan conflict that pitted MPLA against FLNA and UNITA each supported by opposing groups of nations that led to unnecessarily prolonged struggle, the OAU was divided. It took the Nigerian recognition of Augustino Neto's MPLA for UNITA's fortune to begin to decline. It was equally the persistent and determined support by Nigeria through its chairmanship of the UN committee on apartheid that led to demise of the settler racist minority regime in South Africa. Nigeria achieved this through the establishment of two institution in support of the liberation struggle. The national committee against apartheid and the southern African Relief Fund. The former was concerned with elaborating policies and support for liberation movement while the latter, was the funding arm to which both Nigerian governments, as well as, corporate enterprises and private citizens contributed.

One of the major mechanisms for the conduct of this policy was the aid programme which the country has pursued since independence. The lubricant for the aid programme was the oil wealth. Virtually all the countries of Africa had obtained one form of assistance or the other from Nigeria. The main directions of the aid programme had been Nigeria's neighbours, the West African sub-region and frontline states, the freedom fighters, national disasters and other parts of Africa. This was the picture when the economy was in fair shape (Adebayo, 1983).

The question remains in a world where loyalties do not extend beyond sovereign borders, why do countries extend the hand of generosity to others? In international relations theory, the phenomenon of aid giving has several explanations (Holsti, 1994). In the epistemology of international relations, Hollis and Smith (1991) insist there is a difference between "explaining" and "understanding" what happens in international affairs. While realist theory provide ample explanation for the games nations play, the moral or idealist approach is also valid for understanding why nations behave the way they do. Simply put, countries extend help to others on the basis of calculated self-interest. Hayler (1971) popularized the notion of "aid" as "imperialism" during the heydays of the cold war when aid was used as part of the instrumentalities of informal empire, a mechanism for wooing friends and influencing allies, as well as cajoling satellite nations in the periphery of world capitalism. China provides assistance for infrastructure projects in many African countries as part of a package of its investment activities in oil and mining (Mailafia, 2010).

In 1986, Nigeria unilaterally established the Technical Aid Corps Scheme (TAC) as a foreign policy tool to promote goodwill and foster social and economic development in partner countries. As it turned out to be, the amount that was expended on the programme remains shrouded in mystery. Nigeria has been a major contributor to multilateral

institutions. Within the African context, the country has been a major contributor and/or dominant shareholder of such institutions as the African Development Bank Group, Shelter Afrique, Afrexim Bank and the ECOWAS Fund for compensation and Development. Infact there was period when Nigeria virtually underwrote the entire operational budget of the former OAU now African Union (AU) (Salim cited in Mailafia, 2010). Nigeria also in partnership with the African Development Bank Group in 1976 established the Nigeria Trust Fund (NTP) with the object to assist the development efforts of the ADB's low income regional member countries whose economic and social conditions and prospects require concessional financing (ADB, 2009). Nigeria equally in 2004 established the Nigerian Technical Co-operation Fund (NTCF) as a grant window to complement the resources of the NTF. Its objectives was to pool the human capital of recipient countries from the African diaspora to assist in the rebuilding the war-torn countries and private technical assistance grants for the identification and preparation of bankable projects. From all indications, these outcomes have been at best a mixed blessing. Although its resources have been welcomed in recipient countries, it is doubtful whether this has translated into goodwill or even leverage for Nigeria. From the lessons of the experience, countries that contribute to the shareholdings of multilateral banks do so for reason of altruism as well as national self-interest. Given that these institutions wield enormous influence in national development policies of recipient countries, donor countries often jealously guard their voting powers as a means of exerting policy influence on these institutions and, via those institution on regional member countries (Mailafia, 2010) and Daura, 2006). Experience has shown that, in practice, Nigeria has never fully exercised influence commensurate with its status and voting power. This is why Mailafia in examining Nigerian economic diplomacy from the view point of its bilateral and multilateral assistance to other African countries opines that the dissonance between Nigeria's promise of greatness and its mediocrity on most indices of economic development is reminiscent of the legend of the chained Prometheus. Ali Mazrui had observed in 1977, that with its vast resources and huge population, Nigeria was well on its way to being the first major blackpower in modern international policies. This position was corroborated by Ajulo, when he predicted that the country poised to overtake Britain and France as a world power by the end of the century. It is a profound irony that the first decade of the 21st century finds Nigeria in a far worse state than Mazrui and Ajulo had prophesized. A combination of factors such as poor economic management, weak leadership, massive corruption and ethno-religious conflicts have destroyed Nigeria's prestige and weakened its influence on African affairs.

The matrix of the international system has given rise to two separate and distinct goals: the system goals and the actor goals. The system goals are those goals that actors pursue in conjunction with one another, while the actor goals, on the other hand, are the arbitrarily defined goals arranged by every actor, as best suits its fancy and whims (Agwu, 2009). The actor goals was supposed to be the concern of every nation in its interaction be it bilateral or multilateral. For instance, it was for the sake of oil that France parted ways with the United States in the use of the coalition of the willing to bring Saddam Hussein to his heels. This explain why the United State and the United Kingdom under Margaret Thatcher refuse to impose sanction on the apartheid regime in South Africa but rather preferred the

principle of constructive engagement. Great powers only involved themselves in issues that are linked to their economic interest. Meaning that it is financial or pecuniary interests that motivate their foreign policies. Just as the billions dollar contracts softened opposition against Saddam by France, so too is Iran billions dollar liquefied natural gas pipeline to China and missile deal with Russian sway China and Russia vote that was held to merely considering having the security council deal with Iran's history of violation of the UN mandates with respect to its nuclear weapons programme (Shawn, 2006). In the same vein, until the Gulf of Guinea became an attraction because of its hydrocarbon potentials, Africa was remote from the United States interest agenda, as her interest in Africa was confined to North Africa that has geographical proximity with the Arabian Peninsula, its supplies of oil and critical connection to the Middle East conflict.

The centerpiece policy in foreign policy denotes an exclusive area of vital interest that a country emphasizes and on which it brooks no challenges from external powers or interest. But the extent to which a country delineates and successfully enforces this exclusive perimeter zone of influence is however, a function of its national powers (Agwu, 2013). At a point of its military campaign in Iraq at the wake of the unilateral invasion to unseat Saddam Hussein, the United State's foreign policy "establishment" declared that Iraq is a centerpiece of American foreign policy, influencing how the United State is viewed in the region and around the world, suggesting that the centerpiece doctrine is not limited to a country's region but rather it is dynamic and revolves with the interest of the nation. Since the conception of the Africa centerpiece foreign policy by Nigeria, the country has expended so much with little or no return at all. The consensus among scholars is that Nigeria's African centerpiece policy has remained essentially altruistic. Some even argued that it has essentially been a fruitless exercise in charity, from the technical aid corps programme to the peace keeping operations and other numerous aids in cash and kind. To sum it up, Nigeria's avuncular policies and programme in Africa were (and are) never requited.

Writing in the new Nigerian newspaper of September 28, 1986, Mohammed Haruna attributed Nigeria's unrequited favours in Angola and Zimbabwe to the country's conservative and Anglophile policies (Akinyemi, 2002). Haruna, in explaining what might have informed the MPLA government in Angola failure to acknowledge Nigeria's assistance in getting its independence and the frosty reception that Joe Garba got in Luanda, averred that in the initial days of the struggle, Nigeria, through Garba, was hardly enamoured of the MPLA, preferring instead the so-called government of national unity, and the Angolans knew it. A semblance of an ideological position was only taken by Nigeria when apartheid South Africa moved into Angola, promoting Nigeria's recognition of the MPLA. The same scenario, played out in Zimbabwe. It was Nigeria's Anglophile tendencies, for the country under General Obasanjo was for a longtime hostile to Mugabe and supportive of Nkomo, presumably on account that the British preferred him. What this mean is that Nigeria's policies in these countries were marred by the country's initial lack of decisiveness in its actions or positions, the nebulousness and clovenloof nature of its initial positions might have angered the so-called beneficiaries of its assistance. This policy ineptness was also what made Nigeria overreach itself in Chad during its 1978/79 operation "Harmony 1" intended to assist that country to restore normalcy from a

debilitating conflict (Agwu, 2009), which France capitalized on to sufficiently blackmail the country and present the operation as an occupation force to help enthrone Hissein Habre against Libya's sponsor Goukouni Quedde. Thus, not being consistent to follow through a single policy position has been the albatross of Nigeria's African centrepiece policy.

Economic Diplomacy By way of conceptual clarification, diplomacy is the management of international relations by negotiation. It refers to the process of bargaining among states in order to narrow areas of disagreement, resolve conflicts or reach accommodation on issues over which agreement cannot, otherwise be reached (Nicolson, 1959). Diplomacy is different from foreign policy. While foreign policy is the substantive aspect of external relations, diplomacy is the procedural aspect. In this restricted sense, diplomacy is the process of putting into effect the foreign policies of nation-states. It consists of strategies and tactics of implementing foreign policy. It is therefore, distinct from the substantive formulation of a nation's goals and objectives in its relations with other actors in the international system (Asobie, 2002).

Asobie look at the term economic diplomacy in two ways. First, it is the management of international relations in such a manner as to place accent on the economic dimension of a country's external relations. It is the conduct of foreign policy in such a manner as to give topmost priority to the economic objectives of a nation. It has to do with the various diplomatic strategies which a country employs in its bid to maximize the mobilization of external material and financial resources for economic development. In short, economic diplomacy means simply the diplomacy of economic development. Second, economic diplomacy may be seen as a set of strategies and tactics formulated and applied for the achievement of a fundamental restructuring of the existing international economic order. It consists of policies aimed at establishing a new international division of labour, at bringing about a radical redistribution of the pattern of ownership and control of economic resources in the international system. Such policies would entail the application of both implicit and explicit bargaining process. For Asobie, the first conception may be described as depicting the diplomacy of economic development while the second refers to the diplomacy of economic liberation.

The consensus between Ogwu and Asobie is that although Nigeria's commitment to the pursuit of economic diplomacy was officially adopted as a major element of Nigeria's foreign policy in June 1988 by the Babangida's administration, but prior to 1988, there has been proposals on the necessity for the enunciation of a strategy of economic diplomacy. For Ogwu, much of the shuttle diplomacy embarked upon by Prof. Akinyemi, Nwachukwu's predecessor as Foreign Minister, centred on selling the adjustment programme of the Nigerian government to key western officials, institutions and private sector operatives in the conviction that the goodwill of the west in such a matter as debt rescheduling and foreign investment inflows would be beneficial to the country's adjustment programme.

Ogwu and Olukoshi (2002) argued that the immediate domestic context of the decision by the military government of Ibrahim Babangida to adopt economic diplomacy as a central plank of its foreign policy was the deep seated and seemingly intractable crisis of accumulation, which has bedeviled the Nigerian economy since the beginning of the 1980s.

for them, the crisis, first officially acknowledged in 1982, was triggered off, though not essentially caused by the collapse of the early 1980s of the world oil market upon which Nigeria had come to depend on for over 90% of its annual foreign exchange receipts since OPEC oil price revolution of 1973. They equally argued that although this revenue boom resulted in a dramatic increase in the tempo of economic activities in the country, it was hardly employed to redress the host of structural distortions that underlay the post-colonial pattern of development in the country. Of these distortions, those that were particularly crucial to the economic crisis were the heavy dependence of industries on foreign inputs; the absence of inter sectorial backward and forward linkages; and the over-concentration of manufacturing investment in light processing /consumer goods production, the intermediate and capital goods sub-sectors being virtually not existence. It was both within the contexts of domestic economic crisis, structural adjustment and rapidly changing international politico-economic environment that informed or acted to shape the Nigerian decision to adopt economic diplomacy as an object of foreign policy action in the expectation that it would be an effective external compliment to internal economic reforms. The emphasis which the government sought to place on the need for foreign policy to serve the country's domestic economic needs more directly is often justified by reference to the claim that in the period since independence in 1960, Nigeria had pursued a foreign policy line that was too heavy on politics or in which the country's own needs and interest in term of economic well-being were relegated to the background. This position was corroborated by Nwachukwu when he posits that the Babangida's administration decided to switch from the political trust placed on our foreign relations to economic relations as the motive power for economic development (African Guardian, 10 June, 1991, P7).

The objectives of the Babangida's administration economic diplomacy were as follows: (a) De-emphasizing the political content of Nigeria's foreign policy which emphasizing economic consideration which have positive contribution to the development of the national economy; (b) The adoption and implementation of policy measures and strategies that will attract more foreign investment into the economy and bring about rapid industrialization and self-sufficiency in food production; (c) To reschedule Nigeria's external debt (or secure debt forgiveness) on terms that are favourable and would bring sufficient relief to the country; (d) To promote Nigeria's external trade relations with a view to widening their slope, increasing their range and diversifying their content to the country's advantage (in terms of her foreign exchange earning capacity); (e) To encourage Nigerian business groups and individuals to invest abroad with a view to widening the foreign exchange base of the economy; (f) To secure more loans, grants and technical aid from international financial institutions and friendly developed countries far much better interest rates than before; and (g) To secure the goodwill of the dominant industrial capitalist economics of the West who are in position to assist Nigeria's quest for rapid economic development (Eminue, 1994).

In order to achieve these objectives, and as part of the government's strategy of economic diplomacy, several steps were taken at the foreign policy level, complemented by a host of domestic measure. At the foreign policy level, a unit for trade and investment promotion was established in the Ministry of External Affairs, establishment of trade desks

in various key Nigerian embassies in Europe, North America and Asia, publicity on the country's natural resources endowment and investment opportunities available by information officers in the embassies and various trade and investment missions were organized by the Ministry of External Affairs in conjunction with other governmental departments to various parts of the world. At the domestic level, the measures or reforms adopted to complement that at the level of foreign policy includes, the adoption of a new investment code whose overall objective is to make the process of company incorporation simpler; the amendment of the indigenization decree of the 1970s to increase the leeway of foreign investors in the economy; the elimination of bureaucratic procedures associated with profit repatriation and dividend remittance, and the introduction of new tax relief measures (Olukoshi and Aminu, 2002).

Economic diplomacy was predicated essentially on four tools – export, promotion, inflow of direct investment, inflow of capital, and debt rescheduling – which should also form the basis of any objective evaluation. According to Eminue, studies conducted on the impact of SAP in general and economic diplomacy in particular revealed that the increase in Nigeria's non-oil export under the SAP regime has been marginal and not miraculous, that foreign investors have not been falling over one another to bring in new capital to Nigeria and therefore that the results of the efforts have been unimpressive, that very little amount of new loan had been received by Nigeria, and hence economic diplomacy has not served to accelerate the rate of net capital inflow. That observed fraudulent capital repatriation and the take-the-money-and-run mentality of foreign investors all provide a strong evidence that capital flights has occurred in the Nigerian economy under SAP. He equally argued that compared to what Mexico, Egypt and Ghana have been able to obtain, Nigeria's debt rescheduling agreements up to the end of 1990 have hardly been on terms that could be described as favourable. SAP diplomacy not only increases the extraversion of the economy but also became a veritable contraption for capital flight.

Eminue concluded by saying that any policy in which capital outflow systematically exceed capital inflow is based on faulty econometric or theoretical foundation. Such a policy which may stultify an endogenous development process and frustrate national aspirations is a sure road to recolonization and is therefore politically unacceptable since it is a contradiction of an inward-looking development strategy. Economic diplomacy under SAP rather than bring about development, growth, domestic security and public welfare, had led among other things to a situation of no profit in the industrial sector, no investment, no growth, and therefore no increase in employment at best the strategy was a constructive destruction.

The goal of attracting foreign investment remain unrealistic because it is not economic diplomacy or a humanitarian zeal that makes a capitalist invest but the possible rate of returns on investment coupled with perceptions and realities of the political climate. The logic of foreign investment is profit and profit is another name for exploitation. And so if exploitation can take place more easily without investing new capital, why should foreign investors be interested in putting more funds into an inherently unstable political system so as to ensure a growth in our export trade?

Economic diplomacy argued Adigun Agbaje (cited in Ogwu and Olukoshi) is nothing but the handmaiden in the external arena of domestic structural adjustment programme.

In order for it to achieve its objectives namely the promotion of Nigeria's export trade, the attraction of foreign investment, fresh financial inflows and the rescheduling of the country's external debt, it calls for a foreign policy orientation that is non-confrontational, heavily pro-West, and which accepts without question the hegemony of the forces of imperialism. This submission vividly captured the reason why economic diplomacy as a foreign policy tool did not translate to domestic economic development. The only new development was that the adoption of the policy strategy only signal an attempt to completely shed off the radical pan-Africanist elements in the country's post-colonial foreign policy during the oil boom years even with its broad pro-Western orientation.

Peace Keeping Operations Okolie (2010) posits that a set of reasons explains each case of Nigeria's participation, in peace-keeping in Africa. For him, some have adduced the personal interest of Nigeria's rulers, while Nigerian leaders point to national interest, humanitarian considerations, and regional stability as reasons for intervention. Nigeria's interventions through ELOMOG cannot be said to have been solely motivated by the pursuit of national interest, perhaps this partly explains the lack of follow up or "peace dividends" Nigeria never realizes. The personal interest of rulers, such as Babangida's (and Ghanaian President Rawlings) friendship with Doe, was also important. Doe actually visited Nigeria and personally appealed to Babangida to intervene to save his regime. He may also have received a plane load of arms (Vogt, 1993, Hutchful, 1999, Aguda, 1996). Infact, Okolie argued that a retired senior Nigerian diplomat indicated that the position of Nigeria's foreign ministry at the time was that the country had no business intervening in Liberia and that Nigeria lacked credibility in trying to prevent someone from seizing power with force. Aside personal motives, economic motives was also identified as the reasons for Nigeria's intervention. The agreement to exploit the Bong iron ore mine in Liberia to feed Nigeria's Ajaokuta steel mill which would have been jeopardized in the event of Doe's removed. According to Okolie, ECOMOG was used as a multi-lateral veneer for what were clearly Nigeria's unilateral objectives.

Okolie concluded by arguing that the reasons for Nigeria's participation could be broken down into two broad categories: objectives and subjective conditions. The objective conditions include Nigeria's size, population, resources, the size of its military and colonial experience (which makes it wary of allowing external powers free rein in the sub-region). The subjective condition, in a world dominated by a handful of global powers, projecting regional power status was more feasible for Nigeria than claiming world power status or projecting global power. Again, Nigerian government's fear of the so-called domino effect – that is, destabilisation spreading from hot spots to other countries in the sub region, thereby threatening regimes, including Nigeria. There was also concern over the possible influx of refugees and the pressure it would put on resources. Others argued that another reason for Nigeria's participation is external pressure, especially from the United States as it was unwilling to send troops to Africa following the humiliation of their troops in Somalia.

While Nigeria's contribution have, to a large extent, been well received externally, on the domestic front, apart from the fact that Nigeria is facing a lot of security challenges at present, there has been growing criticisms or questioning of the rationale for such extra ordinary human and materials investment, particularly when the benefit accruable do not

seem commensurate with that investment. Moreover, there is a perception that Nigeria's generosity is increasingly being taken for granted. Existing literature consists largely of personal accounts of individual peacekeeper (Ayuba, 2006); academic perspective on the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) (Vogt, 1993); historical accounts and military perspective dealing with operational matters (Oni, 2002; Ogomudia, 2007; Jonah and Zabidi, 2009); and others raising policy matters (Alli, 2009; Iliya, 2009). One common thread in the literature is a querying of the national or strategic interest served by pursuing an active peace keeping role globally. Nigeria's engagement in ECOMOG received vociferous criticism, given the magnitude of resources expended. Although actual financial expenditure in ECOMOG is controversial, President Obasanjo suggested a figure of approximately US\$8 billion (Oluyemi-Kusa, 2007), while Brigadier General Sani, the then director of peace-keeping operations, Army Headquarters, put it at US\$10 billion (Sani, 2009).

Nigeria, the backbone of the operation that lasted over a decade, provided 12 combat battalions, and air squadron. Apart from the loss of lives of officers and soldiers and equipment, it is estimated that over 800 soldiers lost their lives in that operation and were said to have been brought back and buried in the night to avoid public outcry and panic (Malu quoted in Oluyemi-Kusa, 2007). Abubakar (2009) admitted that over 70% of ECOMOG troops and 80% of funds were provided by Nigeria and that Nigeria lost economically by this. Agwai (2020) sum it up thus:

In spite of our long years of participation in peace keeping, experience has shown that Nigeria has not capitalized on human and material contribution to the UN. Even though economic consideration have not been the motivation behind Nigeria's contributing ... nothing stops her from benefiting from such efforts as some countries are known to be doing. In order to achieve these goals, Nigeria has to her ability to take part in Peace Support Operations (PSO) both in quality and level of participation.

In the words of Iliya (2009):

Nigeria is known for its robust peace keeping capacity operations and its preparedness to sacrifice for Africa. We should not continue to partake in peace operations as we have in the past and are still doing without pausing to go into self-introspection in order to come up with firm standards, principles or procedures that would guide us in choosing to participate or not in future PSOs based on our beliefs, culture, political expediency, our foreign policy thrust and our national and security interests and even our economic standing.

One glaring area in which Nigeria has failed to maximize the gains of the PSO is in the area of logistics, specifically contingent owned equipment holdings. The UN reimburses contributing countries for providing equipment according to a specified table of equipment. Agwai argues that:

If Nigeria has 10 APCs and they stay in Darfur for one month that is US\$60,000. Multiplied by one year, you get a total of US\$730,000 on the 10 APC (Armoured Personnel Carriers) alone when it comes to this, you are actually making money. I have evidence to prove that there are countries today that are virtually running their military, particularly the army based on their investment in the UN. All what you need to do is invest ... if a battalion is equipped to meet UN standards, each battalion will fetch you a minimum of US\$1.2 million a month. But if you do not invest, you cannot get anything. And this is the problem we are having in the world, particularly in Nigeria.

While Nigeria has played a vital role in international peace keeping, both under the auspices of UN, as well as ECOWAS, Nigeria itself has been immersed in conflict, either at the level of intra-elite struggles for power or conflict within the context of its troubled federal experiment. Thus while Nigeria possess the necessary potential as well as institutional structures needed for formulating a vibrant foreign policy, its constraints lie in domestic factors – namely the nature of the foreign policy elite and Nigeria’s economic dependence and vulnerability.

It appears that the Federal Military government under General Babangida and Abacha administration did not have a clear cut idea of the nature of the national interest in its decision to intervene in Liberia and Sierra-Leone. For instance, Nigeria has been a party to many peace keeping operations at the sub regional, continental and global levels, with so many sacrifices, yet no explicit or implicit post policy dividend has ever been derived from such military exertions. When the United States of American led its coalition of the willing” to invade Iraq and topple Saddam Hussein, American companies like Halliburton and the entire defence sector were positioned for the post conflict reconstructions in that country. In the case of Nigeria in Liberia and Sierra Leone under the ECOMOG, no such post-conflict reconstruction engagement ensued to the benefit of the Nigerian state, the private sector or any segment of the civil society. This is a clear example of the fruitlessness of the Nigeria’s foreign policy within the context of the national interest.

Agwu (2009) maintains that, Nigeria’s inability to take advantage of the post-conflict reconstruction in the arena it has exerted its military and other resources in peace, support operations is, however, found in the underdeveloped nature of its institutions – especially the economic institutions as compared to the United States that possesses vibrant economy. The Nigerian economy at both the public and the private sectors is completely bereft of such. Without the appropriate platforms to harness the opportunities offered by the post-conflict reconstruction, Nigeria is completely excluded, leaving the field to the developed and independent economies, which have the wherewithal. This suggests that our national interest may not be exclusively located abroad, but is rather primarily at home.

Debt Relief Nigeria has been and is still even after the debt relief, under the unbearable weight of debt crisis. That is a condition whereby a country has accumulated so much debt that it can no longer sustain the management of the debt, resulting in severe distortion and contradictions in the domestic political economy. Magbadelo (2007) opined that the widening gap between the developed countries of Northern Hemisphere and the

underdeveloped countries of the south has continued to create conditions that often warrant the search by the underdeveloped countries for foreign capital and investments. For him, the contemporary socio-economic problems of the underdeveloped countries have their roots in the historical process of their incorporation into the international economic system (i.e. the history of colonial exploitation and the concomitant dispossession of Africa in general and Nigeria in particular through the seemingly entrenched process of imperialism). The substratum of this argument is that the foundation of debt crisis were actually laid during the colonial period. This position is corroborated by Onimode (2000) when he argued that Africa (and by extension Nigeria) foreign trade (as a result of the extreme distortion and disarticulation of African colonial economy) exhibits five major deficits (such as high export dependence; high concentration on a few commodities, low and declining terms of trade; high instability of exports earning due to these factors, and a chronic balance of payments crisis) which were largely responsible for its debt crisis.

It was upon this weak economic base that Nigeria upon attaining political independence in 1960 was unable to withstand some of the post-colonial shocks-cum-internal pressures for improved living conditions by its citizens. Like Omotola and Saliu (2009) posits, as the pressure heightened, Nigeria was compelled by domestic politics to jumpstart development programmes, relying largely on external funding for implementation. At the same time, to encourage economic growth, there had to be some level of investment in the economy. This according to them, can be achieved when there is an adequate investible surplus. In the absence of this surplus, alternative means of generating funds must be devised, most often though borrowing. For these and related reason compelled Nigeria to seek and receive external funds to fill their savings and investment gaps. Borrowing, if is for funding of capital project is not bad. What is bad relates to the condition attached to debt, and the cost of management of that debt. Nigeria's external creditors have insisted on deregulation of the economy, devaluation of the local currency, political liberalization, which as has been demonstrated, actually undermined Nigeria's economy. To make matter worse for Nigeria, poor economic management at the domestic front in the form of wasteful and unprotected expenditure-cum-mismanagement of the borrowed funds by the post-colonial politicians were a major feature in Nigeria. this forces combined disastrously to lead Nigeria into a severe debt burden.

Asobie (2010) posits that under colonial rule, Nigeria borrowed on concessional terms from the World Bank, a multilateral institution. In 1960, Nigeria had an outstanding external loan of US\$824 million, the remnant of a soft loan of \$280 sourced to finance the extension of Nigeria's railway line to Bornu in Northern Nigeria. That in the 1960s and 1970s, Nigeria's external loan stock was in millions of dollars: outstanding external debt increased to \$435.2 million in 1965 and 488.8 million in 1970. By 1975 Nigeria's total external debt stock was \$559.2 million, while what was outstanding was \$349.0 million. Asobie equally argued that one remarkable feature of this period was that the loan was managed with prudence and fiscal responsibility. That things started changing when for the first time, the military government headed by Obasanjo, borrowed the huge sum of \$1 billion, at a very high interest rate; and departed from the tradition of borrowing from multilateral institutions, at concessionary rates to sourced loan from international capital

market. Consequently, Nigeria’s external debt galloped from \$762 million in 1977 to \$2,164 million in 1978, an increase of 183.9% in one year, and then to \$2,825 million in 1979. The precedent continue during the civilian regime of Shehu Shagari as Nigeria’s external debt rose from \$2.8 billion in 1979 to \$14.13 billion in 1983 and under Buhari, it increased to \$10.034 billion in 1985, rising further to \$18.63 billion within one year of the advent of Babangida (Asobie, 2010). Asobie, concluded by arguing that the rapid and huge surge in external debt stock precipitated for Nigeria an external debt crisis: debt servicing became a heavy national burden. To resolve the problem, Nigeria adopted, for many years, the policy of seeking for rescheduling of external debt repayments. This deepened Nigeria’s financial dependence on external creditors, harmed her economy and hampered her capacity to pursue her national interest as an autonomous actor in the international system. Statistics from the structure of Nigeria’s external debt stock below, shows that before the debt relief, Nigeria’s external debt reached its peak during the Babangida’s administration as the debt stock increased from US\$18.6 billion in 1986 to US\$36.06 billion in 1989.

Table 1: STRUCTURE OF NIGERIAN’S INTERNAL DEBT STOCK (US\$ MILLION)

Category	1983	1986	1989	1992	1995	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Paris Club	5,390.00	10,228.00	15,871.00	16,454.70	21,669.60	20,829.93	20,507.77	21,480.01	22,092.93	25,380.75	27,469.92
Multilateral	884.00	1,887.00	3,171.00	4,518.00	4,411.00	4,237.00	3,933.32	3,460.00	2,797.87	2,960.59	3,042.08
Non-Paris Club (Bilateral)	1,526.00	2,873.00	2,311.00	1,226.10	1,311.20	65.77	69.34	66.00	121.21	55.55	51.630
London Club	6,263.00	6,088.00	5,680.00	2,120.00	2,045.00	2,043.00	2,043.21	2,043.21	2,043.21	1,441.79	1,441.793
Promissory Notes	3,702.00	4,498.00	4,553.00	3,246.00	3,148.00	1,597.84	1,486.77	1,446.70	1,291.78	1,15.18	911.392
Total	17,765.00	25,574.00	31,586.00	27,564.80	32,584.80	28,773.54	28,040.41	28,495.92	28,347.00	30,991.86	32,916.815

Source: DMO Batabank

The consensus among scholars is that Nigeria did not faced serious obstacles in her quest to cancel its debt from her external creditors. The reasons, according to them was the high oil price environment, image of Nigeria as a corrupt nation, reputation of her public officials as poor managers of resources and Nigeria’s inability to service her external debts regularly.

The Obasanjo’s administration before securing a debt relief, adopted a number of strategies to overcome the obstacles, which includes, being more regular in external debt repayment, taking measures to reduce corruption and rent seeking, improving transparency and accountability in governance, creating and nurturing democratic institutions; instituting programme of macro-economic reform supervised by international financial institutions; engaging in active advocacy under the aegis of the commonwealth of nations, the African Union and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development. In addition to this, Chief Obasanjo toured several countries of the world, especially the industrialized western nations for debt relief. He hinged his argument on the obvious limitations and constraints of Nigeria to compete in the global arena because of her lack of domestic economic capacity, weak social infrastructure following colonial rule, low export prices and decline in terms of trade, coupled with the burden of debt servicing, economic mismanagement and lack of advanced technology. In October, 2005, Nigeria and the Paris

Club announced a final agreement for debt relief worth \$18 billion. The creditors had cancelled \$18 billion and Nigeria repaid \$12 billion. Most of the \$18 billion was registered as aid, and the deal was complete in April, 2006, when Nigeria made its final payment.

Despite securing debt relief, successive government especially the Buhari's government, have continued on a borrowing spree. By March, 2021, the Debt Management Office (DMO) revealed that the country's total public debt has hit N33.1 trillion (i.e. \$87.241 billion). While debt relief does offer some prospects for Nigeria's development, that is burden-lifting in the form of debt servicing and capital flight from Nigeria which has hindered economic growth, and by extension boost investment in human welfare especially in the areas of health, education and infrastructural development, debt relief also presents threat to Nigeria's development. This is because, conditions imposed in the past that worsened Nigeria's debt problem such as privatization, deregulation, economic reform remain largely intact within debt relief policies and concessional measures proffered to Nigeria, which debt relief typifies, have not altered the underlying inequalities in the structure and composition of the prevailing world order. Finally, it appears nothing has really changed in the country to project the debt relief as an outstanding achievement. This is because the environment that led to huge debt accumulation remain intact, as the entire 2022 budget is through borrowing. The follow-up actions after the debt relief was secured ought to have been, the elimination of the grounds for more debt accumulation.

Citizen Diplomacy Citizen diplomacy as a foreign policy thrust of the Yar'Adua administration, was announced by the then Nigeria's Foreign Minister Chief Ojo Madueke on Monday July 30, 2007 while addressing the opening ceremony of the conference. On foreign policy and Nigeria's economic development organized by the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA).

According to Akinterinwa (2010), the following were the major pillars of Nigeria's citizen diplomacy: (a) Nigeria and Nigerians should be at the centre of Nigeria's foreign policy; (b) Nigeria's foreign policy must meet her development aspiration and objectives in a manner that impacts more directly on the lives of the citizenry; (c) Nigeria's foreign policy must seek a synergy with domestic policy to ensure that the former benefits ordinary Nigerians. Indeed, the boundary between domestic policy and foreign policy has collapsed into national security for collective well-being of Nigerians; (d) In line with the servant-leadership philosophy of Mr. President, Nigerian missions abroad must actively engage the Nigerian community and Nigerian diaspora and render quality consular and other services as a matter of rights, duties and obligations; (e) Foreign policy making and implementation must be democratized to involve Nigerians from all walks of life, and not left for a small circle of experts and practitioners alone; (f) Every foreign policy endeavours must meet the litmus test of determining the extent to which it protects and advocates what is best for Nigeria and what will best benefit the Nigerian people; (g) Nigeria should be guided by the principle of reciprocity or diplomacy of consequence in its interactions with the rest of the world; and (h) Nigeria and Nigerians will not accept being criminalized by the international community simply based on the despicable conduct of a few of their nationals. Due recognition must be given to the remarkable feats and tremendous contributions of Nigeria and Nigerians to world civilization, socio-economic and scientific development, as well as international peace and security.

Some other contents of the Nigerian's foreign policy as expressed in citizen diplomacy according to Nwogbaga (2013) include the desire to ensure that: (a) Nigerians travelling or resident abroad are treated with respect by other nations, (b) The growing number of Nigerians in the diaspora invest their resources in the development of the Nigerian economy; (c) The images of Nigeria and Nigerians are improved abroad; and (d) Nigerian diaspora who seek consular assistance receive sufficient and timely diplomatic attention (Ujara and Ibietam, 2014)

Several variants could be inferred from the above pillars of citizen diplomacy. On one aspect, it connotes citizen centred diplomacy. That is, Nigerian citizen abroad is the centre of Nigeria's national interest and therefore the country's entire diplomatic machinery should be geared towards protecting his or her interest – economic welfare (Ogunsanwo, 2009). The protection of the interests of Nigerians abroad is an integral part of the diplomatic functions recognised by the Vienna convention of 1961 governing diplomatic relations. This must however be done within the limits permitted by international law. It could be inferred from the pronouncement of Ojo Madueke, that this aspect of our diplomats' duties abroad had not hitherto received the proper attention. The problem with this position, as argued Ogunsanwo, is that there are many Nigerian citizens abroad whose interests may not only be conflicting with each other but with the publicly declared objectives of the Nigerian government on specific issue.

For him, it is however reasonable to expect that the minister would not normally expect Nigerian diplomat serving abroad to jettison known government policy objectives in favour of promoting the interest of a Nigerian citizen in the country of accreditation. According to him, for instance, Nigerian pimps in Italy and Belgium may feel that their activities are legitimate since prostitution in both countries is permitted by law. Yet Nigerian diplomats in those countries cannot be expected to lend them hand as it is against government policy.

Another variant of the concept is every one is a diplomat. This implies that every Nigerian should see himself /herself as a diplomat when abroad (Ogunsanwo, 2009). That is, the promotion and protection of Nigeria's national interest abroad should not be seen as the exclusive preserve of the official Nigerian diplomats in our diplomatic missions abroad, as the task involved required all hands on deck. Meaning that any Nigerian going abroad should not take the position that there are professional diplomat who are paid to launder the country's image and consequently whose job is to give them more work to do by engaging in activities capable of damaging the country's image further but rather, Nigerian citizens abroad should have at the back of their mind, that they are our ambassadors and as such should comport themselves in such a manner as to bring only credit and good name to the country (Ogunsanwo, 2009; Nwogbaga, 2013, Ujara and Ibietam, 2014).

For Ogunsanwo, the problem with this variant, is that for it to be meaningful, everyone a diplomat would however need to go beyond the Nigerian citizen who goes abroad if the emphasis is placed on not soiling the country's image. Numerous fraudsters who utilize the facilities available in cyber cafes in Nigeria to defraud foreigners and damage the country's reputation without leaving the shores of Nigeria, will also need to be taken into consideration.

Arising from the above, citizen diplomacy is a political concept depicting the involvement of average citizens engaging representatives of another country or cause either inadvertently or by design. Sometimes called “Track Two Diplomacy”, it refers to unofficial contacts between people of different nations, as differentiated from official contacts between governmental representatives (Agbu, 2009). That is, it is a technique and strategic use of millions of Nigerians, irrespective of where they reside abroad, as Nigeria’s diplomats. That is, Nigerian should be the focus of Nigeria’s foreign policy and first beneficiaries of any external engagement (Akinterinwa, 2010). It is both the end (essence) and the means (agents or instruments) of government and that in conducting any bilateral or multilateral relations, Nigerian government should always be conscious of the basic needs, human rights, security and socio-economic welfare of the citizen (Nwogboga, 2013). It articulates what is or should be implicit as the major goal of our foreign policy. Being people-centred, it is a step further in the saying that, in both its national and international actions, the Nigerian state will be driven primarily by the need to promote the welfare and security of every Nigerian. Put together, citizen diplomacy was construed by Nigeria under late President Yar’Adua to mean that Nigeria’s foreign policy will henceforth be focused on the Nigerian citizens at home and in the diaspora and that this is not necessarily a departure from the country traditional approach to foreign relations in which Africa is taken as the centre piece, however, the policy is rebranded to focus on the citizen (Bakara, 2007), or what Folarin (2013) called citizen-centric foreign policy. That is the country will strive for a synergy between foreign policy and domestic affairs in such a way that the citizen is taken as the focus of its foreign policy.

The appraisal of citizen diplomacy under the late President Yar’Adua was not entirely satisfactory given the cases of maltreatments of Nigerians both at home and abroad. This is because, as a foreign policy thrust, citizen diplomacy was to put the interest of the Nigerians at home and abroad as the centre of the country’s national interest. This is why, one may be cynically assumed that Nigerian government has ever been more security concerned about the protection or wellbeing of every Nigerian at home let alone those outside the shore of the country, despite the introduction of citizen diplomacy. And so the question is to what extent has the Nigerian mission been helpful towards the welfare of Nigerians living abroad or how helpful have Nigerian government been to Nigerians living in Nigeria? There have been tales of how Nigerians living abroad are maltreated in countries that they are found (Dickson, 2010). There have been several instances of Nigerians in several countries languishing in prisons, on death row, deported, marginalised, detained, tortured, and most of the time, the reasons are unknown (Dickson, 2010; Ujara and Ibietan, 2014). This is not to say that every Nigerian is a saint. For instance, new figures obtained exclusively from the Nigeria Drugs Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) shows that hundreds of Nigerians are on death row, while others are serving various jail terms in several countries abroad. According to the figures, 73 Nigerians are presently on death row in Malaysia convicted on drug trafficking related offences. In Sao Paulo, Brazil, 144 Nigerians are serving various prison term for drug related offences. In Thailand, 650 Nigerians are also serving various terms following their conviction for drug related and other offences. In Saudi Arabia, 23 Nigerians remained on death roll for drug related offences. They were convicted for contravening the narcotic and psychotropic

substances that are punishable by death. They were arrested between 2016 and 2017 at King Abdul-Aziz International Airport, Jeddah and Prince Muhammad Bin Abdul-Aziz International Airport Madinah having concealed the banned substances in their rectums (THISDAY August 25, 2019). Countries such as Malaysia, Brazil and Thailand where drug trafficking is prevalent have been having discussion with the government of Nigeria seeking ways to stop traffickers from coming to their countries. The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) require Nigeria government to give clearance to its citizens before they apply for visa.

Apart from the scenario painted above, more often than not, there have been cases of unfair treatment of Nigerians. In 2010, some Nigerians in Togo, were detained unjustly and treated with harsh and severe inhuman conditions for offences they did not commit except for being Nigerians (Ujara and Ibietan, 2014; Akinterinwa, 2010). Also in 2010, of over 200 Nigerians that were on death row; 18 persons were killed in Tripoli and Benghazi with exclusive refusal to part with their identities (Akinterinwa, 2010). For Ujara and Ibietan, no Nigerian is immune to this maltreatment and there is almost no limit to those who inflict this ill-treatment on Nigerians. The Afrophobic widely known as xenophobic attacks in South Africa especially the May 2008 was horrendous. Nigeria's citizens and their businesses were the target in 2008 attack which claimed over 62 lives and displaced several others. Many lost their properties and their shops were looted, which is an indication of an orchestrated attack of business of Nigerians in South Africa (Michael and Mohamad, 2017; chairman and piper, 2012; Alli, 2010). Besides cases of harassment, intimidation and brutalization by South Africa police and security agencies, many Nigerians were killed in extra judicial circumstances. This according to Michael and Mohamad concludes that if there are enough jobs opportunities in Nigeria for employable citizens, the number of Nigerian clamouring to travel to South Africa or other foreign countries for employment opportunities would have been minimal let alone exposing Nigerians nationals to hazard and horrendous treatments. The internal contradictions in Nigeria towards the drive of citizen diplomacy, which are contributing facts for ill-treatment of Nigerians and image crisis abroad till date has not be addressed which imply that Nigerian government seems not to understand the domestic content of its foreign policy.

The inhuman treatment meted out on Nigerians abroad also replicates itself right here in Nigeria by fellow Nigerian citizens. That is back home, the average Nigerian is treated badly by the authorities. A good example is the Nigerian Police Force vested with the responsibility of maintaining internal peace and security have in all ramifications become agents of terrorism engaging in extra-judicial killing, arrest, and detention of innocent citizens, extortion of multifarious dimension and brutality (Dickson, 2010). There are reported cases of police officers escorting their suspect to the bank or ATM, forcing them to part away with cash, and after which they are murdered in extra-judicial circumstance. Even the officer on routine patrol do gunned down bus or taxi cab drivers who allegedly fail to either pay money or to stop for check. In 2014, Amnesty International report indicted some security operatives of extra-judicial killings in some parts of the North-East, where the Army is battling with insurgency (National Human Rights Commission, 2016). This is just few in thousand of cases of citizen ill-treatment by the Nigerian security agent. Against

this backdrop, citizen diplomacy as a foreign policy thrust of the Yar'Adua's administration didn't translate to economic development of the Nigerian state at best it was only to lauder, rebrand and positive projection of the country's international image. The chronic inability on the part of the country's leadership to foster a dividend yielding foreign policy that is sufficiently people-oriented or citizen-centric, suggest that Nigerian leaders are yet to appreciate the fact that the articulation of the national interest of any nation is inexorably dualist in character in the sense that it involves first, the resolution of the conceptual problem and second, the consideration of the strategy for its attainment. That is, the distinction between the substantive national interest on one hand, and the procedure or approach for its realization on the other. Nigeria's foreign policy has been misguided by lack of a precise conception or definition of what the national interest is, and the means towards its accomplishment. This confusion over what constitutes Nigeria's national interest and the procedure for its realization vividly explains why Nigeria's foreign policy, since independence, has witnessed enormous cost without any corresponding dividends.

Conclusion

The study appraised thematically Nigeria's foreign policy since 1960 till 2015. The justification for adopting this approach is that instead of reviewing how each Nigerian government undertook the conduct of Nigeria's foreign policy, the performance of all the governments since independence till 2015 would be collectively set in row against the common issues and shares views so that it would be possible to judge the practical realities against the presumptions. For this purpose, the study is only concern with the high point of Nigerian foreign policy from independence till 2015 and how it has translated to economic security and prosperity of the Nigerian state. The study concluded by demonstrating that Nigeria and its past leaders have consistently been pursuing her domestic development goals independently of its foreign policy so that the nation's foreign policy has not been translated into a source of national domestic development; consequently the nation suffered serious development challenges. Given this position, it is apparent that there will be a clash between the assumed primary aim of foreign policy vis-à-vis external roles and domestic livelihood.

The way forward is that Nigeria's foreign policy should be more inward focused, aimed at adding value to Nigeria's development. That is, the Nigerian people should be the focus of Nigeria's foreign policy, which should be tailored towards energizing the domestic economy, creating jobs an generally reducing unemployment.

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