Socialscientia Journal of the Social Sciences and Humanities

Political Leadership Styles and the Management of Violent Conflicts in Nigeria: A Review of Jos Experience and Application of Necessary Force

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Abstract

This paper interrogates the threat of internal violent conflict in nation-states specifically Nigeria, from the perspective of political leadership styles in its management. The pivot of inquiry herein rests mostly on theoretical paradigms with focus on Jos, the capital city of Plateau State, in North-Central Nigeria. The objective and added interest herein are the political leadership styles – using maximum, minimum and necessary force, in terms of what decisions were taken in the periods of collective violence and why. Relying on secondary data, this study follows the theoretical explanations between the political leadership styles used and the persistence of violence. One fundamental finding and argument of this study is that the Nigerian political leadership style of violent conflict management has featured stereotypes in terms of early warning, conflict build up, escalation and the post-conflict aftermath. Put succinctly, the poor legislative and policy reaction to violent conflict, has been undermined by the absence of standard operating procedures (SOPs) on early warning signals, weak institutional coherence and capacities in conflict transformation as it borders conflict and post-conflict situations. This paper recommends that the governance superstructure of accountability, trust, responsiveness and authority should be the basis for applying necessary, minimum and maximum force in the management of violent conflict in Nigeria within global best practices as the 'Responsibility to Protect' (R2P).
Keywords: Conflict transformation, Collective violence, Maximum force, Maximum force, Necessary force, Political leadership style

Introduction

In Africa and other developing countries, enormous resources have been committed to reduce violent conflicts in the last five decades of the post-colonial era. Global Trends Report (2014) identifies countries with protracted internal armed conflicts for more than ten years covering 1946-2013: Afghanistan (33 years), Colombia (36), D.R. Congo (19), India (59), Iraq (31), Israel (46), Myanmar (63), Nigeria (14 from 1999 and still counting), Pakistan

(14), Philippines (39), Somalia (23), Sudan (28), Turkey (27), and the Sri Lanka protracted civil war with the Tamil separatists ended in 2009 after almost 30 years amongst others.

Nigeria, which is the focal point here, has been described by Osaghae and Suberu (2005) as the most deeply divided state in Africa. They posit that Nigeria's population of over 180 million people and over 350 ethno-linguistic groups within a political and historical paradigm makes this division pronounced. Nigeria's first major violent internal conflict after political independence on 1st October 1960 was the secessionist Biafra civil war fought between 1967 and 1970. The historical causes can be traced to the socio-political build-ups to Nigeria's political independence. This can be seen in the ethno-regional politics of the 1950s by the political leadership and subsequent political and administrative events after 1960 which culminated into the first military forceful takeover of government from the elected civilian regime on January 15th, 1966. Followed up with another counter-military coup on 29th July of the same year.

The attempts by the Nigerian political leadership at violent internal conflict management, even with international inputs, failed as the initial minimum and necessary force used by the Federal Government through negotiations, offers of compromises and police action, culminated into a civil war with huge consequences as maximum force came to bear.

In retrospect, the three regions which made up the Nigeria federation in the 1950s before independence were as follows: northern, eastern, western and later mid-western regions created in 1963. They had rivalry perceived initially by historians and scholars as "healthy" in terms of provision of infrastructure and vast development projects and policies to cover the agricultural, health, education, and other sectors of their regions. A classic example was the establishment to three universities in these regions almost at the same time – University of Nigeria, Nsukka (1960 7th October), Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife (October 1961), Ahmadu Bello University Zaria, (1962 4th October).

Nonetheless, the political leadership of these regions was limited to their regions in terms of influence and acceptance and this pattern and default fault-lines has evolved as Nigeria's political culture and socialization. Subsequently, internal violence which has defined the Nigerian state was sown within this context before the civil war in 1967.

Fearon, J.D., and Laitin, D.D., (2006) note that there were 124 riots emanating from political, ethnic and religious dimensions in the shape of collective violence reported. These internal violent conflicts bordered the 1964 general elections, the 1965 regional elections and the 1966 ethnic pogrom against the Igbo ethnic group (ethnic cleansing cum genocide) covering the western, northern regions and the Benue-Plateau provinces of Tiv land within the middle-belt axis of the northern region.

The political leadership style in the management of these violent internal conflicts suggest stereotypes by the use of police and military action and lacking the statesmanship of restorative and retributive justice to prevent future occurrence. Elaigwu (2005) cited in (Nwanegbo, 2012) corroborate that between 1980 and 2005 Nigeria recorded over 140 incidents of internal violent conflicts with over 100 occurring between 1999 and 2005 and many more thereafter.

Most violent internal conflicts in Nigeria are driven by ethnic identity, social, political and religious coloration within a web of several contestations and factors. In the year 2000

upward, the northern geo-political zones witnessed the Sharia crisis in Kaduna State, (Northwest), with religious violent conflicts spreading across majority of northern Nigeria's capital cities of Bauchi, Kano (North East and West) and the violent insurgency of 'Boko Haram' in Borno, Yobe, Bauchi, Kano Adamawa, Taraba, Gombe, Kano, Kaduna and the federal capital Abuja (Nwanegbo, 2012, Kwaja, 2009). As earlier noted, the violent internal conflict management strategies adopted by the political leadership at the federal, state and local government level are curative rather than preventive in nature as portrayed in their ineffective and inconclusive peace building outcomes.

The theoretical arguments of Niccolò Machiavelli (McCormick, 2012:2) on political leadership in his work, *The Prince,* suggest interpretive insights into the efficacy of the Nigeria political leadership styles in internal violent conflict management. This treatise of state craft posits that it is better to be feared than to be loved:

> … men have less scruples in offending one who is beloved than one who is feared, for love is preserved by the link of obligation which, owing to the baseness of men, is broken at every opportunity for their advantage but fear preserves you by a dread of punishment which never fails.

Hence, the use of force such as curfews, military actions as a first and last resort in the conflict management strategy of most political leaders in Nigeria have followed the Machiavelli style with weak reconciliation and social justice mechanisms.

Methodology
This paper is a desk research. It uses qualitative narrative/inquiry along theoretical lens. The secondary sources of data were generated from an array of both published and unpublished materials such as newspapers, journal articles, and reports of panels' investigations and commissions of inquiry and online sources.

Concept of Leadership and Political Leadership
The concept of leadership though most times broad in description and interpretation, is easier grasped in terms of action and inaction. This is obvious given the understanding that the extent of progress or otherwise of any given existence (i.e., man or animals) is predicated on leadership. For clarity the words, 'Lead', 'Leader' and 'Leadership all point to one direction: being ahead and the head. Chemers (1997) further described leadership as "a process of social influence" in which one person can enlist the aid and support of others in the accomplishment of a common task.

This invariably underscores the leadership connection with followership towards the meeting the challenges of modern societies. Brysk (2002), Masciulli & Day (2006) succinctly observed that political leadership and followership account for significant differences across and within individual nation states in responding to both newer global problems and traditional governance issues. It is within this context that a range of ideas are put forward to highlight this phenomenon. Most times, societies recognizing leadership as the beacon of hope, development and sustenance have sought to understand the energy and driving force of 'good' and 'bad' leadership. Put differently, the ancient query; "are great

leaders born or made"? The answer is subject to numerous underlining factors such as the societal arrangement, institutions and socio-cultural value system in practice.

Hence, Elcock (2001) raises the argument of George Fredrick Hegel (1822) and Thomas Carlyle (1841) that world historical figures or 'Great Men' emerge to change the course of history when they are needed. For Hegel, such 'world historical individuals' are the chosen vessels of the 'spirit' but they may also act from selfish or wicked motives (Plamenntz, 1963, Vol.II:205, cited in Elcock, 2001). Such theories he notes have also been used to justify the actions of leaders who have perpetrated horrors required by their visions, such as Adolf Hitler, Joseph Stalin whose projects transcended all the barriers not just of decency but of simple humanity (Bullock, 1990 cited in Elcock, 2001).

However, the law of duality must be kept in mind as one man's hero (leader) maybe another's villain. For example, Stalin's forced collectivization and industrialization of the former Soviet Union in the late 1920s and early 1930s served both to bring about economic change and to reinforce his personal hold on power. However, these aims were achieved at the cost of untold millions of deaths among the populace. Likewise, Moa Zedong known popularly as "chairman Mao whose Communist revolution has sustained China to their "golden age". Emphatically, the concept of political leadership is difficult to define, because it is dependent on institutional, cultural and historical contexts and situations, in general and specific terms (Blondel 1987; Wildavsky 2006) but it is hard to deny that "everything rises and falls with the leader".

Classification of Conflicts

Conflict in this paper is examined from the perspective of collective violence. This is premised upon the nature and character of group violence in the Nigerian situation. Collective violence referred to as group violence, according to Staub (1999) requires cross-disciplinary dimensions which is mandatory to understand its dynamics. Staub adds that, individual psychology, group psychology, culture, social institutions, the social conditions in a country, the political system, and the system of international relations all have roles in both causation and prevention.

Advisedly, multidisciplinary scholars posit that leaning on theories within singular disciplines should be avoided to attain the required robustness in putting a construct as seen in political leadership styles and violent conflict management here. Within this trajectory, Moller (2003:3) provides insight into conflict typology through a segmentation of conflict, ranging from the international level of wars to the inter-personal level of disputes (Table 1). Galtung (2009:19) in his approach to unveiling conflict within diverse paradigms explains conflict from the dimension of the pursuit of goals, drives and consumption.

Here, life is perceived as being manifold and human life perhaps even much more so, where the whole gamut of life is the pursuit of goals. This may not be a conscious but a reflex reaction whether positive or negative. "Goals connote sign-posts and drives which an individual or set of individuals (collectivity) strive to achieve and enshrined in a pattern of life - culture". Thus, when "goals" envisage and encounter threats, conflicts arise in varying degrees of escalation and de-escalation. Galtung further argues that upon consummation of individual and group goals i.e., consumption, the goal changes if not

reinforced. Using the actor model, Medler, et.al (2008:2) concurs those actors being one or more individuals, have their own goals and are participants in a conflict that include, wealth, power and prestige.

Within this context, actors working towards similar goals interact and have conflict solidarity. This explains mergers and acquisition in the corporate world as well as coalition governments, economic regionalization and even the outcomes of conflicts, be it violent or non-violent and as means to an end regarded as conflict transformation. However, the state actors often times view non-state actors at cross-purpose with their political and socio-economic intents rather than partners.

Azar (1990) posits that complexities of rapid change have raised the stakes in the approaches to the conceptualization and context of conflict. Here, he draws attention to a tendency to understand conflict through a rather rigid dichotomy of 'internal' and 'external' dimensions without confluences. Thus, the sociologists, anthropologists and psychologist preoccupied with the 'internal' (civil wars, insurgencies, revolts, coups, protests, riots, revolutions, genocides, new wars, etc.) and international relations scholars with the 'external' (interstate wars, crises, invasions, border conflicts, blockades, etc.).

Table 1. CLASSIFICATION OF CONFLICTS

Types of conflicts	International	Transnational	Intra-state	Inter-personal
Violent	War and other Armed conflicts – organized crimes	Military Intervention Support for armed insurgents	Civil wars , organized crimes, Armed Insurgencies Genocide	Wife battering Child abuse, Murder. Physical injury to cause harm Gender violence
Non-violent	Political disputes Trade war/disputes, cold war	Sanctions Diplomacy	Political struggle, social movements	Verbal disputes Discrimination

Source: Moller, 2003

Violent Conflict Management

Governments typically are compelled to serve their citizens within a framework of a dual relationship which expects citizens to fulfill a set of obligations known as a social contract. Conflict management is one of such duties of government. Conflict management seeks to curtail the negative effect of conflicts on an organization or society through tested mechanisms that ensure damage control. According to Rahim (1992:16; 2002:208), the aim of conflict management is to enhance learning and group outcomes and further describes conflict management as "the interactive process manifested in incompatibility, disagreement, or dissonance within or between social entities". The concepts of conflict Prevention, Conflict management, and resolution have as usual consensus definition issues as well as the appropriateness required to place these concepts in proper context, for example crisis management.

Necessary, Minimum and Maximum Force

These troikas of force are the legs often deployed to manage violent conflict and even sometimes non-violent depending on the threat assessment outcome and even engaging exaggeration dynamics to achieve parochial leadership ends. Ideally, conflict management and crisis management entails tactics that are enforced when violent conflict is deemed likely (conflict management) or imminent (crisis management), but before a situation escalates into war. Conflict management can be enforced, as soon as the conflict has been identified by the actors, as an effort to reduce tension and prevent further escalation (Swanstrom and Weissman, 2005)

The need to deconstruct and reconstruct the necessary, minimum and maximum force concept enables us to face realities that bring us to the fact that this cannot be linear in the actual process. This is coupled with another interesting aspect of political actors and the military out there in the field of battle in terms of order of battle, coherence and outcomes similarly seen in post-conflict accountability and transitional justice, in which political leaders are held liable within the governance elements of 'trust', 'responsiveness' and 'authority' in the use and manipulation of "necessary", "minimum" and "maximum" force in the management of violent conflict.

Throwing more light, maximum force referred to also as "deadly" or "lethal" force depicts any force or threat of force that reduces the freedom of an action, so that, in performing it, the person or group acts less freely than they might have done. This is not just reducing freedom through curfews, 'tear gas' (pepper spray), arrest and state of emergency declaration as necessary and minimum (reasonable) force would require but outright killing for good cause without question and judicial trial (author's emphasis).

Theoretical Framework

The Protracted Social Conflict (PSC) theory propounded by Edward Azar (1990) forms the basis of our analysis. Azar used the term protracted social conflict (PSC) to designate the type of on-going and seemingly irresolvable conflict, Ryan cited in Azar (1990) further stressed that protracted social conflict "are conflicts between ethnic groups which have been going on for sometimes, and which appear to be unsolved". Azar explains that the root of Protracted Social Conflict is found at interlocking nexus of underdevelopment, structural deprivation, economic and psychological, communal or identity cleavages.

This implies that there is no single cause for or dimension to protracted social conflict. Many factors account for its emergence and prolonged nature, the factors may include economic, political, institutional, cultural, geographical and colonial. This conflict usually occurs when a specific group is discriminated against by those in authority or deprived of their daily basic needs based on communal identity. He argued that it is at this juncture of actual physical and psychological deprivation that structural victimization burst into hostile and violent actions (Azar, 1990).

The Elements of Protracted Social Conflict Theory: This theory consists of four elements that capture the phenomena, they are: communal content, deprivation of human needs, governance and state roles and international linkages. (a) *Communal Content*: This element explains the fact that communities involved in conflict do so to create their identity groups,

which points to the importance of identity groups, racial, ethnic or religious. According to this view, if a society is characterized by multi-ethnic composition, protracted social conflict is likely to occur. Azar further notes, 'that it is the relationship between identity groups and the state, which is the core problem, this condition also explains the community's reliance on their social groups. He holds that in order to overcome this situation, national identity must be stressed over individual interest. This element clearly explains the nature of indigene- settler crises in Jos city Plateau State. (b) *Deprivation of Human needs:* Emphasizing on the importance of human needs as a prime factor necessitating conflict in the society, Azar (1990) argued that deprivation of any kind can lead to aggression. For him, deprivation; it could also imply deprivation in terms of relevance of cultural and religious belief. Deprivation could yet mean degree of social accessibility of the minority groups, like the access to market and political institutions, or recognition of their communal existence.

To a large extent, Azar's point of view is relevant in this paper, as it can facilitate understanding on a broader scale the needs and crucial factors responsible for the Jos identity conflict. (c) *Governance and State's Role:* the third element as contained in Azar's protracted social conflict explains the fact that, government is endowed with the authority to govern and use force where necessary to regulate society, to protect citizens and provide collective goods, the government plays a leading role in the satisfaction of minority and identity groups interest. It is expected that government is impartial and unbiased such that it will eliminate the dominance of one group over others. He concludes by suggesting that there is need to change government structure so that all citizens are equally cared for and equally represented without bias or corruption (Azar, 1990). (d) *International Linkages:* Azar (1990) defined international linkages as political-economic relations of dependency with the international economic system, and/or global pattern which often exacerbate the denial of needs of certain groups, distorting domestic political and economic systems through the realignment of subtle coalition of international capital state.

In summary, protracted social conflict occurs when groups are deprived of satisfaction of their basic needs such as land and political power. While the role of state (federal, state and local governments) whose responsibility is to regulate and manage the conflict respond in a pattern that may exacerbate the conflict. The outcome is usually a very pessimistic one, leading to underdevelopment through destruction of physical and social structures.

Applicability of the theory Edward Azar's protracted social conflict theory clearly explains the subject matter, as the elements such as communal content and deprivation of human needs explain the cause of conflict in a given community. Governance and state role depicts the capacity of government in the management of conflict in any given society, that's the role of regulating and controlling the activities of populace to ensure peaceful coexistence. The theory advocates a holistic approach in managing conflicts among groups or communities.

An overview of Jos city, Plateau State Experience

Most times the political leadership capacity to contain and positively shape the dynamics arising from violent conflicts in divided societies is a significant measure of its relevance. One of such dynamics is the ethnic - "natives versus settlers" identity struggle in the Jos city, Plateau State, north-central Nigeria.

The entrenchment and complexities of religion, ethnicity and elite interest connects with the 'bigger' picture – 'Nigeria'. The political leadership in Nigeria as with other nation-states, operates within constitutional and legal framework with obligations to manage these competing interests for the "greater good". Boin and Hart (2003) cited in Morrel and Hartley (2006:485) notes further that, peoples' expectations of what leaders can provide may differ widely from what is actually possible given legal, logistical and practical constraints. Hence, these different challenges show how the nexus between leaders, stakeholders, groups and the electorate are complex and interdependent (Morrel and Hartley, 2006). The task of the Executive governor in the State, as political leader is outlined as the citizens' expectations in the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Promulgation) 1999 No. 24 LL 206. The oath of office of Governor of State appears below:

> I . . . do solemnly swear/ affirm that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to the Federal Republic of Nigeria; that as the Governor of . . . State. I will discharge my duties to the best of my ability, faithfully and in accordance with the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the law, and always in the interest of the sovereignty, integrity, solidarity, well-being and prosperity of the Federal Republic of Nigeria; that I will strive to preserve the Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of state policy contained in the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria; that I will prejudice the authority lawfully vested in the president of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and so as not to endanger the continuance of Federal Government in Nigeria; that I will not allow my personal interest to influence my official conduct or my official decisions; that I will to the best of my ability preserve, protect and defend the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria; that I will abide by the code of conduct contained in the Fifth Schedule to the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, that in all circumstances, I will do right to all manner of people, according to law, without fear or favor, affection or ill-will; that I will not directly or indirectly communicate or reveal to any person any matter which shall be brought under my consideration or shall become known to me as governor of . . . State, except as may be required for the due discharge of my duties as Governor; and that I will devote myself to the service and well-being of the people of Nigeria. So, help me God.

The aftermath of this political leader's "oath of office" when primed against the governance quartet of trust, authority, accountability and responsiveness leave many rhetorical questions seen in the causalities between groups and fallouts in the use of maximum (deadly/lethal) force. Put succinctly, the judicial commission report (2001:12) for example had identified two identified two events as constituting the immediate causes of the crisis that occurred in Jos between the 7th and 12th of September 2001

The summarized account is: (a) The attempt and effort by one miss Rhoda Haruna Nyam on Friday, 7th September, 2001, to pass through a road at Congo-Russia area of Jos where a Muslim congregation had gathered for their Jumaat prayers and the funeral and the congregation refusal to allow her the right of passage. (b) The appointment of Alhaji Mukhtar Usman Mohammed (A Muslim viewed by "natives" as "settler" in Jos-Plateau State) as the coordinator of the National Poverty Eradication Programme (NAPEP) of the federal government for Jos North L.G.A. The Human Rights Watch (HRW) Report (2013) corroborates that the struggle for "ownership" and political power in Jos intensified following Nigeria's return to civilian rule in 1999. Christian indigenes were elected, State governor and chairman of Jos North local government. But the Christian indigene leaders were angered when the federal government in June 2001, appointed a Hausa resident from Jos to fill a federal government post in Jos

HRW Report (2013) added: They natives/indigenes insisted that the position should be filled only by an indigene and some threatened violence if his appointment was not rescinded. When he attempted to resume his post in August 2001, death threats and 'xenophobic' messages were posted at his office. Tensions were further inflamed by leaflets circulated in the name of a Hausa-Fulani group threatening violence against Christian indigenes. Despite the warning signs the police and the State government did little to defuse the situation… violence erupted in September 2001.

Table 2 LONGITUDINAL TIMELINE OF VIOLENCE IN JOS AND PLATEAU STATE

S/N	Year	Event	Groups involved	Causality/ Impact	Political Leadership - peace building initiatives/style in terms of Judicial Inquiry
1.	2001	Violent Conflict	Natives vs. Settlers	500-2,000	2001 Justice Niki Tobi Report
2.	2002 - 2004	Violence & State of Emergency	Natives vs. Settlers	500-2,000	Justice Jummai Sankey, 2002 Report; Rev. (Dr.) Pandang Yamsat, 2002 Report
3.	2003	Violent Conflict	Natives vs. Settlers	N/A	Justice Felicia Dusu 2003 Report
4.	2004	Violent Conflict	Natives vs. Settlers	N/A	Plateau State Peace conference,2004
5.	2008	Violent Conflict	Natives vs. Settlers	850	2008/2009 Justice Bola Ajibola Report 2008/2009 Gen. Emmanuel Abisoye (Rtd) Report
6.	2010	Violent Conflict	Natives vs. Settlers	522	Solomon Lar 2010, Presidential Advisory Report on Jos Crisis

Source: Geneva Declaration 2011 and compiled 2018 by author

The timeline summary of violent conflict depicted in table 2 provides insight and pathways for current and future analyses in the Jos city violent conflict in terms of peace-building initiative based on various judicial commissions of inquiry and tied to restorative and retributive justice in terms of the use of necessary, minimum and maximum force. This

suggests furthermore, the inability of both government and the gamut of state actors within institutional coherence of non-state actors, to address long standing grievances of the various communities especially as it borders "indigeneity" in Nigeria. This has put up the reoccurring question that the political leadership based on responsiveness, trust, authority and accountability paradigms have not ameliorated the century long 'settler's and indigenes conflict in Jos city and beyond e.g., the Rwanda experience.

The identity politics in Jos city has two groups, contesting for supremacy with the political leadership contending with the cards of exclusion and inclusion amongst the groups. These are the Christian Afizere, Anaguta and Berom dominant amongst other ethnic groups regarded as 'indigenes' as they wield control of the political apparatus of the state. While the second group is known as the 'Jasawa' (Jarawa-distorted version) people comprising the Muslim and Hausa ethnic group majorly. Ostien drawing inference on the leadership style and posture of Dariye referred to an interview in March 2004 by Dariye, in which "he suggested that the demands of Jos Hausa community to be recognized as 'indigenes' might be grounds for evicting them from the state altogether (HRW 2006: 45):

> From the on-set, let me say it again, as I have said it before that Jos, capital of Plateau State, is owned by the natives. Simple. Every Hausa man in Jos is a settler whether he likes it or not. In the past, we might not have told them the home truth, but now we have… They are here with us, we are in one state but that does not change the landlord/ settler equation, no matter how much we cherish peace... Our problem here today is that… the tenant is becoming unruly; you serve him a quit notice...This unruly group must know that we are no longer willing to tolerate the rubbish they give us. The days of "over tolerance" are gone forever. All of us must accept this home truth.

Furthermore, the 18 May 2004 broadcast declaring a state of emergency in Plateau state by the Federal government (The central government) in which the then President Obasanjo, blamed much of the reoccurring violent conflict in Jos city on governor Dariye corroborates:

> As at today, there is nothing on ground and no evidence whatsoever to show that the state governor has the interest, desire, commitment, credibility and capacity to promote reconciliation, rehabilitation, forgiveness, peace, harmony and stability. If anything, some of his utterances, his lackadaisical attitude and seeming uneven handedness over the salient and contending issues present him as not just part of the problem but also as an instigator and a threat to peace (…) His personal conduct and unguarded utterances.

Another dimension is the evidence from the Judicial Commission reports and other sources on the Jos City violent conflict. The 2001 PLSG-JJC report (pp.175), expatiate the angle of minimum force:

There are nine (9) Divisions in Jos metropolis… there is no Division that has up to five (5) Walkie-Talkies out of which a sizeable number are out modeled and unserviceable… that there is an average of 150 policemen in each Division… no single lorry in the command… the deployment of men from Division of the scenes of riot was very cumbersome, problematic and hazardous.

This was against the apparent Jos city population of 821,618. The police, military and security services administration and control by the Nigeria constitution, exclusively is by the central government. The police by constitution are the first responders on "law and order" matters in the state. This suggests an obvious slippery path, as the requisite coherence demanded by multiple government agencies with overlapping functions and driven by political leadership predisposed by group and political interest, cannot display the synergies needed to stem community mass violence and address grievances. Further to this latitude was the overt relationship between the governor and the Commissioner of Police. Oral evidence emanating from the PLSG-JJC (2001:172) Report states:

…the Commissioner of Police was not invited to the meeting, and neither was the representative of the General Officer Commanding (GOC) Army nor the Director of the State Security Service (SSS) and was therefore not privy to the discussions at the meeting and as such a golden opportunity to assess and gauge the apprehensions, fears and intentions of the leaders (groups in conflict) met by the Governor was thus lost…

In addition, and against this backdrop within this evidence: "…the then Secretary to the State Government described the Police Commissioner as "totally unreliable" … the police were unable to contain the crisis and that was why the Army and Air force had to be called in to save the situation…" The root cause of maximum force use comes to the fore here. This apparent pattern affirms a leadership style that reinforces reoccurrences as seen in the violence timelines from year 2001 onwards. The extreme response through maximum force by the Nigeria armed forces at the centre contrast 'rules of engagement', a valuable integral part of transparency in post-conflict accountability. The SOPs – Standard Operating Procedures by the armed forces and managed by the political actors as a template for engaging violent conflict suggest poor security architecture-synergy and out datedness in many fronts.

Common knowledge in procedural template requires actions as: use of persuasion and dialogue –verbal warning (soft and hard style), non-lethal force as barricade to restrict mobilization, communication shut down, arrest of principal group leaders as against use of tear-gas, baton, water cannon and rubber bullets etc. These come before the "real deal", maximum force. Evidently, and to such a degree, the political leadership capacity to contain and positively shape the dynamics arising from conflicts in divided societies is a significant measure of its relevance, hence the sometimes desperation to put down violent conflict at all 'cost'. The timelines of several violence reoccurrences seen in table 2 affirms this argument.

Discussion

The table below summarizes the salient findings, which argues that the use of necessary, minimum and maximum (deadly/lethal) force by the agents of the political leadership (the police and armed forces) have added immensely to the causality levels. This requires a rethink in the direction of 'public interest' and public policy factored on accountability, trust, responsiveness and authority as expected in political leaders. This discourse in this section highlights and summarizes the crux of the matter.

Table 3: POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND GOVERNANCE

Category	Findings
Political leadership accountability	Weak minimum/necessary force response (ignoring early warning signs and absence of security "boots on the ground"); misuse of maximum force by the security apparatus; extra judicial killings depicting the absence or weak violent conflict response template seen in high causalities without accountability even in the face of evidence seen in the PLSG-JJC Reports and other sources
Political leadership trust	Political leadership taking sides (partisan style) with groups based on ethnicity/religion/party affiliations; contrasting oath of offices to protect lives and properties regardless of persons involved.
Political leadership responsiveness	Weak peace building in post-conflict to attain conflict transformation, time lapse to implement judicial inquiry into violence. i.e., the 2004 Jos Peace conference unachieved objectives were not followed up by counterstrategies to reach out to the grassroots (ethnic militia base), middle class (mobilizers) and upper class (elite/sponsors) in a process that buttress the sanctity of citizens life. The outcome of political leadership style of silence contrasts the expectation of response.
Political leadership authority	Poor coherence amongst political actors (Federal and State government) manifested in "small-minded" rivalry amongst security agencies, politicians and breeding 'spoiler' syndrome with group interest superseding public interest. The rival display suggests the calculated attempt to adopt chaos as a style to maintain, sustain their political cleavages and covertly indulge in the lucre of state wealth dominance as security votes statutorily are not accounted for "security reasons".

Source: Author's compilation, 2020

Conclusion and Recommendations

This paper focused on the impact of political leadership styles in violent conflict management, in terms of the use of necessary, minimum and maximum force. This was with specific reference to collective violence experiences in Jos city the capital of Plateau State, located in North-Central Nigeria.

One fundamental finding and argument of this paper is that the Nigerian political leadership style of violent conflict management has featured stereotypes in terms of early warning, build up and escalation. Put succinctly, the poor legislative and policy reaction to violent conflict has been undermined by the absence of standard operating procedures (SOPs) on early warning signals, weak institutional coherence and capacities in conflict

transformation as it borders conflict and post-conflict situations. This paper recommends that this must rest on the governance superstructure of accountability, trust, responsiveness and authority (Cloete, 2003; 2010).

Furthermore, an aspect of interest was the extent of collateral damage manifested in the misuse of state security apparatus as it borders "minimum force", "necessary force" and "maximum force" (RaD Report, 2011). The implications are aptly observed at the political leadership attempts and obvious use of the (Bellamy, 2008; Cottey, 2008; and Stamnes, 2009) 'Responsibility to protect' (R2P). This comes in terms of protection of its population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity at different times, of which they have succumbed to inaction without the appropriate 'blowback 'for political leaders who fail as entrenched in advanced societies when required and at other times when they have put up extreme reactions counterproductive to long-term reconciliation and peacebuilding.

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