

USE OF STATE RESOURCES IN FINANCING ELECTIONEERING CAMPAIGNS IN NIGERIA: AN APPRAISAL OF THE 2015 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

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Abstract

The exercise of franchise and fielding of candidates for electoral positions in most democracies are costing fortunes for candidates and political parties. Funding electoral campaigns has become critical and determines, to a long extent, who contests elections in developing countries. In spite of several check rules and measures, access to state treasury had facilitated funding of political activities and programmes, especially those in power. To that end, this paper seeks to examine how the Peoples' Democratic Party (PDP) and All Progressives Congress (APC) financed their campaigns for the 2015 General Elections in Nigeria. It further seeks to determine the accepted sources of funding for political campaigns while appraising the on-going probe of abuse of arms(security) vote by the Jonathan's government. It also examines the sources of fund available to other political parties. The paper is centred on the postulations of Thomas Ferguson's Investment theory of party competition which is predicated on the power of money in prosecuting electioneering campaigns thus seeing investors as more important than voters in the scheme of electioneering affairs. It made use of secondary sources of data that were analyzed content-wise along an in-depth espouse of related literature. In the end, the paper surmised that there was a sharp increase in the cost of running presidential campaigns and that lots of state resources were deployed by both the ruling and opposition parties (at their spheres of rulership) in the 2015 elections.

Keywords: Political Finance, Campaign Finance, Investment theory of Party Competition, Security Vote and Electioneering Campaign

Introduction

Elections and electioneering are critical democratic processes that engage both the party and their candidates in contests that shape the economy and politics of nations. The history of electoral democracy in Nigeria is replete with unregulated use and abused application of money and other materials in ways and patterns that create undue advantage for either the highest bidders or those with greater access to state resources. Undoubtedly, money is a *sine qua non* in elections and both political parties and candidates in our context are compelled to grappling with the challenges of sourcing and using same to prosecute activities and candidatures. Perhaps, this is not unconnected with our political culture and value system but the crux of the matter is that behaviours and attitudes including the voting pattern of electorates across the

political system have been determined to a significant extent by the forces and dynamics of money and other related materials that sway support and loyalty for parties and candidates. From the first republic through the second, third and even present the dispensation, votes and followership have regularly been reported sold and bought by electorates and candidates in such brazen manners that place gargantuan question mark on credibility and integrity of electoral processes in Nigeria.

In spite of some designed checks and implicit regulations on political finance which like in most other emerging democracies span across all facets of funding political parties and their campaign programmes, implementation and prosecution of defaulters have been lacking. The Electoral Act 2010 allows a Presidential hopeful leverage to spend N1 billion, a Gubernatorial candidate can spend up to N200 million, N40 million for Senatorial candidates, N20 million for House of Representatives, N10 million for House of Assembly/Council Chairman candidates and N1 million for Ward Councillors. See details on table 1 below:

Table 1: Election Expenses Limit

Elective Office	Limit on Election Expenses
President	N1,000,000,000
Governorship	N200,000,000
Senate	N40,000,000
House of Representatives	N20,000,000
State Assembly	N10,000,000
Local Government Chairman	N10,000,000
Councillors	N1,000,000

Source: Electoral Act 2010

The ceiling as set by the Act amidst being almost unreachable for most citizens does not compare the regulative measures by some political parties like the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) and the All Progressives Congress (APC). For PDP, presidential forms were priced at N22m each; Governorship forms were priced at N11million; Senatorial seats, House of Representatives and state Houses of Assembly forms cost N4.5m, N2.5m and N1.2m respectively. For APC, aspirants for the office of the President were asked to cough out N27.5m; those for House of Assembly would be required to pay N500, 000; those aspiring for the House of Representatives must be ready to pay N2m, for the Senate the price tag for the forms is N3m while for the Governorship it is N5m (Adibe, 2014). The amount is just for mere party nomination forms and does not include the money spent in electioneering campaign by such candidates. It again does not include fees for expression of interest, formalization of intent, administrative charges and other sundry levies. See greater details in table 2 below:

Table 2: Cost of Party's Expression of Interest and Candidate Nomination Forms (2015 Elections)

Party	Office in view	Expression of Interest	Nomination Fee	Total
APC	Presidency	N2,500,000	N25,000,000	N27,500,000
	Governorship	N500,000	N5,000,000	N5,500,000
	Senate	N300,000	N3,000,000	N3,300,000
	House of Rep	N200,000	N2,000,000	N2,200,000
PDP	Presidency	N2,000,000	N20,000,000	N22,000,000
	Governorship	N1,000,000	N10,000,000	N11,000,000
	Senate	N500,000	N4,000,000	N4,500,000
	House of Rep	N400,000	N2,000,000	N2,400,000
APGA	Presidency			
	Governorship	N2,000,000	N10,000,000	N12,000,000
	Senate	N500,000	N3,000,000	N3,500,000
	House of Rep	N500,000	N2,000,000	N2,500,000

Source: *Olorunmola, (2016). Cost of Politics in Nigeria. Retrieved from <http://www.wfd.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Nigeria-Cost-of-Politics.pdf> on October 18, 2016*

Accepted that the use of economic resources is an essential ingredient for democratic competition (Casas-Zamora and Zovatto, 2015), the above requirements paint in vivid form the rationale for the description of money as the mother's milk of politics by a former American State Treasurer of California, Mr Jesse Unruh (Unruh, 1966 as cited in izquotes.com). This is further captured by Ohman (2013) when he aptly observed that there is no part of the world where money does not matter in a political decision making process.

Furthermore, granted that a democratic society requires dialogue with its citizens, in a process that requires funding (Ohman, 2013), this funding which is money is capable of making politicians more responsive to contributors than the electorate. The application of money in political finance generates unbridled risk of lopsided competition in elections, corruption, puts state resources at the disposal of the incumbent party thereby making electioneering campaign more difficult for the opposition and skewing electoral processes. However, in spite of beautiful ideals and

principles of guaranteeing inclusiveness and fair play in democratic governance, elections in most developing countries offer no real choices of political parties and candidates to the electorates owing to the influence of money. Money in politics can be a tool for undue influence on the political process seen in the buying of votes or influencing policy decisions. No reliable concept can obscure the fact of life that the flow of funds into any party system reflects the economic and social structure of its society. Parties trying to fund themselves often rely on financial sources that presuppose inequality and illegality. The search for funds may induce politicians to listen more to those who give to their campaigns than to those who vote for them, or for their party (Paltiel 1981, p. 138). On the other hand, politicians are sensitive to factors that may influence the outcome of an election, one of which may be the availability of funding. If this is so, and if elections are the mainspring of responsive and responsible government, money becomes a vital influence on democratic government (International IDEA, (2003). Management of political finance is necessary for credible and genuine elections and electoral campaigns because it has the potential to skew competition between contestants (Ohman, 2013). It further questions the integrity of the process and casts doubts as par dedication, commitment and accountability of leadership.

It is in view of the foregoing that this paper seeks to critically analyse the abuse of state resources by parties in power as main sources of political finance and campaign administration. It further attempts an in-depth examination of the sources for the funding of electioneering campaigns of political parties in the 2015 general elections while trying to establish what constitutes the acceptable modes for funding political parties and elections in democracies.

The paper is structured in six parts of the introduction, re-definition and clarification of key concepts, the theoretical framework of analysis, accepted modes of funding for political finance and electioneering campaigns, (mis)application of state resources by parties in power for political finance and the conclusion.

Conceptual Clarifications

Interest articulation and mobilization functions of political parties have significant implications for electoral democracy across political systems. Parties must interact and sale their programmes and manifestoes to the people in order to market their candidates for elective positions. This process of political marketing has some inalienable cost implications that necessitate the involvement of money and other materials necessary for reaching out to the people and catering for other party expenses. In that order, some concepts that form the bases for this study are re-defined according to the perspective of the study, thus:

Political finance

Literature is replete with variegated but seemingly related definitions and descriptions of the concept of political finance. Ohman (2013, p.2) defined it “as the finances of political parties and election campaigns”. This definition has a wide spectrum and covers all monies that political parties spend in catering for all party

activities and prosecuting electioneering campaigns. In that vein, Political finance in the opinion of many scholars portrays the use of money and other material resources for party activities (Walecki, 2002; Ujo, 2000; Kukah, 2006). For Wilhelm (2013, p.1-23) Political financing includes financial resources raised and spent by parties in the process of political competition. In that respect, the concept of political finance relates significantly with the estimates of the total amount of resources available to parties or candidates. It also indicates how those resources allow one party or the other competitor an advantage in terms of organization or propaganda (Heidenheimer, 1963 as cited in Scarrow, 2007). Broadly speaking, political finance encompasses both campaign finance and political party finance (Jouan, n.d) and as such involves the public and private funding of both political parties and individual candidates. It includes routine operational costs as well as the cost of electioneering campaigns (Biezen, n.d). While elaborating on the meaning of the concept further, Walecki (2003, p.75-93) succinctly opines that “resources expended on extra party actors who are involved in political competition with the objective of shaping public policy agendas, influencing legislation or electoral debates and outcomes are equally parts of political finance”. That presupposes that all monies/resources spent in generating action of an association (be it party or movement) aimed at swaying public opinion and policy is a worthy aspect of political finance. More so, political finance could be seen from a two-pronged perspective and connotations thus: money used for electioneering campaign (campaign fund) and money used for political party expenses (party funds) as observed by Oji, Eme and Nwoba (2014).

Campaign Finance

Across the globe, it has been observed that a clear-cut demarcation cannot be made between the contributions of a political party and those of candidates in the course of electioneering campaigns. Obviously, both parties and candidates raise and spend money for their campaign programmes and observers have not again determined distinct points for parties and candidates. We thus observe that monetary requirements for candidates from emerging democracies tend to scare many citizens vying for elective positions. In Africa, nay Nigeria, it is difficult if not impossible to state in categorical terms who funds the running costs of political parties. Candidates and public office holders rent and customize offices, vehicles and researches for their parties and earn such names as financiers, big wigs, juggernauts, godfathers, etc. Such expenses are rated in forms of investment for such individuals who turn around to call the shots for the parties in victory. The narrowest meaning of the term is “money for electioneering” (Pinto-Duschinsky cited in Ukase, 2015). Campaign finance is defined as the collection of funds and expenditure in relation to election campaign (INEC, 2015, p.7). In a related manner, (Jouan, n.d) sees campaign finance “as all monetary and in-kind contributions and expenditures collected by and incurred by candidates, their political parties or their supporters for electioneering. The concept is further described in Political Party Finance Handbook (PPFH) developed by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) as “any expenditure incurred by a party for the purposes; that is solely for the purpose, of enhancing the standing of or promoting

electoral success for a party at a forthcoming or future elections". This includes issuing disparaging materials relating to another party or its candidates. Thus, Open Society Justice Initiative, (2005) cited in Salman (2015, p.1-11) for the purpose of monitoring media spending, conceptualized campaign expenditure as "expenditure incurred by or behalf of a registered political party or candidate to promote the party and candidate at an election or in connection with future elections, including expenditure that has the aim of damaging the prospects of another party or candidate". Campaign finance thus refers to monies and resources employed in the course of canvassing for votes by a candidate and his party. It includes expenditure incurred by a political party or individual candidates, but also spending on behalf of political parties or candidates by third parties, such as their support groups, hidden advertisements by state and public institutions, or institutions supported by the state.

Electioneering Campaign

Electioneering campaigns refer to all activities aimed at encouraging voters to cast their vote for or against a candidate or a party in the context of an election. It covers all activities ranging from wooing for votes directly to indirectly engaging members of the electorate to support and or vote for a political party or candidate for an elective position. Obot (2013) sees it as the act or process of soliciting for support or votes for a given political party or candidate during election. It includes the activities of political parties in forms of rallies to those of support groups and other third parties whose actions and body languages spur members of the public to support or vote for a candidate. Such activities can come in forms of sponsoring radio, Television and newspaper advertorials, columns, jingles, posters and other forms of promotions that could sway peoples' mind set to supporting or not supporting a candidate in the process of elections.

Security Votes

This tend to be seen by many as an omnibus terminology that is bereft of generally accepted definition. In Nigeria, it does not have bearing from the constitution but may have arisen from the perception of some schools of thought who believe that the concept had its origin in United States of America, particularly under President Richard Nixon after the assassination of President John Fitzgerald Kennedy in 1963, when "the US Congress started to include in the country's annual appropriations, large sums of money for presidential protection (Kumolu, 2013). Attempting an informed definition of the concept in Nigeria, Egbo, Onwumere & Uche (2010, p.1-37) described it as 'opaque fund' reserved for the executive which is not appropriated, accounted for or audited through the legislature. While drawing more emphasis on possible rationale for such fund and how it could constitute exhaust pipe Dada (2015, p.24-32) continued with the foregoing description and referred to security vote as "an opaque fund" reserved for the executive arm at various levels of government, to manipulate security issues for political and economic gains...". The impression here is that security vote is designed to promote the realization of national security, a goal that is not defined and verified. This kind of

vote and fund is not subjected to normal retirement. The holder of executive offices at various levels of government spend such funds according to their discretion and nobody questions it. The spirit is the expectation that high office holders will exercise this discretion with utmost fidelity to the public interest. In the increasingly festering culture of corruption in Nigeria this spirit is observed more in the breach. Revelations from how security funds were allegedly disbursed by the former National Security Adviser, Col. Sambo Dasuki (rtd), as slush funds to prominent members of the former ruling PDP are indication of the abuse to which such discretionary spending is subjected in Nigeria (The abuse, 2016). To that extent, "Security vote may thus be defined as the budgetary or extra-budgetary allocation ostensibly for security, received by the President, Governors and Local Government Chairmen which they spend without legal obligation to account for how it is spent. It is an amount spent by heads of government, with or without legislative appropriation, supposedly on security without the requirement of disclosure on how the money is spent" (Dada, 2015, p.24-32).

State Administrative Resources

Following unregulated application of money and other related materials in electioneering campaigns across mainly developing democracies, ruling political parties, who formed governments, are often tempted to put state resources at their disposal negatively to influence the quality of government and chances of their party (favourite candidates) in next elections. Party politics necessitates competitions between political parties as incumbents and oppositions where the former contest from a vantage of strength owing to its access to public fund (and other state apparatuses) while the latter grapple with relatively mean resources. This situation which takes varied turns and dimensions has overarching implications of hampering electoral integrity by skewing electoral processes in favour of those with greater access to pool of allocable resources. Analysing the blurred demarcation between the state and the government party as it concerns state resources, Ohman (2013, p.1-13) observed that "incumbent political parties and politicians are often inventive in finding ways to abuse state resources". According to him, state resources transcends beyond money to such other facilities like institutional resources (such as personnel and publicly owned media) and other communication tools. The abuse and (mis)application of state resources can thus be seen in four perspectives, namely: financial resources, institutional resources, enforcement resources and regulatory resources. What people forget to add is that as a result, we do not hold elections, we merely purchase consciences. Those being purchased are not the unemployed as is often alleged; money bags many of whom retrieved such bags from the public treasury can buy and do buy any type of wealthy opinion leader. All those who imagine that an incumbent can hardly be defeated in a Nigerian election are merely alluding to the opportunity he has to use public funds to buy everyone just as he can use his office to favour supporters and harass opponents. Hence, discussions bordering on abuse of administrative resources have gained attention in political financing conceptualization in new democracies including Nigeria. Election

observation missions have provided plenty of evidence of abuse of administrative resources (IFES 2014).

Sources of funding to Political Parties in Nigeria

The sources of funds available to political parties are numerous with varied connotations and implications. Depending on context and societal values, several trends and dynamics are possible for internal and external party expenditures. However, the most common sources that are compatible with democracy are party membership dues, local fund-raising by party activists, profit of party-owned businesses and donations (Biezen, 2003; Ninsin 2006). Membership contributions constitute a very effective source of political finance because they are donated on voluntary basis by members. Biezen (2003) asserts that membership dues are an attractive means of party financing because they are not accompanied by direct demands for influence on programming decisions or access to party-related functions. In other words, membership dues guarantee a certain degree of influence of party members on official party politics without allowing single financially privileged persons or group too much influence. Thus, memberships dues are reliable financing mechanisms and political parties with a large support base are often likely to raise substantial revenue from members (Nam-Katoti, Doku, Abor and Quartey, 2011). Membership dues do not constitute significant chunk of funding to parties in contemporary political parties in Nigeria because not many persons (citizens who are not contesting elections) are committed to party affairs; yet big wigs manipulate payment of dues for cronies during primaries in order to guarantee victory for select individuals.

Next in this category is donation. This is about the fulcrum of political financing in Africa, nay Nigeria. Third parties and party men including interesting corporate organizations as well as business associates support the activities of choice political parties and sometimes individuals contesting for political offices. Whereas only parties in government can exploit resources or percentage kickbacks or use front organizations to funnel money to the party, all parties can depend on donations to varying degrees (Austin and Tjernstrom, 2003). Donations are beneficial to political parties in the sense that they give parties a greater degree of flexibility to generate their own funds (Nam-Katoti et al, 2011). Additionally, the unequal access to and the unequal distribution of private donations may have an effect on the equality of political participation and competition.

More so, the most critical of all sources of funding to political parties and their activities is seen in the nature and procedures for direct and indirect funding by the state. This is the only source of funding that may be available to political parties that cannot be shrouded in secrecy (Aye, 1993). Public funding of political parties is an arrangement that enables the state to give financial resources or indirect assistance to political parties in order to enable them to run their activities and achieve their ultimate objective of capturing political power and implementing policy prescriptions that would better the lots of the ordinary people (ISSER, 2012). State indirect funding can assume the forms of media access in public broadcasting, tax benefits, and use of

public town halls for meetings, etc. State funding on the other hand is direct when state grant subsidies to registered political parties in forms of monetary subventions to enable them cater for party expenses. Direct funding as was practised in Nigeria in the first republic and period of President Babangida could give rise to relative equal level playing grounds (Scarrow, 2007; Ohman, 2013) but it places significant financial burden on the state. Public funding opens more vents for political participation by paving ways for more political associations and parties to be registered. Public funding of political parties must find a synthesis between private and public financing of internal party affairs and external activities. If parties rely only on private contributions, certain private individuals may hijack the party. On the other hand, excessive reliance on public funding can weaken the relationship between parties and their electorates. It is, therefore, imperative that parties strive to seek support from both sources or else they will lose funds. Too much reliance on funds from the state could erode the party's link with society and undermine the party's legitimacy.

Theoretical Exposition

In trying to understudy and gain greatest insights into the dynamics of money and electoral democracy while trying to pin down in most comprehensible terms the position of the electorate and the public good (interest) in emergent democracies, Nigeria inclusive, analysis in this study is centred on the postulations of the investment theory of party competition.

Developed by Thomas Ferguson in his 1983 paper entitled 'Party Realignment and American Industrial Structure: The Investment Theory of Political Parties in Historical Perspective'. The theory is detailed most extensively in Ferguson's 1995 book entitled *Golden Rule: The Investment Theory of Party Competition and the Logic of Money-driven Political Systems*, in which his earlier paper is republished as a chapter (Ferguson, 1995).

For this theory, candidates for political office and political parties appeal not to voters, but mainly to investors, who form the 'fundamental constituency'. Ferguson frames his theory as being both inspired by and an alternative to the traditional median voter theories of democracy such as that posited by Anthony Downs in his 1957 work *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. Quoting Downs, Ferguson (1995, p.24) accepts that "the expense of political awareness is so great that no citizen can afford to bear it in every policy area, even if by doing so he could discover places where his intervention would reap large profits". While Downs largely overlooked the implications of this insight, Ferguson (1995, p.24) makes it the foundation of the *Investment Theory of Party Competition*, recognizing that if voters cannot bear the cost of becoming informed about public affairs they have little hope of successfully supervising government. According to Ferguson (1995, p.27) cited in Policy Tensor (2013), "parties are more accurately analysed as blocs of major investors who coalesce to advance candidates representing their interests." The policy platforms of political parties reflect the interests of major investors, and which minor investor-voters are virtually incapable of affecting, save in the negative sense of

voting “no confidence”. As the cost of political campaigns have skyrocketed in the era of tele-democracy, the logic of money driven political systems has become more and more applicable. The investment theory expects that whole areas of policy will not be contested. Ferguson (1995,p.206) thus further contends that the real market for political parties is defined by major investors, who generally have good and clear reason for investing to control the state....Blocs of major investors define the core of political parties and are responsible for most of the signals the party sends to the electorate. Expatiating the tenets of the theory, Ferguson has offered a powerful interpretation of US politics that focuses on the way the allegiances of various sectors of American business shape the party system. His work begins from a simple premise: in electoral systems where vast amounts of money are needed to run for office, candidates and parties’ first task is not to win the support of voters, but rather to win the support of people willing to “invest” in their campaigns.

In capitalist societies like the United States, this means business and the rich. The funding requirement can be thought of as a kind of first filter: candidates unable to raise the requisite amount of cash are screened out, and voters then select from the remaining, well-funded candidates. Ferguson has used this model to explain American politics from the New Deal to the present. In one of his most well-known articles, he showed that Franklin Roosevelt’s Democratic Party was in no simple sense “the party of the people,” but rather a coalition between unions and other progressive forces and some of the most far-sighted sections of American capital (Riche, 2011).

Nonetheless, the character of interests and investors in Nigerian electioneering campaigns is somewhat dependent on a ruling class that are not owners and managers of capital but those who had access to state resources. Business ownership is not properly developed as in the United States but those who could plunder public wealth plough same back by re-inventing and re-enacting their platforms and cronies to continue their racket. In that case, Nigeria sees a situation where state resources are pulled, in whatever form, to finance candidates/parties in the interest of a cartel. Investors in this wake are individuals and their cronies drawing funds from the state treasury at their various levels.

Financing Electioneering Campaign and the 2015 Presidential Elections in Nigeria

Electoral democracy is obviously shaped by money and access to power. Access to power is mainly spurred by the unbridled quest for wealth and influence. Big wigs, juggernauts and so to speak political high tensions, money bags and party financiers are at various levels of business orientations and promoters. Cartels and compradors who throw money and other materials into politics as modes of investment to guarantee kickbacks, choice contracts, juicy positions and influence. Why do businesses and cartels invest and sponsor party activities? Who finance support groups for political parties and their candidates?

In the 2015 general elections, Centre for Social Justice (CSJ, 2015) chronicled spiral abuse and misapplication of state resources by frontline political

parties of the PDP and APC. Like Ohman (2013) observed there were many competitors at the 2015 Presidential elections. Some competed and campaigned as incumbents from a position of power – PDP and from reports by CSJ meddled and misapplied state resources. PDP ran as the party in power at the national while APC as well as some other parties mounted the saddle at some state levels with varied rates of abuse and misapplication of public funds. State resources are not only money but include institutional, financial, enforcement and regulatory resources. Abuse of state financial resources is observed in the following manners:

Diversion of Millennium Development Goals (MDG) Women Empowerment Programme Materials for Partisan Campaigns in Bayelsa: the former First Lady, Dame Patience Jonathan at the MDG Women Empowerment Programme distributed bags of rice which were branded with her husband's picture to each of the women, others received sewing machines, tricycles, groundnut oil and wrappers and she called on over 50,000 women of Bayelsa to support the re-election of her husband (ACCORD, 2015). See pictures of the branded rice at MDG program below:



Again, there were reports that National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) grains, being distributed to persons internally displaced by Boko Haram's rampage were branded with PDP logo and President Jonathan's campaign slogans.

The foregoing actions are clearly in contravention of the Electoral Act 2010 (as amended) which states that state apparatuses shall not be used to the advantage or disadvantage of any political party or candidate at any election.

Regulatory resources of the state was equally misapplied when the SURE-P Programme of the federal government was turned into an instrument for electioneering campaign. CSJ reported that in all the states where the PDP candidate held a campaign/rally, the SURE-P beneficiaries formed a good part of the crowd at the venue. Dressed in blue Ankara under the umbrella organization known as Community Awareness Network (CAWAN), they were mobilised from all the wards in the state to the campaign venue upon the allocation of N5000 each.

State Institutional Resources were equally misapplied by the PDP and the APC by embarking on massive deployment of Governments' Official Vehicles and Aircrafts to Campaigns. The CSJ report has it that official vehicles of various State Governments of both the APC and PDP accompanied their respective candidates to the campaign grounds. They deployed the vehicles of government agencies, commissions and parastatals. In Rivers State, about 30 Sports Utility Vehicles (SUVs) with government plate numbers were used during the APC presidential campaign rally. Aircrafts in the Presidential Fleet of the Federal Republic of Nigeria were regularly deployed to the campaigns of the incumbent conveying the former president, the vice president and other high ranking public officials and members of the ruling party.

There were cases of abuse of state regulatory resources as can be seen in the following excerpts from CSJ report thus:

Nigeria Communication Commission (NCC) tried to frustrate Gen. Muhammadu Buhari's Fundraising Efforts. In an apparent abuse of power, the Nigeria Communication Commission ordered the shutting down of the fund raising platform of the APC presidential candidate. The APC had successfully used the platform of mobile communication as part of its crowd funding measures to raise funds for its electioneering campaigns. In a directive issued under reference No: NCC/CAB/GEN/2015/VOL.1/004 signed by the Director of Consumer Affairs, Mrs. Maryam Bayi, and the Head of Legal and Regulatory Services, Mrs. Yinka Akinloye, on behalf of the Executive Vice-Chairman of NCC, Dr. Eugene Juwah, the NCC shut down the Platform.

Declaration of Public Holiday in Borno State for the APC Presidential Candidate. The APC is not left out in the abuse of state administrative resources. The Governor of Borno State, a member of the APC abused state regulatory resources by declaring a public holiday in the state, to support the campaign/rally of its presidential candidate, Muhammadu Buhari which held in the state.

What is more, the Transformation Ambassadors of Nigeria (TAN) was a support group and promoter for former President Goodluck Jonathan with vast resources that raised several rhetorical questions as par the source of their funding and rationale for their operation especially where the 1999 constitution in Section 221 clearly states that inter alia:

No association, other than a political party, shall canvass for votes for any candidate at any election or contribute to the funds of any political party or to the election expenses of any candidate at an election

More so, TAN violated Section 91(9) of the Electoral Act which states that "no individual or other entity shall donate more than one million (N1,000,000) to any candidate". TAN as a support group violated in grand style political finance laws by their unregulated activities as a third party in the 2015 Presidential elections. Other

persons in that category are some money bags like Chief Engr Arthur Eze who donated 7 Innoson vehicles worth about N14 million along several other whooping sums to the PDP. Sir Emeka Offor is equally in the league of political finance law breakers for supporting the Ebonyi State PDP Presidential Campaign with N400 million.

The continuing probe into the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA) to the former President Goodluck Jonathan has revealed that public funds worth US\$2.1 billion meant for equipping the Nigeria military was diverted to finance party activities for the 2015 general elections (Falodi, 2016). In the same vein, reports have it that the former Governor of Plateau State, Joshua Dariye, diverted state ecological funds to campaign activities for his party (PDP). Observing that abuse of state resources was widespread, Olorunmola (n.d) posited that the use of public funds for party activities cut across all political parties. The trend was perfected by parties at their levels of reign. The APC is said to have been significantly funded by the former governor of Rivers State, Rotimi Amechi whose loot from the state coffers is reported to be part of the rationale for former UK Prime Minister's remarkable reference to Nigeria as "fantastically corrupt". Amechi (the Minister for Transport) is fondly referred to by local newspapers as the ATM of the APC is said to have spent over \$140 million on President Buhari's 2015 campaign and has been accused of stealing £500 million. This is clearly captured by Nneji (2016) in an online Newspapers called *Post Nigeria* thus:

Local media in Nigeria had tagged Amaechi the ATM of Buhari's presidential campaign and his party the All Progressives Congress, APC. Amaechi is praised by APC leaders for single-handedly funding the governorship campaigns of at least five APC governors, including that of former speaker, Governor Aminu Tambuwal of Sokoto State. ... Separately, Amaechi is accused of diverting £140 million of state funds into Buhari's presidential campaign, with reports he paid for media, consultants and private jets.

Recall, that Amaechi was purportedly indicted by a judicial commission of inquiry in Rivers State for looting the treasury of the state, when he served as Governor for eight years. Invariably, the alleged loot which the government is yet to investigate was what he diverted to funding APC campaigns in the 2015 elections. This perhaps explains why the President, Mohammadu Buhari, is hesitating in probing into wide accusations and allegations against the serving minister.

The foregoing, observations of the extent and trend of the use of state resources in financing electioneering campaigns by incumbent and erstwhile political leaders re-enforce the existence of cartels and comprador bourgeois cliques that plunder state treasury to re-enact and sustain their interests in who governs and how values are allocated in the Nigeria. These unbridled quest for power propel an unregulated tendency to invest and monetize the processes of election and

electioneering without recourse to enabling laws. This again, leaves whoever that wins in the closed fist of successful investors that masterminded his electoral victory, who invariably determines who gets what, when and how while shaping the courses of public policy in the garb of 'who pays the piper detects the tune'.

Concluding Remarks

There was a sharp increase in the cost of running presidential campaigns by both the ruling and opposition political parties (Olorunmola, n.d). As reflected in the traceable expenditure of all parties at the elections, they all exceeded the 2010 Electoral Act allowed ceiling on campaign finance but none of the parties was prosecuted. On media works alone, the PDP expended about N9bn while the APC spent about N3bn. Other sundry expenses speak volumes of the extent to which money particularly public resources was used in the elections.

All the political parties meddled with state resources at levels where they hold sway. The PDP according to reviewed reports grossly abused state administrative resources significantly through TAN at the national level while the APC exploited their authority beyond accepted norms at some states like Rivers and to some extent Lagos, Borno to gear up for the contest. The election was thus a battle for money and other materials that was provided through the abuse of state resources at various levels and by all the political parties. Third party spending and deployment of state apparatuses was rampant and skewed support if not for obvious conspiracy against the former President (Goodluck Jonathan) whom the North wanted out of office at all cost.

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