

POVERTY AND INSECURITY IN THE LAKE CHAD REGION: BORNO STATE OF NIGERIA (2011-2015) IN PERSPECTIVE

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Abstract

Despite the vast research on insecurity in the Lake Chad region, little is known about the cause of the current insurgency. In many ways, there are substances and flaws in the three dominant competing narratives about insecurity and violence in the Nigerian portion of the Lake Chad region. Significantly, the study has engaged the three dominant theoretical perspectives explaining the root causes of the Boko-Haram violence in the region. The study elicited from some of the communities different perspectives on the cause of the decline in their socioeconomic activities and the widespread poverty and unemployment in the region. Two hundred and sixty (260) structured questionnaires and some selected interviews were used for three (3) local government areas; MMC, Abadam and Gwoza representing the three senatorial districts of Borno central, north and south respectively. This was supplemented by secondary data. A sequential analytical technique was used in the analysis and testing of the three widely held assumptions about insecurity in the region. While the study aligns with poverty and inequality theory, it found that in addition to the general poverty level in the Northeast, the downfall of agricultural activity which is the major economic activity in the Lake Chad region, the porous nature of the boundaries of countries of the Lake Chad Basin, the diversion of Lake Chad waters for irrigations by Cameroon and the socioeconomic and cultural linkages of the communities of Borno with the Arab Nations of North Africa, where conflict situation and insecurity prevails aftermath of the Arab Spring, have all contributed to the current security stalemate in the region. The study recommends an integrated regional security approach to checking cross-border crimes in the riparian region of Lake Chad. It also recommends that governments should embark on effective poverty alleviation and human capital development programs for youths to make up for the declining traditional economic activities in the region, which are farming, fishing and grazing. Also, that an improved security and immigration policy is needed for short term and even long term measure for shoring up of border security to control external flow of insurgents in the Lake Chad region.

Keywords: Poverty, Border Porosity, Lake Chad, Insurgency, Insecurity.

Introduction

For quite a reasonable length of time now, Borno state in the Lake Chad Sub-region has been devastated by high profile insecurity caused by Boko Haram insurgency, and more recently the activities of the Fulani Herdsmen. This insecurity situation has ranged from fear of personal lives of the citizens to destruction of the entire state's basic existence, thereby making it a national security threat. It has for that reason prompted huge allocation of the national budget to security in that region (Nwanegbo, Umara and Ikyase, 2016 (oncoming) and a declaration of state of emergency to control the situation of imminent security breakdown. The country also pumped down a large percentage of the military men and operations to the area, all in an effort to control the situation. Despite these efforts, the level of insecurity in that part of the country remained very high with the result that, Nigerian state as a whole has continued to ranked very low in the Global Peace Index (see GPI, 2012)

The phenomenon of securing the Nigerian state as an issue has attracted the interest and concern of people within and outside the academic system. While some have argued that what should bring peace would amend the fragility of the state which to them is the basis of this insecurity, others, among whom are Oluwarotimi (2012); Ahule and Ugba (2014) noted that what we have been witnessing on the difficulties in securing the Nigeria state is actually the failure of the state and the collapse of governance. In the opinion of Alubo (2006), the challenge is premised on the weakness of the state in dealing with the primary objectives of protecting lives and property.

Two other theses have emerged as explanation to the current security woes in Nigeria. The first school of thought, include scholars like Ibidapo-Obe (2008), Igbuzor (2011) Nwanegbo and Odigbo (2013) who are of the opinion that government at all levels appears not to have deployed adequate measures to checkmate the onslaught. The crisis appears to have remained insurmountable and some have argued that government at all levels did not do enough to confront the situation head on and deal with it decisively and that is why it has persisted. The second school of thought with scholars like Kuffour (2012) and Salawu (2013) have argued that the increasing state of insecurity in Nigeria is predicated on the manifest political undertone that grips the nation.

While the situation of insecurity is raging in the North-East Nigeria; the spate of poverty in that area has equally attracted a reasonable attention of both local and foreign observer. In the Nigerian Poverty Profile (2010), the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) report Nigeria as housing a high number of citizens living in poverty. On the geo-political assessment, the North West has 77.7% of its population living in relative poverty while the North East came second with 76.3%. The North Central States also has 67.5% of its population living in relative poverty (Dodo, 2012). The recent records have perhaps presented a more difficult picture, it is indeed increasing. Compared to the record in 2004 (51%), the National Bureau of Statistics said that on a general note, 61 percent of Nigerians lived on less than \$1 per day in 2010. Considering that situation can act on environments in different ways, one may not easily come to conclusion that because the North-West as a region with higher level

of poverty is not facing the insurgent situations in the magnitude of the North East that the insecurity has nothing to do with poverty.

The uniqueness of the growing poverty in the North-East region of Nigeria as compared to the North-West situation needs to be mentioned. Arguably the North-East population was not given to the culture injected poverty associated with the docile belief of “God creating the poor” and perhaps making some persons rich and others poor. The Kanuri man like other tribes in Borno state depended heavily on farming, fishing and grazing, relying on the advantage provided by the Lake Chad and its tributaries to become one of the main sources of food supply to the other parts of Nigeria. Some of these changed when the drastic effect of the damming of the river Elbeid by the Cameroonian authority cut off the major supplies of water to the Lake Chad. The hardship created by such tragedy on fishing, farming, grazing threw in a sudden situation of poverty to the region (Babagana, 2016) in the manner they were not to.

Collectively, according to UNDP (2013), the states of Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa (the most hit states by insurgent attacks) are the poorest in the country if we take the major indicators of poverty such as maternal mortality rate, where the national statistic is 630 deaths per 100,000 live births, into consideration. In the North East, this figure rises to 1,549, compared with 165 in the South East. Inside big cities such as Maiduguri, the capital of Borno state, the growing army of unemployed who are available for recruitment by anyone who wants to do mischief is very worrisome. Again, the exposition of Borno State to other national boundaries of the Lake Chad region also can be a factor.

Apparently, the security situation in Nigeria appears to have deteriorated and has continued to threaten domestic and foreign investment with huge consequences on development which has the capacity to multiply poverty and further deepen insecurity situations. While the above discourses are considered relevant, the various groups of opinions on solving the problems of insecurity in the North East did not consider the situation of poverty that relevant as they appear to have given more attention to the state system than to the state of poverty which has a scientifically recognized immutable capacity to generate such upsurge of insecurity (Ibeanu, 2008; Nwanegbo, 2012; Nwanegbo, Odigbo, and Ngara 2014) as an important factor in controlling it.

With the level of poverty in the North East, which equated with many other parts of the country is high, in a country where there are an ever-increasing number of energetic youths roaming the streets; the spate of vulnerability is presumably very high. In the reports of National unemployment rates for Nigeria, it showed that the number of unemployed persons which fluctuates between 31.1% in 2000; 31.6% in 2001; 12.6% in 2002; 14.8% in 2003; 13.4% in 2004; 11.9% in 2005; also in 2006, it was 13.7%; in 2007 14.6%; in 2008 14.9%; in 2009 19.7% (National Bureau of Statistics 2009:238), rose from 19.7 in 2009 to 21.1% in 2010 and 23.9% in 2011 (The Central Bank of Nigeria Annual Report, 2011 cited in Ladan 2012:7). Yet it is noted that the North East presents a distinctively high record of these poverty and unemployment.

In the opinion of Salawu (2010), unemployment increases the number of people who are prepared to kill or be killed for a given course at token benefit. The fact now is that following the explained circumstances, unemployment with its capacity to lure people into engaging in illicit activities seems to have become difficult for the State to manage. This explains why the Country is virtually unsafe. In the face of the above assertions, this study looks at the place of poverty. In the deepening and changing dimensions of insecurity in the Lake Chad region, focussing on communities in Borno state, on the Nigeria portion of Lake Chad. To do this, the work looks at empirical and factual evidences of the prevalence of poverty in Borno and analyzes its implications on the insecurity in the region by specifically seeking to determine the extent to which the reduction in the volume of economic activities in the Chad Basin affected the condition of unemployment in Borno State and to find out the link between the high level of poverty in the North-East region and the generation and sustenance of insecurity in Borno State.

The Lake Chad Basin: Socio-Economic Importance and the Implication of its Shrinkage

The Lake Chad hydrological basin located between latitudes 6°N and 24°N and longitudes 7°E and 24°E (Coe & Foley, 2001) and one of Africa's largest lakes, providing fresh water and other resources to more than 20 million people living in about thirty shore-line communities of the four riparian countries – Chad, Cameroon, Nigeria and Niger – which along with the Central African Republic (CAR) (Science in Africa, 2003) is the single most important geographical feature of the area. According to Coe & Foley (2001), Lake Chad is a remnant of a former inland sea which has grown and shrunk in tandem with changes in climate over the past 13,000 years. Being an extremely shallow lake – rarely more than 7m deep – made it susceptible to the increasing climatic variability and human impacts in the past 40 years. At its largest size, around 4000 BCE, the lake is estimated to have covered an area of 400,000 km² and by the 1960s it reduced but still covered an area of more than 26,000 km². Between 1966 and 1997, it further shrunk from 25,000 km² to less than 1,500 km² and down in a dramatic way to just an area covering about some 532 km² between 1994 and 2004 (see Babagana, 2015). As summed up by Masari (2006), the lake has shrunk by about 90% of its size of 1960.

It is located in the far west of Chad, bordering on North-eastern Nigeria. In terms of the conventional basin area, the distribution of the area among the riparian countries is as follows: 42% in Chad, 28% in Niger, 21% in Nigeria and 9% in Cameroon. The Lake Chad Basin is drained by numerous rivers. Onuoha (2011) identified – the Chari-Logone, Komadugu-Gana or Lesser Yobe Ebeji, Ebeji Mbuli, Botha El Beed, the Yedseram, Ngadolu, Ngadda, Komadugu-Yobe, Taf-taf and Serbewel. Of the above rivers, he posited that the river Chari – along with its tributary, the Logone – provides 90 per cent of the inflow to the lake, while the remaining 10 per cent comes from the Komadugu-Yobe river system. Three-quarters of the water entering the lake north of N'Djamena according to Onuoha (2011) originate from headwaters in the Central African Republic and, to a lesser extent,

Cameroon.

According to Living Waters (2003) the Lake which is located in the semi-arid region of the Sahara Desert is a vital source of fresh water and other resources for human, livestock and wildlife communities. The main economic livelihood in the basin includes fishing, agriculture and pastoralism. It is believed that over 150,000 fishermen lives on the lake shores and its islands. At the peak of its production in the 1960s, the Lake Chad fisheries are said to have included fish of close to 80 species with an estimated annual fish catch of 130,000 to 141,000 tons up to the early 1970s. Recent estimates of annual fish production are said to be close to that of 1977, hovering within the range of 60,000 to 70,000 tones (Babagana, 2016). However, as a result of environmental changes since the 1970s, including fluctuations in the level of the lake, there have been considerable changes in the fish fauna. These include high mortality, the disappearance of some open-water species, and the appearance of species adapted to swamp conditions in areas where they were previously unknown (Babagana, 2016).

The raising of cattle, sheep and camels by local as well as nomadic herders provides additional means of economic livelihood in the basin. James (1989) observed that the lake which provides water and grazing lands for pastoralists and herders has been the traditional convergence point for the pastoralists from Tuareg, Toubou, Feda, Kanembu, Shuwa, Fulani and Wadai from Chad, Niger, Northern Cameroon and Northern Nigeria.

In addition to direct support to livelihoods, the lake serves as a veritable source of fresh water for drinking, sanitation and irrigation. Thus, as Onuoha (2007) explained, the lake provides the water and the agricultural springboard for the production of commodities such as cotton, groundnuts, sorghum, cassava, millet, rice maize and onions. Most of the farming in the basin is rain fed, harvested by hand and cultivated without the use of fertilizers or other agro-chemicals.

However, the dropping of water from the lake has continued at an alarming rate as a result of three prominent factors; climatic changes, unsustainable exploitation of its resources by riparian states, and demographic pressure (Babagana, 2016). Early study on the hydrological history of the lake by Connah (1981) found that the balance between water intake and evaporation is continually fluctuating, with the result that Lake Chad, because it is so shallow, is continually changing its size and shape. These fluctuations may be seen as of three different kinds: long-term, short-term and seasonal. They reflect variations in rainfall not only in the area of the lake itself but particularly in the watershed areas of the Feeder Rivers. Fluctuations in the lake are thus a fairly sensitive indicator of climatic change over a substantial area of Africa (Onuoha, 2007).

Another factor is the unsustainable exploitation or use of water resources of the lake by both the riparian states and local inhabitants. Large and unsustainable irrigation projects and impoundments built by Niger, Nigeria, Cameroon and Chad which have diverted substantial water from both the lake and the Chari and Longone rivers have greatly contributed to the shrinking of the lake. Most significant was the construction of both the Yaguou-Tekele dyke (on the Chari-Logone) and the Maga

dam by Cameroon in 1979, and a series of dams by Nigeria such as the Tiga Dam on River Yobe, the Alau Dam on River Ngadda, and the Yedersdam Dam on River Yedersdam. Other examples of such projects include the South Chad Irrigation Project (SCIP) in Nigeria and the MAMDI Polder Project in the republic of Chad (James, 1989, Coe and Foley, 2001, Science in Africa, 2003, etc).Coe and Foley (2001) specifically contend that the competing demands for fresh water by the four riparian states of Lake Chad, mostly through massive irrigation projects, account for almost 30 percent of the observed decrease in lake area since the early 1960s.

Beyond the vagaries of climate and unsustainable exploitation of the water resources of the lake, the surge in human population in the last few decades has also conduced to increased exploitation and degradation of the water resources of the lake. Harden (1968) has long hypothesized that Africa's growing population is the major cause of the degradation and pollution of most of the continent's lakes. With marked population increases, human activities have begun to play a more significant role in accelerating lake-level declines. Since the 1960s, human demands for water near Lake Chad have grown rapidly. Between 1960 and 1990, the number of people living in the lake's catchment area doubled from 13 million to 26 million (UNEP, 1999). It is currently estimated to be slightly above 37 million (UNESCO 2007). The average population growth within the basin is quite high, being 2.4-2.6% (Odada , 2004). Invariably, this population surge translates into increased pressure on the water resources of the lake by local people living around the lake. Growing human population in the lake region has necessitated the raising of increased numbers of livestock to feed the teeming population. The combined effect of the surge of both human and livestock populations is the accelerated exploitation of the resources of the lake by local inhabitants to sustain their survival and that of their livestock. It has led to overgrazing, unhealthy agricultural practices and intense fishing to feed the growing population (Onuoha, 2008). One impact of this is the destruction of the carrying capacity and the capacity of the lake to replenish itself. In spite of the worsening state of the lake, researchers still predict some 75% population increase around the lake by 2025 (Sambo, 2006).

Of the estimated 20 million people that lived on the Lake Chad basin in 2003, about 11.7 million live in the North-Eastern region of Nigeria. Already, the effect of the Lake Chad shrinkage is being felt by the local population who depend on the lake for their livelihood. First, the diminishing water resources of the lake compound the problem of water security/scarcity in the region. Water scarcity occurs when the amount of water withdrawn from lakes, rivers or groundwater is so great that water supplies are no longer adequate to satisfy all human or ecosystem requirements, resulting in increased competition between users and demands (UNEP 2002). Interestingly, Nigeria has been fingered as one of the African countries likely to suffer water stress in 2025 (UNEP 2002).Safe drinking water which IDEA (2000) argued is essential to human and animal survival, is very limited in the North-Eastern region creating poor quality of life in the region as it affects people's health and productivity.

Secondly, the shrinking of the lake's water poses great threat to food security, leading to the exacerbation of poverty in the region. Although there is pervasive poverty in Nigeria, available statistics in 2004 show that the existential condition of the vast majority of the inhabitants of the North-Eastern region, especially people living around the Lake Chad region, is the lowest (Soludo, 2007). This according to Babagana (2016) is as result of the shrinking of the lake its effect on crop failures, livestock deaths, collapse of fisheries, increased soil salinity, and significant disruption of economic livelihoods. The result has been the incidence of resource conflicts and mass poverty within the basin.

This have the tendency to poses serious security challenges for the North-Eastern region of Nigeria in particular and the country in general. It starts up heavy movement of people and livestock away from the basin and into the hinterland and indeed other parts of the country, increasing resource competition among the residents and the moving population. Instances of the growing conflict between the Fulani herdsmen and the farming population in all parts (especially the Middle-belt) of Nigeria offers explanation to this.

Poverty and Insecurity

There is no single and universally accepted definition of poverty except that poverty is generally viewed as a state of being poor. In fact, defining poverty remains problematic and the debate relating to what constitutes it, how it is measured and how it is to be tackled, rages on. That bothers on the issue of the universality of the definition. Indeed, definitions and measurement indicators applied in one type of society may be difficult to transfer to other societies, without serious modifications (Ruggeri, 2003). There are several identified frameworks which may be useful for understanding and measuring poverty such as material poverty, money-metric measurement approaches and multidimensional approaches, etc (Hulme, Moore and Shepherd, 2001). Scholars who adopt the material and physiological approaches view poverty as a lack of income, expenditure or consumption. However, the view about poverty has been broadened based somewhat on the increased credence given to the views of poverty by the poor themselves. As Bevan and Joireman (1997) argue, 'while poverty everywhere involves people experiencing very real material and other deprivations, the concept of poverty is used to cover a wide-ranging set of interrelated life-chances which vary and are valued differently in the diverse cultures and sub-cultures of the world'. This is based on the belief that the poor are likely to be poor in several ways, not only in terms of income.

On this basis, the notion of what constitutes 'basic needs' has been expanded to encompass not only food, water, shelter, and clothing, but also access to other assets such as education, basic healthcare, participation in the political process, security and dignity. The 1995 Copenhagen Social Summit was the first major international gathering to mark the expansion of the concepts of poverty and well-being and the World Bank (2000) described it in terms of material deprivation, low levels of education and health, exposure to vulnerability and risk, and 'voicelessness' and 'powerlessness'. Multi-dimensional approaches capture the full range of

deprivations that constitute poverty, and may empower and give ‘voice’ to the poor, but lack the precision and comparability of income/consumption measures.

Scholars however are divided on the relationship between poverty and insecurity. While one group believes that poverty is both a cause and consequence of insecurity, another group believes poverty causes insecurity, yet a third group thinks that poverty is the result of conflicts and insecurity. According to Verstegen (2001), Poverty and insecurity are closely related as violent conflicts have led to death of many people, displacement and destruction of property which leads to destruction of years of development efforts, investments and insecurity.

Those who dismiss the fact that poverty is a major cause of conflict and insecurity argue that poverty may lead to conflict when other factors are present. To them, poverty is not a sufficient condition for the occurrence of conflict. According to Nelson (1998 in Ekpenyong, Ukommi and Agha 2010), the precise links between economic grievances and ethnic conflict are exclusive variable, and strongly conditioned by a wide range of non-economic factors. There is no denying the fact that conflict has a direct impact on poverty. During severe conflicts, there is always wanton destruction of lives and property (private and public) which makes life insecure. Such environments become investment-unfriendly and thus poverty becomes the order of the day. World Bank Group Data and Statistics (2003) show that in 2002, of 63 low income countries, 38 were located in Sub-Saharan Africa and were associated with conflict. At the end of 2005, the global number of refugees was at its lowest level in almost a quarter of a century but by the end of 2008, the total number of refugees under United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) mandate exceeded 10 million ([UNHCR, 2008). This increased as a result of increase in inter-group conflicts and multiplies poverty itself.

Insecurity in north-east Nigeria:Contending Theoretical Explanations

Three contending explanations struggle for dominance in discourses about insecurity in North east Nigeria. They are the Political Elites Conspiracy, Ideological and the Inequality theories. Political Elite Conspiracy Theory advocated by scholars like Adibe (2012), Alozieuwa, (2012), Kukah, (2012), etc. view insecurity in the Northern Nigeria generally as an outcome of the frustration by northern power elite who, having lost political power were determined and committed to the cause of bringing down Nigeria under a southern President. Adibe (2012:57) opined that, “the loss of power to the south is seen as loss of the North politically, especially following the fall-outs from the ruling party’s bickering over zoning and power sharing arrangements and President Jonathan’s decision to contest the April 2011 elections”. In asserting this position too, Walker (2012) posits that the declaration of President Goodluck Jonathan on Boko-Haram infiltration of his cabinet, and in particular the security apparatus echoed the conspiracy theory (Punch News, 2013). “The president painted a picture of a puppet group that was being used by aggrieved northern politicians to bring down his government” (Walker, 2012: 7).There is though no universality in the opinions of this school of thought. Another version of the political explanation points to the likelihood of Jonathan and his administration, sponsoring

the crisis in the North to pressure the North into supporting and relying on him for quick solution (Babagana, 2016). These are the different versions of what this theory posits.

The second school of thought posits the Ideological explanation and views the Boko-Haram sect as a group that aims to seize power from the Nigerian government, impose the will of God among the Kuffur (unbelievers), and in due course Islamize the Nigerian state. The proponents of this view include mainly political scientists, international relations, and religious studies experts (Mozayyan, 2009, Zenn, 2012, Uzodike and Maiangwa, 2012, Danjibo, 2009, Aghedo and Osuma, 2012) among others. This group argues that the Boko-Haram crisis has resulted from religious belief, in the form of political Islam. They see “the Boko-Haram as a militant sect driven by the ideology of a fanatical Islamic practice” (Aghedo and Osuma, 2012:858), which believes that western education is incapable of stimulating meaningful development and wealth in the region.

Danjibo (2009) sees Boko-Haram as a creation and extension of the “Maitatsine” dogma of 1980, which can further be dated to groups of Islamic extremists active in northern Nigeria that existed as far back as in the 1945. Hence, the type of activities and campaign Boko-Haram has engaged in are not unique to the present, it can be traced back to the 1804 jihad launched by Uthman Dan Fodio, which used force against corrupt authorities who practiced ‘impure’ forms of Islamic government (Uzodike and Maimangwa, 2012: 92). Expanding this argument, Mozayyan, (2009: 241-242) maintains that the main incentive that make political Islam to flourish lies in the corrupt and unproductive local political leadership promoting Western ideologies that failed to advance people’s well-being. The inspiration he maintains derives from the triumph of the Mujahedeen over the Soviet in Afghanistan which denotes the accomplishment of Islam over secularity.

Taken further, it has been suggested that al Qaeda’s more recent influence has transformed Boko-Haram into being part of global political Islam which aims to overthrow all governments and create Islamic theocratic states. Hence, while the global call of jihad against “enemies of Islam” together with the jihadists victory in Afghanistan reinforce the universal thinking on jihadists across the globe, it also inspired young men and women to emulate what they considered as a jihadist model (Crenshaw, 2009:403-404). This position is justified by the fact that Boko-Haram members flew the black Taliban flag during one of their violent attacks on a police station in Kanamma, Yobe State, as a way of identifying with the Taliban in pan-Islamic solidarity (Lengmang, 2011 cited in Alozieuwa, 2012: 5).

However, the Islamic state theory is not a coherent whole; there are many disagreements among scholars in this field. Basically, this explanation ignored the fact that other parts of the North’s, for example, Sokoto, Kebbi, Katsina, Zamfara and others states are also, populated predominantly by Muslims and the Boko-Haram type of violence have not gained ground in them. However, the aim of this study is not to critique the theory but to put it to test with the public thinking, how the people in the state of Borno view the Islamic state explanation on Boko- Haram violence.

Most theories on poverty show that there is a connecting trend between poverty and insecurity. Poverty and Inequality Theoretical approach to understanding the roots of violence has its proponents from among scholars like Midlarsky (1975), Forest (2012), Kabir-Isa (2011), Mahmud et al (2009), Dougherty and Pfaltzgratz Jr, (1990) among others. Most of these scholars are sociologists and development studies experts, and even political economists. From their standpoint, the bloodshed is attributed to failure to meet the human needs of social actors. Its fundamental hypothesis is that all humans have basic needs, and failure to achieve it can lead to violent conflict when perceived as a way to survive (Rosati et al, 1990 cited in Faleti, 2006: 51).

This model conceptualizes poverty as the real threat to the security not only of individuals, but of Nigeria state as well. The solution that is urged is to pay more attention to sustainable development as the most functional way to prevent violent conflict rooted in economic deprivation. In many ways, socio-economic deprivation can lead to frustration. Midlarsky (1975) argued that, the ever widening gap between the rich and the poor as a result of deprivation will not only produce frustration, but also bring out aggressive attitude. He maintained that, “deprivation is a perceived disparity between value expectation and value capabilities and that the lack of a need satisfaction – relies on the psychological state of frustration and aggressive attitudes emanating from it”. Dougherty and Pfaltzgrate (1990: 266) echoing Midlarsky’s argument of socio-economic deprivation as root cause of violent conflicts, posits that aggression is constantly a corollary of frustration and relative economic (inequality and) deprivation.

The Progressive Social theory specifically addresses this issue. This theory looks not to the individual poverty but to the economic, political and social system which cause people to have limited opportunities and resources with which to achieve income and well-being. Karl Marx demonstrated how social and economic systems combined to initiate, promote and sustain poverty situations across cultures. For examples, Marx showed how capitalism created what he called the “reserved army of the unemployed” as a conscientious strategy to keep wages low. Studies by Jencks (1996) for example suggested that the extant economic system is structured in such a way that poor people fall behind regardless of how competent they may be.

In Nigeria, the Human Development model identifies with the Northern elite’s arguments of socio-economic deprivation perspective as the root of the problem. For example, Sanusi (2012) evidently raised the national resource allocation question, explaining the idea of a “direct link between the very uneven nature of distribution of resources – the 13 per cent derivatives going to oil producing states of the south and the rising level of violence – Boko Haram’s insurgency in the North (Thisday newspaper, 28 January, 2012). He therefore calls for the country to focus resources as a matter of necessity on regenerating other regions of the country if Nigeria wants to secure durable stability. Forest (2012) reinforces the socio-economic deprivation argument as the root cause of the Boko-Haram insurgency as he subscribes to the position that an array of grievances and opportunities have laid the basis for Boko-Haram to extend its grip through extensive corruption among a

political and well-to-do selected few elites that is heavily invested in the status quo. They argue that government must attend to socio-economic deprivation, which is most pervasive in the north creating higher levels of poverty and inequality.

One possible criticism that can be made of this theory is that in spite of similar poverty and deprivation in other parts of the North, no similar violent group of such Boko-Haram magnitude has surfaced in other impoverished parts of Northern Nigeria. However, the Niger Delta region, where deprivation is widespread, has also had insurgency problems in the past, which were temporarily mitigated by granting of Amnesty, and additional development funding from oil revenues and have resurged in a more deadly magnitude now that some of the palliatives and largess extended to some of the youth leaders appear to have been stopped by this present administration. The similarity is that the North East people even though are not laying the kind of claims that the Niger-Deltans are, but they are also disorganized by the effect of the desert encroachment as earlier explained, making them destitute also in their place and increasing both pressure and vulnerability to participate in any kind of activities as long as it guarantees the meals they have lost in their individual ventures. However, it is true that several states in the North that do not benefit from the enhanced derivation allocation like the oil states have not witnessed the type of Boko-Haram violence or taken to militancy (Adibe, 2012). Yet, it must be noted that the states affected by the spate of insecurity occasioned by Boko-Haram all lie close to and therefore depended on the Lake Chad to some (and even great) extent on the lake for economic survival.

The discernible factor in this discourse is that there appears to be a link between poverty, inequality/deprivation and violent responses which jeopardizes security. The case of poor societies of the Niger-Delta attests to this. Secondly, even though the North West also has records of very population, the situation that generates poverty in both regions appears to be different. While the North West population seems to accept poverty culturally and as an existent reality in life and makes not much efforts to change the condition, the North East population lost their major sources of livelihood essentially in the reduced water levels of Lake Chad and therefore got transformed from active productive population to active unemployed and poor population. The sudden transformation may have had a driving effect on them in the way that the North West population does not feel.

Thirdly, the surge of neighbouring population affected by the same ecological disaster into the North-East borders also might have had different effects on the North-East population of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa and might have triggering effect on those populations. These are the three major factors that this study would empirically test in the remaining parts of the paper.

Research Design

The study applied the Case Study approach in the study of poverty and insecurity. The primary aim of using this method is to enable the study to find out as much detail as possible about the issues under study. It involved collecting data that relate to the problem of insecurity, relying on the situation in Borno State, and all the

factors that creates and deepens poverty in the state. It is complemented by the Survey method. Using these two approaches (Case Study Approach and Survey method) is scientifically accepted in social science research as the Survey Method supports the Case Study Approach effectively for achievement of good result. In fact as Hillway (1956, 216) clearly asserted, Case Study “seems to be effective when used in conjunction with the Survey Method”.

Area of Study

This study focused on Borno state of Nigeria which falls within the Lake Chad Basin area. The choice is predicated on the fact that Borno presents one of the most delicate pictures of insecurity situation in Nigeria as it houses the largest and most complex communities in the affected states of North-East Nigeria and in the Lake Chad region. Beyond housing the traditional stool of the historic Kanem-Borno empire that has its influence spreading beyond the boundaries of Nigeria; it is equally a major trading and grazing route between Nigeria and the neighboring countries of Chad, Niger, Cameroon and Benin Republic, as well as three Nigerian states of Yobe, Gombe and Adamawa to the south and west.

The period from 2011 to 2015 is equally significant because the current wave of insecurity came to the topmost level within this time period and therefore suitable. It also provides us with sufficient time frame for reasonable analysis and scientific conclusion.

As shown in the official Borno State Government Diary (2007), the state is subdivided into three senatorial districts with 27 local government areas: Abadam, Askira-Uba, Bama, Bayo, Biu, Chibok, Dikwa, Damboa, Gubio, Guzamala, Gwoza, Hawul, Jere, Kaga, Kala Balge, Konduga, Kukawa, Kwaya Kusar, Mafa, Magumeri, Maiduguri Metropolitan Council (MMC), Marte, MObbar, Monguno, Ngala, Nganzai and Shani with 311 political wards.

The state has three strong emirates (Borno, Dikwa and Biu) and four chiefdoms (Askira, Uba, Shani and Gwoza). Official statistics estimated the population to be 5,158,680 million in 2012(NPC, 2009) with an approximately 60 inhabitants per square kilometer.

Population of Study

Three groups of population are involved in this study. The first is the general population of the people of Borno state where opinions on poverty and insecurity was elicited from. For that, the population based on the 2006 census figure was five million one hundred and fifty eight thousand six hundred and eighty (5,158,680) persons (NPC, 2009) constitutes the universe of study.

The second population was made up of people in the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) camps in the state. As of January, 2015, nearly 1.5 million IDPs that were sacked from about 11 local government areas of Borno were forced to leave the comfort of their homes to take refuge in Maiduguri as IDPs.

The National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) had reported that Boko Haram terrorists had forced residents of various communities to take refuge in

31 camps across the Northern Nigeria, and 20 of such were domiciled in the Northeast, while more than half of them are in Borno State's towns of Biu and Maiduguri. As at August, 2015, about half a million IDPs were being camped in various public school premises as well as newly-completed but yet-to-be-commissioned housing estates within Maiduguri.

The third population was the group of informed members of the state whose opinions help in establishing the state of activities in the border and on effort at reducing poverty by the state. This was done through a non-probability (purposive) sampling method. Among those targeted for this are people drawn from among the government official (past and present), customs officers, immigration, military, police, SSS, Civil Society organizations, etc.

Data Collection and Analysis

The study employed two main sources of data in pursuing its objectives: Primary and Secondary sources. In appreciation of the enormity of the population of the universe of study, a representative sample was used. Yet, following the works of Black and Champion 1976, Eboh 1998, Nwana 1981, it is important to point out that technical, human and financial constraints affected the determination of a sample size for the study. In the light of this observation, we used the Yaro Yamani's (1968) formula in selecting the sample size of Four Hundred (400) structured questionnaires were used at three (3) local governments, chosen on the basis of one from each of the three political zones in the state to elicit responses from the first group of respondents. Its allocation is as shown in the table below based on their populations and the percentages of the sample they represent.

Table 1: Population and Samples of the selected Three (3) local governments in Borno State

S/N	Senatorial Zones	Selected L.G.As	Population of L.G.As	Percentage of Population	Population of Samples
1	Borno North	Abadam	100,180	6%	24
2	Borno Central	M/guri	1,197,497	76%	304
3	Borno South	Gwoza	276,312	18%	72
	Total		1,573,989	100%	400

Source: Compiled with data extracted from National Population Census (2006)

The study also employed in-depth interviews and questionnaire. Four Hundred (400) heads of households were drawn randomly and questionnaires and interviews administered on them. The spread across the three (3) local governments selected is as shown in the table 1 above. Several field observations limited to agricultural activities and conditions were also used. Agriculture had been the main economic activity of people in the state and therefore much emphasis was given to it in this study.

Table 2: The Socio-Demographic Characteristics of the Respondents

Gender	Frequency	Percentage
Female	21	8
Male	239	92
Age		
25-34 years	31	12
35-44 years	67	26
45-54 years	46	18
55-64 years	60	23
65-74 years	36	14
74years+	20	8
Religion		
Islam	231	89
Christianity	29	11
African Traditional. Religion	0	0
Marital Status		
Married	226	87
Single	34	13
Educational Qualification		
Tertiary	18	7
Secondary	83	32
Primary	23	9
Islamic	96	37
None	40	15
Occupation		
Civil Servants	54	21
Traders	41	16
Islamic Scholars	13	5
Farmers	152	58

As shown above, of the 260 respondents, 239 (92%) were males and 21 (8%) were females, all drawn from the three (3) Local government areas of the state. The disparity between men and women can be understood in the obvious cultural/religious limitations in even assessing women in that part of Nigeria. Age distribution shows a distribution across all active ages with the respondents within the age brackets of 35-44 years (26%) and also within 55-64 years (22%) the highest frequencies. The respondents from the study area were predominantly Moslems (89%). Marital status revealed that 87 percent were married as against the single, 13 percent. Educational qualification shows that majority of the sample population had more of Secondary (32%) and Islamic education (37%). About 60 percent of the respondents were into farming. However 21 percent were civil servants, 16 percent were into trading and 5 percent were religious scholars. Due to the fact that both qualitative and quantitative

techniques of data collection were applied the analysis of data was based on the “Sequential Analytic Technique” of data analysis. In practical process, the dual processes of content analysis and the quantitative method of arriving at the average positions of the respondents were used.

Reduction in Lake Chad Basin Activities, Unemployment and Poverty

Series of discussions in the literature identified the fact that the Lake Chad was a major source of livelihood for the teeming population of people that lives around the Chad Basin. The tendency too was that the decline in the water level of the Lake Chad could have effect and indeed is a major cause of the decline in the economic activities in that area with effects on the neighbouring communities in Borno state. Confirming the effect of this declining volume of economic activities in the Chad Basin as a result of water scarcity and other climatic conditions on agricultural practice and on farming population, series of interviews held revealed that agriculture has become less attractive as a result of low farming yields, of food and cash crops such as wheat, millet, guinea corn, sugar cane, rice and beans (cowpea). This invariably translates to low income capacity in the sale of crops; and the economic power of inhabitants in the state. As noted by a respondent in Borno; “in the past agriculture was the main economic activities of our families, but the last 10years has seen most families selling their farm lands to visitors because of the low yield of commercial crops” (Male/56years/Gwoza/Borno).

Table 3: Residents’ Perceptions and Descriptions of factors militating against agricultural practices


Descriptions	Response
Desertification/encroachment	78%
Wind Erosion	81%
Dryness of Streams and Lake Chad Waters	95%
Extremes Climatic Conditions	87%
Increasing Number of People with Sight Problems	52%
Migration of Youths to Cities and border towns	88%
Increase Criminal Activities	18%
Prostitutions	17%
Fragile Health	62%
Incessant Communal Conflicts	89%
Low yield of Crops	61%

Table 3 above shows the frequency and percentage distribution of respondents perceived and observed changes in Agricultural practice giving predominance to climate change in the last two decades. Desertification was noted by majority of the respondents as a major problem from climate change. It was only in Maiduguri that fewer numbers of respondents (7 percent) saw desertification as a

problem, in Abadam about 65 percent saw desertification and desert encroachment as emerging. Dryness of streams also was highlighted by 95 percent, which also corresponded to responses related to diversion of the Lake Chad water. It is also at this time that Lassa fever becomes rampant. A fever, most medical practitioners have linked to the faeces of a particular kind of rodent, commonly found during the dry season. Other problems attributed to harsh or extreme weather conditions were on agricultural produces, mostly millets, sorghum, onions; and tomatoes; these are crops highly sensitive to weather conditions, the resultant effect was described as low quality and quantity of the produce as well as the cost. A burden mostly felt by people in other parts of the country as well as neighbouring countries of Niger; Chad, Cameroon, down to Mali, and some countries in Central Africa who seriously rely on food from the north. According to a farmer in Abadam; the dry season used to last between November and March, but today it starts earlier around September and the effect is felt till April/May (IDP/49years/Abadam).

Describing the harshness of the weather, Salkida (2012) explains that, as you approach the Lake Chad basin from Maiduguri, in Northeastern Nigeria, the atmosphere of despair is telling. The air is dusty, the wind is fierce and unrelenting, the plants are wilting and the earth is turning into sand dunes. The sparse vegetation is occasionally broken by withered trees and shrubs. The lives of herders, fisherfolk and farmers are teetering on the edge as the lake dries up before their eyes. Vegetation and water, the traditional staples of livelihood for the Lake Chad community dwellers, are vanishing. Vultures feast on dead cows as drought and desertification take their toll (in Babagana, 2016: 36). The UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) have called the situation an “ecological catastrophe,” predicting that the lake could disappear this century.

Figure1: The drying up of Lake Chad



Source: Philippe Rekacewicz, UNEP/GRID-Arendal

The once busy Baga market in Maiduguri, where truckloads of fish from the lake used to be processed and then transported daily to other parts of the country, is now quiet. The villagers must now travel by canoe and on foot for days from Doron Baga to Daban Masara, then to Darak in search of food. Darak is an affluent fishing community to the east of Cameroon's border with Nigeria.

These breads and multiplies poverty in the Northern Nigeria, in the level that cannot be found in the south (Akoroda, 2010). The FAO (2005) survey of the 36 states in Nigeria shows that the fraction of Nigerians who had been unable to afford food 'almost every month' between January and December 2005 was on the increase and more from the North.

Thus, the shrinking of the lake's water therefore poses the biggest single threat to food security, leading to the exacerbation of poverty in the region. Although there is pervasive poverty in Nigeria, available statistics in 2004 show that the existential condition of the vast majority of the inhabitants of the Lake Chad region is the lowest. Consequently, the poverty level in Lake Chad region has been exacerbated as the shrinking of the Lake contributes to crop failures, livestock deaths, collapse of fisheries, increased soil salinity, and significant disruption of economic livelihoods.

In addition to increased poverty, the diminution of Lake Chad intensified the rate of migration and cross-border movement within the basin which heightens resource and identity conflict in the region, and even beyond. Already, the shrinking of the lake has induced the influx of Udawa nomadic cattle herders from the Republic of Niger as well as the migration of citizens of Chad and of Nigerians further south in search of optimum opportunities. It has been noted that the long-distance migrants, usually referred to as Udawa, have been well-armed and are willing to use violence to assure their grazing.

Consequently, as areas dry up, farmers and cattle herders have had to move southward towards greener areas where they end up competing for the available scarce resources such as fresh water and arable/grazing lands with other economic groups or with host communities. This explains some of the conflicts between herders and farming communities reported in recent years in North-Eastern Nigeria. Some of the farmers forced to migrate from the Lake Chad area have gone to cities, as far as Lagos, where they take up menial jobs or swell the ranks of the jobless, adding to the social crises there (Science in Africa 2003). As water quantity diminishes or quality degrades over time, agricultural activities also collapse as discussed, the net effect on the region was unsettling: the frequency and intensity of conflicts and insecurity within the region escalated into the issue of Boko Haram. These discourses led into confirming the hypothesis that the cause of poverty in the state is the declining and diminishing agricultural activity which is the main stay of economic activity in the state.

A common response from over 78 percent of the respondents revealed a positive impact of declining agriculture owing to climate change. Categorically it was mentioned that the current trend of agricultural produce, has made a lot of families to advise their wards to take to western education so as to be eligible for government

jobs, and politics which to them is becoming impossible without education. Some of the people interviewed corroborated the link and agitation for better education and in relation to the change in climate condition. They see it as the valid alternative to agriculture which has been impeded by changes in climatic conditions (IDP/Male/65years/Abadam). The following statement, which also serve as advice was made by a fairly young respondent in Maiduguri, that youth should think less of inheriting their family plantations: “I think the youths of our generation will be nowhere tomorrow if they are not educated because the changes in weather and climatic conditions have brought a lot of techniques into agriculture which is needed in modern day rearing of animals and cultivation of crops. Without this, in next few years all of us (youths) will not be interested in farming” (IDP/Male/23years/Gwoza). Some of these techniques were observed to be the irrigation practices and fertilizer applications in modern day farming, which has posed a lot of difficulties to farmers. Also the problem arising from availability and distribution network of pesticides and insecticides which are increasingly being used ever now than before, respondents claimed are not easily accessed when needed, and when supposedly available; they are usually too expensive.

Going by this, a village head in Abadam, Grema Loskurima, summarized some of the importance of western knowledge and scientific education in boosting farming yields: I am one of those whose crops produce better in this community. It is not because I have a big farm land or magic; but the knowledge of good farming practices, which has been possible with the help of my son who studied agricultural science in Borno State Ramat Polytechnic. He is the one who combines the fertilizers into ratio. If not for him I would have leased the farm land to other people and concentrate on cattle rearing (IDP/Male/43 years/Abadam).

What is discernible from this is that the change in weather conditions change the technology of agricultural production as the normal production processes seizes to be profitable and attractive. Education which brings new methods and new applications as well as new opportunities in political and governmental administrative positions thence became the alternative.

Poverty and Insecurity in Lake Chad Area

Over the past three decades, poverty has increased disproportionately in the North as the Table below shows:

Table 4: Incidence of Poverty by Geo-political zones

Geopolitical zone	Percentage					
Year	1980	1985/6	1992	1997	2004	2010
North East	35.6	53.2	54.0	68.0	72.2	76.3
North West	37.7	48.4	36.5	62.0	71.2	77.7
North Central	32.2	48.4	46.0	53.0	67.0	67.5
South East	12.9	30.9	41.0	79.5	26.7	67.0
South West	13.4	42.0	43.1	74.1	43.0	59.1
South-South	13.2	38.0	40.8	78.6	35.1	63.7
Nation wide	28.1	43.0	42.7	69.2	54.4	69.0

From the table above, it can be seen that between 1980 and 1985/6, the incidence of poverty was lowest in the South East followed by the South-South. But in 1997, the situation was completely reversed with the incidence of poverty becoming highest in the South East followed by the South-South. Again by 2010, the situation has completely changed with incidence of poverty highest in the three geopolitical zones in the North and lowest in South West. In the North, the northwest maintained a relatively higher level of poverty compared to the northeast yet remain comparatively peaceful indicating that poverty alone is not enough reason to be violent.

Poverty was highlighted by over 63 percent of respondents, as responsible for the poor yields in the farm. The common argument for them was finance and irregularity in the supply of fertilizers, insecticides and pesticides by governmental agencies as at when due. As noted by Mr Umoru, 'the wealthy farmers are doing well because they have enough money to buy fertilizer and chemicals. For us the poor, it is very expensive to buy. We have children and wives to cater for, so we cannot afford to spend much on chemicals' (Male, 48 years/ Maiduguri). While it was relatively easy for wealthy farmers to adjust and cope with changes in climatic variations, it was not the case with the poor who constitute the majority of farmers in the state. Mr Umoru's statement in Gwoza captured the challenge of poverty as relying more on chemicals which are usually subsidized by the state and local government, there farming suffer as the middlemen in the distribution prefer distributing the fertilizers and chemicals to the wealthy farm owners first and before it gets down to them at the grassroots it is usually too late (IDP/54years/Gwoza).

Another factor is the linkage between modern agricultural practice to western education, which some sects of the Muslim populated North have frowned at and being regarded as negative influence to Islamic faith. This is evident in the recent religious crisis involving the Boko Haram faithful and the state government in Borno and other parts of the Northern States (Idris, 2009).

Meanwhile, insecurity accords a process or condition of exposure to danger, indeed a pervasive unsafe condition of existence. Given the understanding of the meaning and impact of poverty (as earlier explained), it is safe to build a nexus between poverty and insecurity as a "cause and effect" syndrome. Poverty impact on socio-economic and political circumstances of a people, so does insecurity manifests in the different segments of any society where poverty predominates. In the case of Borno, insecurity manifests in different forms and this cannot be separated from the activities of the large army of unemployed and under-employed people in the state. Most of the criminal activities were noted to be perpetrated by unemployed youths popularly called Kwanta Kwanta. These sets of boys are local bandits found around waylaying wealthy men, traders, commuters at nights in most suburbs in the Northern Nigeria. The increasing level of insecurity was attributed to unemployment and massive drift from agricultural activities. Over half of the sampled respondents agreed that unemployment has to do with the unproductive and now costly nature of agriculture. Associated with this is the incessant religious violence in Northern Nigeria and high level of criminal activities.

In the past the north used to be the safest, lifestyle was so simple, food stuff was cheap to the extent that tomatoes and pepper were not sold. We all sleep with our doors unlock; lives and properties were safe. The situation has completely changed since the 1980s (Male/69years/Gwoza). For another, a lot of people have lost their lives and properties to these rampaging hoodlums and armed robbers. We the poor are mostly affected. We the peasants are usually not taken seriously whenever we call for government to provide security (IDI/Female/43years/Gwoza). Those who lost their means of livelihood (Farming, Fishing, animal rearing etc) readily take to criminal activities to survive or turn their angers against the society. The case of the Almajiris in the Northern part of Nigeria is worthy of mentioning here. These Children have no means of livelihood except through begging. Thus they are easily recruited as foot soldiers by the Boko-Haram Sect to unleash terror on the innocent citizens of the country.

Conclusion

There is a nexus between poverty and insecurity as a “cause and effect” syndrome. In other words, it is practically impossible to find one without the other accompanying it. And just as poverty impact on socio-economic and political circumstances of a people, so does insecurity manifests in the different segments of any society where poverty predominates, In the case of Borno state, insecurity manifests in diverse ways and these are not unconnected with the ravaging poverty in that region.

The challenge posed by Boko-Haram in the Lake Chad region is not only about the viciousness of either its terror campaigns or the sect’s avowed mission to impose Islamic law on the country, but about the confusion regarding the exact cause(s) of the violence. A lot of factors have been attributed to the cause of insecurity in Borno state such as socioeconomic, political and religious factors. However, this work has confirmed that the high-rate of poverty in the state has made the youths enlisted in the ranks of Boko Haram foot soldiers which have elongate the conflict since 2009. Most of the activities of the sect are concentrated in the Lake Chad region of Nigeria. The study confirms that the cause of this sustained poverty in the state can be traced to the declining and diminishing agricultural activity which is the main stay of economic activity in the state as a result of the change in the weather condition and diminishing water level in the Chad Basin. Insecurity in Borno state and indeed Boko Haram's rise has been fueled by this economic decline, Lake Chad has shrunk by 90 percent in the past 40 years, drastically affecting fishing livelihoods and irrigation farming for a surrounding population of about 30 million. And desertification claims more than 770 square miles of cropland every year.

The study however found that poverty in the region was created by the rapid decline in volume of major economic activities of the people which are farming, fishing and grazing. The decline is cause by the shrinkage of Lake Chad and other climatic and ecological factors. Poverty impact on socio-economic and political circumstances of a people, so does insecurity manifests in the different segments of any society where poverty predominates. In the case of Borno, insecurity manifests in

different forms and this study attributes this to the activities of the large army of unemployed and underemployed people in the state. Those who lost their means of livelihood (Farming, Fishing, animal rearing etc) readily took to criminal activities to survive or turn their angers against the society. In the North, the northwest maintained a relatively higher level of poverty compared to the northeast yet remain comparatively peaceful indicating that poverty alone is not enough reason to be violent. Thus the work concluded that even though poverty may not on its own create insecurity, it has indeed contributed in the facilitation and deepening of insecurity in this region and also that the poverty was deepened by the change in the means of livelihood of the people in that region occasioned by the drying up of a substantial part of the Lake Chad, especially in the Nigerian side. As it is now, the Nigerian portion of Lake Chad stands at about 230km from Maiduguri (Agbelegbe and Ipinloju, 2001). With such distance, the farming soils are getting the more and more dry, making farming difficult.

Following the findings, these recommendations are here made;

- a. Owing to the fact that the decline in the economy has a lot of roots in the disastrous decline in the Lake Chad water level, it needs a regional effort to improve on the Lake's water sustenance. The process could be in removing the blockages of the inflow channels created by the countries at the basin lines through dams and or finding alternative inflow channel to get water retained in the Lake and by that return ventures around it. That would make the people profitably busy. As it can be seen, the whole of the region is enmeshed in crisis that are not unconnected with resources contest, this can reduce the pressure on the people and then make the environment easy to police.
- b. It is also suggested that the Riparian nations of Lake Chad basin need to strengthen up the Lake Chad basin authority to enforce regulation (as they are not now) and extend their duty into policing the Chad Basin. A lot of trans-boarder ill appear to be generating from that environment that member countries cannot control because of international laws and regulation on policing with a countries national boundary. However, with such joint policing arrangement, a special kind of joint force can have access to a certain level within the boundary positions and in collaboration with the national security forces, certain kinds of ills could be curtailed.
- c. Nigerian state, beyond the regional arrangement, need also to evolve a workable boundary and immigration policy and policing process. As it can be seen now, the this subsisting method of security agencies having road blocks at the known entry routes and in some other popular bush parts and collecting gratification from smugglers is not working. Mechanisms for checks and for protecting the borderlines need to be improved upon, especially along the tracks where people transverse with legs which makes the country very pregnable. As it is known, most communities in Borno, Yobe and Admawa states have socio-economic and cultural affinity with the communities at the

borderline of the neighboring countries and therefore contacts between them have to be consciously and cautiously regulated.

- d. National programme on agriculture (farming, fishing and grazing) and youths vocational skills programme need to be evolved to re-engage the youths into gainful self-employment and take them away from their present pre-occupation. That would be effective as poverty alleviation and human capital development programs for youths who are most the vulnerable to recruitment and radicalization would reduce pressure in the state. To achieve this, the government should establish business development service center in Borno State adequately funded and staffed with skilled personnel to offer business development and career advice to jobless youths, facilitate young entrepreneurs' access to credit or start-up funds, provide coaching services, and distribute market information data to inform youths' decisions about career paths.
- e. Whatever is designed to deal with this menace need to become acceptable to the people for it to succeed. Therefore, it is very important that a re-conscioutisation programme need to be embarked upon around the states, using the traditional and religious institutions to re-direct the belief system of the people, especially the youths to make the programme work. Talks, drama, music, folklores, etc, works well in this kind of campaign and need to be fully explored.

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