

CROSS-BORDER MIGRATION AND THE RISING WAVES OF TERRORISM IN WEST AFRICA: THE EXAMPLE OF BOKO HARAM IN NIGERIA

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Abstract

This study examined the nexus between cross-border migration and the rising waves of terrorism in West Africa with a special focus on Boko Haram in Nigeria. The study was provoked by the need to unveil the roots causes of Boko Haram terrorism and to evolve effective counter-terrorism strategy against the spread of the menace in Nigeria. The data for study were gathered from secondary sources while content analytical technique was used for data analysis. The theoretical framework that anchored the study is opportunity structure theory. The findings revealed that the porous nature of Nigerian borders provides opportunities structures that propel the spread of the Boko Haram terrorism. This study affirmed that existence of many unmonitored and illegal roots along the borders facilitate easy flows of finance, illegal weapons and terrorists across the Nigerian borders. The study recommended for improved border security network through proper funding and mobilization of security agents to checkmate inflows of terrorists and illegal weapons into the country. It also recommended for improved joint border security surveillance between Nigeria and her neighbours to ensure effective border policing.

Keywords: Cross-border, migration, terrorism, Boko Haram, transnational security.

Introduction

The movement of people across national, regional and continental borders generally referred to as migration, is a natural global phenomenon. Since the beginning of the world, movement of people from their former abodes to another either for socio-economic or safety reasons has been a normal process. In Africa this phenomenon has manifested itself historically as an important feature of socio-cultural, economic and political lives of the people. In sub-Saharan Africa, it has been a permanent characteristic of the region long before colonialism. Specifically, in West Africa, it is a normal process of interaction without a barrier even with the forceful partition of the continent between the western capitalist powers which paved the way for colonization (Gabriel, Adeola, Fayomi, and Oluyemi, 2012). West Africa has a long history of population mobility, both regionally and internationally. Migration in West Africa is linked with factors as diverse as long-distance trade, the search for pasture, urbanization and the growth of administrative centres, the demands of mining, industrial production and plantation agriculture, armed conflict, land

degradation, drought and rural poverty (DFID 2004). In recent times movement across national borders within West Africa has been facilitated by the ECOWAS Protocol on free movement and establishment. Migration therefore has played a major part in shaping settlement patterns in the sub-region region.

The scale of migration in West Africa in recent years has increased remarkable. Census based estimates by the United Nations Population Division suggest that West Africa has the largest absolute international immigrant stock (based on place of birth data) in Africa. It is also the only part of sub-Saharan Africa where migration stocks relative to the total population have been increasing over the past few decades (De Haas 2007). Recent trends show not only that intra-regional mobility is increasing, compounded by factors such as climate change and environmental degradation, but also that West Africa is a region of destination for migrants and refugees coming from other parts of Africa and the wider world (Makonnen and Loubaki, 2011). These movements raise new issues, and ultimately have consequences, implications and challenges for development in the sub region.

Consequently, terrorism has emerged as formidable threats to human security and is now taking on a singular importance in terms of national, regional and international engagements. In the words of Onuoha and Ezirim (2013), the threat posed to security, stability and development by terrorism is not new in Africa in general. However, it was not until few years after the 9/11 attacks in the United States that the issue of the vulnerability of West Africa to domestic and transnational terrorism assumed centre stage in policy and academic debates. As of 2006, the debate centred on whether terrorism was a real, emerging or imagined threat in West Africa (Obi, 2006). The situation has changed dramatically in the last few years. In fact, the rising number of attacks, the multiplicity of active terror networks and the growing links between and among these groups have transformed the threat of terrorism from imagined or emerging to a real security challenge in West Africa (Laqueur, 1987).

Statistics has shown that about one in seven persons – almost one billion people – are migrants in extended sense: 740 million of them are internal migrants and 215 million international migrants excluding tourists (Castles, and Millar, 2003). These migrants are driven by economic, environmental, political and other push and pull factors. Their number is likely to increase greatly in the years to come, with bad harvests due to climate change, rising sea levels and political instability and insecurity being major factors (Nail, 2016).

International/transnational terrorism is fast becoming a major threat to political stability and human security in West Africa (Imobighe, 2009). Increasingly, we have seen the threat of terrorism in the region taking an international dimension with more than one territory identified with the planning, preparation, targeting, execution and effects of acts of terrorism. The relationship between terrorism and various forms of migration is a complex one. In one sense, it falls under the even broader theme of globalization. As aptly noted by Jamal (2005) migrations is the merging points of both globalization and terrorism. Migration has changed the concept and practice of security, and the rules of human interactions. Its threats or

perceived threats have made individual governments to formulate policies and strategies to regulate and control the way people move across their borders.

Despite its dominant gains, the challenges of migration have become a part of human existence and a matter of survival for countries, most especially in the light of globalization. The dramatic increase in worldwide flow of people, goods, and ideas has created a new group of threats. These are transnational organized crimes such as smuggling, trafficking, terrorism; cross-border crimes, illegal migration, sharp socio-economic differences, mismanaged refugee and asylum seeker flows, among others. Countries of origin, transit, and destination are now on the defense against the attacking influences of migration flows.

Nigeria could be said to be much more vulnerable to the threats than any country in Africa. Being the largest population and market in Africa, peoples of different backgrounds enter the country for socio-economic purposes from all over the world. Almost all the migration and security stakeholders seemed to agree that its borders are porous and poorly monitored. Also almost on the daily basis would one read or hear of migration-related offences committed by Nigerians and non-Nigerians within and outside its borders respectively. Geographic, demographic, political, and socio-economic circumstances are advanced for the peculiar nature and trend of the threats the nation experiences. The inherited boundaries have been a major problem to its security - to monitor, to recognize, to defend it against unwanted incursion, movements or activities.

Since its independence in 1960, Nigeria's internal security has been threatened by cross-border crimes such as trafficking in arms, persons, drugs; armed banditry, gun-running, vehicle theft, smuggling, touting and duping, illegal or silent migration (i.e. unnoticed or undocumented movements across borders), illegal lumbering, bunkering of petroleum products, and of course the transhumance activities of herdsmen who move their herds across national borders regardless of any regulations. Others are terrorism, expatriates hostage taking, expatriate quota abuse, violation of immigration laws, document frauds, and financial crimes. Nigeria is Africa's most populous country and is central to the continent's development. The current security situation is of mounting concern both to Nigeria and regional states, including Cameroon and Niger as the group has successfully staged several attacks in some neighboring countries. This study examines the nexus between cross-border migration and the rising wave of terrorism in West Africa with particular focus on Boko Haram in Northeastern.

Statement of the Problem

The movement of people across national, regional and continental borders generally referred to as migration, is a natural global phenomenon. In West Africa this phenomenon has manifested itself historically as an important feature of socio-cultural, economic and political lives of the people. Today, migratory flows, characteristics, trends, and processes are complex and diverse, with multifaceted consequences for both the migrants, their countries of origin, transit and destinations. These consequences impact on the development process through opportunities for

and constraints on peace, security, political advancement, socio-economic growth and human development (Barclay, 2010). This situation has led to increased focus by migration authorities, specialists, politicians, researchers, and other relevant stakeholders on the impact cross-border migration on national security especially, its links to terrorism.

Recently, terrorism has emerged as a formidable threat to human security and its study has assumed much importance in terms of national, regional and international engagements. In the words of Onuoha and Ezirim (2013), the threat posed to security, stability and development by terrorism is not new in Africa in general. However, it was not until few years after the 9/11 attacks in the United States that the issue of the vulnerability of West Africa to domestic and transnational terrorism assumed centre stage in policy and academic debates. As of 2006, the debate had centred on whether terrorism was a real, emerging or imagined threat in West Africa (Obi, 2006). The situation has changed dramatically in the last few years. In fact, the rising number of attacks, the multiplicity of active terror networks and the growing links between and among these groups have transformed the threat of terrorism from imagined or emerging to a real security challenge in West Africa.

This has underscored the need to systematically re-examine the links between cross border migration and terrorism in order to have good understanding of the current circumstances, trends, and nature of the threats, especially with the emergence of Boko Haram in northeaster Nigeria. Since its advent, the group has wrecked immense havoc in the region, especially by “using explosives and firearms with gruesome, fatal” consequences (Awake, 2006). This study seeks to examine the nexus between cross-border migration and rise of Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria and its attendant security challenges. In address this problem the study raises the following research questions:

1. Is there a nexus between cross-border migration and Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria?
2. What are the challenges posed by Boko Haram terrorism to national security in Nigeria?
3. What are the challenges posed by Boko Haram terrorism to national security in Nigeria?

Theoretical Framework

The framework of analysis adopted for study is the opportunity-structure theory. This theory, which is an off-shoot of structural functional theory, is associated with the works of some scholars such as; Tilly, 1970:15; 1978:20; McCarthy and Zald, 1973:142; Granovetter, 1973:171; Gamson, 1975:83; Max, 1976:17 and Scocpol, 1979: 26; others include, Horowitz, 2001:63; Fearon Laitin 2003:21; Wilkison, 2004:47; Ensminger, 2004:28; Scacco, 2007:35 and Orji, 2010:9, among others.

These scholars link the likelihood of outbreak of violent conflicts to the presence or absence of certain opportunity structures favourable for the organisation and mobilisation of violent behaviours. Put differently, scholars of this orientation

argue that no matter however discontented or aggrieved, a group of people may become they cannot engage in violent behaviours unless some opportunity structures which drives/trigger violent behaviours are on ground. These include; availability of willing violent participants, weak or low state capacity to provide security and law enforcement, availability of small arms and low cost weapons and availability of elites well connected with the local social networks of violence.

Therefore, the probability that individuals could or could not be mobilized or organised to participate in violent behaviours depends largely on the presence or absence of relative favourable socio-economic and political structures/conditions which fuel violent behaviours. As such where these structures/conditions are not in place or relatively unavailable; aggrieved individuals may decide to seek or explore other peaceful options or means to address their grievances. The this theory is appropriate for the study aptly explains both the local conditions and structures that provided the impetus for the mobilisation organization, and the rise of the Boko Haram terrorism which this study is set out to investigate.

Methodology

The study adopted qualitative method in carrying out its investigation. The data employed for the study were gathered from secondary sources. As such, data used for this study were collected from public libraries as well as private libraries of a number of colleagues and associates within and outside the country. Besides, the study also made use of internet materials wherein relevant articles were carefully gathered. The study utilized content analytical techniques for the analysis of data. As such the information employed for analysis in the study were carefully extracted from logical chains of evidence presented in journal papers, conference papers, periodic papers, edited books, documentary materials among others.

Migration Trends and Security between Nigeria and Her Neighbours

Nigeria is a big brother to other West African countries including the francophone countries in terms of numerical strength, diversity and socio-cultural power. Adepoju (2005) is of the view that West Africa has experienced a variety of migrations caused by population pressure, poverty, poor economic performances and endemic conflicts. Therefore, it is important to set migration trends between Nigeria and her neighbours in an adequate historical perspective.

According to Adepoju (2005), the pre-colonial migration in West Africa occurred largely in search of security, new land safe for settlement and fertile for farming. Colonial regime altered the motivation and composition of migration by introducing and enforcing various blends of political and economic structures, imposing tax regimes and establishing territorial boundaries. As a result of these developments, there were large-scale population movements, giving rise to the male-dominated, seasonal and cross-border migration which subsequently became institutionalized.

During the colonial period, Amin (1974), states that colonial period provoked large-scale labour migration required for plantations, mines and public administration

beyond local supply. A series of economic measures, including compulsory recruitment, contract and forced labour legislation and agreements to secure cheap labour, sparked clandestine internal and cross-border migration of unskilled adult males required for infrastructural work, especially transport networks in the north and plantation agriculture in the coastal countries. Therefore, the contemporary patterns of migration in West Africa are rooted in socio-economic, political and historical-cultural factors which have shaped the direction of development and types of economic activities and laid bold imprints on especially international migration.

Migration between Nigeria and her neighbours includes temporary clandestine workers, female and male traders, farm workers, cross-border workers, professionals, and refugees. They are essentially intra-regional, short term and male dominated, in response to the interdependent economies of neighbouring countries. The emigration configuration is also highly diversified. West Africa encompasses countries of immigration and emigration as well as both immigration and emigration. Some of the countries serve as transit paths for migrants.

The main traditional countries of immigration are Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana. In the early 1970s, Nigeria also became a major migration receiving country buoyed by oil-led employment in various sectors of the economy. The major labour exporting countries have been and still are Burkina Faso, Mali, Guinea Conakry, Cape Verde and Togo. The situation in Cape Verde is unique in that the Diaspora outnumbers the resident population (Carling, 2002). Senegal has been a labour exporting and labour receiving country. All these have changed in recent years. Ghana and later Nigeria turned labour exporting countries when economic conditions deteriorated in Ghana in the late 60's and in Nigeria in the middle 80's.

The deteriorating socio-economic conditions and deepening poverty in the late sixties and early seventies propelled a wide variety of migration configurations. Macro-economic adjustment measures and a huge increase in the number of entrants into the labour market have fuelled a job crisis, creating a sustained pressure for emigration. A significant amount of brain circulation takes place between Ghana, Gambia and Nigeria; Togo and Cote d'Ivoire; Burkina Faso and Senegal and Cote d'Ivoire, countries with shared colonial legacy (Adepoju, 2005). Currently, within the context of ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, Rights of Residence and Establishment, most countries of the sub-region have enacted, or retained a series of laws, which in effect restrict 'foreigners', including nationals of ECOWAS, from participating in certain kinds of economic activities; the expulsion of aliens also negated the *raison d'être* for establishing the Community. So long as the economies of recipient countries accommodated clandestine labour migrants there was little sign of stress. As economic conditions worsened and unemployment among nationals deepened, immigrants become targets for reprisals through expulsion (Ojo, 1999). It should be emphasized that Illegal immigrants are being expelled from virtually all West African countries before and even after the formation of ECOWAS.

Understanding the Dimensions of Transnational Security Threats in West Africa

West Africa is a highly complex region caught between affluence and

affliction. The region's states vary in territorial size, colonial history, economic strength, internal cohesion, and external linkages. The region is made up of 16 states: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo. Apart from Mauritania, the remaining states are members of the regional Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) formed in 1975 (Onuoha and Ezirim, 2013).

Established originally as a regional organization to essentially promote the economic integration of Member States, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has been gradually transformed, under the pressure of political events, into an organization also responsible for finding solutions to armed conflicts and other political crisis which were undermining peace and security within the community space. The 1990 decade saw ECOWAS, spurred by its most powerful member country by far, Nigeria, intervene beyond the conventional diplomatic field by sending thousands of soldiers to try to restore peace in Liberia, then in Sierra Leone and more modestly in Guinea Bissau (Yabi, 2010).

In countries spared the scourge of civil wars, unrest is nevertheless spurred on by the opulent extremes of the tiny elite minority compared to the abject poverty of the vast majority, the unjust distribution of profits from abundant natural resources, criminal neglect of the social sector and the environment, endemic corruption, and the perceived discrimination against minorities. Banditry and challenges to state authority in large swathes of territory within ECOWAS are notable, especially in the Niger Delta, northern Niger, and Casamance in Senegal. Disputes over land, water, and chieftaincy have claimed hundreds of lives in low-intensity conflicts in northern Ghana, Mali, and western Côte d'Ivoire, among others. The conflicts have created major human and regional security threats through spillover effects and the export of bad practices that have blighted the region's development perspectives (Musah, 2009).

In West Africa, a string of civil wars shattered societies, beginning in Liberia in late 1989 and almost seamlessly encroaching neighbouring Sierra Leone a little more than a year later. At times, Guinea threatened to become involved in this cluster of warfare. While these conflicts ended in 2002–2003, the burden of armed conflict and partition shifted to Côte d'Ivoire between 2003 and 2007, with post-electoral fighting there from 2010 to 2011. The West African nations of Guinea-Bissau, Senegal, Mali, Niger, and Congo-Brazzaville also faced army revolts, secessionist movements, and insurrections. At the Horn of Africa, large parts of Somalia have been gripped by clan based warfare and devoid of a national state or government since 1991. After the civil war between the government and southern rebels in Sudan ended with a power-sharing deal in 2003, insurgents in Darfur began their fight for political inclusion (Veit, 2011). The flow of arms and combatants, including mercenaries, across porous borders paired with the willingness of regional governments to support insurgent groups against neighbours is a dangerous combination. These transnational threats, which are interrelated and aid one another in terms of operation within the context of organized crimes include:

Porous Borders:

The porous borders of West Africa continue to engender cross-border crime and instability in the sub-region, owing to the lack of an appropriate mechanism for monitoring movements and illegal activities across these borders. In West Africa alone, there are a total of 35 international boundaries characterized by high levels of porosity. This makes them highly vulnerable to threats such as trafficking of people, drugs, small arms and light weapons as well as recent instances of terrorism. Nonetheless, border security issues are not always integrated into national security or economic strategies, and border agencies are usually ill-equipped, ill-trained and poorly resourced (Lampsey, 2013). Some of these activities involve the illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons/ammunitions and human beings, especially women and children. Mercenarism and the recruitment and use of child soldiers in armed conflict, trans-national syndicates involved in crimes such as peddling of narcotics, armed robbery and the smuggling of goods are other cross-border related crimes. These cross-border crimes are mostly symptomatic rather than as causes of instability in the sub-region (Addo, 2006).

While members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have committed not to import, export or manufacture Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), weapons continue to enter the sub-region due to poor border controls. Studies conducted have shown that between 4 and 5 million ECOWAS citizens ply the highways and frontiers of the Community's territory every month (Lamine, 2006 cited in UN 2014). In fact, the threats and challenges posed by organized criminal activities in West Africa have become so pronounced that experts in the field now characterize such groups as representing particular 'African criminal networks', ACN, (Aning, 2009:6).

Illicit Goods and Human Trafficking:

Organized crime in West Africa became an international security concern in the mid-2000s, due to the detection of large cocaine shipments transiting the region on their way to Europe. Assessments conducted by UNODC revealed that a number of transnational organized crime problems pose a threat to stability and development in the region, including oil bunkering, arms trafficking, human trafficking, migrant smuggling, toxic waste dumping, fraudulent medicine, cigarette smuggling, and the looting of natural resources (UNODC, 2013). Trans-border criminal activities in the region straddle weak borders into specific geographic locations in affected countries where state capacity to respond to the threat and challenges posed by these illegal activities is equally weak. The smuggling of goods, especially cocoa, timber, ivory and petroleum products across national borders is most prevalent along the Côte d'Ivoire-Ghana-Togo-Benin-Nigeria and Burkina Faso corridors of the sub-region. Ordinary business men and women, and sometimes rebels and criminal gangs involved in civil wars in the sub-region engage in the smuggling of these and other products. These goods are smuggled in vehicles or on foot, using secret and illegal routes across the borders to evade special regulations, levies or taxes, thereby making more income through the transaction of these products (Addo, 2006).

The growth of drug trafficking poses new challenges to the region and facilitates the emergence of new types of threats to international security. The danger lies, especially, in the nexus among drug-trafficking cartels, corrupt government officials, and suspected terrorist elements in West Africa. As succinctly put by Cockayne (2011), revenues from global illicit markets for drugs, sex, counterfeited pharmaceuticals and music, cyber fraud, stolen oil, and hostages offer political and military leaders a fast, easy, and relatively cost-free source of funds for their electoral and military campaigns and patronage systems. Political leaders also offer traffickers protection or even access to government services from diplomatic passports to the use of the military for trafficking purposes. It is a win-win situation or so it seems.

Territories with a history of state neglect and different sources of tensions in particular represent havens for drug traffickers, facilitating these kinds of transnational activities across national and international borders and at times, providing havens for radical groups (Aning and Pokoo, 2014). The scope of the human trafficking problem is widespread in West Africa. Child trafficking in particular spreads across eleven of the fifteen Member States of the ECOWAS including Ghana, Togo, Benin, Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Niger, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Sierra Leone, the Gambia, and Mali (de Andrés, 2008). The drivers of trafficking are basically the demand for labour and the demand for sex. In Africa and in West Africa, it is mainly children and women that are trafficked. Children are trafficked in the region and also between the sub-regions. They are trafficked for labour reasons, very often for the mining industry and also the petroleum industry. There is also trafficking for domestic servant reasons and all kinds of other service reasons, as well as for forced marriage.

Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons:

It is also important to point here that West Africa is a showcase of arms proliferation, notably Small Arms Light Weapons (SALW). Vast quantities of arms have flooded the region despite their rampant misuse by state and non-state actors alike. The widespread availability of small arms, especially to abusive actors, poses a major threat to West Africa. There are several reasons why SALW are extreme tools of violence in West Africa. These weapons are cheap and widely available; they are also lightweight, and so can be used by child soldiers, who have played a significant role in major conflicts in West Africa (Keili 2008 cited in Piccolino and Minou, 2014). The illicit trade in weapons between Benin, Ghana, Nigeria and Togo is fuelled by more demand by the people for self-protection, as a result of the feeling of insecurity throughout the region. This regional demand is being met by forgers principally in Ghana but also in Togo, whose local revolvers, shot guns and rifle type weapons flood the arms markets of the sub-region (Asoba, and Glokpor, 2014).

The uncontrollable circulation of weapons has a great destabilizing effect for those countries where it is observed. Civil conflicts, organized crime and terrorist activities are enabled by the illegal access to firepower that they would otherwise not be able to acquire. Destabilization has a bi-directional connection with illegal arms trade. In countries that have recently suffered major political unrest or the collapse of

the state's supervisory mechanisms, SALW depots of the military are exposed to theft by criminals or corrupted military officials (UN, 2014). The inflow and circulation of arms, particularly small arms and light weapons, in the region has clearly contributed to the increased conflict and abuses against civilians by governments and armed groups. It also has facilitated the formation of new armed groups and the use of ill-disciplined fighters, including mercenaries (HRW, 2014). Given ineffectual national security systems, porous borders, and growing demand for arms by criminals and militants, cartels specializing in arms trafficking have devised methods for concealing and conveniently trafficking arms across borders in West Africa. The audacity of militants operating in West Africa grew with the proliferation of weapons in the Sahara-Sahel region following the destabilization of Libya. Libyan arms first obtained by AQIM and other mercenaries have been transferred to groups such as Ansar Dine, Boko Haram and MUJAO, emboldening and enabling them to mount more deadly attacks (Onuoha and Ezirim, 2013).

Recruitment of Mercenaries and Child Soldiers:

Various scholars have noted the changing nature of modern warfare, in which wars are fought less and less by regular armies and in which civilians are more and more the targets of violence. Children are caught in the middle of these trends. Child soldiering is a challenge to existing moral norms and regulations that guides the conduct of modern warfare. The reintegration of child soldiers and post conflict reconstruction and peace-building are practical issues that confront war-torn countries. However, post-war conflict management expressed by the international community and sub-regional peace providers had concentrated only on the concern for child soldiers and their atrocities without an effective programme of post conflict reconstruction and peace building (Santa Barbara, cited in Egbe, 2014). Mercenaries in particular routinely commit abuses against, and often terrorize civilians. The use of such forces has been witnessed in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire. Many of these fighters hire out their services in conflict after conflict (Misol 2004 cited in Piccolino and Minou, 2014).

It has been noted that the longer a conflict continues the more likely children are forcibly recruited because of shortage of adult soldiers. Children are also often recruited because they are believed to have special qualities, like obedience, they do not compete with the leadership; are quick, invisible, fearless, and mainly cheap. The availability of lightweight, easy to use and low cost small arms also contributes to the use of children as combatants. These 'small arms' are popular with government forces and nongovernmental groups, the police and civilians and can be used and transported by children as young as nine years old. The trade in these arms is largely unregulated and embargoes are often not respected (Peters, 2005). The cross-border recruitment and operation of the terrorist groups within the sub-region also has security implications. It points to attempts by the al-Qaeda terrorist network and its affiliates to spread their operational and human resource base within Africa, and establish a coordinating point in West Africa. This is ultimately aimed at spreading Islamic extremism and global jihadist movements.

Migration and Security Threats in Nigeria

Nigeria could be said to be much more vulnerable to the threats than any country in Africa. Being the largest population and market in Africa, peoples of different backgrounds enter the country for socio- economic purposes from all over the world. Almost all the migration and security stakeholders seemed to agree that its borders are porous and poorly monitored. Also almost on the daily basis would one read or hear of migration- related offences committed by Nigerians and non- Nigerians within and outside its borders respectively. Geography, demography, political, and socio- economic circumstances are advanced for the peculiar nature and trend of the threats the nation experiences. The inherited boundaries have been a major problem to its security - to monitor, to recognize, to defend it against unwanted incursion, movements or activities. Since its independence in 1960, Nigeria's internal security has been threatened by cross- border crimes such as trafficking in arms, persons, drugs; armed banditry, gun- running, vehicle theft, smuggling, touting and duping, illegal or silent migration (i.e. unnoticed or undocumented movements across borders), illegal lumbering, bunkering of petroleum products, and of course the transhumance activities of cattle rearers who move their herds across national borders regardless of any regulations. Others are terrorism, expatriates hostage taking, expatriate quota abuse, violation of immigration laws, document frauds, and financial crimes.

The various crimes have caused or influenced rate of ethno- religious and political crises in the country, where several lives and property were lost and people displaced. The more recent was the Boko Haram (Nigerian version of Taliban) sectarian crisis against the state. Foreign nationals were discovered among its fold and the Nigeria police alleged that the group received training and arms in Afghanistan. The migration induced conflicts and violence has led to reductions in revenue of the government, foreign direct investment, infrastructural facilities, and the ability of the government to deliver dividends of democracy to its citizens. Lots of Nigerians and immigrants now live in constant fear of insecurity. Kidnappings of expatriates, robberies and other forms of criminality have led some citizens to call for overhauling of the national security; states to agitate for state police, and also led to growth of private security companies. Some Nigerians in Diaspora are hesitant to come home due to the state of insecurity because a few of them have either been killed or robbed while visiting home.

Boko Haram terrorism is seen as a dimension of insecurity. Terrorism is a premeditated use of threat or violence by sub national groups to obtain a political or self-interest objectives through intimidation of people, attacking of states, territories either by bombing, hijackings, and suicide attacks, among others. It implies a premeditated, political motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents (US Commission, 2012; Ogbonnaya and Ehigiamuose, 2013). Two types of terrorism have been identified; domestic and transnational terrorism.

Cross-Border Migration and Boko Haram Terrorism in Nigeria

Migration has changed the concept and practice of security, and the rules of human interactions. Its threats or perceived threats have made individual governments to formulate policies and strategies to regulate and control the way people move across their borders. Despite its dominant gains, the challenges of migration have become a part of human existence and a matter of survival for countries, most especially in the light of globalization. The dramatic increase in worldwide flow of people, goods, and ideas has created a new group of threats. These are transnational organized crimes such as smuggling, trafficking, terrorism; cross-border crimes, illegal migration, sharp socio-economic differences, mismanaged refugee and asylum seeker flows, amongst others.

Premdas (1991) argues that migration spreads ethnic conflict across borders, creating “an uncontrollable chain of ever-widening involvement of host communities” and “embroiling and accumulating antagonists and strange bedfellows, thereby growing larger and more irrationally out of control” (Whitaker, 2003). Deducing from the above, there is a synergy between cross-border migration and boko haram terrorism in Nigeria. Thus, terrorism is a transnational crime.

Terrorism is therefore seen as a dimension of insecurity. It is a premeditated use of threat or violence by sub national groups to obtain a political or self-interest objectives through intimidation of people, attacking of states, territories either by bombing, hijackings, and suicide attacks, among others. It implies a premeditated, political motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub national groups or clandestine agents (Ogbonnaya and Ehigiamuose, 2013).

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Nigeria is Africa’s most populous country and is central to the continent’s development. The current security situation is of mounting concern both to Nigeria

and regional states, including Cameroon and Niger. With Boko Haram's disregard for international borders, as militants have staged attacks in neighboring Cameroon, the creation of an Islamic State may not be solely contained within Nigeria, but may also affect regions outside the country's borders, including Cameroon.

Boko Haram terrorism has claimed thousands of lives and created a refugee and internal displacement crisis. Nigerians are increasingly forced to seek refuge in neighboring states to avoid Boko Haram attacks and military campaigns against these insurgents, which in-turn places added strain on the economies and humanitarian services of neighboring states. The activities of terrorists in the northeastern region have resulted in the deaths and displacement of thousands with their attendant humanitarian crisis.

As noted by Onuoha (2014), the implications of Boko Haram insurgency on regional security can be accessed from at least four dimensions, namely: the group's expansion in the form of recruitment, training, equipment and funding; its targeted violent cross-border attacks; transnational consequences of its operations; and a potential erosion of Nigeria's role as the de-facto leader of ECOWAS.

With Boko Haram's unprecedented gains in recent years, the group appears to be inching closer to achieving its goal of carving out a strict Islamic state across northern Nigeria. They have killed thousands of innocent people, displaced several others and destroyed hundreds of schools and churches in a wave of terror aimed at carving out an Islamic state in Nigeria. Five years after the emergence of Boko Haram, Nigeria does not seem to have an effective strategy for dealing with these misguided elements and their deep commitment to waging war against the country and its people (Agekameh, 2014). While the international community has generally responded swiftly and generously to refugee crises over the past half century, in recent years, some worrying trends have begun to emerge. Countries that once generously opened their doors to refugees have been tempted to shut those doors for fear of assuming open-ended responsibilities, of abetting uncontrolled migration and people-smuggling, or of jeopardizing national security. Real and perceived abuses of asylum systems as well as irregular movements, have also made some countries more wary of refugee claimants, and concerned that resources are not being sufficiently focused on those in greatest need (Jastram and Achiron, 2011). Sub-Saharan Africa has witnessed significant flows of forced migrants, including internally displaced people and victims of trafficking.

Boko Haram Terrorism and National Security in Nigeria

The threat of terrorism in West Africa like other parts of the world is a security management problem. While there might be numerous explanations and rationalizations as to why terrorism is more a security management problem in West Africa than it might be in other parts of the world, weak state capacity and poor governance in the region have been key factors. Terrorism both as practiced and justified by terrorist themselves, is a tool used to achieve a specific outcome by using force or violence on one segment of society with the primary goal of causing fear in the larger society to make change in that society. In short, terrorism is a term used to

describe violence or other harmful acts such as kidnapping, armed robbery, assassinations, pipe - line vandalization and a host of others. These happen to be some of the challenges confronting the federal government of Nigeria.

Despite the measures put in place to suppressing terrorism, the danger seems to be over stressing the government and the citizens of Nigeria. The fact is that most of the government efforts have been mere window dressing as they have not actually addressed the issues that brought about terrorism in those areas. For example, while government actions in the Niger Delta were merely settling the militants and their leaders, the general lack of infrastructural development in the Zone has remained unsolved. Boko Haram terrorism constitutes the highest form of insecurity in this nation. However, the concept - security, is empty without a critical discourse of something pertinent to secure. Indeed, security could best be understood when situated within the context of a referent object (Nwagboso, 2012). In the history of humans, the central focus of security has been people (Rothschild, 1995). Contrarily, some scholars especially those in international politics have argued that when thinking about security, states should be the most important referents. On the other hand, some analysts have challenged this position by arguing that any intellectual discourse on security should accord priority to human beings since without reference to individual humans, security makes no sense (McSweeney, 1999).

Notwithstanding these controversial debates, the focus of this aspect of investigation is on Boko Haram and other domestic terrorism and their impact on the telecom industry. However, Boko Haram terrorism has been a major cankerworm in Nigeria basket which poses a threat to security of life and property and Nigeria is presently mired in a state of obfuscation. To be precise, Nigeria has long been facing severe security challenges from terrorists prior to 1999. Thus, there has been a great internal insecurity challenges in Nigeria before the dawn of democracy in 1999. These include; Maitatsine activities in the 1980s, the Odua'a People's Congress (OPC) in the South West and the Bakasi boys in the South East.

The emergence of terrorism in Nigeria marked a threshold in the dramatic reign of public insecurity, which has generated widespread anxiety in the country. In 2002, Nigeria came face to face with a new security challenge arising from the activities of Boko Haram sect (otherwise known as the Yusufiyya movement). This genre of violence was fuelled by religious extremism. Boko Haram is a Jihadist militant organization based in North Eastern Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger and Chad. The movement was founded by a radical Islamic cleric, Mohammed Yusuf (Ngare, 2012). Scholars and analysts have raised several fundamental questions as to whether Boko Haram was founded on strict Islamic ideology. This is in view of the Sect's preference to violence as a means of proselytization and societal change. It is equally important to note that Sharia Law was already in place in some Northern Nigeria before Boko Haram was launched in 2002. It could have been thought that all that the sect needed to do was to call for internal reforms to entrench a proper Islamic order rather than resorting to violence.

Forest & Giroux, (2011) posit that that Boko Haram is largely a product of wide spread social – economic and religious insecurity whose repercussions resonate

among certain communities in the North. But this begs the question: if the region for several decades has coexisted with these ills without conflict, why are the ills (pervasive poverty, endemic corruption, inequality, injustice, youth unemployment and absence of good governance) now serving as a catalyst for the emergence and spread of the Boko Haram insurgency.

In 2011, Boko Haram initiated a campaign of suicide bombing, a phenomenon witnessed for the first time in Nigeria's history. The Federal Government responded to these security threats by declaring an antiterror war on the sect. The escalation of the insurgency in between 2012 and 2013 led to the declaration of state of emergency on three North Eastern States of Bornu, Yobe and Adamawa. In spite of this development, the activities of Boko Haram have tended to have continued unabated. The outcome of these activities has created unprecedented humanitarian crises for the country with colossal effect on public safety and human security. Since the last five years the Boko Haram sect has continued to wage a vicious campaign of terror against the Nigerian state, as well as the civil population of the country. The sect started with sporadic attacks on security formations. With time, they graduated to offensives on Christian churches, schools and other public places. The use of improvised explosives and suicide bombing has since added to the ever degenerating complexion of insurgency.

Conclusions and Recommendations

The study concluded that the rise of Boko Haram terrorism has its roots with the migration across the Nigerian borders. It argued that West Africa has a long history of population mobility, both regionally and internationally. The study attributed causes of the movement to a lot factors which include but not limited to long-distance trade, the search for pasture, urbanization and the growth of administrative centres, the demands of mining, industrial production and plantation agriculture, armed conflict, land degradation, drought, rural poverty in recently the ECOWAS Protocol on free trade and movement.

Despite its dominant gains, the challenges of migration have become a part of human existence and a matter of survival for countries, most especially in the light of globalization. The dramatic increase in worldwide flow of people, goods, and ideas has created a new group of threats. These are transnational organized crimes such as smuggling, trafficking, terrorism; cross-border crimes, illegal migration, sharp socio-economic differences, mismanaged refugee and asylum seeker flows, among others. Countries of origin, transit, and destination are now on the defense against the attacking influences of migration flows.

Nigeria could be said to be much more vulnerable to the threats than any country in Africa. Being the largest population and market in Africa, peoples of different backgrounds enter the country for socio-economic purposes from all over the world. Almost all the migration and security stakeholders seemed to agree that its borders are porous and poorly monitored. Also almost on the daily basis would one read or hear of migration-related offences committed by Nigerians and non-Nigerians within and outside its borders respectively. Geographic, demographic,

political, and socio- economic circumstances are advanced for the peculiar nature and trend of the threats the nation experiences.

The inherited boundaries have been a major problem to its security - to monitor, to recognize, to defend it against unwanted incursion, movements or activities. Since its independence in 1960, Nigeria's internal security has been threatened by cross- border crimes such as trafficking in arms, persons, drugs; armed banditry, gun- running, vehicle theft, smuggling, touting and duping, illegal or silent migration (i.e. unnoticed or undocumented movements across borders), illegal lumbering, bunkering of petroleum products, and of course the transhumance activities of herdsmen who move their herds across national borders regardless of any regulations. Others are terrorism, expatriates hostage taking, expatriate quota abuse, violation of immigration laws, document frauds, and financial crimes. Nigeria is Africa's most populous country and is central to the continent's development. The study recommended for improved border security network through proper funding and mobilization of security agents to checkmate inflows of terrorists and illegal weapons into the country. It also recommended for improved joint border security surveillance between Nigeria and her neighbours to ensure effective policing of the border communities.

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