

International Migration and Policy: Xenophobia in Structure of Immigration Policy of US, UK and South Africa

Sampson I. Ekwonna

Department of Political Science,
Imo State University, Owerri.
samekwonna@gmail.com

Abstract

The continued attack on the lives and property of foreigners --- especially, Nigerians --- in South Africa of the recent times and the very deafening silence of its political leadership in the face of a clear affront on its law-and-order leave a worrying feeling of either (a complete) lawlessness or a certain pattern to the madness. Since there is not much supporting evidence of a general war of all on all, we are wont to support the latter. Our intent is to investigate the now trending xenophobic attacks to fully understand its meaning, manifestation, implications in international law among civilized nations, and its prevalence among states. This paper adopts a descriptive research design and its method of analysis is cross country comparative, using secondary data drawn from existing literature. For explanation, we are going to rely on the national identity approach.

Keywords: Immigration, Xenophobia, International Law, migrants, Asylum.

Introduction

Xenophobia is not a typical South Africa invention or phenomenon, it is traceable to varying degrees of refinement in the different laws and rules sought to be impressed on foreigners seeking entry and stay and their conduct in the receiving states, and the behaviour of nationals towards migrants. Even, the most primitive societies have it. It is all a question of rights and privileges and power. There are rules on who can come into a society and become part of it, to what level and through what rituals or rites of passage or cleansing.

People have always moved from one group or society into another, encountering different degrees of challenges to entry and possible assimilation or settlement. The development of human civilization has increased the rate to which these migrations and contacts occur, and the advent of globalization has accentuated this phenomenon as long distance migrations have become the norm. Globalization, with its acclaimed goodies and capabilities of general empowerment, has encountered greater resistance at the borders of the state, as the latter's atavistic element of sovereignty puts up a life-and-death resistance (Ekwonna, 2016). Every day, it becomes manifest that the concept of (national) sovereignty is in greater need of re-fashioning or retooling to find compatibility or survival in a globalized world. A question arises: How can the state continue to sustain its sovereignty, in its internal and external totality, in the face of the incessant onslaught of the forces and inevitable consequences of globalization? One of such inevitable consequences is the large-scale migration of persons from the remotest of places in search of better opportunities of life -- be they economic migrants, refugees, internally displaced person (IDPs), asyumees; be they honest good folks or criminals and

dangerous malcontents and terrorists. To these persons the state owes nothing, but to its own citizens the state owes the sovereign duty of a modicum of security. At the border of its international and treaty obligations, the sovereign state is driven by the fears and anxieties of its own populations; therefore, it enacts rules on immigration, laced with the strands of these emotions. Xenophobia is found not only in the violent behaviour of citizens towards immigrants but also traceable in the rules on immigration as drawn up by the state in its foreign policies.

This paper makes the stand that traits of xenophobia are innate or inevitable in the immigration policies of states because of their nature as states under pressure of influx of foreigners at the borders and pressures from their own populations for their own survival such policy output becomes a necessity. We, therefore, want to examine the immigration policies of such pressured states as USA, UK, and South Africa, to understand the underlying factors to the phenomenon of xenophobia. Our specific objectives shall be:

1. To frame the phenomenon of xenophobia in concept and incidence.
2. To understand the implication of xenophobic in international law - rights and obligations of receiving states, immigrants, receiving communities.
3. To identify the incidence of xenophobia in the immigration policies of immigration- pressured states like the USA, UK and South Africa.

The following research questions are raised:

1. What constitutes the meaning, nature and incidence of xenophobia?
2. How does xenophobia situate in the interaction of international law and municipal law?
4. How does immigration policy induce or condone xenophobia in USA, UK, and South Africa?

For a clearer understanding of the phenomenon xenophobia as sought in the foregoing questions, the following hypotheses may be put forward:

1. Xenophobia in its intrinsic nature can be explained as an instinct of self love and a child like fear of the dark, which fear, in extension, stresses hate of the outsiders, and which hate is really indistinguishable from racism.
2. Xenophobia demonstrates a union of contradictions between the principles of international law obligations on states and the political realities of state sovereignty.
3. Xenophobia is produced in the immigration policy and governance of states.

Methodology

This paper adopts a cross-country study design by looking at the incidence of xenophobia in the immigration politics of USA, UK, and South Africa to show the common and peculiar character of the phenomenon in question, as indicated in the hypotheses of this paper. We rely on secondary data from varied sources and which we subject to a content analysis.

Review of Related Literature

The phenomenon of xenophobic violence has captured the attention of scholars in many countries and they have examined it from different perspectives. Using the case of Germany in the early 1990's, Steinhardt (2018) finds that xenophobic violence in host countries can negatively impact on the integration of the immigrants into the mainstream of society: in specific ways that "it reduces subjective well-being and increases return intension, while it reduces investment in German language skills".

Scholars have found an intimacy between racism and xenophobia in the violent hate towards the foreigner. The Council of Europe (1994) accepts a close tie between racism and xenophobia that the attempts to deal with racism and xenophobia, though centering around local activities and actions, they are determined and influenced by (the implementation of) national policy (p.9). By extension, it means that though the roots of xenophobia and racism are in the individual human nature, its wide prevalence or abetment cannot be divorced from national policy (especially on community relations – defined as "the totality of relations between the indigenous population and the various migrant or ethnic groups of immigrant origin" (p.10).

Harris (2001) recognizes the complicity between racism and xenophobia: he finds that distinctiveness of identity of colour, religious features, etc. makes one more prone to be identified as other and likely target of xenophobic behaviour. In putting a specific leadership and its policies in focus of study, Young (2017) identifies some parallelism between current rhetoric on immigration under the Trump administration and the 1920's (late 19th & early 20th century) hostilities towards immigrants. In the earlier period, it was the Chinese and Japanese, Southern and Eastern Europeans and Mexicans, who for their "race, ethnicity and culture" were considered impossible to assimilate into the American mainstream society.

Today, it's the undocumented Mexicans who are branded "rapists, drug dealers, and prostitutes, Muslims as national security threat", etc. In a counter narrative, Vanyoro (2019), uses the experience of a specific healthcare emergency facility to both unwittingly expose the hidden xenophobia in government policies and procedures and the likelihood of government facilities ignoring them and providing services to otherwise targeted foreigners in South Africa by bypassing "institutional and policy related difficulties" relating to registering and testing three categories of indigent migrant patients: undocumented migrants, non-native speaking migrants and migrants without referral letters (self-referrals). The researcher's expectations or opening assumptions of healthcare providers revealing an 'exclusionary' and xenophobia practice were completely belied by the realities on the field.

In *Reverse Xenophobia*, Lesetedi and Modie-Moroka (2007) identified the close link between the concept/phenomena of xenophobia and migration. It identifies most works on xenophobia as being one sided, focusing on the negative perception of foreigners by locals, while neglecting reverse case of how the immigrants perceive the host population. It examined the case of Zimbabweans in Botswana. DiGiusto and Jolly (2009) suggests that, in line with the contact theory (though) smaller number of

immigrants might incite xenophobic reactions, “larger immigrant populations dampen xenophobic attitudes”.

D’Amico (2018) in a cross-country study examined the interaction of xenophobia and a nation’s refugee policy of integration, and finds that high prevalence of xenophobic negativity among citizens and law makers/government would be less incentive to prioritize on a policy of refugee integration and assimilation. And further, this study sees a rise in right wing extreme parties as exploiting and accentuating the negativity of xenophobia. Crush & Ramachandran (2010) examined the neglected potentials in migration for both origin and destination party states and how that is sought to be undermined by xenophobia inspired by intolerance, by comparing the experiences of India and South Africa; in India it is the Bangladeshis while in South Africa it is the aliens of other African countries. Identifying Brexit as manifestation of politically “activated” xenophobia, an irrational fear not supported – in fact, contradicted on all points -- by scientific data from numerous studies, Beauchamp (2016) summarized:

The best explanation is that Britain’s xenophobia over immigration is being activated. They see immigrants around them, and they start looking for ways to prevent more from coming in. it’s not about assessing the harm immigrants are doing to Britain; it’s about being terrified that they’re changing the “character” of Britain to be more “foreign”.

Explanatory Framework: The National Identity Approach

Ordinarily, national identity deals with self categorization, in which people are placed in two broad categories – nationals, citizens, compatriots and others, while others left out are foreigners, aliens, non nationals, expatriates, etc. This classification in politics carries certain rights and obligations for the citizens, and from which the other non-nationals are exempted or denied. The laws of the land reflect this discrimination. The politicization of this identity involves nationalism in which one identifies with ones country, its land, laws, symbols, and cultures with own identity.

This identity driven nationalism can be classified into: strong instrumental nationalism and weak nationalism. For the strong instrumentalists, national identity is “necessary, but not necessarily sufficient condition for a democratic welfare state,” while for the weak nationalists, “a national identity can constitute a condition for a democratic welfare state, yet it is neither necessary nor sufficient” (Sandelind, 2015). The weak nationalists believe that since a national identity is not really necessary, any other form of shared identity may just fit the bill to “construct the same sense of trust and solidarity,” therefore, immigration might not be constructed as a threat. However, the strong instrumentalists manage to construct immigration as a threat to the formation of a national identity that produces the sense of trust and understanding necessary for deliberative democracy and the advancement of social redistribution.

The national identity approach highlights historical experiences, cultural idioms and social conflicts that have shaped past and current immigration policies (Mayer 2000, p. 1247). Our interest is in the strong instrumentalist nationalist approach. It better captures the mood of xenophobia in the USA, UK and South Africa, where migrants are

perceived at best as disruptive to the capacity of the state to be democratic and deliver the desired welfare state. However, the intriguing thing in this approach, and which is often overlooked by its aficionados in its nature is that it inheres the choice to also construct a positive image of immigration as beneficial to the survival of the nation. The leading lights of this approach include Miller, Barry, Goodhart, and Collier.

I. Xenophobia: Self-love, Hate for Outsiders and Racism

Xenophobia in its intrinsic nature can be explained as an instinct of self love and a childlike fear of the dark, which fear, in extension, stresses hate of the outsiders, and which hate is really indistinguishable from racism.

Xenophobia is a natural human instinct, the foundation of which is so deep it is traceable to the very animal juncture or intersection of evolution. It is in the animal level DNA of nature. It is ingrained in the human-animal instincts/emotions of love of the self or self-love, and fear of darkness or unknown. It is out of the love of the self that the civilizing principles of rationalization of self-preservation are derived. The man loves himself first – more than anything else, and, his love or the lack of it for anybody or anything else derives from and only in pursuit of this. The measurement of this consists in the proximity, or degrees of removal, of the subject of love or hate from the self. Then the man loves his family – children (and may be) his wife – then, his siblings and others according to the degrees of removal from the self. And, this progresses to the total stranger, who is barely human – and might as well be meat or vegetable to be eaten when necessary for self-preservation. In the reverse order of the diminution is the increase in the fear of the unknown/stranger. This manifests in ignorance and hate, violence, scapegoating, stereotyping, profiling, etc.

Xenophobia describes attitudes, prejudices and behavior that reject, exclude and often vilify persons, based on the perception that they are outsiders or foreigners to the community, society or national identity. In *Reverse Xenophobia*, Lesetedi & Modie-Moroka (2007) identified the close link between the concept/phenomena of xenophobia and migration; defined xenophobia as “the dislike or intolerance of foreigners” and which fear or dislike can be attributed to competition for scarce resources, employment, housing, services, facilities and even simple physical space. This can lead to violence, resentment, hostility and abuse both verbally and physically of foreigners by the locals, resulting in “negative energy between both locals and foreigners”.

Nature of Xenophobia

Besides a deep-seated hate of foreigners, the phenomenon embodies other elements to fully comprehend it, which include the following:

1. It is a practice: this means that in the absence of some behavior pattern, the mere hate of another would amount to wasted or inchoate emotions.

2. It is a pattern in the behavior of governments, the general public and the media: xenophobia permeates the whole society, even if not manifest all the time. It is a society-wide thing; some reasonable spread of the local population must share those sentiments.
3. It is accompanied with perception of violent behavior: whether as threats or actual manifestation, the victim or target must perceive a significant degree of hostile intentions and action in the behavior pattern of the dominant population. It is inevitably physical or abusive.
4. The dominant group as perpetrators of xenophobia. It is never the product of the weaker group: ethnic, religious, economic, political and cultural, to exercise xenophobia (on any other group). It is often the exclusive flaw of the dominant groups. Members enjoy a sense of protection or security or impunity in the strength of the groups dominance, even when they know privately the illegality or immorality of such acts either against their own or against any likely dominant groups.

Xenophobia combines these traits in its nature to be complete in its comprehension.

Causes of Xenophobia

The factors animating xenophobia according to Well (2009, p.234 cited in Choane, Shulika, and Mthambeni, 2011) center on intolerance that focuses on three types of factors:

1. **Cultural factors which include identity and nationalism:** In situations where there is wide cultural difference between the host population and the migrants, as can easily be shown in dressing, language, religion, race, and other identity symbols, xenophobia is, at best of times, just beneath the surface. These cultural elements could easily become points of friction when people come into social interaction in places of work and leisure, as each side tries to hold onto and not lose its own values in a changing environment. The host community very quickly perceives threat to its own society as it has known it, from a neutralizing effect of the newcomers. It does not take much time or incitement for cultural questions to find imaginative interpretations in fertile political genius and answers begin to manifest in terms of some form of nativism or narrow nationalism.
2. **Material or economic factors related to employment opportunities, available resources etc:** The basic perception and which is most irate of the immigrants by the host population is one of unfair competition for jobs, especially when they are scarce and the people are unemployed; an unmerited scrounger for social services; and the veritable fountain of social vices hitting the host community. This perception is very high, but not confined to the economically and, thus, socially weaker sections of the society, perhaps, because that is where the migrants often wind up for shelter and also because that is where the problems of the socioeconomic system bite the most.

The intrusion of foreign migrants into vulnerable communities beset by joblessness and despair inevitably produces a tinderbox that spark violence. Migrants are easy targets. That's because they are seen as being better by the locals. They therefore become targets of people who feel their circumstances have not been addressed by government. It is no surprise that xenophobic attacks have typically occurred in poor neighbourhoods that have been affected by service delivery protests since the mid-200s. (Khadiagala, 12/9/2019). It is possible to represent the fate of migrants by illustrating it as one of being in the wrong place, where the people are already seething with anger at being left out in the share of enjoyment of jobs and amenities by the operations of the state/governance and to have walked into the rage (of the locals) that was not really meant for them with a 29% unemployment (one-in-three people in the country don't have a regular formal job) (Khadiagala, 12/9/2019).

3. **Ineffective or poor policing:** Admittedly, large scale immigration is often attended with law and order issues. The way the police agencies handle that can either mitigate or accentuate the problem. In most cases, the training of the police personnel does not include – or at least does not emphasize on – how to handle the challenges of immigrant-national friction/relations; it is often thought of a normal non-distinguishable part of regular policing. But, it is not. The average cop-on-the-beat is not prepared, and the force lacks motivation in such situation as he is even persuaded to perceive the immigrant --- who literally has come and problem started – as (the cause of) the problem. If everybody had remained in his country, would there be anybody suffering xenophobia? Sometimes, policing challenges not well handled can spill over into acts of xenophobia. Policemen are humans and, as part of their society cannot only think like the rest of the society, and without extra attention to recruitment, training and motivation, begin to perceive and act like the rest of the society, and indulge in behaviour of xenophobia. It could be merely a situation of undermanned and infrastructural deficit force. Ineffective or poor policing can create a gap of ungoverned space in which violence normally takes place. The migrants just walked into this psychological space and fit the bill of everybody's *non* friend.
4. **Poor border control and immigration policy:** Wrong immigration policy and poor border control infrastructure can result in uncontrolled or improperly controlled influx of all manner of migrants – refugees and asyumees, economic migrants of skilled and non skilled kinds, fugitives and criminal elements, and fifth-columnists and terrorist elements. The failure of a receiving state border controls could lead to uncontrolled immigration, much influx than the state and its economy and amenities can tolerate. This would lump all immigrants into a motley crowd, preventing any easy separation of the genuine and desirable from the bad and undesirable, will tar the whole with any bad behaviour of the any

segment. The bad impression created by the few becomes the basis for wrong stereotyping of the whole.

- 5. Feeling of being overrun by immigrants:** Commonsense logic would be that the fewer immigrants, the less the tendency of citizens to acts of xenophobia, as they are more like interesting curiosities. The greater presence creates the feeling of suffocation in a non-expanding space – in fact, shrinking space per individual. The greater number means more contact between more citizens and more aliens and the greater chances of interpersonal conflicts and the greater chances of interpreting this in-group framework into stereotypes. The feedback to the immigrants would be one of non-acceptance by the host; and for the host it would be one of outside/foreign invasion. However, the presence of larger proportion of immigrant content in the host population has been found to reduce the tendency to xenophobic behaviour (DiGiusto & Jolly, 2009). Perhaps, also the greater opportunities of interactions in non-competitive environments help to douse tension between immigrants and host population.

Xenophobia and Racism

In many cases, it is difficult to distinguish between Xenophobia and racism as notification for behavior, especially in cases where physical characteristics are differentiated and even when such differences are not, and even in cases of shared ancestry, etc (ILO, IOM, OHCHR & UNHCR, 2001). Racism is often color driven but xenophobia is largely cultural/ culture-driven. Racism is dislike for other race/colour, while xenophobia is fear of others whose identity difference could be colour, culture, ethnicity, or plain foreignness. However, racism can draw from and lead to xenophobia or fan it. And, in cases of ethnic or racial differences xenophobia can mask racism thereby leading to wrong diagnosis. The racial preferences of the South African immigration policy is easily swept into the same bin as xenophobia (Neocomos, 2006, cited in Solomon & Kosaka, 21/6/2019; Palmary n. d. p.4) .

Though conceptually different from racism in its intrinsic nature and enabling factors, xenophobia becomes very indistinguishable in situations where whatever existing differences upon which the latter is constructed is joined with any discernable racial distinction between the host community and the migrants. It follows that irrational fear against outsiders expressed in behaviour intended to offend or humiliate them can be xenophobia in a set of circumstances even when racial preferences are involved, like in South Africa, but in a different set racial preferences can make such hate racism. So it is not only a thin line but just an imaginary one that separates xenophobia and racism.

II. Xenophobia: Union of Contradictions between International Law Obligations and the Political Realities of State Sovereignty.

Xenophobia demonstrates a union of contradictions between the principles of international law obligations on states and the political realities of state sovereignty.

Several instruments of the international law exist at the global and regional levels to help shape global and direct (compliant) national policies on the treatment of persons, especially aliens, including:

- (a) Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD),
- (b) ILO discrimination on employment and occupation convention III,
- (c) Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly's recommendation 1134(1790) on the Rights of Minorities and its Council of Ministers' Recommendation No: R (92) 12 on Community relations.

Article 13(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 12 of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights recognize the right of every one to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his own country. International law *per se* does not obligate states to admit aliens, nor are states under any obligation to exclude aliens, because of the principle of territorial supremacy or sovereignty. However, under any treaties or customary practice, a state can have such obligations (Kapoor 2000 p. 347) Such obligation emanating from treaties and customs, incidentally, owes to the same principle of territorial supremacy. Further, no alien has a right to asylum, it is at the discretion of the state to grant or refuse asylum.

From the foregoing, it is clear that the state is at liberty to decide on *who* to admit and *who not* to and *how*. And, the practice of states has shown the exercise of the right to arbitrariness in the decision of such; this is otherwise called Immigration policy. States have shown ethnic and racial, linguistic, economic, skills, religious, and other prejudices and preferences in their immigration policies and have not been found to break the international law.

Rights of the immigrant, which are also human rights include:

- (i) Right not to be held in slavery and servitude;
- (ii) Right against torture, cruel and inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment;
- (iii) Right against arbitrary arrest and detention; and,
- (iv) Right to security and to found family. (Martin, 2005).

As a principle, xenophobia defines state protection or responsibility for protection of alien rights in terms of narrow definition of citizenship; and, as a policy, it operates in the discriminatory interpretation of citizenship and its rights protection. On the face of it, the alien should be in a position to enjoy as much rights as the citizen, but with significant exceptions:

- (i) no right to franchise but right to life and personal liberties;
- (ii) due for certain minimum international standards of justice in treatment, even if the state treats her citizens badly; and,
- (iii) the receiving state's responsibility for reasonable diligence to protect an alien from harmful actions of private citizens, or if it fails to take remedial measures, the home state can seek redress (Kapoor 200 p. 348).

However, several variables constitute a constraint on the operations of these rights:

- (a) Relationship between the alien and his state: this can affect the capacity of the alien to enjoy, or to overcome some of the obstacles to the enjoyment of, these rights. In most cases, the alien is literally escaping a condition which may include the very state itself and would rather deny or denounce their connection than to risk repatriation, which is like the sword of Damocles hanging over his head.
- (b) The condition of the alien's national state: this does affect his status as an alien, hierarchically, the most aliens as refugees and asylees come from states with serious integrity challenges, and some would qualify for failed states. Such states lack the internal capacity or coordination to mount defence of citizens' rights in foreign lands.
- (c) Power equation between states: the case is usually of migrants from the comparatively disadvantaged/weaker state to the advantaged/stronger one. The state of lesser power always has less leverage over the stronger one, to extract better treatment for its nationals.
- (d) The primitive right of rejection or expulsion by the receiving state: In spite of developments in international law on migration, the state has retained its primitive right to not only accept but also remove aliens without duty of explanation to any authority. At best, an alien is a nuisance that is being tolerated, and may be removed. This right can short-circuit any process of laws by the alien of any rights.
- (e) The inherent limitations or structural difficulties in being an alien: Being an alien contains the structure of its own disability. The alien is disabled psychologically, financially, intellectually, and lacks the morale to pursue such intricate principles of law, either in defence or proactively.

In view of the foregoing, it is clear that the migrant provokes the attention – nay, sympathy – of the international law, but the fundamental weakness of the intents of law as against the realities of the power of the state and its politics belies the expectations of the individual. The absence of machinery of enforcement over the state is brought to the open in the blatant display of nativism in its unpleasant manifestations as xenophobia and racism.

The international law on the treatment of aliens has remained intents and good wishes left to the conscience and convenience of states. States themselves have become the product of their own internal politics.

Xenophobia is a product of such politics; and, the capacity of state policy to escape its internal politics is very limited or doubtful. As long as there is poverty, politics and aliens, some form of xenophobia would survive. Xenophobia problematizes issues of local realities into general principles that affect or guide foreign policy decisions. The connection among these (local) realities, issues and the decision are arranged or propagandized into simplistic cause-effect relationships that make a single solution

logically inevitable, even if that solution is itself a utopia. The connection between xenophobia and immigration policy is deep

III. Xenophobia is Institutionalized in the Structure of Immigration Policies and Governance of States.

Xenophobia is produced in the immigration policy and governance of states.

There are certain basic background information necessary to enable us understand the politics and policies of states and governments that inadvertently predispose them to xenophobic behaviour: nature of immigration policy as control and immigrant policy; nature of state at formation; structure of state's interaction with the foreign individual; and, stereotypical classification of migrants:

1. Components of Immigration Policy as control and immigrant policy

Meyers (2000) identifies the two parts of immigration policy of states as consisting of immigration control policy (or immigration regulation), and immigrant policy:

- (1) Immigration control policy (or immigration regulation): namely, the rules and procedures governing the selection and admission of foreign citizens. This concerns the admission and selection of permanent immigrants, temporary immigrant workers and refugees, as well as attempt to restrict illegal immigration. The very first signals of xenophobia dressed-up in foreign policy begins to lay roots here but are often confused or hidden in such empirically confusing platitudes as principles of state's foreign policy. For instance, in South Africa, such principles as *Ubuntu* (humaneness) and *Batho Pele*(people first)(Maude, 2015); and, in America as *land of the free*, would definitely not let the intending migrant suspect xenophobia. However, the rules as to who to and how to come in are clearly designed to restrict to the barest convenient.
- (2) Immigrant policy: namely the conditions provided to the resident immigrant (e.g. work and housing conditions, welfare provisions and educational opportunities). This is the flashpoint and the battlefield of xenophobia, because this is where the migrant gets to intimate contact and friction with the citizens in the struggle for survival, and this is spelt out as jobs, social amenities and services, and community and social relations.

2. Immigration and Nature of State at Formation

Distinctions have to be made about the character of concept of national identity – conceptions of how identity is acquired:

- (1) Between settler societies and ethnic societies/states. The former is more likely to accept permanent immigration, while ethnic states like European societies are

less receptive to immigration, especially when dissimilar ethnic groups are involved/intended. Examples of settler societies are USA, Australia, Canada, etc.

- (2) Ethnically Homogenous and ethnically diverse societies: the former are less likely to accept immigrants of dissimilar ethnic origins, than the ethnically heterogenous.
- (3) Rules of citizenship acquisition – *Jus Soli* versus *Jus Sanguinity*: States like the US operating the *Jus soli*-citizenship by birth are more receptive to immigrants of dissimilar ethnicity than those of citizenship by parentage *Jus Sanguinity* e.g. Germany, Switzerland (Mayer, 200 pp.1253-1255).

3. The Structure of State's Interaction with the Foreigner

The structure of state's interaction with the foreign individual is xenophobic in its essentials. The objective of it is to keep out, to be restrictive, selective in an arbitrarily discriminative way. The whole system is to allow free movement, transaction and settlement, in a descending and increasingly restrictive effect, for the elite and against the lowly poor and weak sections of the societies. The elite having the means and wherewithal will have unrestricted freedom to spread their graces while the poor should be restricted to suffer their condition in their little corner of the earth and be prevented from spreading their lot of the disease of poverty. Elitism and poverty here refers to ones economic and social value, including skills and earning power; and, this determines his location on the operation of the structure of state-foreigner interaction. The overall dynamics of the interaction system include:

- (i) The citizens of rich states have highest prospects of acceptance into all states, rich or poor;
- (ii) The elite citizens of poor states have (high) prospects of free passage into all rich states; and higher prospects of acceptance into poorer states.
- (iii) The poor citizens of the rich states may not be welcome in rich states but have relatively higher probability of acceptance into poor states.
- (iv) Poor citizens of poor states have very low acceptability into other states, rich or poor.

Other variables that could affect the operation of acceptance of the model would include criminal record and race. The predominance of races in regions allows regionalism to conceal racism in immigration policies of dominant states. This is because there is a coincidence of race and general poverty/wealth in regions. Special skills requirement enables the concealment of poverty. The poor are originally poor because their skills earn them so little value.

4. Stereotypical Classification of Migrants:

The foregoing exposes the inherent incidence of xenophobia in the policies of states as:

1. Classification of migrants into: documented/undocumented, native language, language speakers/non speakers (linguistic assimilation/skills or capabilities (as in South Africa) (Vanyoro 2019).

2. Education/skills threshold: e.g. Visa classification like H1B etc. in USA.
3. Economic disability: investors and economic migrants.
4. Omnibus social desirability: Refugees, IDPs, migrants, etc.

5. Incidence of Xenophobia in Policies of States: USA, UK, South Africa

The migrant is never on equal platform with the citizen or resident, in the eyes of the law: his place – if he can really find it! – is always second class. The law is not protective of him, nor does the politician, in any way feel obliged to him and, therefore, the man on the street perceives him as a growing menace. He suffers xenophobia.

Xenophobia is violence, and its nature is structural in forms of laws and policies of the state, including pronouncements of symbols of authority and contacts with state institutions; and, procedural violence in their informal social interactions.

Our proposition is that xenophobia is institutionalized in the structure of immigration policies and governance of states. To that end, we shall demonstrate it in the incidence of xenophobia in laws and actions of the state and its agents, in USA, UK and South Africa. The significant thing about these acts is that they are carried out within the law of the land and in pursuance of legitimate authority.

(a) Xenophobia in US Policy and Governance:

The politics of US immigration policy is rife with general nativism in its immigration control policy, and, in a more particular way, xenophobia in its migrant policy. And, the end-result is pain for the migrant. Nativism is anti-immigrant politics, it provides the intellectual foundation and cloak to racism, xenophobia, and other hostile emotions towards others in any way dissimilar to one. It has always been lurking just beneath the surface in the history of US politics. Nativist policies which are either responses to xenophobic demands or stoke xenophobic behaviours in the US political, legal, and economic systems against specific peoples or groups of immigrants include the following examples in its history (Young, 2017):

- (1.) The Chinese Exclusion Act, 1882, which suspended the immigration of Chinese labourers for 10 years, and which was operational till 1943. Those already in were required to obtain certificate proving their eligibility to live and work in the US.
- (2.) The Scott Act, 1887, prohibited the return of Chinese who left America, even when they were legal residents or citizens.
- (3.) The 1892 Geary Act, excluded Chinese from bail in Habeas Corpus cases.
- (4.) The Gentlemen's Agreement, 1907, which compelled Japan to deny passports to emigrants (Hayland, 1929 pp. 502-503, cited in Young, 2017).
- (5.) The Immigration Acts of 1917 and 1924 (or Johnson Reed Act), added to the restrictive measure which effectively prohibited Chinese immigration into the US for almost 75 years.
- (6.) The Philippine Independence Act, 1934, would allow only 50 Filipino immigrants per year into the US.

Those who suffered the humiliating effects of these laws included the Japanese, the Koreans, and the Filipinos; and the cumulative impact is that by the end of the 1930's and for decades to come Asians were almost completely excluded from immigration to the USA. These ethnic groups were roundly portrayed as being "immoral, criminal, inassimilable" or "immoral, subversive and servile and therefore impossible to assimilate" (Jones 1960 p. 264, cited in Young 2017). The East European and Russian migrants, and especially Jews did not escape the xenophobic prohibitionism, too. Jews were stereotyped as "greedy and materialistic... or vilified for their religious beliefs", and the Russians, Poles, Czechs were branded socialists and anarchists. The overall effect of this policy pattern was that, "while immigration from Great Britain, Ireland, Germany and the Scandinavian counties were relatively unrestricted, southern and eastern European immigration was dramatically reduced..."(Young 2017 p. 344).

Structural Xenophobia thrives in the US migration control policy and its system as operates in its laws. The adjudication process is lacking in judicial decency. The illegal migrant does not enjoy even a modicum of rule of law as demonstrated in the following examples:

- (1.) "Summary, non-court removal procedures": This denies the illegal migrants access to impartial adjudication and legal counsel. They are denied opportunity to present their claims; and as xenophobic tendencies go, the illegal migrant facing removal (i.e. deportation) is invariably constituted into a "vulnerable and trapped class of residents" who would not leave the country for fear of criminal consequences of re-entry, and who lack ways to correct or regularize his status (Benson 2017 p. 343).
- (2.) The procedural complexity of the removal proceedings: "The adversarial nature of the removal proceedings, their substantive and procedural complexity, and the immense (sometimes life and death) consequences of adverse decisions make effective *pro se* representation virtually impossible" (Kerwin, 2005, cited in Benson 20017).
- (3.) Very few substantive and procedural protections in adjudication: The civil removal adjudication system offers less substantive and procedural protection as indicated in the following anomalies:
 - (i) The absence of *mens rea* (knowledge and intent to break the law), or guilty mind, which cannot be invoked as defence in removal cases – "even in cases of undocumented persons brought to the US as children".
 - (ii) Constricted space or lack of room for plea-bargaining agreements.
 - (iii) Excessive reliance on detention (of immigrant) and use of privately owned and administered prisons and which undermine due process. "Detention burdens the ability of persons in removal proceedings to corroborate claims or secure counsel" (Benson, 2017).
- (4.) Adversarial orientation of US Immigration and Naturalization officers: By their training, motivation and socialization, these officers see themselves as more in the job of overcoming of the legal protection given to immigrants which they consider more of a barrier to their job.

- (5.) Separation of refugee families in the Spring of 2018: Targeted were immigrants from the southern borders, Mexico, and Central America. “The Trump administration most likely separated thousands more children from their parent than was previously believed”, and that would take about a year or two to identify them (Jacobs, 6/4/2019). The parents of the separated children were prosecuted.
- (6.) Executive order temporarily banning immigrants and refugees from seven Muslim majority countries: Libya, Iran, Sudan, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen, from entering the USA for 90 days, all refugees from anywhere for 120 and an indefinite ban on refugees from Syria.
- (7.) The Trump administration started building a wall on its southern border ostensibly to keep out illegal immigration of persons and criminal activities from Mexico.

For an immigrant nation like the US to have so much restrictions to prevent migrants from coming in, and to have evolved or developed such an oppressive system for the illegal ones that manage to slip in is testament to the degree of xenophobia that is masquerading as immigration policy. One might be tempted to ask: what if the Native Americans had shut the doors to the Pilgrims would there have been a USA today?

(b) Xenophobia in UK Policy and Governance:

The migrant policy of Britain, as indicative in some of its laws, reflects xenophobia, as in the following sample:

- (1.) “[T]he aim ... to create here in Britain a really hostile environment for illegal migration”, by a government policy of denial of NHS access to migrants. (Home Secretary Theresa May, in an interview with The Telegraph in 2012.) (Shahvisi, 2019).
- (2.) In 2013, under “Operation Vaken”, billboard buses inscribed “Go Home” patrolled six London boroughs with large immigrant populations, and threatening undocumented migrants with arrest or “voluntary deportation” (Shahvisi, 2019).
- (3.) Immigration Act, 2014. Restricts access to free NHS secondary and tertiary care to those who have been resident in the UK for five years or more, introducing a levy of P\$200 yearly for visa holders; and, billing other visitors, including irregular migrants, for secondary and tertiary care services.
- (4.) Women who are “not ordinarily resident”, including prospective asylum-seekers and all manner of non-citizens and non-residents, not minding their conditions of desolation are required to pay substantial charges to access antenatal, intrapartum and postnatal services, as well as abortion care. This has drawn criticism as mere “response to xenophobic populism” (Shahvisi & Finnerty, 2019; Winter, 2019).
- (5.) Up-front payment before service, for migrants of all kinds in the NHS access to secondary and tertiary care, since 2017.
- (6.) Obligating the NHS to share patients’ information details with the Home Office, as part of immigration crackdown. Suspicion of this alliance between NHS and Immigration Services has prevented people of uncertain immigration status from

using the NHS, and instead opt for private providers, for fear of detention (Shahvisi, July 16, 2018).

- (7.) Though appearing in every respect a referendum on sovereignty, Brexit campaigns, vote and the very idea of it, is steeped in xenophobia. The margin of victory – in fact the (high) percentage of leave vote – demonstrates the rate of xenophobia in UK policies, and the distribution of votes among positions of pro and con is merely a reflection of degrees without a significant difference. Brexit is a referendum on xenophobia – irrational fear of integration, one way or another (Yakovenko, 2017, cited in D’Amico, (2018). Brexit is a politics of xenophobia against the rest of EU, its process of voting and otherwise. It only dredged up all the seething but maybe concealed pent-up negativity against the foreigners and outsiders both inside and outside. It was not fueled by real economic grievances. People voted against influx of migrants. (Beauchamp, 27/6/2018).

(b) Xenophobia in South African Policy and Governance:

Quite unlike the UK and the US whose xenophobia and racial preferences, respectively, are starkly clear, South African immigration policy is equally guilty of xenophobia, though a little dodgy. The general environment within which the South African immigration policy can be figured-out is made up these constants:

- (1.) Inadequate migrant statistics and politics of Nativism. There is widespread misperception about the number of migrants in the country and which allows or has been exploited for politics. Even in public domain, government ministers and officials freely claim unsubstantiated figures, of ‘millions of migrants pouring into the country to compete with South Africans for public services and welfare’, that only exacerbates the sense of dread of the migrants in the native populations (Palmary, n.d. pp. 3-4; Tella, 2016).
- (2.) Apartheid-era inspired “gradation of prejudice”. There is a general stereotyping of foreigners coming into South Africa in which Africans are perceived as “refugees” and those from other continents as “tourists or economic investors”. And, according to Palmary (n.d. p.4) “these attitudes are [easily] translated into behaviours such as unequal service delivery or repressive policing practices.”
- (3.) Poor knowledge of migrant rights under South African laws among enforcement level officials. Lack of proper education and training of the low level officials who are to interact with immigrants and intercede with the public about the real intents and provisions of the law about immigrants, and the silence of the particular Acts on some of these important points of friction, help to feed xenophobia.

The politics of South African immigration policy is rooted in the country’s troubled history in which the measure of power was in how much nastiness one can dish out to others. The Apartheid regime has gone but its behaviour pattern and mindset still constitute a challenge to live down. This is manifest in the two major pillars of its immigration policy: Refugee Act of 1998 and Immigration Act of 2002, and their general implementation.

- (1.) Refugee Act, 1998: Though it allows refugees freedom to apply for status and to seek employment and access to education, and rights under Chapter 2 of the Constitution but the devil is in the details of implementation. It does not give them the rights to freedom of trade, occupation, and profession.
 - (i) Access denied to work, education, subsistence and welfare support during the pendency of application. However, if status is not determined after six months subject can apply for permission to work or seek education.
 - (ii) Silent on access to public services like housing and health care during pendency of application.
 - (iii) Silent on access to primary health care and whether it is free as it is for nationals.
 - (iv) Denies access to informal employment, which means only high-demand skills and students can immigrate for asylum.
- (2.) The problem of the Department of Home Affairs (DHA): It has been accused of naked racial preferences and dehumanizing treatment of African immigrants, and general “anti-immigrant tendencies” (Tella 2016 p.153). The now renowned inefficiency and slowness of the DHA in processing asylum claims have come to be interpreted by the skeptical immigrants as intended to create unpleasant conditions of being in limbo and which will dissuade them from permanently settling in South Africa. And, to provide South Africa with a cheap source of labour, as they are exploited by employers (Palmary n. d. p. 9).
- (3.) Immigration Act, 2002. It has been criticized for being too focused on reduction of illegal immigration through repressive forms of law enforcement. Its other unpleasant nature include:
 - (i) Policy of being tough on unskilled migrants while encouraging or lessening restriction on especially skilled migrants.
 - (ii) Policy of detention at the borders, a legacy of the Apartheid era, intending to employ harsh treatment on intending migrants in order to create deterrence.
- (4.) The Lindela Detention Centre. This facility as a repatriation camp has become institutionalized for xenophobic abuse of migrants, owing to poor financing, improper orientation and general neglect. “Human Right Watch (1998) observed that conditions at the centre are worse than those in the prisons, illustrated by the ridiculously low amount allocated to each detainee for daily needs.”(Tella, 2016 p. 153).

The peculiar nature of South African xenophobia is captured in its racial selectiveness, in which Europeans and Americans are welcomed in open arms (as they are regarded as investors or visitors), while migrants are targeted, suggesting that it is not necessarily against foreigners but “against those who seem to correspond to stereotypes of the stranger, especially that from Africa (Neocomos, 2006, cited in Solomon & Kosaka, 21/6/2019). Citing reports/ surveys that suggest South African police lack adequate training in “race and discrimination” and diversity, Solomon & Kosaka (21/6/2019)said, “the police can hardly be expected to police foreigners impartially if

they do not understand their language or cultures and have no basic training in human right.” Absence of documentation means that migrants cannot compete for legal jobs or open bank account and are forced to go underground into those areas where they come in contact with the violent elements of the society.

The threshold in international immigration regulation and control is naturally set to be low enough to allow practically unhindered access to some classes and which same threshold is naturally too high, enough to hinder other classes from coming in. Or, to specifically target certain classes, for preference or prohibition. Over the years, the USA, has shown preference for the Cubans over the Haitians; the UK had at some point restricted the coloured from the commonwealth, while at some other time literally poaching them for labour in times of local shortfall (Shahvisi, July 16, 2018); the European states have not encouraged Africans south of the Sahara to come in; and, the US struggles to keep out the Mexican from the South while having an unmanned border with Canada in the North, etc (Meyer, 2000 p.1250). Most coloured states are poor and almost all their citizens fall below the poverty range and lacking in up-market skills and are, therefore, not very high-up on the immigration scale of most countries, including poor Africa African states: South Africa would rather it had borders in Europe or Asia than with fellow Africans.

Discussion of Findings

Though human migration preceded the birth of the state but the latter has largely developed solely on the idea of controlling – nay restricting – the former, both as the demonstration and necessity of its own very viability – the state would not know how to be nor will it be for long if it doesn’t control human migration. On its own, human migration negates or erases state boundaries. This is the cause of the problem: the one is power and control and the other is instinct and freedom, and both of them are primitive forces. By disrupting and controlling human migration, the state tries to enable large number of otherwise unstable phenomena to be stable enough to develop some internal cohesion or common identity separate from neighbouring like-entities, and which further reduces itinerancy. Conversely, uncontrolled flow of migration disrupts or subverts that, either by dissipating/debilitating the originating state or by neutralizing the cohesion or identity of the receiving state, resulting in an unstable and subversive disequilibrium. The fear of this condition is at the root of the antagonism between globalization and the state system.

The international law, in its self, was developed by the states for their own convenience, and remains acceptable only so long as and to the extent to which that purpose is served. That is why the individual is sort of lost in the shuffle.

A state’s migration policy is objectivated to protect itself from dissipation through emigration and subversive disequilibrium through immigration; but, by the operation of immigration policy, the receiving state by auto-balance mechanism protects the originating states from debilitating emigration. In the search for internal cohesion is found a common identity by identifying self from others – outsiders or aliens – through real or imagined differences in race, colour, ethnicity, language, different conceptions of

identity. The more stark the cleavage added to the idea of difference the greater the feeling/perception of own identity. No phenomenon would so much symbolize that subversive disequilibrium or such threat as the alien – he does not belong, nor fit in, and so might be the problem which much of the society has an instinct to blame. To the individual citizen who naturally embodies the love of the self and fear of the dark/unknown, the alien represents the furthestmost removed in degrees of self love and, therefore, the darkest and most unknown, the alien is the most threatening symbol to his self love, represented in his society and his identity in it, the alien is the only disruptive image and therefore subversive element introduced into its equilibrium.

The alien seems to have the effect of greater internal solidarity, even among otherwise disparately characterized national identity. The black and white South Africans forget their racist differences to bind up against other black African aliens (Tella, 2016). In UK, all citizens and residents cooperate to deny NHS access to those who are “not ordinarily residents” whether they be whites or coloured (Shahvisi & Finnerty, 2019). This is xenophobia. While the racial preferences of South African immigration policy are agreed to owe their roots to its Apartheid past, that of the USA may be explained as probably a racist intent to reproduce an Anglo-Saxon purity in the country. So, to separate racism and xenophobia could be quite a challenge in some respects.

The machinery of state, in its normal operation to deliver governance, by intent or otherwise produces xenophobia as bye-product; and, so far, it does not have any necessity to fundamentally change its methods nor its ingredients (just for the comfort of the aliens), especially if that might inconvenience its majority voters. Xenophobia is a collective name for viable commodities in different political marketplaces, and the politician in or out of government has an eye on the market of votes and power.

We analyzed the roots of xenophobia in the nature of man as selfish and distrustful of the unknown/others in an ever-widening circle of relationships. This analysis might be considered a little too sweeping, even in the light of the framework of the two streams of the national identity approach. However, it is the same primordial love and fear that makes the unknown migrant first the victim of stereotype the burden of which the whole society then carries, in the hatred and violent actions against him.

In the fear of either losing a habituated lifestyle of service and amenities or a futurist promise of a better life, which the democratic welfare state is intended for, the citizens construct migration – which is actually the large scale immigration of the poor – a threat. Issues of local interest are identified (and pseudo analyzed) in simplistic import of general local morality (in a ‘we-and-them’, good-and-evil reductionism). Specific isolated problems or issues of group relations are generalized into common areas of incompatibility (between the immigrants as a group and rest of society).

The growing resentment of the people finds willing exploitation in the opportunism of politics in which perhaps genuine instrumentalist national identity believers seek to translate their primordial fears into political capital to feed their love for the self; or, mere political opportunists who, perceiving the migrant as a non voter and to whom nothing is owed and, therefore, expendable.

Though most migrants know nothing about international law and its implications on their desire for a better life, the burden placed on the destination states is even less comprehensible to them. We have been able to show that the relationship between the state and the international law makes the latter weak if not helpless in concrete action to protect the migrant in the face of the political realities of host states, as shown in their immigration policies. The democratic states owe obligation to their citizens to produce and continue to deliver on welfare (in the face of dwindling capacity), while counting on the support of their people (with rising expectation). However, the sudden injection of migrants is certainly perceived as having a diluting effect on the impact of its output of those welfare goods.

Conclusion

Xenophobia comes from a natural reaction to a situation of threat but the accompanying violence is the difficult issue. Apart from the certain sufferings on the migrants, the society itself is scarred, too, as it runs the risk of 'scapegoatism' that even after the migrants leave, somebody else would need to fill in the gap.

Xenophobia exposes the contradictions between the principles of international law that seem to guarantee a much freer movement and settlement than the sovereign state subjects are willing to provide. In many ways, it is possible that the former might itself be part of the problem, as it is founded on a platform removed from real life experiences of its subjects. 'You cannot regulate the thoughts of the people though you can regulate their action; but, their actions originate in their thoughts about migrants.'

Further Research into Xenophobia

For a more comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon of xenophobia, future researches should look in the following directions:

1. The interaction between the economic and skill status of immigrants and xenophobic experiences;
2. The complicity and effect of large scale migration on the originating states.

References

- Beauchamp, Z. (27/6/2016). Brexit was fueled by irrational xenophobia, not real economic grievances. *Vox*. <http://www.vox.com>.
- Benson, L. (2017). Immigration adjudication: the missing Rule of Law, in *The US Immigration System: Principles, Interests, & Policy Proposals to Guide Long-term Reform*. *Journal of Migration and Human Security*, vol. 5 no 3. JMHS specialcol-immigration-system.pdf.
- Bremmer, (11/9/2019) ideas: what the xenophobia violence gripping South Africa means for future of country. *Time*
- Choane, M., Shulika, L.S., & Mthambeni, (2011). An Analysis of the causes, effects and ramifications of xenophobia in South Africa. *Insight on Africa*, 3.2 (2011) 129-142 African studies association of India, New Delhi.

- Council of Europe (1994). *Tackling Racism & Xenophobia: practical action at the local level*. Directorate of Social and Economics Affairs, Council of Europe.
- Crush, J. & Ramachandran, S.(2010). Xenophobia, international migration and development. *Journal of Human Development and capabilities* vol. 11 no 2. Routledge, Taylor &Francis.
- D'Amico, E.A (2018). Xenophobia and its implications for refugee policies: A Cross-national study, being a Graduate Thesis/Dissertation presented at Iowa State University. <https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/etal/16339>
- Demossier, M. (2014) Sarkozy and Roma: Performing securitization. In Maguire, M. Frois, C & Zwawski (eds.). *The anthropology of security: Perspective from the frontline of policing, counter-terrorism and Border control*. London: Pluto Press
- DiGiusto, G. M. & Jolly, S. K. (2009). Xenophobia and immigrant contact: British public attitudes towards immigration. <http://faculty.maxwell.syr.edu/skjolly/xenophobia.pdf>.
- Ekwonna, S. I. (2016). Globalization, Declining State Power and the Challenge of Asymmetrical Forces: Putting the Variables in their Proper Cause-Effect Relationships. *Ndunode: Calabar Journal of Humanities* vol 12 No 1, January. Pp. 111-124. Calabar: Faculty of Arts, University of Calabar.
- Ekwonna, S. I. (2016b). Turning the median voter theorem on its head: The Language and Methodology of the Rising Political Extremism in USA and Europe, and its Implications. In A. A. Nwosu, E. J. Otagburuagu, L. C. Ogeenyi, K.C.W. Udegbonam, E. C. Ngwu, M. D. Udoudom, K. O. Ugwu & A. C. Ajah (Eds), *General Studies in 21st Century African Development*, Volume 2. Proceedings for the 2017 School of General Studies Conferences, University of Nigeria, Nsukka (pp. 284-293). Nsukka: Grand-Heritage Global Publication
- Harris, B. (2001). A Foreign Experience: Violence, crime and Xenophobia during South Africa's Transition *Violence and Transportation Series*, vol. 5 August.
- ILO, IOM, OHCHR & UNHCR, (2001). International migration, racism, discrimination and xenophobia. A discussion paper at the World Conference against racism, racial discrimination, Xenophobia and related intolerance (WCAR) 49353b4d2.pdf.
- Jacobs, J. (6/4/2019). U.S. Says it could take 2 years to identify up to thousands of separated immigrant families. *The New York Times*.
- Kapoor, S. K. (2000). *International Law*. Allahabad: Central Law Agency.
- Khadiagla, G.M. (12/9/2019). Yes, but Nigerians aren't targeted more than other Africans in South Africa's xenophobic attacks but the damage is done: *Quartz Africa*. <https://qz.com/africa/Nigeria>
- Lesetedi, G, & Modie-Moroka, T. (2007). Reverse xenophobia: Immigrants attitudes towards citizens in Botswana. [lesetedi.pdf](#).
- Martin, S. (2005). *The Legal and Normative Framework of International Migration*. Global Commission on International Migration. www.gcim.org.
- Maude, S. M. (20015). South Africa's foreign and migration policies missteps: fuels of xenophobic eruptions, *Td The journal for Transdisciplinary research in South Africa*, 11(4) December, s/e. pp. 60-70.

- Meyers, E. (2000). Theories of international immigration policy --- A comparative analysis. *The International Migration Review* vol. 34, no. 4 (Winter). pp. 1245-1282.
- Palmary, I. (n. d.). Refugees, safety and xenophobia in South African cities: the role of local government. <https://www.csvr.org.za>foreigners.Refugeessafteyand.pdf>.
- Shahvisi, A. & Finnerty, F. (2019). Why it is unethical to charge migrant women for pregnancy care in the National Health Service. *Journal for Medical Ethics*, vol 45 Issue 8. Pp. 489-496.jme.bmj.com.
- Shahvisi, A. (2019). Austerity or xenophobia? The causes and costs of the 'Hostile Environment' in the NHS.
- Shahvisi, A. (July 16, 2018). The NHS must stop excluding immigrant patients while poaching health workers from abroad. Chpi.org.uk/://.blog/>the-nhs..www.unboundmedicine.com.
- Solomon, H & Kosaka, H., (21/6/2019). Xenophobia in South Africa: reflections, Narratives and recommendations. *Southern African Peace and Security Studies* Vol.2 Number 2.
- Steinhardt, M. F. (2018). The impact of Xenophobic violence on integration of immigrants. *Discussion Paper Series*. IZA Institute of Labour Economics.dp 11781.pdf.
- Tella, O. (2016). Understanding xenophobia in South Africa: the individual, the state and the international system. *Insight on Africa* 8(2) 142-158. African Studies Association of India. SAGE Publications.
- Vanyoro, K.P (2019). "When they come, we don't send them back': counter-narrative of Medical xenophobia in South Africa's public health care system. Palgrave communications <https://doi.org/10.1057/541599-019-0309-7>
www.nature.com/palcomm1.)
- Winter, G.F. (2019). Migrants and pregnancy. *BJM*. <https://doi.org/10.12968/bjom.2019.27.8.531>.
<https://www.magonlinelibrary.com>>
- Young, J. (2017). Making America 1920 Again? Nativism and US Immigration: Past and Present. *Journal of Migration and Human Security*, vol. 5 no 3.JMHSspecialcol-immigration-system