

POLITICAL ECONOMY OF COUNTERINSURGENCY IN NIGERIA, 2009-2019

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ABSTRACT

Insurgency in Nigeria is an impediment to national security. The attacks by the Boko Haram insurgents on security agencies, civilians, public and private buildings in Nigeria have become very worrisome. This social violent act seems to have defied all measures so far put in place by government. The main objective of this study is to assess the defense budgetary allocation in Nigeria from 2009 to 2019. In view of this, the study investigated the defense spending in the war against Boko Haram by the Nigerian state. It utilized theory of post-colonial state and adopted documentary method of data collection. The study discovered among others that despite the increase in defense budget for the past 10 years, the activities of Boko Haram insurgency is still escalating. The study recommended among others that defense budget should be used for the procurement of weapons by the minister of defense.

Keywords: Nigeria, insurgency, counterinsurgency, defense budget, Boko Haram.

INTRODUCTION

The fundamental responsibility of the state is the security of lives and properties of its citizens. Issue of security is germane to the country's survival as a political entity. Since the attainment of independence in October 1960, the Nigerian state has been beset with series of problems and challenges. These problems which are economic, social and political in nature have continued to threaten the unity and corporate existence of the Nigerian state. The issues of social identity, fear of domination amongst others are some of the problems that have plagued Nigeria from her early years of independence to the present fourth republic. The first, second and third republics could not stand the test of times due to the fact that the Nigerian state lacked the capacity to address lingering issues that kept recurring. The fourth republic began with high hopes that the country had finally overcome the problems of the early years of its independence. However, the fear of domination by one zone over the other, national integration, social identity, security, power struggle, minority question, devolution of powers, resource control etc. which were problems of the past republics re-emerged. Lately, the Boko Haram insurgency particularly in the north eastern part of Nigeria has resulted in the death of many people. Never in the history of Nigeria, with the exception of Nigerian civil war, has the country recorded such number of deaths within a short period of time. Apart from rejecting western education and their desire to establish and impose Sharia laws in all

northern states of the federation, their desires and demands have remained relatively baffling. The dichotomy between the north and south and the subsequent problems that have emanated from it have once again made political analysts, commentators and scholars of Nigeria Government and Politics to question the rationale for the bringing together the separate protectorates by the British in 1914. Blame has been placed on the constitution which appears to have been a common consensus that the Nigerian constitution is a military one and as such does not represent the views, wishes and aspirations of the citizens of Nigeria. This has called for the review of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria to make it a peoples' Constitution as recommended by previous Constitutional Conferences in Nigeria. Today, the Nigerian political system is so tensed that the security situation in the country has become a subject of national discourse. Since Nigeria's return to democracy in May 1999, armed non-state groups, largely young men as foot soldiers, have significantly undermined the country's internal security environment (Onuoha, 2014).

The issue of Boko-Haram since 2009 has continued to pose serious challenge to Nigeria's national life. To the insurgent group, it has been argued that poverty and the struggle for the control of economic and political power among the political class in the north are reasons for the emergence. Others have argued that it is fallout of the on-going global attempt to radicalize Islam and instigate global jihadism with the ultimate aim of challenging the westernization of the international system by the United States and its European allies. Boko-Haram has caused serious security problems to Nigeria and its people. Their activities have affected economic and social activities. The Boko Haram sect in the north has embarked on a string of reckless, needless and mindless killings and bombings in the country. Lives have become so cheap that on regular interval, suicide bombings and attacks by the Boko Haram sect has left thousands of people dead. The first attack of Boko Haram came in September 2010 in the Northern part of the country where many lives were lost and properties worth millions damaged (Onuoha, 2014). Since August 2011, there have been increasing signs of international collaboration between Boko Haram and militants outside Nigerian territory, such as in Borno State's border region, northern Mali, the Sahel, Somalia and other countries in the Muslim world. As a result of these international connections, Boko Haram, which in 2009 was known as a "machete-wielding mob," has now matched and even exceeded the capabilities of some al-Qaeda affiliates, while also incorporating al-Qaeda ideology into the locally driven motives for the insurgency in northern Nigeria (Zenn, 2013). For example, in Mali 100 Boko Haram militants reinforced MUJAO's positions in the battle

for Gao and that Boko Haram helped MUJAO raid the Algerian consulate in Gao and kidnapped the Vice-Consul who was executed by MUJAO on September 2, 2012, and that Boko Haram supported MUJAO, AQIM and Ansar Eddine in their January 8, 2013, attack on Kona, central Moptiregion (Zenn, 2013). On May 1, 2014, a car bomb blast in Abuja killed at least 19 people at a bus station. The summer of 2014 has been especially violent, with bombings, massacres, and mass shootings being committed on a near weekly basis. In July 2014, Human Rights Watch estimated that 2,053 people had been killed in 95 separate Boko Haram linked attacks in the first half of 2014 alone, and the number is likely much higher by now (Uzochukwu, 2014). The unprecedented activities of Boko Haram may not be unconnected with the porous nature of Nigeria's borders which has made them take advantage of countries like Chad, Niger and Cameroon as places of settlement, training, transit, attack planning and recruitment. Boko Haram appears to have a "diplomatic" presence in Saudi Arabia, in addition to other militant connections. In August 2012, a Boko Haram faction led by Abu Muhammed negotiated in Mecca with a Nigerian government team led by National Security Adviser Sambo Dasuki and advised by General Muhammed Shuwa. In 2019, Boko Haram launched a major offensive in January, attacking several Nigerian military bases, including those at Magumeri and Gajiram (Uzochukwu, 2014). Insurgents also overran and destroyed the refugee town of Rann near border to Cameroon, displacing its inhabitants yet again. The destruction of Rann was initially attributed to Islamic State West African Province (ISWAP), but Shekau's Boko Haram later claimed responsibility.

The Nigerian government under President Goodluck Jonathan, no doubt, mounted a robust counterinsurgency operation, known as operation Zaman Lafiya, but it was not strong enough to check the advance of Boko Haram. Unlike the Niger Delta counterinsurgency, in which non-military efforts have been critically used along with protective military and security operations to achieve some measure of compromise, the insurgents in the northeast had always remained adamant to any overtures for negotiation. They have been most unidentifiable, elusive, and intransigent, making bunkum and risky any moves for dialogue. As a result of this, counterinsurgency in the northeast has been driven mainly by military and security operations. The control of about 21,545 of Nigerian territory in 2014 by Boko Haram from zero ground in 2009 meant, that Operation Zaman Lafiya was not successful.

In response to the groundswell of public criticism of the performance of the operation, Muhammadu Buhari, on assumption of office as Nigeria's elected president in May, 2015,

quickly made modifications within the military, dismantled operation Zaman Lafiya, and put in motion another counter insurgency operation, code-named Operation Lafiya Dole, under the command of Lt -General Tukur Buratai. Within three months – October to December, 2015 – the operation, marked by a consolidation of efforts from the military, the Department of State Services, Nigeria Police, and other security agencies, and military cooperation from neighboring countries through the Multinational Task Force, had given a good account of itself. In what can be seen as a bombardment in the history of Nigerian warfare, Boko Haram was effectively pushed out of all its bases within the Nigerian territory. At 1:30 p.m., Thursday, 22 December, 2016 Operation Lafiya Dole reached its highest point with the capture of Camp Zero in Sambisa Forest, the last fortress and hideout of the routed insurgents. However, the fall of Camp Zero is not the end of insurgency in the northeast of Nigeria. While the Nigerian Air Force is continuing with its search, locate, and destroy (SLD) operations against the insurgents, other armed forces and security operatives are working hard to contain sporadic suicide bombing and violence sponsored by Boko Haram. In carrying out these counterinsurgency operations both under Good luck Jonathan and Buhari administration, government spent a lot.

National resources that should have been channeled to more useful ventures have been used for counter-insurgency acts; example defense allocation for procurement of weapons. The huge allocation to Defense represents 9.43 percent of the 64.618 trillion appropriated in the past 10 years. The sum of N2.945 trillion (48.30%) or almost half of the huge budget was spent in 2012, 2013, and 2014. In 2009, defence had N233 billion or 7.64% of the N3.049 trillion appropriated. Other years are as follows: 2010-N264 billion (5.03%) of N5.248 trillion; 2011-N348 billion (7.0%) of N4.972 trillion; 2012-N921.91 billion (18.90%) of N4.877 trillion budgets; and 2013- N1.055 trillion (21.16%) of the N4.987 trillion. In 2014, N968.127 billion or 19.51% of the N4.962 trillion appropriated was allocated to defence. The figure came down to N388.459 billion (7.67%) of N5.068 trillion in 2015. In 2016, it was N429.128 billion (7.08%) of N6.061 trillion budget; and 2017, N465.87 billion or 6.26% of N7.444 trillion budget. In 2018, the budget was N9.12 trillion of which defence got N580.145 billion or 6.26%. in 2019, the national budget was 8.83trillion of which defence got 435.62 or 4.93 of the total national budget. All these exclude the security vote to the state governments. From the foregoing, this study examined the defence budgetary allocation in Nigeria with a view to ascertaining the impact it has had on the fight against Boko Haram between 2009 and 2019.

The joint security challenge against Boko-Haram appears to beat their wits and is unable to stop them. These acts of terrorism break national security, engender chaos and hamper sustainable development. Government in an attempt to counter the insurgency has been allocating huge amount of money from 2009 till date to equip the military in the fight against insurgency. Military spending from 2011 to 2015 shows that Nigeria spent \$16.382 billion on defense, but made little progress against Boko Haram. For example, several hundreds of Nigerian soldiers mutinied because according to them, they were sent to fight Boko haram with antiquated and often inoperable weapons, obsolete and defective ammunition, vehicles that constantly broke down because of parts shortages, they had not been paid in months, and a host of other complaints, which they alleged were due mainly to corruption among the officer corps. In fact when military spending were plotted against number of Boko Haram inflicted deaths; it was found that the more the state spent, the more soldiers recorded death of personnel. The broad objective of this study is to examine the state and counter insurgency in the north east Nigeria 2009-2019. The specific objectives are to: ascertain if the increase in defense budget reduced the activities of insurgents in the north east Nigeria between 2009-2019; secondly to find out if lack of proper utilization of security vote accounts for ineffectiveness in the military combatant mission against the insurgency in north east Nigeria from 2009-2019.

This study is significant in that it is carried out at the time boko haram insurgents are occupying more territories in northeastern Nigeria; at the same time Nigeria's defense budget is increasing. As solution to academic problem, the study is a contribution to the existing knowledge in that it will serve as a source of data for academic references. As a solution to social problem, this study will be useful to Nigeria's Ministry of Defense, policy makers and implementers; the military personnel fighting the insurgents as well as the boko haram fighters. The recommendations made in this study will be of great benefit to both the state and non-state actors in the conflict.

REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

National security like every other social science concept lacks a single universal accepted definition due to varying epistemological and methodological differences and background of scholars Ezeibe (2011). For him national security connotes more than military defense or territorial defence by the military. National security therefore includes food security, economic security, military security and even more. In Latin America, national security has been elevated to a doctrine and sometimes referred to as a technocratic ideology which postulates that the security problem of third world can only be solved through the desideratum of science and technology under the armed forces (Frank 1981, 260-262).

Corroborating the above, Nweke (1985:3) argues that one merit of conceiving national security as an ideology is that it presents security problem as a synthesis of political, economic, socio-psychological, military and geo-political strategies for meeting the

challenges of new states in global politics. He added that ideologisation of national security places undue emphasis on the role of the military in national security. This tendency in turn creates in minds of the armed forces that it is only through them that security, stability and progress can be achieved (Nweke, 1988). Though, the conception of national security as an ideology is more sophisticated in Latin America, the policy orientation of African security is similar to the Latin America at least in major areas of non-aligned third world (Ake 1976). According to encyclopedia of social sciences, national security is the ability of a nation to protect its internal values from external threat. A more explicit definition is that a nation is secured when it does not have to sacrifice its legitimate interest to avoid war and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by war (Braithwaite, 1988:8). The national security of Nigeria is to secure the territorial independence and ensure the continual existence of groups that appears to be saturated with each other. Hence national security in Nigeria equates the security of states (Ake, 1984:301-302). National security interest of Nigeria is defined in terms of national survival. This is however an illusion. The national survival slogan is often used by dominant class to delude the masses into thinking that government policies aim at protecting the masses from diseases, ignorant and hunger. In Nigeria, the concept of national security has risen to two dangerous doctrines of illusionism and militarism. (Nweke, (1988).

It is worth reiterating that corruption is inimical to national security development. Where corruption is found there is bound to be hiccups in the process of administering fair, just, impartial, and effective duties and services. The same can be said of the Nigerian armed forces whose internal dynamics are been eaten up by the gangrenous cancer, corruption. This has caused the armed forces to experience decline which creates instability in the military and in the nation's security. The extent to which corruption is crippling the Nigerian military is gaining increasing scholarly interest. For instance, Akume and God'swin (2016) averred that there are a number of factors that have combined to undermine the government's ability to combat the Boko Haram insurgency, the most prominent being corruption. For them corruption is not a strange phenomenon in Nigeria, and in the fight against insurgency its manifestation has been expressed through malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance. These three concepts mean, Malfeasance is more than stealing; it is the performance by public officers of deeds that they are forbidden to perform by constitutional or statutory law or by commonly accepted moral standard... Misfeasance is the improper performance of lawful duties, it involves administrative activity that is within the lawful mission of an agency but violates constitutional standards or public interests. Nonfeasance is the failure of public

officers to perform required duties (Akume A.T and God'swin (2016). As reported by Emtrepre news (2014), the United States under the Secretary of State for Civilian Security, Democracy and Human Rights, Sarah Sewall, said categorically that corruption is hindering Nigeria's efforts at ending insurgency in the Northeast. The first case according to her is the theft of funds appropriated to the defence sector for combating terrorism in Nigeria. International crisis group (ICG) in a bid to address the escalated terrorism increased the defence budget from 100 billion naira (\$625 million) in 2010 to 927 billion naira (\$6 billion) in 2011 and one trillion (\$6.25 billion) naira in 2012, 2013, and 2014. Despite the huge allocations to the Nigerian defence sector, there is no corresponding outcome due to the inability of the military to justifiably expend the appropriations in tackling security problems in the country.

El-rufai (2012) stated that it can be argued that there is no correlation between the amounts of money budgeted for the defence sector and the outcome of transformation in the sector. To that extent, therefore, Akume A.T and God'swin (2016) wrote that a thorough investigation about how the monies are spent will reveal that a large sum of the monies budgeted for combating insurgency have been misappropriated by top state actors, military and other security agencies' officials in collaboration with politicians and contractors supplying military hardware. As Duke O, Agbaji DD, Etim E. (2016) documented that a case in point was the \$2.1 million Arms Deal Scandal popularly called the Dasukigate; involving the former National Security Adviser (NSA), (Rtd.) Col. Sambo Dasuki and other top military officers and politicians. The case revealed the large-scale fraud in the armed forces where funds meant for the military were disbursed for private and partisan purposes. The Nigerian defence sector has seen over \$15billion stolen, leaving the military without vital equipment, insufficiently trained, low in morale and under resourced. This has crippled the Nigerian military in fighting an aggressive ideologically inspired enemy, such as Boko Haram.

Another way corruption challenges the military's war against Boko Haram terrorism is the limited logistical support for the military. The components of logistics in its most comprehensive sense are those aspect of the military that deal with: the acquisition and distribution of military equipment (like arms and ammunition, fuel, weapon systems, etc.); transport of personnel and equipment; construction and maintenance of facilities (like training camps, command centers, military bases, garrisons, etc.); acquisition and furnishing of services (like uniforms, jungle boots, belts, entertainment, etc); and medical services (like

food, water, and medicine) (Ogun (2011), Osokogu (2011)). Regardless of the huge defence budgets, there are reports that the Nigerian military is ill-equipped, and that soldiers are usually sent into combat with limited weaponry. In a study by Fulani (2014) he explained that some soldiers in Mubi and Izighe military bases, Adamawa State, stated that they use limited and very poor weaponry against well-armed insurgents. The soldiers said that while they were equipped with just AK-47 rifles and only dozens of bullets, the insurgents use sophisticated arms and ammunition like Browning Machine Guns, rocket propelled grenades, night vision goggles, AK-49 rifles, armored personnel carriers, and suchlike. Added to this is the fact that soldiers are poorly fed, medical services are limited or unavailable, and families of fallen soldiers are only granted minimal stipends. These alone can completely demoralize the soldiers and hamper on the fight against terrorism. More so, the level of secrecy inherent in the defence procurement pattern paves way for corruption. The public is made not to meddle into a candid scrutiny of defence matters. Thus, the absence of disclosure effectively makes the security sector the most prone to contract inflation and ineffective service delivery as well as the creation and financing of fake defence contracts. Jimoh (2017) citing Transparency International's news report, 'Weaponising transparency', noted that "corrupt military officials have been able to benefit from the conflict through the creation of fake defence contracts, the proceeds of which are often laundered abroad in the United Kingdom (UK), United States (U.S.) and elsewhere." Similarly too is what Akume and God's win (2016) saw as good arena for corruption –military hardware contracts. For them, this is facilitated through the "offset" principle operated in defence procurement that is built into contractual conditionalities. Defence offset dictates that the buyer of the military hardware obliges to reinvest a percentage of the contract in the supplying company's home country. Since defence contracts involve great expenditure, the offset arrangement is similarly large in value, since (in many countries) there is almost no due diligence on potential improper check on beneficiaries from the offsets, and no monitoring of performance on offset contracts, thus, it is highly susceptible to corruption (Akume and God's win (2016)). The suspicious way the Nigerian government smuggled an alleged sum of \$9.3 million to South Africa for military hardware purchase to confront the Boko Haram terrorism, and the failed attempt to probe this in the House of Representatives only explains the role corruption by the government and the armed forces' Chiefs have played in challenging the efforts to combat terrorism in Nigeria Akume and God's win (2016). Corruption has also caused the Nigerian state to be handicapped in its fight against Boko Haram terrorism in the case of the

purchase of substandard military material. In a statement issued in 2016 by the Senior Assistant to the Minister of Information and Culture, Segun Adeyemi, Alhaji Lai Mohammed, insisted that the weapons, munitions and equipment which the former President said he bought were refurbished and lacked the basic components and spare parts. Additionally, that the ammunition bought for both high calibre and small weapons were mostly expired, incompatible with weapons and grossly inadequate (Point Blank News (2016)). This situation leads to injury and deaths of soldiers who use the substandard equipment. It is important to note, as Sahara Reports (2017) documented, following the fatal crash of Group Captain Ubong Akpan and Master Warrant Officer Zabesan Hosea, who boarded a Russian-made Mi-24V helicopter with the intent to carry-out assault on Boko Haram terrorists in Adamawa state in December 2014, the arm procurement audit, which investigated the incident in August 2015, revealed that Air Vice Marshall Amosu and (Rtd) Col. Sambo Dasuki, purchased two unserviceable Mi-24V helicopters which did not have the necessary parts to fly, including being without rotors. Also, the audit showed that Col. Dasuki and other defence Chiefs purchased unserviceable and cheaper military equipment when they had budgeted for newer military hardware. They then diverted the left-over funds to their personal accounts (Duke O, Agbaji D.O and Etime (2016)).

The precursor to huge military spending can be hinged on years of military interregnum, which engendered a unitary governance structure and totalitarian streak that gave no chance to the civil populace to question anything. That mindset has led us to where we are and why defence spending is shrouded in secrecy in the name of classified information, not wanting to compromise national security or ‘national interest’, thereby veiling corruption in the process. And as some people have noted, national security is always an excuse for impunity, and for the perpetration of monumental and unimaginable corruption and theft of public funds. This explains why not much headway has been made in tackling defence related corruption.

FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS

This study adopted the theory of postcolonial state. The theory was proposed by Karl Marx and it was elaborated further and applied by other marxian epigenists in the analysis of African social reality. Such ardent marxian scholars include Claude Ake, Okwudiba Nnoli, Ibeanu, Onimode, Offiongetc; they have spent ample time explaining the political, cultural and economic legacies of colonialism and nature, character and structural compositions of postcolonial states and their leaders. Many scholars such as Graf (1988), diamond (1986) and Joseph (1996) have identified capitalist rent seeking, patrimoliadalism and prebendalism as

the major characteristics of post-colonial Nigeria state. Some have even fancifully referred to the African state as a “rogue state” (Joseph, 1996). These characteristics have combined with another and with many others, in complex dynamics, to undermine the Nigerian state’s capacity to discharge those fundamental obligations of modern state to its citizens, such as socio-economic provisioning, guarantee of fundamental human rights and freedoms, ensuring law and order and facilitating peace and stability as preconditions for growth and development (Jega, 2002).

This theory is historical and behavioral in the sense that it made effort to look into the historical antiquity of colonial rule, how political independence was attained and post-independence era of erstwhile colonies and behavioral mannerism of their leaders. The theory established that due to the nature of political, cultural and economic legacies the colonized inherited from the colonizers which were more consuming than production in character made the system so competitive and unavoidable for economic gain. This peculiar attribute of the neo-colonial state can be traced to the colonial epoch. Elaborating more on the character of postcolonial state, Onyemaechi in Okolie and Onah (2017) opines that;

The post-colonial states of Africa are socially disarticulated; most of them are artificial creations by western colonial powers where differing people were forcefully hammered into inchoate boundaries, different races, ethnicity, language, religion, etc., without desire and consent to stay together to pursue common interest, aspiration and goals. These states did not allow democratic practice of free and equal political self-determination thus resulting into fractured states of heterogeneous societies and nations of complex political crises as in Liberia, sierra-Leone, DRC Congo, Sudan, Nigeria, cote d’Ivoire, Mali, to state only in a few from the legion, thus impairing survival of democracy in Africa.

The nature of African states facilitated long military interface in politics which denied and destroyed civil participation in democratization process with the collateral effect that Africa found itself in a dialectical tension between forces of tradition and modernity (Eke, 2008:162, 176-177; Levin, 2016)

Alavi (1973:146-147) noted that the main attribute of the post-colonial state is an instrument of the class domination and that the state and its apparatuses are used as main instrument of primitive accumulation by the local dominant class and foreign collaboration. Similarly, Ekekwe (1986:12) rightly noted that whereas the state in the advanced capitalist formations functions to maintain the economic and social relation under which bourgeoisie accumulation takes place, in the periphery of capitalism, factors which have to do with the level of

development of the productive forces make the state, through its several institutions and apparatuses a direct instrument for accumulation for the dominant class or its elements. As corollary, Ake (1981: 128-129) noted that the indigenous bourgeoisie which took over government at independence lacked a secure material base and hence used its political power for accumulation.

In applying the theory, Nigeria is characterized by weak institutions and powerful individuals; these individuals that occupy key public positions use its apparatus to enrich their personal pockets. The unique nature of the post-colonial states such as Nigeria therefore presents the fact that the state serves as major instrument of capital accumulation and that those that control the government increase military spending to build their domination and capital accumulation. This explains why after about a decade of huge increases in military budget spending on boko haram, insecurity situation in Nigeria has worsened.

NIGERIA DEFENCE BUDGET AND FIGHT AGAINST BOKO HARAM

Military budget refers to the budget of the Federal Ministry of Defence. The budget is a short term plan (usually on annual basis) of the sources of revenue and expenditure of an organization; for a ministry, it shows expenditure. This is because the source of fund is the central government under which the ministry works. Secondly, the military is a service organ of the government; it is not an income generating organ. Hence, in its budget there are no source(s) of income. In Nigeria, military budgets are basically used to meet the needs of the armed forces of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. These needs-costs categories are broadly two: recurrent and capital expenditures. Recurrent expenditures are classified into personnel and overhead costs.

Recurrent expenditure is all the regular expenses that go into the running of the defence ministry. These include salaries and allowances paid to the soldiers; operational costs such as travelling and accommodation, telephone, electricity and water bill; maintenance costs incurred on equipment, building and installations.

Table 1. Nigeria Defence Budgetary Allocation, 2009-2019

The Nigerian defence budgetary allocation from 2009 to 2019 is demonstrated in table one below thus:

S/No	Year	Personnel N(billion)	Overhead N(billion)	Recurrent N(billion)	Capital N(billion)	Total N(billion)
1	2009	132.3	43.9	176.2	46.8	223
2	2010	155.3	37.3	192.6	39.4	232
3	2011	NA	NA	309.8	38.2	348
4	2012	254.8	41.6	296.4	35.9	332
5	2013	300.4	NA	NA	64	364
6	2014	273.8	40.5	314.3	35.4	350
7	2015	289.3	49.5	338.8	36.7	376
8	2016	278.4	33.8	312.2	130.9	443
9	2017	285.5	40	325.5	140	465
10	2018	370.6	51.8	51.8	144.9	580.145

Source: www.budgetoffice.gov.ng and <https://www.vanguardngr.com/2019/05/security-gg-spends-n6trn-on-defence-in-11years/>

. From table 1 above there is an indication that the budget of the military in Nigeria has been on steady increase since 2009. The fact that Boko Haram insurgency started in 2009 and the declaration of war against insurgency by Nigerian government, plausibly explains the steady increase that occurred since then in the military budget. The increment does not only reflect in the capital, but also in the recurrent expenditure which is normal since Nigeria has been consistently deploying military to the North East region which is the hot spot of Boko Haram insurgency. Increase of the capital budget indicates that the country has been buying military hardware and equipment needed to fight the insurgency. The increase in the recurrent budget does not only show that more personnel are been recruited since the counter insurgency started but supplies to the military in combat and allowances paid to troops in the front-line also justifies the increase.

FRAUDULENT ARMS PROCUREMENT DEALS AND LACK OF MILITARY CAPABILITY

Corrupt military officials have been able to benefit from the conflict through the creation of fake defense contracts, the proceeds of which are often laundered abroad. In 2015, Nigeria’s vice president said around \$15 billion had been stolen from the public purse under the previous government through fraudulent arms procurement deals.

The same 2015, the presidential candidate of the All Progressive Congress (APC) party and other scholars were of the view that funds meant for the welfare of security forces predominantly the army and air force were diverted and shared by politicians and top military officers of the country. This was done by carefully and surgically using the escalations of the Boko Haram crisis to camouflage the request for funds for the procurement of arms but in reality it was actually to get the funds from the Nigerian Senate after convincing the then president Goodluck Jonathan with lies. With the killings of both civilians and military forces on the increase, questions were asked on where and how the monies allocated to the military were spent. Nigerians needed to understand why the terrorist attacks were not reducing. After President Buhari was sworn in on the 29th of May 2015, the anti-corruption agencies began to investigate the suspects on the watch list of most corrupt Nigerians of which arrest were carried out. Investigations revealed that the office of the NSA which was not an operational office but an advisory office was involved in the over inflation of invoices in the procurement refurbished military aircrafts which were quoted to be new but were not. Sadly the aircrafts began to fall from the skies one after the other thereby killing the young and vibrant air force pilots. Buhari’s Administration unraveled the biggest scam in the history of Nigeria, when it decided to probe spending of funds meant for the procurement of arms and ammunition under the immediate past regime of former President Goodluck Jonathan. It was discovered that a former National Security Adviser (Col. Sambo Dasuki, rtd.) and others allegedly laundered and diverted \$2.1 billion dollars (over N550 billion) arms funds. The former National Security Adviser shared the arms fund as follows:

Table 2: Distribution of Arms and Ammunition Funds by NSA

The distribution of arms and ammunition funds by the National Security Adviser in Nigeria from is demonstrated in table two below as follows:

S/N	Name	Amount	Purpose	Remarks
1	Attahiru Bafarawa	N4.6 billion	Spiritual purposes	Arrested by the EFCC
2	Chief Raymond Dokpesi	N2.1 billion	Publicity & Media	Arrested by the EFCC
3	Alh. Aminu Babakusa	N2.2 billion	Shared to politicians	Promise to refund part.
4	Waripamowei Dudafa	N10 billion	Shared to PDP delegates	-
5	Chief OlisaMetu	N1.4 billion	Shared to politicians	Arrested by the EFCC
6	Bala James Ngillari	N450 million	-	Arrested by the EFCC

7	Mrs. Esther Nenadi Usman	N2.5 billion	Shared to party officials	Arrested by EFCC
8	Air Marshal Adesola Amosu (rtd)	Returned N2.3 billion	-	Returned N2.3 billion
9	Air Chief Marshal Alex Badeh (rtd)	\$930,500 and \$690.00	Questionable contracts	Arrested by the EFCC
10	Femi Fani-Kayode	N840 million	Campaign publicity	Arrested by the EFCC
11	Chief OluFalae	N100 million	Received from Mrs. Usman	-
12	Rashidi Ladoja	N100 million	Received from Mrs. Usman	-
13.	Prof. Rufai Alkali	N320 million	Support Group	-
14	Bashir Yuguda	N1.5 billion, N1.2billion, N775 million	Suspicious payments.	

Source: Adapted from Jimoh, 2016. Grand Theft Nationale: How Elites Stole Nigeria Dry.

The implication of this fraudulent arms procurement deals lies in the inability to provide the soldiers the required arsenal to fight the Boko Haram insurgents. Regardless of the huge defence budgets, there are reports that the Nigerian military is ill-equipped, and that soldiers are usually sent into combat with limited weaponry. A study carried out by (Fulani 2014; 5:4) explained that some soldiers in Mubi and Izighe military bases, Adamawa State, complained that they use limited and very poor weaponry against well-armed insurgents. The soldiers said that while they were equipped with just AK-47 rifles and only dozens of bullets, the insurgents use sophisticated arms and ammunition like Browning Machine Guns, rocket propelled grenades, night vision goggles, AK-49 rifles, armoured personnel carriers, and suchlike. Added to this is the fact that soldiers are poorly fed, medical services are limited or worse, unavailable, and families of fallen soldiers are only granted minimal stipends. These alone can completely demoralize the soldiers and hamper on the fight against terrorism. Corruption has also caused the Nigerian state to be handicapped in its fight against Book Haram terrorism in the case of the purchase of substandard military material. In a statement issued in 2016 by the Senior Assistant to the Minister of Information and Culture, Segun Adeyemi, Alhaji Lai Mohammed, insisted that

the weapons, munitions and equipment which the former President said he bought were refurbished and lacked the basic components and spare parts. Additionally, that the ammunition bought for both high caliber and small weapons were mostly expired, incompatible with weapons and grossly inadequate (Point Blank News2016; 1:2.). This kind of situation of only leads to the injury and deaths of the soldiers who use the substandard equipment. It is worth noting here, as (Sahara Reporters.2016;17:1) wrote, following the fatal crash of Group Captain Ubong Akpan and Master Warrant Officer Zabesan Hosea, who boarded a Russian-made Mi-24V helicopter with the intent to carry-out assault on Boko Haram terrorists in Adamawa state in December 2014, the arm procurement audit, which began in August 2015, revealed that Air Vice Marshall Amosu and (Rtd) Col. Sambo Dasuki, purchased two unserviceable Mi-24V helicopters which were missing the necessary parts to fly, including being without rotors. Also, the audit showed that Col. Dasuki and other defence Chiefs purchased unserviceable and cheaper military equipment when they had budgeted for newer military hardware. They then diverted the left-over funds to their personal accounts (Duke et al 2016; 5(13):219-226.)

In 2019, several hundreds of Nigerian soldiers mutinied because according to them, they were sent to fight Boko haram with antiquated and often inoperable weapons, obsolete and defective ammunition, vehicles that constantly broke down because of parts shortages, they had not been paid in months, and a host of other complaints, which they alleged were due mainly to corruption among the officer corps. Lack of military arsenal as the result the failure of the office of the former National Security Adviser to procure the required military arms and ammunitions that made it impossible for the Nigerian military to effectively protect the citizens of the areas affected by the insurgency such that in Benisheikh, Boko Haram killed 160 people; 23 people were killed in a village in Kukawa local government area Idris and Ibrahim, 2013). 228 people were also killed by Boko Haram in Baga town and about 4,000 houses burnt (Ibrahim and Bashir, 2013); 55 people were further killed by Boko Haram in Bama town (Ibrahim and Sawab, 2013); in Konduga town, 57 civilians were killed; Izge town was attacked by Boko Haram and 106 civilians were killed (Idris and Ibrahim, 2014). All these killings happened in Borno State. In Yobe State, Boko Haram insurgents killed 62 students of College of Agriculture in Gujba town (Yakubu, 2013); 30 students of the Government secondary school in Mamudo were also killed by the insurgents (Hamza and Matazu, 2013); 59 students of Federal Government College, Buni

Yadi in Gujba Local Government Area were killed over-night by the Boko Haram insurgents in their respective hostels (Matazu and Wakili, 2014). In Adamawa State, precisely at Shuwa and Michika towns, dozens of people were killed (Anwar, 2014); Apart from the Killings in these three states of the north eastern region, the Boko Haram insurgents moved to other parts of Nigeria: In Abuja, the Federal Capital of Nigeria, 21 persons were killed and 25 others injured, apart from the destruction of vehicles, at one of the busiest shopping malls (Ogechi and Azu, 2014). In Bauchi Metropolis, Boko Haram members struck at a popular hotel and killed 13 persons in addition to injuring 34 others (Orude, 2014). The residents of Sabon Gari area in the Kano Metropolis (an area inhabited by non indigenes) were bombed by the Boko Haram Sect and about 45 people were killed (Adeyemi, 2013). Also the Kano Central Mosque attacked, where multiple bombs exploded during Juma'at prayers and about 100 worshippers were killed (Mudashir, 2013).

Conclusion/Recommendations

Boko Haram has literally destroyed the north eastern part of Nigeria. In an effort to save the country it became sacrosanct to purchase armaments and other military hardware in order to checkmate the insurgency in the north east. The reverse was the case when monies amounting to trillions of Naira were diverted into private pockets by corrupt Nigerian government officials and elites who were friends of the government. To this end the insurgency in Nigeria gained momentum and the security operatives at the war front became handicapped and the terrorist took over the north east. Therefore, in the course of this study the following findings were made: that the increase in defence budget does not account for reduction in the activities of insurgents in north east Nigeria and negative use of security vote lead to ineffectiveness in curtailing insurgency in Nigeria.

Arising from the findings, the study makes the following recommendations.

1. Government should adopt a carrot and stick approach in the fight against boko haram. For instance, members of this sect who renounce their membership should be pardoned and rehabilitated; and unrepentant insurgents handled with hard measure.

2. Defence budget should be used for procurement of sophisticated arms and ammunition to equip soldiers battling the insurgents.
3. Military officers found guilty of misappropriation defense funds should be executed publicly.

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