

## **WOMEN'S INVOLVEMENT IN TERRORISM: A CRITICAL LOOK AT THEIR ROLES IN SELECTED TERRORIST ORGANISATIONS**

**Tunde Agara<sup>1</sup> & Alexander Subair<sup>2\*</sup>**

<sup>1</sup>Department of Political Science, Ambrose Alli University, Ekpoma, Edo State, Nigeria

<sup>2</sup>Department of International Relations and Strategic Studies, Igbinedion University, Okada,  
Edo State, Nigeria

\*alexander.subair@iuokada.edu.ng

**ABSTRACT:** The study examined why societies are slow or not inclined to imbibe the directive on gender equality, as terrorist organisations are using this directive to entice more women by offering them opportunities to hold positions of prominence, which are denied by the societies in which they live. While the research study employed content, process theories and push and pull factors were also examined. The study adopted a multi-layered methodology in which four cases of transnational terrorist groups were selected and qualitatively analysed. The study concludes that women play a variety of roles in terrorist organisations, in some cases more than men do, and the implications of this role for the global war on terror have led to a long way in devising effective counterterrorism strategies and policies. For example, Boko Haram may be abducting girls and women to use as future recruiters or suicide bombers. However, in espionage parlance, they are called 'sleepers' who can be 'awakened' later in the future for certain jobs, such as suicide bombing or targeted assassination. Like the Russian KGB, many such 'sleepers' were deliberately planted in America as American children and families during the heydays of the Cold War.

**Keywords:** Counterterrorism, Motivation, Suicide Bombers, Terrorism, Women

### **INTRODUCTION**

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), in its preamble, reiterates the equal rights of both sexes. However, in most societies and under many circumstances, there still exists gender disparity due to ingrained cultural patterns that accord the male element prominent positions, resulting in most women's failure to reach important social, elective, and even appointive positions in their societies. Paradoxically, while societies are slow or not inclined to imbibe the UDHR directive on equal rights, terrorist organisations are using this directive to entice more women into their fold by offering them opportunities to hold positions of prominence denied to them by the societies in which they live. This acts as one of the motivational inducements for joining such organisations.

To fully understand motivation as a push/pull force or the inner conscious action-takes decision to do what one does, we must bear in mind that this action and the decision to join or not to join are equally dependent on the type and nature of the terrorist organisation and the allure it holds to the person. Broadly, terrorist organisations can be categorised to include state-sponsored, religious, ethnic, and politically motivated terrorism (Spindlove & Simonsen 2003).

Although Hoffman (2006) alluded that all acts of terrorism are, to a certain extent, politically motivated, there may be a need to differentiate between politically and religiously motivated terrorist organisations, as these become very important in the final decision as to which to join or not join. Although both employ the use of violence, they still differ in certain important respects that make it important to distinguish between them. In this respect, a good starting point is that for a terrorist action to qualify as being purely politically motivated, it must "challenge the state but affect no private rights of innocent parties" (Kittrie, 1981).

Therefore, religiously motivated terrorism would differ from other acts of terrorism primarily because, first, while political terrorism attempts to find a resolution within the lifetimes of the perpetrators, religious terrorism outlives their participants. This is predicated on the belief that the rewards of those involved in this cause are trans-temporal and that the time limit of their struggle is eternity. Second, the targets of religious terrorism are not chosen for their military value; rather, they are chosen for the sole purpose of making an impact on public consciousness, both by their brutality and suddenness. Third, the constant recourse to an eternal being to justify their action has the power of 'satanising' the enemies while making the perpetrators of religious terrorism 'godly'. As Juergensmeyer (2004) noted, this is a kind of "perverse performance of power meant to ennoble the perpetrators' views of the world while drawing viewers into their notions of cosmic war". The effect of this, as he had also noted, is "not so much that religion has become politicised but that politics has become religionised.

Fourth, the targets of religious terrorism and violence also tend to assume and acquire similar religious mien, explanations, and perspectives. For example, following the 9/11 attacks, the then-US President, George Bush, whipped up national sentiments when he invoked the 'religious image' of America's "righteous cause" as combating and bringing to an end the "absolute evil" of its enemies. Fifth, the 'divine' nature of religious terrorism, the notion that the battle is between 'good' and 'bad', 'truth' and 'evil', and the expectation of heaven rewards for terrorists all rule out the possibility of a compromise or a peaceful resolution. Sixth, the spiritual dimension that the war has acquired extends beyond the confines of human law and the ideal of morality. Society's law is subordinated and, in extreme cases, is deemed nonexistent or inapplicable because of the recourse to a higher authority. The belief and perception here are that society's laws and limitations are of no relevance when one is obeying greater 'divine' authority. Finally, the result of religious terrorism is that it impacts the sense of redemption and dignity of the perpetrators. It is at this level that religious terrorism results in personal willingness on the part of perpetrators, who are often men who feel alienated and marginalised from public life (Agara and Ogwola, 2014). This paper explores the influence of gender inequality as a driving force for women joining terrorist organizations, focusing on four major groups. It contends that women play crucial roles within these organizations, highlighting the need for a revised counterterrorism strategy that addresses their involvement.

## **REVIEW OF LITERATURE**

### **Motivation**

As a concept, what then is motivation, and how does this apply to the issue of women terrorists? The concept of 'motivation' is primarily used to explain the connection between an individual's behaviour and his or her environment. Motivation, therefore, becomes a patchwork concept that includes other concepts, such as 'feeling', 'needs', and 'goals', and 'drives' in its effort to

explain and account for an individual's tendency to respond differently to the same stimulus at different times and for different individuals to respond differently to the same stimulus. Motivation and its understanding, therefore, become imperative if one is to understand why people behave the way they do. As Drucker (1974) has tried to explain, every organisation and society, no matter how authoritarian they may be, must satisfy the ambitions and needs of its members and do so in their capacity as individuals. This implies that people act in their interests as defined by their needs. This has been brilliantly put by Adam Smith (1976) when he stated that:

It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner but from their regard for their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their own advantages.

As with many terms and concepts in the social sciences, motivation suffers from basic definitional disagreement. Cole (2002) defined it as a "process in which people choose between alternative forms of behaviour to achieve personal goals". This definition rules out the possibility of behaviour being the operation of instinctive and reflexive action while showing that it is a conscious choice. The exercise of choice is not to be seen as a rational process but essentially as one that is considerably influenced and affected by sometimes deeply rooted emotions and values of the individual. Mitchell (1982) identified four common characteristics that underlie most definitions of motivation: motivation is typified as an individual phenomenon. This implies that every individual is unique; motivation is described, usually, as intentional. This implies that motivation is under the individual's control, so behaviours that are influenced by motivation should be seen as choices of action; motivation is multifaceted. This implies that in any motivated behaviour, two factors are of greatest importance: (a) what motivates people (arousal) and (b) the force of an individual to engage in the desired behaviour (direction or choice of behaviour); the purpose of motivational theories is to predict behaviour. This means that motivation is not the behaviour itself or the performance; rather, it concerns action, the internal and external forces that influence a person's choice of action.

On the basis of these characteristics, Mitchell (1982) defines motivation as "the degree to which an individual wants and chooses to engage in certain specified behaviours". All motivational theories can be divided into two broad categories. The first is content theory, which includes Maslow's (1943) 'Hierarchy of Needs', Herzberg's (1959) 'Motivation/Hygiene Theory' and McClelland's (1975). The content theory also includes the reformation of Maslow's theory by Porter (1964) and Alderfer (1972). The content theories are distinguishable by the fact that they are premised on the belief that human behaviour can be scientifically predicted and thus manipulated. They sought to adduce reasons or causes for individuals behaving and performing in certain ways and generally attempt to answer the question of 'what' drives, moves or motivates people to behave the way they do. The sets of theories under this heading generally describe motivation as "behaviour caused by some stimulus but directed towards a desired outcome" (Cole, 2002). Put pictorially, it looks thus:

Stimulus —————> Appropriate Behaviour —————> Goal/Desired Outcome

**Fig. 1:** Content theory basic motivational model (Culled from Cole (2002, p. 96).

However, an awareness has been generated that the sources of human behaviour, hitherto thought to be self-evident and self-explanatory in scientific terms, are no longer proven. Motivation may actually be the final issue after certain conscious cognitive processes, which are not easily traceable or subjected to scientific analysis, and the exact magnitude of the logical positivist type has occurred or undergone by the individual. Hence, the second type of theory, process theory, evinces a departure from the traditional focus and addresses the more fundamental issue of how people's actions and behaviour are determined. This set of theories, unfortunately, has not enjoyed wider currency and application because they focus on the thought processes that individuals undergo before making decisions. Vroom's (1964) 'Expectancy Theory', Adams' (1965) 'Equity Theory' and House and Mitchell's (1974) 'Path-Goal Theory' are representative of this category. A third category has been introduced by Daft (1997), the 'Reinforcement Theories', which may not be useful to the trajectory of this paper because they focus on employee learning of desired work behaviours. The theories here focus on changing or modifying employees' on-the-job behaviour through the appropriate use of immediate rewards and punishments.

Since no one is born a terrorist (Sanmartin 2004) and since all attempts to stereotype or delineate specific terrorist personalities have failed (Crenshaw 2004, Weatherston & Moran 2003), identifying the reasons for involvement in terrorism becomes essential. Overall, the motivation that propels an individual to join and participate in terrorist activities ranges from political to social to psychological and cultural. Nevertheless, they differ from individual to individual and from one type of organisation to the other. For instance, what motivates an individual to join a political terrorist organisation may not be the same as another person joining a religious terrorist group. Hence, for any person to be successfully assimilated into a terrorist group, his motivation must align with the ideologies and actions of that group.

While some feminist social scientists have preferred to argue that there are no specific female motivations, Nacos (2005) has also argued that, in reality, there is no evidence that male and female terrorists differ in terms of recruitment, motivation, and brutality. As Brown (2017) asserted, joining a terrorist organisation and becoming involved in their activities may be "for men an opportunity to display their prowess, to defend their women and to have a life that is more fun than the Call of Duty Computer game"; however, for women, "the journey is presented as cleansing and exciting, an opportunity to help those suffering and a chance to have to shape history." Thus, while most of the motivations may be common to both sexes, in societies with a history of oppression and gender inequality, there will certainly be some motivating factors that are peculiar and unique to women.

In Bloom's (2011) conceptualisation of The Four Rs's theory—revenge, redemption, relationships, and respect—to explain the contents of women's motivation and participation in terrorism, another r—rape—was later added. While this list would seem likely, it is inexhaustible, particularly for women living in Islamic societies where the cultural traditions are unequivocally followed and adhered to by the society and where it is easier to convince women to join terrorist groups as a way of expiating their sins and recovering societal respect or improving their social and familial standing. Thus, the family is a strong factor in motivating

or influencing the final decision that a woman makes to join a religious terrorist group. There is, therefore, a high probability that the final decision will be influenced by a member of the family who belongs to the group or has been persecuted, imprisoned, tortured, or killed by those seen as enemies of the group.

What could account for Western women joining jihadist groups has been broadly categorised by Saltman and Smith (2015) into two broad categories of push/pull factors. Among the pull factors are feeling isolated within Western culture, seeing the Muslim community as being persecuted worldwide, and anger and frustration over what is perceived as international inaction to the plights of Muslims. The push factors, on the other hand, are religious duty and building a utopia haven, sisterhood and a sense of belonging, and romanticising and seeing joining a jihadist group as an adventure without realising the implications of such a decision. What this implies is that Western women, at least the younger generation, are no longer feeling comfortable or bored or disillusioned with life as offered by Western countries and thus want to find a new life that is meaningful and adventurous, and the propaganda of a paradise proves irresistible for someone who is leading a dull life in a cultural environment of anomy and indifference.

Concerning the Balkan region, Mietz (2016) identified nine push and seven pull factors, although he was quick to note that both of these factors were not unique to the Balkan region alone but were shared by other citizens of other countries but that three factors may be responsible for attracting Balkan females to jihadist groups in Balkan countries. The impressive list of push factors includes questioning one's identity, boredom, unsatisfying one's life, looking for adventure, high youth unemployment, restrictions on free movement, feelings of not belonging, limited ability to make good judgments, Islam phobia, and slow political and economic growth. The pull factors include helping to create a new state, the romanticism of marrying a jihadist, sisterhood belonging, jihadi 'cool' subculture, seeking revenge against the 'unbelievers', practising 'pure' Islam freely, and 'religious duty' to migrate to the Islamic State. The three factors identified as being responsible for female Balkan jihadists are high youth unemployment, weak institutions, Wahhabi 'charities', and radical mosques.

Interestingly, the factors identified as both push and pull factors are present in both so-called developed and undeveloped countries, particularly in Nigeria. Although we agree with Sanmartin's submission that no one is born a terrorist, we must also agree that the social and cultural environment acts as a driver. A simplistic explanation is that in both Western and Islamic states, women become radical because they want to run away from an unpleasant, boring life and hence are easily prone to any suggestion of a deviation from life as they have been experiencing.

### **The Problematic in Conceptualising and Contextualising 'Terrorism'**

This concept suffers from a crisis of definition, thereby confusing its actual meaning and usage. Dupuy (2004) collected over one hundred definitions, but the real essence of the concept did not change much. As an ancient word, its root can be traced back to the time of the Zealots in the 1st century, but its current usage is associated with the period of the French Revolution, the 'Jacobin Reign of Terror' (1792--94). Global terrorism is a more recent period. Rapoport (2001) traced its origin to the late decades of the 19th century and distinguished four waves of global terrorism. The last wave, which we are now witnessing, is religious and started in 1979 when

Ayatollah Khomeini declared the Islamic Republic in Iran. However, we contend that for any definition of terrorism to be acceptable, it must at least include these six major elements: (1) the use of violence or threat of violence, (2) the existence of an organised group, (3) the intention of achieving a political objective, (4) the focus of violence must be a targeted audience that extends beyond the immediate victims, who are often innocent civilians (usually account for collateral damage), (5) in this case, the government can be either the perpetrator or the target, and finally, (6) it is a form of insurgency usually favoured by the weak (Lutz & Lutz 2008). Hence, we align with Sinai's (2010/2011) definition:

Terrorism is a tactic of warfare involving premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated by subnational groups or clandestine agents against any citizen of a state, whether civilian or military, to influence, coerce, and, if possible, cause mass casualties and physical destruction upon their targets. Unlike guerrilla forces, terrorist groups are less capable of overthrowing their adversaries' government than of inflicting discriminate or indiscriminate destruction that they hope will coerce them to change policy.

Currently, specific attempts to define it can be grouped into two categories: official and academic definitions. Schmid and Jongman (2005) compiled several official definitions of terrorism. The U.S. Vice President's 1986 task force defined terrorism as "the unlawful use or threat of violence against persons or property to further political or social objectives. It is generally intended to intimidate or coerce a government, individuals or groups to modify their behaviour or policies." A British legal definition provided by Schmid and Jongman (2005) defines terrorism as "the use of violence for political ends, and includes any use of violence for the purpose of putting the public or any section of the public in fear." The US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) defines terrorism as "the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives".

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) states that terrorism is "any activity that involves an act that is dangerous to human life or potentially destructive of critical infrastructure or key resources; and ... must also appear to be intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination or kidnapping." The US Department of Defense (DoD) defines terrorism as "the calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological objectives." Unsurprisingly, three commonalities can be discerned from these definitions: (1) the use of violence, (2) political objectives, and (3) the intention of sowing fear in the target population. However, academic definitions are more complex, all-embracing, and more diverse. For instance, Hoffman (2006) defined terrorism "as the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change", whereas Combs (2003) defined it as "a synthesis of war and theatre, a dramatisation of the most proscribed kind of violence – that is perpetrated on innocent victims – played before an audience in the hope of creating a mood of fear, for political purposes." Nicholson (2003) defined terrorism as "the deliberate killing of nonmilitary personnel in order to pursue a claimed political goal through exertion of pressure on a society".

Shimko (2008) defined terrorism as "the indiscriminate use or threat of violence to advance social, political, economic, or religious objectives by creating a climate of fear." Rourke (2008) defined terrorism by attempting to highlight the features common to it: "terrorism is (1) violence; (2) carried out by individuals, nongovernmental organisations, or covert government agents or units; that (3) specifically target civilians; (4) uses clandestine attack methods, such as car bombs and hijacked airliners; and (5) attempts to influence politics." Kegley and Wittkopf (1999) defined it as "criminal acts and threats against a targeted actor for the purpose of arousing fear in order to get the target to accept the terrorists' demands." In all, Jenkins (1980) submits that terrorism should be defined "by the nature of the act, not by the identity of the perpetrators or the nature of their cause."

## **METHODOLOGY**

The methodology adopted for this study is multilayered. Four cases are selected for qualitative analysis. One of the benefits of a case study method is that the cases can be evaluated in depth to provide a thorough body of evidence to support the acceptance or rejection of hypotheses. A 'most similar system design (MSSD)' method is also adopted. This method examines each case study to identify similarities among them and areas of differences, if any. Unlike the 'most different system design (MSDS)', all the cases chosen have certain things in common. Four terrorist organisations— Hamas, al-Qaeda, ISIS, and Boko Haram—were chosen for comparison. These cases were chosen, despite the existence of other terrorist groups, on the basis of their listing as terrorist organisations as well as documented and publicised involvement of women within their organisations occupying various roles. Structured, focus comparison is used to compare variables across the four cases selected for this study. George and Bennet (2005) argued that focus comparison is effective because the process "allows researchers to avoid the all too familiar and disappointing pitfalls of traditional, intensive single case studies." Therefore, when this method is used, it is easier to note the similarities and differences between the selected cases. The variables we have selected for consideration are as follows:

1. Are the women involved in these organisations mostly single, married, widowed or divorced?
2. What is the average age of the women involved in these organisations?
3. How do the women in these organisations become involved?
4. What role can be said to be the predominant role that these women play within these organisations?
5. Do these women have any particular religious affiliation?
6. What can be said to be the main motivation(s) for their involvement in these organisations?

### **Case-Studies Analysis I – Islamic Revival Movement (Hamas)**

Hamas is one of the arms or wings of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine, established on the eve of the first intifada (an Arabic word for 'civil uprising means 'shaking off') (Agara, 2022), in December 1987 by Sheikh Ahmed Yassin and Mahmoud Zahar as the Brotherhood's local political arm and with one specific purpose: eliminating Israel as a nation and returning all of Palestine to Islamic control. The Hamas Charter declares violence to be a legitimate means to

use against Israel. Sheikh Yassin was the spiritual leader who founded the Islamic Centre (al-Mujamma' al-Islami) in 1973 to coordinate the Brotherhood's activities in Gaza.

In 1988, Hamas published its charter, now known as the Hamas Charter, where its primary purpose was put in words. The document opens with verses from the Qur'an, claiming the superiority of Islam over other religions and clearly stating Hamas's motto in Articles 5 and 8—"Allah is its goal, the Prophet its model to be followed, the Qur'an its constitution, Jihad its way, and death for the sake of Allah its loftiest desire". Also included in the Charter was the ominous warning that "Israel will exist and will continue to exist until Islam abolishes it". The Charter, from its preamble to the last article, clearly stated its purpose—the violent elimination of Israel as a people and a nation. Very clearly, the wording of the Charter is that Hamas does not want peace or offer or want any compromise with Israel. Rather, it will only agree to intermittent 'truces' when its military capabilities are not sufficiently strong enough and it needs time to recuperate and rearm—the practice and uses of deception. Thus, the various 'peace solutions' and 'conferences' are seen as ways not only to provide the influence of arbitration over Moslem land but also to allow Hamas to rearm, reorganise and re-strategise before the continuation of the conflict.

After Hamas took over Gaza in 2006, it transformed from an underground guerrilla organisation into a uniformed terrorist organisation designed to protect Gaza from outside influence. However, despite its unquestioned terrorist identity, Hamas sought and often obtained recognition and funding from Western powers. In June 2014, Hamas and Fatah announced their decision to form a unified government. Fatah is a secular group that was founded by Yasser Arafat and a small group of Palestinian nationalists in the late 1950s. Both its existence and purpose were a secular version of Hamas's, and this secularist ideology was roundly criticised by Hamas as being "in total contradiction to the religious ideology and ideas which are the basis of position, behaviour and decisions" of Hamas. The secular Fatah had joined the jihadis group Hamas to govern the Palestinian territory together. This led to a new phase in the conflict, which has been termed 'lawfare', meaning the abuse of international law and legal processes to accomplish military objectives that cannot be accomplished on the battlefield (Sekulow 2014).

While Hamas is considered an extremely conservative organisation, its use of women and the role they play in the organisation has greatly surprised observers. The first recorded use of women was in the attack on a Sbarro pizzeria in 2001 in Israel, in which 15 were killed and 130 were wounded, of which 8 were children (Bloom 2011). The planner of the attack was Ahlam at-Tamimi, a woman who had previously been involved in providing intelligence and played a pivotal role in planning the operation, choosing the target, and even accompanying the bomber on a failed bombing attack (Bloom 2011). This portrayed Hamas as an organisation that is willing to use women to promote their cause and carry out their terrorist acts. Its use of women accords them with some level of attention due to the "seeming incongruity of women, symbols of fertility and the gift of life intentionally taking the lives of others" (Schweitzer 2008).

As a terrorist organisation, Hamas falls within the nationalistic/religious side of the continuum rather than a purely political/secular group such as Fatah or the PLO. The violence between it and Israel is the motivating influence that attracts most women in addition to some of them being exposed to and being victims of the violence between them. Although women may not

have been allowed to take a leadership role, they are effective at increasing support and garnering media attention for both their plight and the population they represent.

Women have been involved in various capacities within Hamas, primarily in logistical, support, and occasionally in combat roles, though they are typically less visible in direct action compared to their male counterparts. Here are some examples of how Hamas has utilized women:

- i. **Logistical and Support Roles:** Women have played essential roles in transporting weapons and funds, often evading suspicion due to gender biases. Their participation in propaganda, fundraising, and recruitment efforts has also been key, particularly in targeting younger members and family members. Female operatives are sometimes used as couriers because they are less likely to be suspected by security forces.
- ii. **Suicide Bombings:** While rare, Hamas has used female suicide bombers in some operations. One prominent example is Reem al-Riyashi, who carried out a suicide bombing at the Erez crossing in 2004, killing four Israelis. This marked one of the few cases where Hamas employed a female operative in such a role. Hamas justified her participation through religious and cultural narratives, portraying her act as a defence of Palestinian dignity.
- iii. **Martyrdom and Propaganda:** Hamas's propaganda often glorifies women who have participated in operations. The narrative of female martyrdom is used to inspire others, portraying these women as defenders of their homeland and honour. Women are celebrated for their contributions, even if they are not frequently involved in combat roles.
- iv. **Training and Tactical Support:** Women in Hamas have also contributed to the training of younger recruits and have provided tactical support to shield male fighters. In some cases, they have offered critical logistical support from their homes, helping protect Hamas operatives from detection and ensuring the continuity of operations.

While women are not the predominant force in Hamas's military wing, their involvement reflects the organization's ability to adapt and utilize societal perceptions of gender to its strategic advantage. Their roles, though fewer in direct combat, are pivotal to Hamas's operational success. Examples of women's involvement in Hamas's operations demonstrate the group's broader reliance on every facet of society to further its goals, despite the lower profile women often have in militant organizations.

### **Case-Studies Analysis II – al-Qaeda**

The name 'Al Qaeda' (the Base) has been the focus of media attention since the August 1998 U.S. embassy bombings and has achieved a near-mythical status because, before the 9/11 incident, Osama bin Laden never uttered the name. However, the origin of the name was attributed to Abdallah Azzam, who coined the term al-Qaeda al-subah (the solid base) in 1988 in his bid to refocus his ambition of the reconquest of the Muslim world (Migaux, 2007). The killing of Azzam in Peshawar in 1989 created a leadership vacuum that brought Osama bin Laden into the limelight as one who would later give an impetus of a different sort to Al Qaeda and a new direction to the jihadist strategy (Migaux 2007).

Bin Laden's main grouse, which he was able to sell to other movements, was subsequently his opposition to the presence of Christian troops on Saudi soil, which was necessitated by the invasion of Kuwait by the Iraqi army in 1991 and left the Saudi regime vulnerable to invading the Iraqi army. To prevent the possibility of a Saudi invasion, more than half a million international coalition soldiers, mainly Americans, were stationed in Saudi territory (Migaux 2007). Two of Islam's three holiest sites are situated in Saudi—Mecca and Medina—the third being Jerusalem, which has been occupied by Israel since 1967. This development was unbearable for bin Laden, who viewed it as a humiliation for all Muslims; the land of the prophet defiled by infidels. For bin Laden and other Muslim nationalists such as him, the mere presence of Americans presented a twofold act of aggression: the occupation of Saudi Arabia by infidel soldiers was seen as evidence of America's desire to plunder the country's wealth under the pretext of protecting it. America, having thus humiliated all Muslims, became their principal enemy and was also deemed responsible for the present state of apostasy of Saudi authorities. This formed the thrust of bin Laden's grouse, which was later given religious colouration.

Women in al-Qaeda do play several roles, but many of them are 'invisible' to the public but greatly assist the organisation in encouraging and supporting al-Qaeda's next generation of terrorists. The leadership of al-Qaeda has embraced women as essential to play the roles of supporters, facilitators, and promoters in carrying out jihad (von Knop 2006). They are allowed to act as recruiters and ideological supporters, and through this role, they are responsible for raising and inducting new members with the ideology of the group. To this end, an online periodical – al Khansaa – is published by the Women's Information Bureau with the sole aim of motivating women to participate in jihad by bringing up their children to be good jihadis and by being supportive of their husbands, brothers, and sons. The magazine indoctrinates that the goal of women is also to become a shahid (Muslim martyr) (von Knop 2006). Another online publication by the women – Al-Shamihka – means 'Majestic Woman' to serve similar purposes by urging and encouraging women who have lost their husbands, brothers, or sons to seek revenge, which has become a common motivation for female participation in such organisations.

The participation of women in online discussions and forums portrays them as playing the strong role of recruiters, and they often support their husbands, brothers, and extended male relatives, helping them cope with and endure the hardship associated with the difficulties of training, terrain, and harsh conditions. There is no particular age preference for women, as some are between 14 and 40 years of age. The expansive nature of al-Qaeda helps increase its scope and recruitment pool, and women's involvement varies depending on the affiliate they are with and the focus of the organisation.

### **Case-Studies Analysis III – ISIS**

While the PLO may be credited with the internationalisation of terrorism, at least the ethnonational political dimension of it, Al Qaeda would be credited with internationalising the religious dimension. Of course, this is not to argue that there were no instances of religious terrorism before the emergence of Al Qaeda but that religious terrorism now has a reference point in Al Qaeda. Al-Qaeda has now metamorphosed into many cells, including Iraq (AQI), which has now turned into ISI (the Islamic State of Iraq), and with the formation of the new Caliphate, it has turned into ISIS (the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria).

The new Caliphate is crucial to ISIS, and it is envisioned to be a unified, transnational government ruling over the entire Muslim community (the ummah). The conflict to install and establish this Caliphate will not end until all habitable land is conquered for Allah; hence, a single, global, Islamic state, also known as the Caliphate, is formed (Khadduri 2010). Hence, the Caliphate is the highest type of political organisation on earth, and its subjects derive their highest welfare through absolute obedience to its ordinances, as given by Allah, the lawgiver; there is no place for a legislator, and all human governments exist only to enforce Allah's law. The age-long contestation that has divided Muslims into two bodies—the Shi'as and the Sunnis—creates a problem as to where the Caliph will come from (Agara & Imonie 2015). The dates back to the lack of explicit guidelines on how to determine the successor to Muhammed, and this has been the source of a long-standing, bloody feud between the Sunnis and the Shi'as. While the Shi believe that the successor, the caliph, must be from the bloodline of the prophet, the Sunnis maintain that any believer may qualify for the office of the caliph regardless of his lineage.

To date, ISIS has emerged not only as the most ruthless of all the Sunni jihadist organisations in Syria and Iraq but also as the most successful. Its ruthlessness in carrying out its jihadist mandate has caused several terrorist organisations to distance themselves from it, while some have even had to resist them violently (Sly 2013, Oddon 2014, and Knickmeyer 2014). Not alone are they ruthless, but they possess sufficient assets to support a standing military force; they are no longer a terrorist gang but a terrorist army possessing greater striking power than al-Qaeda and every other terrorist force in the Middle East. As Sekulow et al. (2014) noted,

This terrorist army is proving to be irresistibly attractive to a subset of British and American Muslim men [and women], with hundreds (if not thousands) flocking to the black flag of jihad. By some estimates, up to three hundred Americans currently fight for ISIS, all of them now enemy combatants against their own country. Britain faces an even worse crisis, with more Muslim young men volunteering to fight for ISIS than volunteering to serve in their own country's armed forces.

In fulfilling its eschatological mandate, ISIS also utilises and relies on women as sympathisers to provide basic logistic support, including money, time, domestic chores such as sewing, cooking, providing a haven and hideouts, sex, and other duties that may be deemed necessary for the cause and their mujahedeen. They also act as spies to espie out probable targets and undertake missions such as running messages and as HUMIT to gather intelligence or as decoys to distract attention from their men during operations. It is more likely to suspect a single man than one who is accompanied by a woman posing as his wife or sister. The roles played by women in ISIS are crucial and critical to the ability of any terrorist organisation to function well and effectively. Women, as female warriors and dominant forces, operate more significantly and are more active when trained to handle weapons, make bombs, and execute terrorist agendas and acts. ISIS is especially dangerous because it has both the means and the will to carry out its assignments. To date, it is the richest terrorist force in the world.

### **Case-Studies Analysis IV – Boko Haram**

Boko Haram belongs to one of the many sects of Islam, and it is based largely on the northeastern part of Nigeria. The group emerged as an arm of the Sahabab group in 1995, and

its leader was then Abubakar Lawan, who later left the group for the University of Medina for further study. The leadership of the group later conceded to Muhammad Yusuf, who, immediately upon taking up the mantle of leadership, changed the doctrine of the sect and came up with the appellation 'Boko Haram'. At the initial stage, the sect. was limited to Borno, Yobe, Katsina, Kaduna, Bauchi, Gombe, and Kano states but is now known to have members and sympathisers in virtually all of the other northern and middle belt states of Nigeria.

The name 'Boko Haram' was not originally used by the group. It is known as the 'Yusufuya sect', whereas others called it Jamaatul Takfir Wal Hyra Ahlus Sunna, Khawaarji or even Jamaatu Alhli sunnah Lidda'awatiwal Jihad. This last name is the approved group (Sanni, 2011). Yusuf was professed to have been mentored by Sheik Jafar Mohammed, with whom he fell out on the basis of his militant doctrines and later declared his mentor an apostate, a death penalty in Islamic terms, and the Sheik was subsequently shot dead on the eve of the 2007 election while leading the dawn prayer in his mosque at Kano. Although Yusuf himself had been reported as describing his movement as a nonmilitant group of youths who are bent on upholding the words of Allah, he nevertheless did state that they would rather die than succumb to the present corrupt system in the country.

The popular name of the group projects its doctrines, aims, and objectives, the ideological polemics of the group itself. 'Boko' is a Hausa term popularly used for Western education or learning (a book). It is a derivative of the Hausa 'Boka' (meaning 'sorcerer'). 'Haram' is Arabic for everything deemed taboo, and so combined, 'Boko Haram' actually translates to meaning that Western education (and of course, everything connected to it, including the civilisation it fosters) is taboo. This essentially captures the basic doctrinal and ideological stand of the group.

As Sanni (2011) has noted, the group emanated from an orthodox teaching slightly resembling those of the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan and later accepted the ideology of Al Qaeda, which shaped their doctrine of acceptance of everything Western as an aberration or as un-Islamic. Their belief systems hold that banking, taxation, and jurisprudence, the entire framework on which the modern state structure is built, are completely deemed infidel. The mixing of boys and girls under the same shade and the theory of evolution are all harmful, so the system that allows this mixing must be destroyed and annihilated. Boko Haram, in selecting its target, has focused on the broad target priorities of Al Qaeda, which are American and Israeli Jews first, British Jews and then French Jews, and so on. The unifying factor here is that they are Western and Christian. As Hoffman (2008) elaborated, in order of importance, the primary targets of Al Qaeda, which Boko Haram had adopted equally, are as follows:

Americans, British, Spanish, Australians, Canadians, Italians. Within these categories, there are further distinctions: businessmen, bankers and economists because money is very important in this age; followed by diplomats, politicians, scholars, analysts and diplomatic missions, scientists, associates and experts, military commanders and soldiers; and finally, tourists and entertainment missions and anyone who was warned by the mujahideen not to step in the lands of Moslem.

As part of their activities were the targeting of Christian students' worshippers at Bayero University (Kano State), the bombings of two churches in Jos, and the warning by Boko Haram that all southerners and Christians should leave north. This is domesticating the broad strategy

of Al Qaeda, as quoted above. The obligations of jihad are to wage, both defensive and offensive wars, against those termed infidels (non-Muslims and even northerners), the Nigerian state, and apostates (those leaders that have been deemed compromising and not following the true teaching of Islam); hence, fellow Muslims are not exempted. According to Islamic laws, it is lawful and legitimate for the Muslim faithful to wage war anywhere and everywhere against four types of enemies: infidels, apostates, rebels, and bandits. Of these four, only the first two count as a religious obligation for all Muslims, hence a jihad. An infidel is an unbeliever in the Islamic faith who can be converted either through peaceful means or through war and conquest. An apostate is a former believer who has either left the faith or renounced it for other religious beliefs.

Like other terrorist organisations, Boko Haram has involved women in its repertoire of activities, particularly as suicide bombers. Most likely, because they were not making headway with propaganda and other means of recruiting females into their fold, another means they have perfected is kidnapping. Generally, the act of kidnapping is motivated by certain reasons, chief among which are money or some form of economic gain. However, Zannoni (2003) proposed a distinction between kidnapping as a criminal act (with economic motivation) and as politically induced (with political motivation). A third distinction, which cuts across both criminal and political aspects of kidnapping, concerns religious reasons, as exemplified by the Boko Haram terrorists. Nwanunobi (2017), on the other hand, has attempted to classify this act according to the purpose for which it is perpetrated. For example, he sees kidnapping for ransom (commonly reported by the media) in Nigeria as more prevalent in the South East and South-South (Niger Delta), kidnapping for ritual (religious) purposes (uncommonly reported) as more prominent in the Southwest and North Central regions, and abduction (mostly unreported) as more prominent in the Northeast and Northwest regions. Thus, whether it is viewed as politically, religiously, or economically motivated, kidnapping has become a business in which all are involved and has closed the divide between organised crime and terrorism (Abadinsky, 2010).

Boko Haram kidnapped for all three reasons: to score some political goals, for money (ransom) for weapons, and, of course, for religious purposes, to add to the number of memberships. However, it is notoriety, as kidnappers started in February 2013, with the abduction of a seven-member French family in northern Cameroon, which included four children (The Guardian, 19 April 2013). However, between February 2013 and May 2013, this kidnapping strategy started with the abductions of more than a dozen government officials and their families in Borno State. In May 2013, Boko Haram carried out a mass assault on police barracks in Bama, Borno State, in which 12 Christian women and children were abducted (Agence France-Presse, 13 May 2013).

Boko Haram achieved the interjection between criminal and religious/terrorist organisations' acts of kidnapping people for money in Nigeria, with two prominent incidents. On Wednesday, April 16, 2014, more than 100 innocent Nigerian school girls from the Government Girls Secondary School in Borno State were reported to have been kidnapped by Boko Haram. The students were abducted from their school located at Chibok Local Government of Borno State while preparing to write the Senior Secondary School Certificate examinations (SSCE) at approximately 9 pm (Vanguard Newspaper, Wed. April 16, 2014). The actual number of girls abducted became controversial, with the Vanguard Newspaper quoting Major General Chris Olukolade as reporting that only eight girls were missing and that 14 of the abducted girls

escaped. The Vanguard Newspaper later reported that the military had admitted the error in the numbers and collaborated with the school's principal's report that approximately 129 students were abducted, of whom only 14 were able to escape (See Vanguard Newspaper, Friday, April 18, 2014). The actual identity of the girls abducted also generated hues and cries, but this was laid out to rest when the Northern Christian Forum released approximately 180 names of some of the girls, many of whom are Christians while asking for N50 million compensation for each of them (Guardian, Monday, May 5).

For criminal organisations, greed and enrichment could be sufficient reasons for their involvement in kidnapping. However, for Boko Haram involvement, we need to look deeper, particularly into the doctrinal basis and justification provided by Islam, because this provides them with the necessary justification to continue such acts of kidnapping. Religious grounds and precepts have also provided perpetrators with grounds and a basis to justify violence against humanity. In this respect, virtually all religions are guilty only that some are guiltier than others (Agara, 2012). For example, history is replete with the barbaric killings, pillage, and destruction of human beings and property caused by Crusaders in the name of Christianity (Lewis, 1984). Today, Islam has taken over the use of the Qur'an and the Hadith as a basis to perpetuate the mass destruction of innocent victims in the name of jihad. It is in this respect that religion, especially Islam, has become and used as a means rather than an end in itself, thereby making religion ideological.

In terms of justificatory significance and importance, according to the Muslim tradition, the world is divided into two houses: the House of War (Dar al-Harb) and the House of Islam (Dar al-Islam). The abduction of the Chibok girls is justified under Dar-al-Harb, which accepts that they are to be regarded as 'spoils of war' and as slaves. It is on this basis that the reference to girls as spoils of war and as slaves in the video shown on social media found justification. The Qur'anic acceptance of slavery parallels that of the Old and New Testaments of the Christian Bible, but it also prescribed a just and humane treatment of slaves. In addition to being treated well, fed and clothed, and not punished severely, the Qur'an also urges owners whose slaves ask for their freedom to allow them to buy it (Segal, 2001, p. 35; Esposito, 1988, p. 45). Women slaves serve as concubines, and in Muslim societies, their sexual services are not considered degrading. Of equal importance is the kidnapping of women to provide a ready source of females for coercive sexual relations and sex economies under duress. While it is possible to conceive of young men joining criminal organisations because of the lure of money and the easy good life it offers, the lure to join terrorist groups such as Boko Haram can only be due to an affinity of the group's ideological underpinnings and what this stand for or implied.

As Zoe (2014) noted, it is incredibly difficult to keep these virile young men living a life of violence and insecurity perpetually in the bush without access to sex, women, and the social trappings of manhood. In consonance with Muslim belief and culture, a sexually frustrated person is dangerous to the community; hence, Islam vehemently abhors sexual abstinence and expects that every man and woman, unless physically or financially incapable, should marry and be sexually active. As such, kidnapping women fulfil this crucial military, social, and religious role. They are necessary to keep the men fully motivated, and if the only way to acquire them is by kidnapping, then so be it.

Maiangwa and Agbibo (2014) reported that this tendency is not peculiar nor is it exclusive to Boko Haram alone. For example, as they have shown, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) has

been known to kidnap and abduct 'wives' for its commanders in raids that have spanned well over three decades. In the example of Sierra Leone, particularly during the years of protracted conflicts (1991--2001), 'Operation Fine Girl' was a regular occurrence during which young girls and women were regularly kidnapped and abducted, forced into sexual service or marriage with members and commanders. Thus, for terrorists, sexual violence becomes a weapon against the government and the civilian populace, both to instil fear and a sense of insecurity and to demonstrate its power and impunity (Witness 2001).

To avoid sexual violence and the horror of being repeatedly raped by whosoever desires sex, following witness reports, many of the girls have learned to opt for the sexual property of specific males—a phenomenon that is commonly known as 'bush marriages' or 'AK-47 marriages' (Maiangwa & Agbiboa 2014, Denoy & Maclure 2006). This succinctly paints the picture of why Boko Haram deliberately looks out for girls to kidnap and what the captured girls have to go through to survive the ordeal of being captives and 'slaves' Therefore, the greater the number of male members, the greater the urgent need to find and provide sexual outlets for them. Hence, kidnapping and abductions of females and women may persist indefinitely.

The abduction and kidnapping of the Chibok girls were further justified by the Al-Shabaab terrorist group, which had been linked to the training of Boko Haram militants because of what they perceived as the Nigerian government's abuses against Muslims. Since the group's stand against Western education is well orchestrated, educating women is seen as the ultimate slap in their collective faces. Hence, in a perverse logic, the girls were seen as being rescued from the Nigerian state's injustices of subjecting them to Western education. On one of its Facebook handles (Al-Andalus), the Al-Shabaab group has equally asked its followers and sympathisers to comment on the fate of the abducted girls, whether (1) they should be released unconditionally, (2) they should be given freedom for a ransom, or (3) they should be given to jihadists so that 200 more boys can be born to join the mujahideen (Thomas and Ahmed 2014). Ironically, all three options are well endowed by and permissible under Sharia law and the Hadith if the girls are labelled unbelievers or infidels.

It is instructive to note that Brown's work delves into the intersection of gender and agency in terrorism, arguing that women's involvement is not merely coerced but can also reflect a sense of agency within the framework of extremist ideology. In her recent book, *Gender, Religion, Extremism* (2020), Brown discussed how terrorist groups create distinct narratives for male and female recruits. She highlights that women are often positioned as guardians of the domestic sphere, yet they are empowered through roles such as fighters, recruiters, and propagandists. This duality illustrates how these groups leverage gendered identities to further their objectives.

Similarly, Bloom's research has also explored the roles of women in terrorism, particularly in the context of how terrorist organizations utilize gendered propaganda. For instance, ISIS has been known to craft messages targeting women as the "mothers of the future caliphate" while presenting men as protectors of the Islamic state. This strategic division of labour not only reinforces traditional gender roles but also sustains the operational capacity of these groups.

Overall, recent studies indicate that terrorist organizations are increasingly adept at using gendered narratives and propaganda online to appeal to diverse demographics, creating a complex interplay between gender and recruitment in contemporary terrorism. By analysing

these dynamics, researchers provide a deeper understanding of how gender influences participation in and the perpetuation of terrorist ideologies.

**Implications for GWOT (Global War on Terrorism) and Conclusion**

In conclusion, women play a variety of roles, sometimes even more than men do, in terrorist organisations. Men feature mainly as combatants, leaders, and planners, whereas women, because of their natural advantage over men, feature many other roles than men. Women's roles can be categorised into four broad categories (Mahan & Griset 2008). A brief description of each category is presented below.

<b>SYMPATHISERS</b>	<b>SPIES</b>
Basic Logistics Support	Running Messages
Money	Gathering Intelligence
Time	Serving as Decoys
Food	
Safe Haven	
Sex with Male Terrorist	
<b>WARRIORS</b>	<b>DOMINANT FORCES</b>
Execute Terrorist Acts	Play a Prominent Role
Weapons	Leadership
Bomb Making	Establish Policy
Execute Terrorist Events	

The implication of this finding is a long way in devising effective counterterrorism strategies and policies that will be relevant to solving the new threat posed by women's involvement. We conclude that there is a great possibility that Boko Haram may be abducting girls and women to use as future recruiters or suicide bombers. In particular, they are called 'sleepers' who can be 'awakened' later in the future for certain jobs, such as suicide bombing or targeted assassination. The Russian KGB had many such 'sleepers' deliberately planted in America as American children and families during the heydays of the Cold War. This submission has been vindicated by recent news reports from dailies (June 4, 2014), which have shown pictures of two women who were arrested for recruiting for Boko Haram. Other reports are indicative of this possibility. For example, since 2013, with a change in tactics by the civilian joint task force (JTF), male supporters of Boko Haram have become uniquely vulnerable to detention and abuse. The vulnerability of male supporters to arrest and detention has also initiated a similar change and responsive shift in Boko Haram tactics. For obvious reasons, women are now being used as 'mules' by Boko Haram.

Many instances of this have been captured and documented. In June 2013, an AK-47, a pistol, and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) were found with two 'shivering' veiled women in Maiduguri (Vanguard News, 30 June 2013). Two months later, two women hiding rifles in their clothing were among five suspected Boko Haram militants who were arrested by the security forces (The Guardian Nigeria, August 2013). Additionally, in August 2013, a woman was detained alongside a 35-year-old male Boko Haram suspect (Vanguard News, 17 August 2013). Additionally, male Boko Haram members have reportedly disguised themselves as women in veils to evade arrest. In one case, in July 2013, three men dressed as veiled women were killed, and approximately twenty others arrested in an attempted attack on a police station (Daily Trust, 6 July 2013).

This adaptive response to the use of women as instruments is not exclusive to Boko Haram but rather shows that they have been properly trained in the worldwide strategy of religious terrorism. In Iraq, for example, women were similarly deployed to smuggle arms and execute suicide bombings during a clamp-down on Al-Qaeda in the mid-2000s (Sjoberg & Gentry 2011, Bloom 2011). This instrumental use of women is to exploit and capitalise on women's superior ability to evade security checks, cache weapons in clothing, and attract less suspicion as suicide bombers. This tactical use of women has a historical antecedent, as evidenced by liberation campaigns such as the Algerian resistance against the French, in which women were initially ordered to smuggle weapons (Minne & Clarke, 2007, Horne, 2002). It is also reminiscent of the behaviour of rebel movements in conflict zones in other parts of Sub-Saharan Africa, in which women are tactically exploited. Civil conflicts in Mozambique, Sierra Leone, and Rwanda include gender-based violence (GBV) in abduction, sexual violence that forces marriage, and the conscription of enemy women into insurgent groups (Mazurana & McKay, 2003, Turshen, 2001; Coulter et al., 2008).

If the abduction of women by Boko Haram is tactical, other violence against Christian women appears primarily punitive. In Maiduguri, in August 2013, a Christian student reported an attack by Boko Haram on her university accommodation: the men were murdered, the women segregated into Muslim and non-Muslims, and the Christian women were systematically raped (Barkindo et al 2013). Such attacks on Christian women by Boko Haram can be regarded as an extension of other institutionalised and long-term discriminatory practices against them in northern regions (Onapajo & Uzodike, 2012). Women have faced broad discriminatory practices in both the professional and domestic spheres. They have been targeted in acid attacks for 'un-Islamic' practices, such as a failure to wear the hijab, or for taking a job (Turaki 2010). Women are also often accused of 'dishonouring Islam'. In 2006, riots ensued in which more than 50 Christians were killed, mostly women and children, after a Christian female teacher confiscated a Qur'an from a student in Bauchi (Alao 2009). This generic culture of discrimination against Christians has enabled the escalation of recent violence.

## References

- Abadinsky, H. (2010). *Organised crime* (9th ed.). Belmont, Wadsworth.
- Adams, J. S. (1965). Injustice in social exchange. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), *Advances in experimental social psychology* (2nd ed., pp. 267–299). New York, Academic Press.

- Agara, T. (2012). Expanding the universe of violence: A discourse on the linkage between religion and terrorism. *International Sociological Association (ISA) Newsletter*, Issues #8 and #9.
- Agara, T., & Ogwola, I. R. (2014). Of zealots, extremists and fundamentalists: Religious opposition to modern state system. *African Journal of Management, Social Sciences and Humanities*, 2(1).
- Agara, T., & Imonie, E. G. (2015). Understanding the root of sectarian differences in Islam and intra-religious terrorism: The Sunnis, Shi'as and Wahhabis. *Canadian International Journal of Social Science and Education*, 3.
- Agara, T. (2022). An examination of the early Arab-Israeli wars: Lessons in tactics and strategies. *FUWUKARI Journal of Politics and Development*, 6(1).
- Alderfer, C. P. (1972). *Existence, relatedness and growth: Human needs in organisational settings*. New York, Free Press.
- Alao, A. (2009). Islamic radicalization and violence in Nigeria: A country report. *Security and Development*.  
<http://www.securityanddevelopment.org/pdf/ESRC%20Nigeria%20Overview.pdf>
- Barkindo, A., Gudaku, B. T., & Wesley, C. K. (2013). Boko Haram and gender-based violence against Christian women and children in north-eastern Nigeria since 1999. *NPVRN Working Paper No. 1*. Amsterdam: Open Doors International.
- Bloom, M. (2011). *Bombshell: Women and terrorism*. Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Bloom, M., & Lokmanoglu, A. (2020). From pawn to knights: The changing role of women's agency in terrorism? *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*.  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2020.1759263>
- Brown, K. (2016). Gender and countering Islamic State radicalisation. *E-International Relations*.  
<http://www.e-ir.info/2016/02/18/gender-and-countering-islamic-state-radicalisation/>
- Brown, K. (2020). *Gender, religion, extremism: Finding women in anti-radicalization*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Cole, G. A. (2002). *Personnel and human resource management* (5th ed.). London, BookPower/ELST.
- Combs, C. C. (2011). *Terrorism in the twenty-first century* (6th ed.). Boston, Pearson Education Inc.
- Coulter, C., Persson, M., & Utas, M. (2008). *Young female fighters in African wars: Conflict and its consequences*. Stockholm, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet.

- Crenshaw, M. (2004). The psychology of political terrorism. In J. Jost & J. Sidanius (Eds.), *Political psychology* (pp. 379–414). New York, Psychology Press.
- Daft, R. L. (1997). *Management* (4th ed.). Dryden Press, Fort Worth, Texas.
- Denov, M., & Maclure, R. (2006). Engaging the voices of girls in the aftermath of Sierra Leone's conflict: Experiences and perspectives in a culture of violence. *Anthropological Quarterly*, 48(1), 19–42.
- Drucker, P. (1974). *Management: Tasks, responsibilities, practices*. New York, Harper and Row.
- Dupuy, P. (2004). State sponsors of terrorism: Issues of responsibility. In A. Bianchi (Ed.), *Enforcing international law norms against terrorism* (pp. 203–225). Portland, Hart.
- Herzberg, F., Mausner, B., & Synderman, B. B. (1959). *The motivation to work* (2nd ed.). New York, Viking Press.
- Hoffman, B. (2006). *Inside terrorism* (2nd ed.). New York, Columbia University Press.
- Hoffman, B. (2008). The changing face of Al Qaeda and the global war on terrorism. In T. J. Badey (Ed.), *Violence and terrorism 07/08* (pp. 21–32). Dubuque, McGraw Hill.
- Horne, A. (2002). *A savage war of peace: Algeria 1954–1962* (Reprint of 1977 original). London, Pan Macmillan.
- Jenkins, B. M. (1980). The study of terrorism: Definitional problems. Santa Monica, CA, RAND Corporation.
- Juergensmeyer, M. (2004). Holy orders: Religious opposition to modern states. *Harvard International Review*, Winter, 34–38.
- Kegley, C. W. Jr., & Wittkopf, E. R. (1999). *World politics: Trend and transformation* (7th ed.). St. Martins, Worth Publishers.
- Khadduri, M. (2010). *War and peace in the law of Islam*. Clark, NJ, Lawbook Exchange.
- Kittrie, N. N. (1981). Patriots and terrorists: Reconciling human rights with world order. *Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law*, 13(2), 199–234.
- Knickmeyer, E. (2014, February 3). Al-Qaeda 'disavows' Syrian terror group for being too terroristy. *Wall Street Journal*.
- Lewis, B. (1984). *The Jews of Islam*. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press.
- Lutz, J. M., & Lutz, B. J. (2008). *Global terrorism* (2nd ed.). London, Routledge.
- Mahan, S., & Griset, P. L. (2008). *Terrorism in perspective*. Thousand Oaks, Sage Publications.

- Maiangwa, B., & Agbiboa, D. (2014). Why Boko Haram kidnaps women and young girls in north-eastern Nigeria. *Conflict Trends*.  
<https://www.researchgate.net/publication/266798115>
- Maslow, A. H. (1943). A theory of human motivation. *Psychological Review*, 50(4), 370–396.
- Mazurana, D., & McKay, S. (2003). Girls in fighting forces in Northern Uganda, Sierra Leone, and Mozambique: Policy and program recommendations. *International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development*. University of Wyoming and the University of Montana.
- McClelland, D. C. (1975). *Power: The inner experience*. New York, Irvington Publishers.
- Mietz, E. (2016). What about the women? Understanding and addressing the problem of ISIS female recruitment in the Western Balkans. Belgrado, Belgrade Centre for Security Policy.
- Migaux, P. (2007). Al Qaeda. In G. Chaliand & A. Blin (Eds.), *The history of terrorism: From antiquity to Al Qaeda* (pp. 335–387). Berkeley, University of California Press.
- Minne, D. D. A., & Clarke, A. (Trans.). (2007). Women at war. *Interventions: International Journal of Postcolonial Studies*, 9(3), 339–361.
- Mitchell, T. R. (1982). Motivation: New directions for theory, research, and practice. *Academy of Management Review*, 7(1), 80–88.
- Nacos, B. (2005). The portrayal of female terrorists in the media: Similar framing patterns in the news coverage of women in politics and in terrorism. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 28(5), 435–451.
- Nicholson, M. E. (2003). An essay on terrorism. *American Diplomacy*, 8(3).
- Nwanunobi, T. (2017, February 21). Kidnapping: Unemployment, poverty top reasons for rise. *Sundiatapost*. Retrieved from <http://sundiatapost.com/2017/02/21/kidnapping-unemployment-poverty-top-reasons-for-rise>
- Oddon, E. (2014, July 7). Jordanian jihadist leader condemns ISIS caliphate. *Al Monitor*.
- Onapajo, H., & Uzodike, U. O. (2012). Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria. *African Security Review*, 21(3), 24–39.
- Porter, L. W. (1964). *Organisational patterns of managerial job attitudes*. New York, American Foundation for Management Research.
- Rapoport, D. (2001). The fourth wave: September 11 in the history of terrorism. *Current History*, 100(650), 419–424.
- Rourke, J. T. (2008). *International politics on the world stage* (12th ed.). Boston, McGraw Hill.

- Saltman, E., & Smith, M. (2015). Till martyr do us part: Gender and the ISIS phenomenon. [https://www.isdglobal.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/02/Till\\_Martyrdom\\_Do\\_Us\\_Part\\_Gender\\_and-the\\_ISIS-Phenomenon.pdf](https://www.isdglobal.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/02/Till_Martyrdom_Do_Us_Part_Gender_and-the_ISIS-Phenomenon.pdf)
- Sanmartin, J. (2004). *El terrorista: Como es, como se hace*. Barcelona, Ariel.
- Sanni, S. (2011). Boko Haram: History, ideas and revolt. *The Constitution*, 11(4), 39–52.
- Schmid, A. P., & Jongman, A. J. (2005). *Political terrorism: A new guide to actors, authors, concepts, data bases, theories and literature*. New Brunswick, NJ, Transaction Publishers.
- Sekulow, J., Sekulow, J., Ash, R. W., & French, D. (2014). *Rise of ISIS: A threat we can't ignore*. New York, Howard Books.
- Schweitzer, Y. (2008). Palestinian female suicide bombers: Virtuous heroines or damaged goods? In C. D. Ness (Ed.), *Female terrorism and militancy: Agency, utility, and organisation* (pp. 131–151). London, Routledge.
- Shimko, K. L. (2008). *International relations: Perspectives and controversies* (2nd ed.). Boston, MA, Houghton Mifflin Co.
- Sinai, J. (2010/2011). How to define terrorism. In T. Badey (Ed.), *Violence and terrorism 10/11* (12th ed., pp. 18–22). Boston, McGraw Hill Higher Education.
- Sjoberg, L., & Gentry, C. (2011). Introduction. In L. Sjoberg & C. E. Gentry (Eds.), *Women, gender, and terrorism* (pp. 1–16). Georgia, University of Georgia Press.
- Sly, L. (2013, February 3). Al-Qaeda disavows any ties with radical Islamist ISIS group in Syria, Iraq. *Washington Post*.
- Thomas, T. C., & Ahmed, F. (2014, May 16). Al-Shabaab support for Boko Haram reflects the group's own sordid past with children. *Sabahi*. [http://sabahionline.com/en\\_GB/articles/hoa/articles/features/2014/05/16/feature-01](http://sabahionline.com/en_GB/articles/hoa/articles/features/2014/05/16/feature-01)
- Turaki, Y. (2010). *Tainted legacy: Islam, colonialism, and slavery in Northern Nigeria*. McLean, VA.
- Turshen, M. (2001). The political economy of rape: An analysis of systematic rape and sexual abuse of women during armed conflict in Africa. In C. Moser & F. Clarke (Eds.), *Victors, perpetrators or actors: Gender, armed conflict and political violence* (pp. 55–68). London, Zed Books.
- Von Knop, K. (2007). The female jihad: Al-Qaeda's women. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 30(5), 397–414.
- Vroom, V. H. (1964). *Work and motivation*. New York, John Wiley and Sons.

Weatherston, D., & Moran, J. (2003). Terrorism and mental illness: Is there a relationship? *International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology*, 47(6), 698–713.

Witness. (2001). *Operation Fine Girl: Rape used as a weapon of war in Sierra Leone*.  
<http://hub.witness.org/en/OperationFineGirl>