

WE KNOW WHERE OUR PROBLEM LIES: EXAMINING THE ENDSARS PROTEST AND NIGERIA'S INTERNAL SECURITY CHALLENGES

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ABSTRACT: This paper examines the EndSARS protest and the internal security challenges in Nigeria. The paper sought to determine the implications of the EndSARS protest on the internal security challenges in Nigeria. The study integrated a historical research design with a systematic literature review thus; secondary data was mostly used in the study. An attempt was made to identify the fundamental cause and catalyst of insecurity in Nigeria which has earned Nigeria the ignoble title of the third most terrorized country in the world. Using the five demands of the EndSARS protesters, the study critically analyzes Nigeria's internal security challenges in terms of their origin, antecedents, consequence, or probable solutions. The study concludes by urging government attention to these demands and an urgent review of the country's security policy and institution and rejig of the security infrastructure.

Keywords: EndSARS, Internal Security, Police brutality, Protest, Nigeria Police Force

INTRODUCTION

Security sits at the heart of politics and governance of nations and states. There is scarcely any political party or a politician running for political office that does not mouth security as one of their campaign agenda and include it in his party manifesto. Using Nigeria as a case study, the current central government – President Muhammadu Buhari and his All Progressive Congress (APC) party – campaigned vigorously on the back of the rising insecurity in the country largely caused by the incessant attacks of the Boko Haram terrorist group. The reasons for this are not far-fetched: the state exists to enhance the welfare and wellbeing of its citizenry and this cannot be achieved in the absence of law and order (Egbefo & Salihu, 2014). Despite a significant proportion of the nation's annual budget being allocated to security and the government's purported commitment to taming insecurity, it yet continues unabated judging from Nigeria's position on the Global Peace Ranking and Global Terrorism Index for the past five years. Nigeria ranks 147 out of 167 countries on the 2020 Global Peace Index and 3 out of 167 countries on the 2020 Global Terrorism Index. While terrorism-related deaths have declined by 39.1 % between 2015-2019 other forms of crimes such as banditry, smuggling, and kidnapping have ensured Nigeria has moved a meagre 4 places up the Global Peace Ranking between that time. This has thus given internal security centre stage in discussions bordering on Nigeria's nationhood and economic prosperity. However, while the term is often used loosely in everyday conversation to mean the absence of crime/crisis or protection of lives and property, it has taken a wider scope in policy and intelligence discussions in the politico-economic sphere. Ani and Onyebukwa (2016) commented that as nation-states became more interdependent for their survival and growth, the concept of security began taking on new meanings and wider scopes and perspectives.

Thus, while security can simply refer to not being faced with any threats or danger, the list of what constitutes threats or danger has been growing in recent times. Changing and extreme weather conditions have led to food insecurity as do the seemingly unending farmers' and herders' clashes, the COVID19 pandemic was a health-security risk and its impact which led to mass job losses and business downturn poses an economic risk. All these are internal security issues Nigeria is faced with. One recent remarkable event that probed the architecture and modus operandi of internal security in Nigeria is the EndSARS protest.

The EndSARS movement was a mass protest largely made up of Nigerian youth demanding the disbandment of the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS) unit of the Nigeria Police Force (NPF) and an urgent reform of policing in Nigeria. SARS was a special unit of the NPF charged with the responsibility of taming the beasts of armed robberies and kidnappings for ransom which was on the rise as it appeared lucrative with low risk in 1992 when the unit was established (Malumfashi, 2020). Other high-profile crimes such as vehicle theft and illegal possession of firearms were later added and in 2018, tackling cybercrime was added within their purview (Ogbonnaya, 2020). The protest began on October 5, 2020, in response to the extrajudicial killing of a man in Ughelli by operatives of the SARS unit. In just five days, the protest had spread across major cities nationwide, and Nigerians in diaspora and celebrities offered up their voices in solidarity. In Nigeria, virtually all military and paramilitary forces are allegedly known for human rights abuses, extortion, torture, and illegal detention. And while the Nigerian Police Force is notable for these, the SARS unit is more notorious for these; it would seem that the SARS unit embodies and captures everything that is wrong with the police force and while they are at it, they do so more intensely and with a greater degree of reckless abandon. Since Nigeria's return to democratic rule in 1999, the EndSARS protest made history as one of the largest demonstrations in the country as a significantly large number of youths partook in it (Ayandele, 2021). Ogbonnaya (2020) believed that the protest emanated from "pent-up frustrations following years of human rights violations, extortion, torture, brutality, and extra-judicial killings by SARS operatives and the police in general". However, it is also believed that it constitutes the distrust Nigerians feel or are beginning to feel in the state's ability and willingness to protect them and safeguard their fundamental human rights (Verjee & Kwaja, 2020).

While the extrajudicial killing of the young man in Ughelli on October 5 by SARS operative might have been the protest's trigger releasing the suppressed anger of many youths over intimidation and prejudiced profiling, analysts believe that some series of events during or caused by the COVID19 pandemic might have built up the momentum. For instance, National Human Rights Commission reported that 18 people were killed by security operatives trying to enforce the lockdown in its first two weeks and an additional 105 complaints of human rights abuses were received ("Nigerian security forces kill 18 during curfew enforcement", 2020). Seven of those deaths were by operatives of the Nigerian Police Force and SARS operatives reportedly killed an additional seven people across three states in Southern Nigeria in late April 2020 (Ogbonnaya, 2020). Worsening economic conditions with little or no prospects for improvement, tertiary institutions closure for over eight months due to lecturers on strike, rise in fuel price and electricity tariffs, gross unemployment and underemployment, and state corruption were all variables that helped further fan the embers of youth anger (Ojewale, 2020). Though the then Inspector-General of Police (IGP), Mohammed Adamu, on October 11, 2020, announced the disbandment of SARS, the protest continued with much vigour and momentum as the youth were determined not to be fooled this time – the government had announced the disbandment of SARS thrice between 2014 –

2017 (Malumfashi, 2020). Also, the government announced the creation of a new Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) unit two days later as a replacement for the disbanded SARS, a move that was met with intense scepticism and criticism. The criticism was well-founded as people felt that the same officials in the disbanded SARS will be drafted into the SWAT squad to continue their brutality with impunity. Thus, in the eyes of many, the government demonstrated no true political will to address the core issues, as a change of name does not translate to a change in the mode of approach or behaviour of the operatives. Eventually, the protest ended with the military incursion that led to the alleged killing of protesters at the Lekki Toll Gate on October 20, 2021, but the protest has some implications for the internal security of Nigeria and this study sets out to explore the same.

The Present Study

Just as age is associated with wisdom, youthfulness is also often associated with a poor sense of judgement or in extreme cases, inanities. This is particularly true of the EndSARS protest whose bulk of actors and participants were youths. The protest was dismissed in many quarters as youthful exuberance and the lack of a central leadership to coordinate the collective behaviour and communicate the grievances and demands of the group led many to assume this assertion. The protest did coincide with the ASUU strike which left many students at home for months. Thus, some felt that young people who were idle and frustrated with the ASUU strike merely deflected their ill feelings to the protest. This further strengthened their belief in the irrationality of the protest and the protesters. More so, high-ranking government officials issued statements criticizing the origin and purpose of the protest. The then Inspector-General of Police and the Northern Governors Forum identified the spread of fake news through social media as the cause of the protest and accused the protesters of wanting a regime change (Ukpong, 2020). Even the president echoed the same thoughts of the protesters wanting to remove him from office in an interview (Tolu-Kolawole, 2021). Thus, many in government did not take the core issues surrounding the protest seriously possibly because they were immune from the injustice being meted out to the masses. Due to the ability of those in power to shape opinion and how we remember history, this paper set out to argue the credibility of the purpose of the protest and the protesters using their five-point demands. This paper argued that the protesters meant well for the country and its internal security and their concerns are veritably reflected in their demands. In the local parlance – pidgin English – a proverb says “*na who wear shoe na him know where he for dey pain am*” meaning try as hard as we can, we can never truly feel the pain as much as the one in the hurtful situation. Consequently, the citizens who were at the receiving end of police brutality had a rich understanding of the antecedents of their plight, and the consequence it holds for the nation’s internal security and this is reflected in their demands.

Hence, while the rationality and legality of the protest were called into question especially after the IGP announced the disbandment of SARS, this paper argues that the actors and participants had a deep understanding of the implications of their actions and demands, particularly regarding the internal security of Nigeria. Thus, this paper seeks to examine the implications the five demands of the EndSARS protesters have for the internal security of Nigeria. The question guiding this research study is as follows: do the EndSARS protesters' demands play a role in addressing the internal security challenges facing Nigeria? In answering this question, this study integrates the historical research design with the systematic literature review research methodology. The study thus uses secondary data in

investigating the above research question; related literature on the EndSARS protest and internal security in Nigeria are reviewed, and interconnected themes are identified and analyzed accordingly.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Nigeria's Internal Security Challenges

The world is changing obviously as does the way security is understood within the intelligence community. Policy analysts and even the common man's fascination with security is not simply because of its relevance, but as described by Peterside (2014), it is an "enduring but elusive quest". Nations are always trying to achieve security and despite their best efforts, there are always some more threats or crises needing to be resolved. Security however is a broad concept with varied contextual meaning and implications – its scopes and varied context are not the purposes of this paper –but in this study, we situate its context within nation-states. Ozoemena, (2009 as cited in Peterside, 2014) defined security within this context as "the sum total of actions and measures, including legislative and operational procedures, adopted to ensure peace, stability and the general wellbeing of a nation and its citizens". It utilizes various architecture and operational measures to guarantee the safety and welfare of the citizenry, groups, businesses, and the state from threats and violent aggression (Ogunleye et al., 2011). This is what is often regarded as "national security". It is understood as the protection of a nation's territorial integrity and sovereignty, resources, citizenry, and the defence of its interests (Afolabi, 2015). A critical and comprehensive look at the above definitions shows why nations always seek security but never seem to find it; it is a necessary condition for nations' peace and prosperity; however, the antecedents of insecurity are not always within the control of the state. National security is further understood in terms of "external security" and "internal security". While internal security refers to preserving law, order, and peace within a nation's territory, external security concerns itself with protecting the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the state – protecting the nation's boundary from foreign invasion. Internal security under the purview of the ministry of interior is usually kept by the police, customs and immigration, and, civil defence corps somewhat peculiar to Nigeria, and the armed forces look after the external security under the ministry of defence. In Nigeria however, the constitution permits the military to get involved in internal security and policing hence we have the military running various operations in the country both in time past and present. National security as much as it involves the military and law enforcement of a state is nonetheless unrestricted to using guns, ammunition, and the force of law to maintain peace and law, ensure prosperity, and preserve a nation's values and founding principle. As Nweke (2011) opined, it spans "how governments govern; how media reports are affected; on whether citizens have food to eat or not; on whether soldiers, policemen, teachers, and civil servants are paid (good) salaries or not". That is, national security borders on the defence of a nation's territory and sovereignty, harmonious coexistence between ethnics and religious groups, confining poverty, unemployment, and inequality to a single digit, building sustainable and strong institutions, upholding the rule of law, and building an effective and fair justice and criminal system.

As paramount as internal security is to a nation's peace and prosperity, Egbefo & Salihu (2014) observed that successive Nigerian governments have paid lip service to it and have no tangible and appealing approach to achieving it. Successive governments have invested much of the machinery of the state in "regime protection and the pursuit of mostly imagined

enemies” rather than promoting the cause of national security and interests (Jega, 2007 as cited in Nweke, 2011) The government is not as serious in preventing crime as they are in punishing or prosecuting criminal – even the state of the nation’s judicial, policing, and the correctional system makes a mockery of the latter. Internal security is worsening in Nigeria, still, the call for state police has not been heeded by the government at the centre. The best they had come up with is “community policing” hence some regions of the country discontent with the growing insecurity, have come up with their regional security outfit to complement the efforts of the largely understaffed police force. For instance, there is the Amotekun in the South-West, Ebube Agu in the South-East, and the governors of the South-Southern states of Nigeria have also announced the plan for a regional security outfit although it is not yet operational. There are other non-state actors in Nigeria dissatisfied with the politico-economic make-up and standing of the country and have formed their ethnic militias and groups to start an agitation or secure their region. Some of these actors formed theirs before respective state governments flagged theirs. For instance, in the north the Arewa People’s Congress (APC) is considered by many the armed wing of the Arewa Consultative Forum (ACF); in the west, there is the Oodua People Congress (OPC); the East had the Bakassi Boys, Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), and more recently the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) and its security outfit – the Eastern Security Network (ESN); and the Niger Delta had the Egbesu Boys, Niger Delta Peoples’ Volunteer Force (NDPVF), and the Movement for Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND). The presence of these ethnic militias is a clear indication of the failure of the government to curtail insecurity and crisis in the country. It is generally said that nature abhors a vacuum so as the government develops cold feet toward providing a framework for sustainable peace and security, these militias sprang up to fill the void and try to succeed where the government has failed. The government’s failure to curb insecurity is not a reflection of their lack of effort or security policy but as Nwagboso (2018) observed, it is an indication of the lack of insight into the intricacies of crime and security threats in a multicultural society like Nigeria and also a show of lack of firm political will to address the underlying causes of these threats. The government has refused to heed calls for restructuring and devolution of powers which many believed will allow us to live apart in unity and ultimately be the cure of incessant clashes rooted in ethnicity. Egbesu and Salihu (2014) argued that Nigeria faces more threats from within its borders than from outside. That was over six years ago at the time of writing but it can be argued and factually so that the statement still holds today as in 2014. We begin an examination of such threats and their sources next.

Sources of Internal Security Challenges in Nigeria

A glance at the daily newspapers in Nigeria can readily tell one of the internal security challenges. There are often stories of terrorist attacks, kidnappings, religious/ethnic clashes, reprisals, armed robberies, smuggling, seized firearms and ammunition, and attacks that resemble ethnic cleansing. While there is a consensus on terrorism being a security challenge amongst scholars and political and security commentators, the other aforementioned challenges have been argued as being a representation and manifestation of the security challenges. That is, what some refer to as Nigeria’s security challenge, others see as the after-effect of the nation’s core security challenges. No matter the side one is on, it is inconceivable to argue the threat they pose to our individual lives and living, and shared values and norms. Ifeoma et al. (2015) believed the proliferation of arms during and after the civil war to be the fount of internal security challenges in Nigeria. These arms got into the hands of ex-servicemen and other civilians and were later used for crimes such as armed

robbery, kidnapping for ransom, and political thuggery. Also, the onset and prevalence of confraternities and secret cults in Nigerian tertiary institutions is a contributing factor; these cults were sometimes armed by the military government and at other times, the school management to fight off the student union government who stood as vocal opposition to military rule and the school oppressive policies at the time. Nweke (2011) argued that military might or policing is not the most decisive factor in securing a state and went on to posit poverty, ethno-religious crisis, perceived economic and resource allocation inequity, political instability, and electoral violence as major sources of internal security challenges in Nigeria. Oshio (2009) corroborated this when he observed that “citizens expect their governments to provide them with political stability and socio-economic security, including employment, healthcare, and shelter, the non-fulfilment of which breeds discontent and social unrest or even serious political challenge”

Poverty has been on the rise since 1980 from 28.1% to 40.1% in 2019; that is a 12% increase in about four decades (World Bank, 2020; Panchal, 2020). The latest poverty reports indict Nigeria as having 86.9million people living in abject poverty thus surpassing India as the nation with the highest number of poor people and becoming the poverty capital of the world even though India has about six times Nigeria’s population (Panchal, 2020). Having less than a US dollar a day or 361 US dollars per year is the benchmark or index for measuring poverty in the report. Crass corruption, burgeoning unemployment rates, and widening inequality have been pinpointed as the leading salient causes of this event (Panchal, 2020). The ruling political class has shown gross incompetence and inefficiency in managing the nation’s vast mineral resources and diverse human capital and translating both into shared economic prosperity. So, despite the seeming rich potential Nigeria has, she is like a still-born baby or to avoid appearing too harsh, a stunted demented baby. The link between poverty and insecurity has been established satisfactorily so much so that Nweke (2011) rightly observed that “poverty provides the objective as well as the subjective context for the high level of insecurity in the country”. Poverty and unemployment are negatively associated with criminal behaviours such as armed robbery, kidnapping, political thuggery, and human trafficking (Adebayo, 2013; Wayas et al., 2019). Also, poverty laced with greed has seen police officers connive with criminal elements to perpetrate crime either by supplying them arms and ammunition, intelligence and logistics, or helping them escape the wrath of the law.

The alarming rate of poverty in Nigeria has made many Nigerians find crime appealing. However, poverty is not a stand-alone factor; it interacts with inequitable wealth distribution, exacerbating unemployment, and subjective feelings of favouritism of one group and marginalization of another often based on ethno religious sentiment (Nweke, 2011) They further observed that this creates “rigid identity divides based on us versus them syndrome, fan the embers of group hatred and ignite tensions and even violent conflicts”. Taking a cue from crime prevention theories (Olajide & Mohd Diah, 2017), individuals who engage in criminal activities often weigh their meagre available options and find the same to be the most suited especially if it offers less effort and involves less risk. That is, poverty provides them with a motive due to their basic instinct for survival and the sorry state of our security architecture and infrastructure provides them with the window for the commission of the crime. Also, the social contract model (Phenson et al., 2014) explains how citizens due to trust have consented to contract the assurance of their security and well-being to the government in exchange for their independence and other rights. The prevalence of poverty in Nigeria is a clear indication that the government has failed and “breach the terms” of this contract and the prevalence of crime in Nigeria might be citizens' way of venting their anger

and registering their displeasure. According to Freud's psychodynamic model of personality, an individual can redirect his impulses as a means of disguising from an unavailable source to an available one (Feist & Feist, 2008; Schultz & Schultz, 2017). An individual who therefore cannot directly air out their frustration on the government for the perpetual poor state of the country's economy can prey on soft targets in ways such as robberies and kidnappings and other vices in a bid to satisfy his/her impulses.

Ethno-religious Conflict

Achumba et al. (2013, p. 81) defined ethno-religious conflict as a "situation in which the relationship between members of one ethnic or religious group and another of such group in a multi-ethnic and multi-religious society is characterized by lack of cordiality, mutual suspicion, and fear, and a tendency towards violent confrontation". Nigeria, a multicultural secular state with citizens adherent to various religions has faced significant ethno-religious violent conflicts in her over six decades of independent existence (Osadola, 2012; Ifeoma et al., 2015; Nwagboso, 2018; Adeakin, 2013). However, it did not begin with her independence as history is replete with what is now known as Nigeria in pre-colonial times and colonial times experiencing violent confrontations and wars between her various ethnic nationalities. These conflicts stem from fuming mistrust amongst the several ethnic nationalities and faithful of the two major religions in Nigeria – Christianity, and Islam (Ifeoma et al., 2015). Suspicions about groups having a violent "expansionist and domineering" ideology and plans have often formed the breeding ground for this distrust. Also, Ibrahim and Igbuzor (2002) identified the declining state of nationalism amongst Nigerians as a major cause of the spate of ethno-religious conflict; individuals are continually subjugating their national identity to that of their ethnic group and religion. Thus, in their hearts and minds, their ethnic and religious affiliations come before their duty and love for the country and its values. This, therefore, gives birth to conflict as there is no unity or common ground amongst ethno-religious groups due to a lack of singularity of purpose and their refusal to subscribe to that of the state. Conflicts over land, kingship and chieftdom, resources, infrastructure and social amenities, local government council, and political power have been identified as significant contributors to ethnic conflicts in Nigeria and religious intolerance and suspicion as the prime reason for the religious crisis in the country (Achumba et al., 2013; Osakwe, 2017).

Terrorism

Terrorism is undisputedly a source of internal security challenges in Nigeria. As Nigeria struggles to contain the Boko Haram threat in the north eastern part of the country, a new group many believed to be deadlier, called the Islamic States of West African Provinces (ISWAP) has emerged threatening not just the peace and political stability of Nigeria, but possibly the West African region. Sampson and Onuoha (2011 as cited in Ifeoma et al., 2015) saw terrorism as the "premeditated use or threat of use of violence by an individual or group to cause fear, destruction or death, especially against unarmed targets, property or infrastructure in a state, intended to compel those in authority to respond to the demands and expectations of the individual or group behind such violent acts". In this font, both groups seek the annexation and total imposition of Islamic laws in the north eastern part of the country. Boko Haram which began in 2002 engages in numerous nefarious and sometimes dastardly activities such as the bombing of public places and institutions, attacks on security installations and religious houses, rape and pillaging, and kidnapping and execution. Their attacks have left many dead, millions homeless, economic activities crumbling, and security

forces overwhelmed. Similar to Boko Haram in activities but distinct in ideology are the activities of bandits and armed herdsmen. While the former wreaks mayhem and carnage in the north eastern part of Nigeria, the latter does the same in the north western part of the country. These bandits and armed herdsmen are typically Fulani, both of Nigerian descent and from other West African countries (Amaza, 2020). Kidnapping for ransom and mindless killing is their major forte – some of their killings have been termed “ethnic cleansing” by various columnists of Nigeria dailies. However, Amaza (2020) noted that some of the killings are reprisals for native farmers who might have killed a Fulani pastoralist or seized cattle found grazing on their farm.

Poor State of Security Infrastructure

Ifeoma et al (2015) also decried the state of Nigeria’s security infrastructure –the police force is ill-equipped, understaffed, and poorly trained to prevent or contain a security threat, and if all else fails, to minimize or prevent human casualty. Our porous and unmanned borders also present Nigeria with an internal security challenge (Nigeria's border with Niger is 1608km and 809km with Benin thus making it difficult to secure). Owing to the poriferous nature of the country’s borders, there has been a massive proliferation of arms and ammunition and an influx of illegal immigrants who have become easy recruits as foot soldiers for terrorist organizations and bandits. President Buhari blamed Muammar Gaddafi and the instability in Libya for the influx of arms, ammunition, and militias into Nigeria through the country's porous border thereby exacerbating the country’s insecurity (Ogundipe, 2018).

Elections

Elections also serve as a source of the internal security crisis in Nigeria. Electoral fraud and violence often mar elections conducted at every level in Nigeria (Nweke 2011; Egbefo & Salihu, 2014). There is no election be it at the federal, state, or local government level that has been adjudged as free and fair since the return of democratic rule in Nigeria in 1999. This often creates tension and instability in the political spheres as supporters of the politicians clash and courts of law and election tribunals sometimes overturn an election victory weeks or months after a previously declared winner by the electoral commission must have sworn an oath of office and already settled into his/her position.

EndSARS and Nigeria’s Internal Security Challenges

The EndSARS protest helped bring to bear the excesses of the Nigeria Police Force as well as cast in the glare their plight and blight. It was not the first time their excesses were drawing attention as their brutality and extrajudicial killings have been extensively documented aforetime by human rights organizations the US State Department described as “credible international organizations” (Husted, 2020, p. 1). However, it was the first time that citizens would register their rage and frustrations against the rogue policing unit in such a coordinated large scale fashion as it was described as being “notable for its size, duration, and reach” (Husted, 2020). The protesters though with a decentralized leadership had five demands of the government and this paper will analyze Nigeria’s internal security challenges in terms of their origin, antecedents, consequence, or probable solutions in the context of these demands. The protesters demanded firstly the prompt and unconditional release of all arrested protesters. This is significant given that the execution of such action by the government is affirming the credibility of the protesters’ grievances and recognizing their

right to register such grievances by way of peaceful protest. The inability of the government to recognize the grievances of its citizenry and their embrace of a militaristic approach to quelling such grievances has been observed to partly be a cause of violent extremism and armed conflicts in the country. Onubogu (2020) contends that the government's move to always silence dissents with bullets and bombs helps fan the embers of violence as "extortion, torture and extrajudicial killings by those who are supposed to protect citizens continues to drive a cycle of violence". With many governments' counterproductive reactions to the citizens' demands for accountability, transparency, good and responsible governance, and respect for the rule of law and citizens' fundamental human rights from the government and her institutions, many are beginning to lose faith in the ability of the state to provide them welfare and security. And many have lost faith so much so that videos surfaced online showing citizens in Ariaria Market in Aba, the commercial hub of Abia State allegedly cheering and hailing unknown gunmen which have been responsible for multiple terror attacks on security installations, infrastructure, and personnel in the south-east region of the country (Ugwu, 2022). As more citizens lose faith in the state, they turn to groups that are seen to be fighting the perceived excesses and injustice of the state thereby threatening further the peace and stability of the state. The unconditional release of all EndSARS peaceful protesters will send a soothing message to the citizenry that the government shares their pain and grievances and this might restore their faith in the government's commitment to its duty. Such faith is necessary as it is the unsuspecting citizen who has lost such or who never had such that shields the "enemy of the state" or other aggressors from the hands of the law. This was seen in the north eastern part of the country where a significant number of masses supported and provided information and logistics to Boko Haram insurgents thus making them difficult to capture.

The EndSARS protesters secondly demanded justice for all deceased victims of police brutality and appropriate compensation for their families. This will go a long way towards restoring the masses' trust in the government and policing institutions. The loss of trust in the government in a manner account for citizens sympathizing with dissidents, aggressors, insurgents, terrorist and in extreme cases becoming their followers. In a survey conducted from 2014-2015, only 21% of the participant have some form of faith and trust in the Nigeria Police Force (Buchanan-Clarke & Lekalake, 2016). The perceived injustices meted out to those who have had dealings or contact with the force personnel are partly responsible for this. There is a causative link between the perception of inequity and insecurity (Onifade et al., 2013). As people perceived government unfairness or laxity in tackling insecurity, they resort to self-help and this might further escalate the already fragile situation. A case in hand is Sunday Igboho who became an "ethnic messiah" in Oyo State after challenging the killings of his kinsmen in Ibarapa, Oyo State by Fulani militia after the state and federal government developed cold feet. He however took his agenda further to a secessionist movement. Still, he remains a product of the inactions of the state and the citizens' loss of trust in the government. Providing justice for the deceased victims of police brutality and fitting recompense for their families is a signal to the concerned citizens that the government stands with them and more importantly that the government stands on accountability, transparency, and rule of law.

Thirdly, the protesters demanded setting up an independent body to oversee the investigation and prosecution of all reports of police misconduct within 10 days. This, like the first two demands, resonates with the acknowledgement of the legitimacy of the protester's grievances and provision of justice to the end that public trust in the government and her policing architecture is restored. Though the Police Service Commission and internal disciplinary

mechanisms within the force exist to try and curtail officers' misconduct, evidence points to gross dereliction of duty by these bodies as erring officers walk freely which has further emboldened them in their brutality and wrongdoings.

The protesters' fourth demand in consonance with the new Police Act, advocated for psychological evaluation and retraining (to be confirmed by an independent body) of all disbanded SARS officers before they can be redeployed. This demand is in congruence with empirical findings which suggest a positive relationship between training and on-the-job performance. Campbell (2018) lamented the continuing poor funding and insufficient training of the police which to a significant degree account for their inability to maintain law and order within the nation's boundary thus leaving the government of the day no choice but to invite the military to try and succeed where the police failed. The military is actively engaged in some form of policing and peacekeeping operations in almost all the states of the federation thereby weakening the dependability of the police force. On average, it is unlikely an individual will perform well above his training or honed skills. Within extant management literature, the link relationship between training and work performance has been rightly established (Nwanzu & Uche-Okolo, 2017). Specifically, using a sample of police officers, training and development have been found to correlate with high job performance (Maina, 2017; Abdulhabib & Al-Dhaafri, 2018; Yevugah & Caesar, 2018). Thus, it is expected that field and on-the-job training will likely improve the performance of SARS officers. The training and reorientation should be geared towards human rights and civil liberties, criminal and civil law, and tactical training on how to minimize casualty in a hostile situation. This is likely to improve their relationship with citizens whom they are expected to serve and protect as most of the discontent and controversies surrounding the policing outfit centre on gross human rights violations and flagrant disregard for the proceedings and technicalities of the law.

Lastly, the protesters called for an increment in police salary so they are satisfactorily remunerated for safe guarding the lives and property of citizens. Alongside their training, the protesters pointed out the poor salary structure and welfare of police officers as significant contributors to their excesses and corruption. There is plausibility in such claims as available data suggests pitiable welfare of the force relatively. The head of the Nigeria Police Force is the least paid amongst his peers in the State Security Services (SSS), National Intelligence Agency (NIA), and the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), and members of the force are also the poorest paid in the West African sub-region (Aytogo, 2020). He further added that experts believe that the police's status as the worst paid amongst sister agencies in Nigeria drives their greed, exploitation, and thieving. While other analysts have acknowledged the contributory role of the police officers' poor remuneration to their excesses, they maintained still that it is not a major cause. For such, it is "a thing of the mind" and corruption is which is deeply rooted in the soils of our society and they suggest mind renewal or reorientation as a solution or other institutional reforms such as decentralization of the police force. While the credibility of these opinions is sound, it does not invalidate that of the protesters as the relationship between remuneration and job performance has been attested to in the scientific literature. A meta-analytic review of studies examining the effect of incentives on performance at work found that incentives help in improving the worker's job performance on both individual and team levels (Jenkins et al., 1998; Condly et al., 2003). In a more recent meta-analytic study examining the same above, Garbers and Konradt (2013) found financial incentives to have a positive effect on job performance. The literature also

suggests that individuals who are satisfied with their pay are more likely to be committed to the organization (Uzonwanne & Nwanzu, 2017).

Also, in the scientific literature, money in form of fair wages and remuneration is a potent motivator for workers for whom basic and security needs are still a quest and this motivation, in turn, does influence performance (Ek & Mukuru, 2013; Shahzadi et al., 2014; Zameer et al., 2014; Aliyu, 2019). The police force suits the above context; their low pay makes it a struggle to meet basic needs thus a living wage relative to the Nigerian economy will ameliorate their living condition and other incentives and rewards may motivate them towards better performance.

Conclusion and Recommendation

Insecurity continues to be on the rise in Nigeria and while this reflects a failure in the country's national security policy and architecture, the personnel charged with the responsibility of enacting the former cannot be excused from the grand scheme of things. The EndSARS protest placed police personnel under intense fire and scrutiny from some, and sympathy and empathy from others. And while the protest may have ended, the onus is on the government to take the lessons learned from the protest – especially that from the protesters' demand – to try and review the current security situation to the end that reforms are urgently implemented. Already, a judicial panel of inquiry has been set up by some state governments to look into allegations of abuses and extortions by police officers and in some cases, compensation has been paid to victims. However, such gestures without the much-needed institutional reform will simply end up as a stunt or populist scheme to soothe the pain of the masses without treating the underlying diseases.

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