COUNTER TERRORISM IN NIGERIA: AN ASSESSMENT OF BUHARI GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE TO BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY

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ABSTRACT: The Boko Haram insurgency has been regarded as one of the deadliest terrorist groups in the world. Its operations since the year 2009 have contributed to thousands of deaths and displacement of people in Nigeria and other neighbouring countries. Therefore, this work critically assessed the Buhari's government response towards combating the Boko Haram terrorist activities in Nigeria. The specific objectives are to ascertain the effectiveness of Buhari government's response to the Boko Haram activities in Nigeria; identify the problems encountered by Buhari's administration in combating the insurgency in Nigeria and proffer suitable solutions or strategies for effective counter terrorism in Nigeria. This paper adopted Galula's Counter-insurgency theory as the framework for analysis. Data was sourced through secondary sources and analyzed with both qualitative and quantitative methods. This paper revealed that despite the fact that the Buhari's government has achieved some degree of success in combating Boko Haram insurgency (in terms of reduction of incidence of attacks and number of causalities; and recapture of territories), the success has not been significant or effective in the fight against the Boko Haram insurgent. This is because the Boko Haram is still carrying out successful operations or attacks. In addition, it revealed that the use of unconventional warfare by the terrorists; issue of globalization; poor border security; Boko Haram's network with international terrorist groups; corruption etc are the factors that pose challenge to Buhari's administration towards combating the Boko Haram insurgency. This paper recommended that for the need for effective training of security personnel on counter terrorism and insurgency; adequate use of ICT or modern technologies; effective border security; strengthening of the cooperation and coordination of security agencies; strengthening of Multinational Joint Task Force and solving the problem of corruption etc.

Keywords: Terrorism, Insurgency, Counter terrorism, Boko Haram

Introduction

The survival of any sovereign state is mainly determined by the level of its national security and, achievement of national security depends on the level of strategies or measures adopted by the state. One fundamental responsibility of the state is to ensure the security of the lives and properties of its citizens, protection of its territorial integrity and sovereignty and guarantee of its socio-economic and political stability. However, these responsibilities have been

mainly threatened by the emergence of domestic and international terrorism since the end of the 20th century (Ogbonnaya, Ogujiuba & Stiegler, 2014).

The emerging trend of terrorism in the contemporary world has brought a lot of concern to the international community and the activities of terrorist organizations have become one of the greatest threats to global peace and security (Okoli & Lortyer, 2014; Shola, 2015). To Maza, Koldas and Aksit (2020) "Terrorism remains a major threat to the stability of the international system, given that its impacts whenever such attacks take place leave a long-lasting emotional, physical, and psychological trauma on the targets and victims" (p. 1). That is why Horne argued that terrorism and other forms of transitional political violence are more threatening today than ever before as civilian causality has been on increase (Alao, Olusegun & Alao, 2012).

Emergence of Boko Haram insurgency can be traced to Mohammed Yusuf in 2002. During this period, Boko Haram was seen as simple advocacy for Islamic Puritanism in northern Nigeria to the creation of the Islamic state in West Africa (Onuoha & Oyewole, 2018). Boko Haram became a terrorist group in 2009. As a terrorist group, it has graduated into phases, the period of clandestine/Islamic insurgency from 2009 to 2013. The next phase was a period of full confrontation with the Nigerian state from 2013 to 2015 (marked by occupation of Nigeria's territory) and the third phase marked by regional or transnational spread (regionalization and internationalization) from 2015 to present (Saliu & Saka, 2019).

The activities of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria have created series of threats and concern for the survival of Nigerian citizens and the state. The Boko Haram insurgency has killed thousands of people and displaced millions of people while hundreds of thousands have left Nigeria and fled into Cameroon, Chad and Niger (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2015, 2016; Onuoha, 2014; Boko Haram, 2018). It has been reported that fatalities from Boko Haram's violence ranges between 20, 000 and 30, 000. As at mid 2017 it was reported by government of Borno State that Boko Haram activities had led to destruction of N1.9 trillion ($5.2 billion) worth of properties, including one million houses and 5, 000 classrooms (Onuoha & Oyewole, 2018).

The result of Global terrorism index shows that in 2014, the Boko Haram over took Islamic state of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) to become the most deadly terrorist group in the world. Death attributed to Boko Haram increased by 317 percent in 2014 (6,644 deaths). While in 2015 report, Boko Haram was among the first four terrorist groups that were responsible for 74 percent of all deaths and has killed about 5,478 people in same year. Also, in 2016-2017, Nigeria was seen as the third highest countries that experienced terrorist attacks (scoring 9.31) (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018). Since 2014, Boko Haram has transformed as internal security threat to a regional security or transnational threat, which is as a result of its intensification of cross-border attacks (Onuoha, 2016). Furthermore, the Boko Haram cross-border terrorist activities have enabled it to form an effective alliance with other terrorist groups in other countries such as ISIS, Al-Qaeda, Al-Shabaab etc.

These threats by Boko Haram have made successive administrations (from Jonathan's to Buhari's administration) in Nigeria to put in place several measures to effectively counter

terrorism in Nigeria. Some of the notable counter terrorism measures are the establishment of Military Joint Task Force (JTF), declaration of state of emergency, establishment of anti-terrorism Act, establishment of Alimajiri Institutions, establishment of military command and control centre in Maiduguri, revitalising of Multinational Join-Task Force etc.

The Buhari's government at some point claimed to have technically won the war against the Boko Haram insurgency as a result of the successful recapture of most territories under the terrorist's control. Based on this, this paper critically evaluates or assesses the counter-terrorism in Nigeria with focus on the response of Buhari's government towards combating the Boko Insurgency. Specifically, this paper helps to ascertain out the extent Buhari's government has succeeded in combating the Boko Haram insurgency; identify the challenges that undermined Nigerian government effort in this regard and offer suitable solution on how to achieve effective counter-terrorism in Nigeria.

Conceptual Clarification

Terrorism

Wardlaw (1982 as cited in Shola, 2015) defines terrorism as "the use or threat of use of violence by an individual or a group whether acting for or in opposition to establish authority, when such action is designed to create extreme anxiety or fear including effects in a target group larger than immediate victims with the purpose of coercing that group into acceding to the political demands of the perpetrators." Terrorism is an aggression carried out by individuals, groups or states among human beings which includes forms of unjustly terrifying, harming, threatening and killing of people and banditry. It also includes any violent act or threat carried out as part of individual or collective criminal plan aimed at terrifying or harming people or endangering their lives, freedom or security (Combating Saudi Arabia Stance on Terrorism, 2004 cited in Okoli & Lortyer, 2014). The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) defines terrorism as

> Violent acts that: appear to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination or kidnapping and occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum" (cited in Mbaegbu, 2018).

In this paper, we see terrorism as a deliberate use of force, violence or threat of use of violent attack by certain group mainly against non-combatants or civilian population which causes injuries, loss of lives, properties and psychological fears with the aim to mount pressure on the government to respond to its political and ideological demands or objectives. In some instances such threats tend to change the orientation of the citizen, and turn them against the state through radicalization.

Counter-Terrorism

Counter-terrorism means the practice, <u>military tactics</u>, techniques, and strategy that government, military, law enforcement, business, and <u>intelligence agencies</u> use to combat or prevent terrorism. It also involves the strategies attempted to counter financing of <u>terrorism</u> (Counter-Terrorism, 2018). According to Cortright (2011 as cited in Ezirim & Okoye, 2018, p. 36)

> Counter-terrorism requires not only improved security but better effort to address the underlying conditions that give rise to terrorism resolving conflicts, ending foreign occupations, overcoming oppression, eradicating poverty, supporting sustainable development, empowering the marginalized, defending human rights, promoting good governance – all are vital to the struggle against terrorism, yet addressing these challenges is made more difficult by repressive counterterrorism policies.

Counter-terrorism involves a broader or comprehensive military and civilian strategies or response towards combating, eradicating or eliminating terrorist activities in a state. Counter-terrorism/counter-insurgency involves political, security, economic and informational components that reinforce governmental legitimacy and effectiveness in combating the activities or influence of terrorists group over the population (Ilo & Chilaka, 2019). In this paper, we refer to counter-terrorism as the action or strategies adopted towards preventing or eradicating terrorism or controlling the escalation of terrorist attack within the affected areas.

Theoretical Framework

This paper adopted the Galula's Counter-insurgency framework. This framework was propounded by French Officer called David Galula. This theory or framework believes that to achieve counter insurgency there is need for combination of military, political and social actions under strong control of a single authority (Counter-Insurgency, 2018). It also holds that "the development and success of counter-insurgency campaign should be hinged on the heart of the "political machine" which needs political programmes targeted at pacifying the insurgent's base. The counter-insurgents should also effectively coordinate efforts at such programmes as this is a major requirement… This coordination can be achieved through committees and integrated military-civilian hierarchies" (Itumo & Nwobashi, 2015, p.11).

The central message of this framework is on the development of political machine in order to win the support of the people or population and once the state wins popular support, the insurgency operations will be defeated. According to Galula

> A victory [in a counterinsurgency] is not the destruction in a given area of the insurgent's forces and his political organization... A victory is that plus the permanent isolation of the insurgent from the population, isolation not

enforced upon the population, but maintained by and with the population... In conventional warfare, strength is assessed according to military or other tangible criteria, such as the number of divisions, the position they hold, the industrial resources, etc. In revolutionary warfare, strength must be assessed by the extent of support from the population as measured in terms of political organization at the grass roots. The counterinsurgent reaches a position of strength when his power is embedded in a political organization issuing from, and firmly supported by, the population (cited in Counter-Insurgency, 2018).

Galula proposes four "laws" for counterinsurgency:

1.   The aim of the war is to gain the support of the population rather than control of territory.
2.   Most of the population will be neutral in the conflict; support of the masses can be obtained with the help of an active friendly minority.
3.   Support of the population may be lost. The population must be efficiently protected to allow it to cooperate without fear of retribution by the opposite party.

4. Order enforcement should be done progressively by removing or driving away armed opponents, then gaining support of the population, and eventually strengthening positions by building infrastructure and setting long-term relationships with the population (Counter-insurgency, 2018).

Galula goes on to describe a general military and political strategy to put them into operation in an area that is under full insurgent control:

1. Concentrate enough armed forces to destroy or to expel the main body of armed insurgents.
2. Detach for the area sufficient troops to oppose an insurgent's comeback in strength, install these troops in the hamlets, villages, and towns where the population lives.
3. Establish contact with the population, control its movements in order to cut off its links with the guerrillas.
4. Destroy the local insurgent political organization.
5. Set up, by means of elections, new provisional local authorities.
6. Test those authorities by assigning them various concrete tasks. Replace the soft and the incompetents, give full support to the active leaders. Organize self-defense units.
7. Group and educate the leaders in a national political movement.

8. Win over or suppress the last insurgent remnants (Counter-insurgency, 2018).

The relevance of this framework to this study is that it is based on adoption of comprehensive measures (both military and non-military) to counter terrorism. So, this theory will enable us to explain if Nigerian government capability to counter Boko Haram insurgency

depends on combination of strategies adopted. That is, if the inability of Nigerian government to respond to insurgency is because of poor adoption of holistic approach to counter-insurgency.

Methodology

The data for this research were from secondary sources like textbooks, journals, official documents, proceedings, newspapers etc. Analysis in this paper was done with both qualitative and quantitative methods. Qualitative analysis was done with content analysis and logic reasoning, while quantitative analysis involves simple percentage method. This study combined qualitative and quantitative method of analysis because some of the areas in analysis' deals with figures that require statistical method. The scope of this work is limited to Buhar's administration from June 2015 to 2020.

Buhari Government's Response to Counter-terrorism in Nigeria

Since Buhari's administration was inaugurated in 2015, the administration has adopted several strategies or initialed responses for effective combat of Boko Haram insurgency. Some of these measures or responses include:

1. Revitalising or strengthening of Multinational Join-Task Force in 2015
2. Relocation of Nigerian Military Command Centre from Abuja to Maiduguri in June 2015 with the aim to centralize operation close to the action of Boko Haram and reduce the rate of bureaucracy to speed up decision making.
3. President Buhari terminated the STTEP contract and turned to the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF)
4. Negotiation of peace deal with Boko Haram by offering of unspecified amnesty.
5. Review of National Counter Terrorism Strategy (NACTEST) in 2016 for effective prevention of violent extremism.
6. Deradicalization programme through the office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA).
7. Formation of Presidential initiative for the North East (NPE) for alleviation of poverty which is the prime cause of terrorism.
8. Initiation or launch of the Operation Safe Corridor Programme since 2016 for reintegration of repentant terrorist members (Boko Haram).
9. Launching of the National Action Plan for prevention of violent extremism which focuses on key four areas: strengthening institutions for prevention of PVE; strengthening of rule of law and human rights; building of community engagement and resilience and integration of strategic communication to PVE.
10. Alliance with Saudi Arabia's Islamic Military Alliance: This is a counterterrorism military coalition that involves 39 Islamic countries.
11. The use of civilian vigilante known as Civilian Joint Task Force (JTF) in order to help the Nigerian military Joint Task Force (JTF) in fight against the Boko Haram insurgency in the North East.
12. Establishment of cooperation with United States and United Kingdom. This led to approval of nearly 600 million dollars sale of high-tech attack planes to Nigeria by

Trump administration. Also the Prime Minister of U.K pledged for provision of military training and equipment to Nigeria. UK also promised for investment of about 16 million dollars in educational institutions for children living in conflict zone and launching of crises response programme (Counter Extremism Project, 2020).

Assessment/Analysis of Performance/Response of Buhari's Government in combating Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria

In assessing or examining the extent which the responses initiated by Buhari's administration has combated Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria, we need to look at the two areas namely: aspect of number of incidence of attacks and casualties; and secondly, occupation of territories by the terrorist group in Nigeria.

Incidence of Attacks and Casualties

Looking at the incidence of attacks and casualties by Boko Haram in Nigeria, the table stated below will show whether government had reduced or improved on curtailing the terrorist attacks in Nigeria.

Table 1.1: Showing the incidence of attack and casualties caused by Boko Haram in Nigeria from June 2015 - July 2020

Year	No. of Casualties	Incidence of Attacks
2015 from June – Dec.	2224 casualties (2016 people killed and 208 injured)	88
2016	871 casualties (477 killed and 394 injured)	33
2017	901 casualties (590 killed and 311 injured)	65
2018	985 casualties (460 killed and 525 injured)	49
2019	292 casualties (238 killed and 54 injured)	21
2020	724 casualties (564 killed and 160 wounded)	19

Source: Timeline of Boko Haram (2020), Toromade (2017) and compiled by the researcher

Table 1.2: Showing the report of Global Terrorism index on number of fatalities caused by Boko Haram 2013 to 2018

Year	Number of Fatalities	Number of Incidence
2013	1, 587	-
2014	6, 118	-
2015	4, 095	-
2016	762	-
2017	1, 022	222
2018	589	144
2019	1,068	-

Source: Institute of Economics and Peace (2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020)

Data from the tables above (1.1 and 1.2), suggest that there has been reduction in the rate of Boko Haram terrorist activities and number of casualties as compare to 2014 attacks. Therefore, it indicated that the Buhari administration had contributed in curtailing the Boko Haram activities.

Table 1.1, indicated that from June 2015 to 2020, Boko Haram had carried out 275 successful attacks which caused 5997 casualties with 4345 people killed and 1652 people wounded or injured. Table 1.1 revealed that from June to December 2015, Boko Haram carried out 88 attacks causing 2224 casualties comprising of 2016 people killed and 208 citizens injured. In 2016, Boko Haram caused 33 incidences of attacks which led to 871 casualties which involve 477 and 394 people killed and injured/wounded respectively. While in 2017, Boko Haram carried 65 attacks which caused 901 casualties with 590 and 311 people killed or wounded respectively.

In 2018, it indicated that Boko Haram terrorist engaged in 49 attacks which led to 985 casualties involving of 460 deaths and 525 people injured. The Boko Haram carried out 21 attacks in 2019 causing 292 casualties which comprised of 238 and 54 people killed and injured respectively. Finally, the table shows that from in 2020, Boko Haram had successfully executed 19 attacks causing 724 casualties with 564 people killed and 160 wounded.

The result of table 1.2 shows that from year 2013 to 2019, Boko Haram had caused 15,241 deaths. In 2013, 1587 people were killed while 6118 people died as a result of Boko Haram insurgency in 2014. While 4095, 762, 1022, 589, 1,068 people were killed by Boko Haram in 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018 and 2019 respectively.

The result from both table 1.1 and 1.2 proved that the activities of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria had declined. In Buhari's administration, this is evident in the reduction or decline of number of casualties and incidence of attacks which is unlike the results of 2014 terrorist attacks that caused about the death of 6118 and wounded thousands of people. Although there has been fluctuation of increase and decrease of Boko Haram attacks in Buhari's administration. This is observed in the reduction of Boko Haram attacks and number of casualties in 2016 but increased in 2017. The number of casualties (both killed and wounded) further increased in 2018 but the number of death decreased. The terrorist incidence and casualties decreased in 2019 with 238 people that died and 54 injured. The second table from Global Terrorist Index supported this by proving that from 2015 to 2016 the number of fatalities/death has decreased and further increased in 2017 (1022 fatalities) and declined again in 2018 (589 fatalities). While in 2019, it further increased. Despite these fluctuations, number of casualties had reduced as compared to 2014.

The above result of the performance of Nigerian military in combating Boko Haram insurgency can further be authenticated in research of Onuoha and Oyewole (2018), Omenma, Onyishi and Okolie (2020), Saliu and Saka (2019) etc. According to Onuoha and Oyewole (2018, p. 8) "Nigeria's military forces have been successful in the fight against the group, killing its members, destroying insurgent bases, disrupting their logistic networks and freeing captives."

The study of Onuoha (2020, as cited in Omenma et al, 2020) proved that Nigerian military has recorded modicum of successes in the counter insurgency operations.

Occupation of Territory

In terms of occupation of territory, the Nigeria military during Buhari's administration had been able to recover most of the territories that were under the control of Boko Haram. Report indicated that as from July 27, 2016, Nigerian government with the help of Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) has recaptured 801 of territories under Boko Haram control. The MNJTF has not only significantly weakened the capabilities of the terrorist group, but also continued to dislodge it from its strongholds (Omenma *et al*, 2020). This had made the operation of Boko to be restricted to areas like Borno, Adamawa and Yobe states and areas in Chad, Cameroon and Niger (Omenma *et al*, 2020, Ajah, 2018). The study of Ajah (2018) noted that the offensives deployed by MNJTF have drastically degraded the Boko Haram capability which made the terrorist to be confined to remote villages and little pockets of enclaves. Studies proved that from 2015 to 2018, the Nigerian government through its military and MNJTF had recovered or recaptured about 29 local governments that were under Boko Haram control. This comprised of 107, 513.66 km^2 of size of territories with 7, 203, 301 population (Ajah, 2018).

In conclusion, despite the success of Nigerian government (under Buhari's administration) in curtailing the Boko Haram capabilities, it still shows that the Nigerian government is yet to totally win the war against the terrorist groups. This is because; the Boko Haram still poses a great threat to Nigeria national security. The Boko Haram is still carrying out much successful attacks or terrorist operations leading to deaths, injuries and displacement of good number of people in communities especially in the North East. This can be observed from table 1.2 that from June 2015 to 2020, average incidence of attacks by Boko Haram in every month is 4 or 5. That is in each month Boko Haram carries 4 to 5 attacks in Nigeria. In half of 2015, it shows that average incidence of attacks by Boko Haram in each month was 14 to 15. While in 2016, it was 2 to 3 per month, 2017 it was 5 to 6 incidences per month. Also in 2018, it was 4 to 5 times incidence of attack each month as against 2019 that was average of 1 to 2 incidences of attacks, while in 2020, the average incidence of attack is 1 to 2.

In the table 1.2 which is the report of Global terrorism index, it proved that average number of fatalities (death) in each month was 341.25 or (341 to 342) and average of 11.50 or 12 deaths per day. In 2016, there was average of 60.5 (60 to 61) deaths per month and average of 2.08 (2 to 3) deaths per day. In 2017 the average number of death by Boko Haram in each month was 85.1 (85 to 86) and average of 2.8 (2 to 3) deaths per day. In 2018, it proved that the average number of deaths per month and day was 49.03 (49 to 50) and 1.61 (1 to 2) respectively. Finally, in 2019, it indicated that the average number of deaths per month was 89 and average of 2.9 92 to 3) deaths per day. This issue of average of number of incidence and deaths in each day and month from 2015 to 2020 indicated that Boko Haram is still posing a great threat to national security in Nigeria. Despite the success of Nigerian government, it is still evident that Boko Haram is still in control of some areas in Borno, Adamawa and Yobe states and other Lake Chad region which is a threat to national security in Nigeria.

Challenges of Combating the Boko Haram insurgency under Buhari's Administration

Despite the appreciable efforts of the Buhari administration in reducing the number of Boko Haram attacks and recapturing most of the territories under Boko Haram's control, Nigerian government has not effectively countered or won the war against the Boko Haram terrorist group. This is largely because of the following challenges.

1. **Use of unconventional warfare by the Boko Haram:** The adoption of unconventional or asymmetric warfare by the Boko Haram insurgency like terror and guerrilla war strategy (GWS) which is a new kind of war called the fourth generation warfare (4GW) has made Nigerian state army or military very ineffective or ineffectual to combat terrorism (Ekwonna, 2018; Ndubuisi, 2017). This strategy of warfare is alien to Nigeria military because the Boko Haram target on general terror by using suicide bombing, detonation of explosive device. It also focuses on high target assassinations, kidnapping and hostage taking, destruction or sabotage of infrastructure, demonization of the media etc. While the military and other security agencies use conventional warfare by fighting according to the rules of warfare. This paper strongly believes that the difference in approaches has made the Nigerian government or military to be unable to fully identify and unearth where the insurgents are, their activities and how to counter them. Based on the rules of warfare, the military cannot use the asymmetrical or unconventional method used by Boko Haram because it meant to protect the population and avoid issue of war crimes or violation of human rights, while the terrorist uses the population as a liability to launch its attack and gain advantage. According to Ekwonna (2018, p.111).

> The army, still trapped in the industrial age has a mindset that is geocentric or simply, territorial and too life regarding still operates on doctrines that condition its objectives around seizing and defending pieces of real estate, and protecting the lives of the population that might be indifferent or even hostile to it. The 4GW warrior is population centric, not to define but as cover and chokepoint on the state. In 4GW, territory, and population are not objectives or assets but could be liabilities – conversion of territory and population must lead to abandoning of 4GW for conventional warfare or likely defeat. And for the army, the abandoning of territory and population, means defeat and the creation of an uncontested space for the insurgents to grab power.

2. **Boko Haram's Strong Link with International Terrorist Organization:** The formation of strong ties with international terrorist organization by Boko Haram terrorist like Islamic state of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), Al-Qaida, makes Boko Haram to look stronger. In the same vein, President Buhari viewed that the allegiance of Boko Haram to ISIS has made the insurgents stronger as terrorist groups which shows the indication of global threat of terrorism (Agba, 2015). At the strategic level, the Boko Haram's tie-up with these terrorist groups provides an avenue for it to source for funds, ensure capacity building and materiel and take a breathing space for refuge or safety for its leadership whenever the heat against them get too hot (Ekwonna, 2016). According to the BBC analysis

(cited in Ekwonna, 2016, p.126) "the fact that the group is now parts of a wider international network means the campaign of violence could escalate in neighbouring countries particularly in Chad and Niger which have border and are closer to Libya where IS began its expansion in Africa." Onuoha and Oyewole (2018, pp. 3 – 4) summarized this:

> Boko Haram developed capacity for insurgency with recruits and sometimes conscription from Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger, Chad and beyond. It professed support for Al Qaida in 2010 and later pledged allegiance to the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in 2015. Boko Haram members were known to have received training from Al Qaida in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), which operates across the Sahel and North Africa, and from Al Shabaab in East Africa.

3. Mismanagement of Funds/Corruption: The issue of corruption in the security agencies had led to mismanagement of funds meant for procurement of weapons and military equipment towards combating the Boko Haram insurgency. This situation had made the Nigerian government to be unable to procure adequate weapons and equipment for the military or security outfit for effective counter-terrorism which had at various times made the terrorist group to gain advantage and continue to carry out successful attacks on both the military or combatants and Nigerian population. It has been noted that the morale and fighting spirits of the soldiers have been drastically reduced because of institutional corruption which has resulted to shortage of arms and ammunition and poor reward system. It was revealed that between 2014 and 2018, the Nigerian government spent over US $3.9 billion in arms procurement but more than US $2 billion of the budget was siphoned (Onuoha *et al,* 2020 as cited in Omenma *et al,* 2020). Omenma *et al* (2020, p. 17) sided that "there is close relation between institutional corruption and soldiers desertion from the battle field on one hand, and Boko Haram resilient on the other hand." According to Ilo and Chilaka (2019);

> However, whether this bogus allocation and increase in security budget has brought about corresponding increase in security of lives and property of Nigerians is another issue that must not be glossed over. Apart from widespread allegations that corruption in the defence and police affairs ministry including the Nigerian Police Service Commission over the years which has brought to fore the reason why operatives of the armed forces are not sufficiently kitted with the state-of-the-art combat weapon to be able to decisively crush the uprising threatening the territorial integrity of Nigeria, it appears that the more government spends on defence, the more insecure Nigerians feel. The heavy spending on security would ordinarily not attract public attention if this jumbo expenditure has continued to translate to jumbo security of lives and property of Nigerians, especially in the North east (pp. 236 – 237).

In addition, Saliu and Saka assert that;

> The problem of corruption and fraud in defence budgeting and expenditure and the fraudulence that has characterized arms and ammunition purchase and general procurement within the Nigeria defence establishment and other security agencies largely undermines the capability of the security agencies to curtail the menace of Boko Haram. While the situation has improved, yet Nigeria security agencies especially those deployed in active duties mission notable in the Northeast against Boko Haram have continued to face challenges of shortage of equipment, munitions and other essential gadgets needed to successfully prosecute the counter-insurgency operation. These factors constitute serious impediments to Nigeria's counter-terrorism operation against Boko Haram in North-eastern Nigeria.

The report of 2017 Transparency International (IT) indicated that corrupt military officials have embezzled funds through creation of fake defence contracts which are laundered overseas. This had led to lack of access to modern and key war capability like Amphibious Equipment, Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices (C-IED) equipment, ground and our lift assets, intelligence gathering platforms etc (Omenma *et al*, 2020). The Presidential Committee set up by President Buhari in 2015 reported that there were irregularities in procurement and management of funds for the military which office of the National Security Adviser (NSA), Rtd. Colonel Sambo Dasuki was indicted. It was revealed that out of 513 contracts reviewed by the committee, 53 contracts that worth the sum of USD 2.1 billion were not delivered. These contracts includes item like purchase of four Alpha Jets, 12 military helicopters, bombs and ammunition (Saliu & Saka, 2019). This mostly contributed to the failure of Nigerian military to completely win the war against Boko Haram insurgency.

4.   Poor Cooperation and Intelligence Gathering among Security Agencies: The escalation or continue attack of Boko Haram terrorism has been associated with the security agencies failure in intelligence gathering (Itumo & Nwobashi, 2015). "The animosity between Nigeria's security agencies and their unwillingness to share intelligence are hampering effort at effectively combating the Boko Haram insurgency in the country's North-east" (Ibekwe, 2017). The report on Terrorism 2016 published by US Department State's Bureau for Counter Terrorism and Countering Violent Extremism viewed that failure of the Nigerian State Security Services (SSS) to share information with EFCC makes it hard to investigate terrorist financing. And, the level of interagency cooperation and information sharing was limited and at times hindered overall effectiveness (Ibekwe, 2017). It is noted that the issue of overlapping of roles, authority and jurisdiction among security agencies and the culture of superiority most especially the military contribute to poor cooperation and intelligence gathering among security agencies. This undermines their ability or capacity to effectively combat Boko Haram operations (Saliu & Saka, 2019). Furthermore, Ikeanyibe *et al* (2020 as cited in Omenma, *et al,* 2020) revealed that the impact of interagency collaboration on counterterrorism has not been effective in Nigeria because of lack of resources and weak institutional capacity to drive collaboration. According to Saliu and Saka (2019, p. 13):

While the office of national Security Adviser NSA is expected to coordinate the activities of the intelligence agencies and provide oversight, it seems the office has not been successful in its coordination and oversight responsibility given the increasing nature of security threats that Nigeria has had to contend with especially from 2010 upward. The appointment of a substantive Chief of Defence Intelligence by President Muhammadu Buhari in 2015 was meant to aid the synchronization of intelligence gathering and information management rather than abate it. For once, the issue of which office between that of the NSA and the Chief of Defence intelligence is responsible for providing oversight and coordinates the operational activities of the various intelligence agencies surely remains problematic... This overlapping roles, responsibility and authority as it relate to oversight and management of intelligence information has undermined the anti-Boko Haram effort.

5. **Inadequate Security Personnel in the rural Areas of Northeast:** The difficulty of combating the Boko Haram insurgency can also be associated with poor availability of security personnel at the remote areas in the northeast Nigeria. This is in line with the empirical study of Maiangwa and Waziri (2018, p. 213) that stated that giving the few number of civilian JTF and security personnel at the local government areas, it was difficult for them to resist the onslaught of Boko Haram. Whereas the security forces were busy trying to secure Maiduguri town, Boko Haram were busy gaining grounds and recruiting additional followers at the local government areas in preparation for large scale violent campaigns." That is why most of the attacks conducted by the Boko Haram happened in the village or remote areas in the Northeast.

6. **Inadequate Utilization of civilian Joint Task Force (JTF):** Ignoring the role of civilian JTF and its poor utilization by the government has posed a strong challenge to counter-terrorism in Nigeria. Studies show that despite the effort of government in integrating some members of civilian JTF into Borno Youth Empowerment Scheme (BOYES) and provision of vehicles for its operations, majority of trained and educated civilian JTF have not been integrated into BOYES. This poor utilization of civilian JTF has led to death of many member of civilian JTF and which led to the withdrawal of most of its members (Maiangwa & Waziri, 2018). Inadequate utilization of this civilian JFT made it very difficult to counter Boko Haram, because the civilian JTF is very essential in community policing in terms of information sharing and cooperation and coordination and it has tried in repelling Boko Haram in the Northeast.

7. **Poor Border security:** Poor border security and management contributed to the challenge of countering Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. The porous nature of Nigerian border has aided or enhanced the operation of Boko Haram in terms of trafficking of arms and ammunitions; easy movement or cross border migration; trafficking of people and illegal goods for funding; establishment of training camps and easy establishment of links with international terrorist organizations (Nosiri & Anekwe, 2017; Nosiri & Ohazurike, 2016; Onuoha, 2014; Azom & Okoli, 2016). Therefore, if there is an effective border management, the Boko Haram

will find it very difficult to traffic arms and ammunition and indulge in other cross-border crimes towards enhancing its operations.

8.   Problem of Globalization: Globalization which deals with the integration and interconnectedness between state or group with the use of information and communication technologies posed a strong challenge to Nigerian government towards countering the Boko Haram insurgency (Nosiri & Ibekwe, 2017; Otinche, 2018). With the use of information and communication technology, the Boko Haram insurgency has been able to establish strong network among its members and other international terrorist groups and traffic sophisticated weapons. This has also enhanced their method of operations in terms of attacks; propagation of ideology and propaganda and also undermines border security (Noiri & ibekwe, 2017).

Conclusion

The Buhari's government has recorded some element of success in combating the Boko Haram insurgency most especially in terms of recapturing some territories that were under the control of the insurgent. However, the Boko Haram is still conducting successful operations or attacks in the northeastern Nigeria and the Lake Chad regions (Cameroon, Chad and Niger). This shows that Nigerian government is still far from winning the war against Boko Haram insurgency. Despite the statement of Nigerian President Mohammadu Buhari that Nigerian military has technically defeated Boko Haram, the results in the above tables indicates that the Nigerian government claims of defeating Boko Haram is far fetch.

This paper identified that issue of poor coordination of security agencies, adoption of unconventional warfare (4GW) by the insurgents, Boko Haram maintain ties with international terrorist groups, inadequate security personnel in rural areas, poor border security, problem of globalization, corruption etc. are challenges or problem undermining the ability of Buhari's government or Nigerian military in combating the Boko Haram insurgency. Therefore, we recommend for an effective strategies for counter-terrorism in Nigeria.

Recommendations

This paper made the following recommendations:

i.   There is need for appropriate adoption or use of modern technologies or ICT in the fight against Boko Haram insurgency.

ii.   Strengthening of community policing is very essential for combating the Boko Haram's terrorism. For example, the military JTF need to be strengthened and reorganized.

iii.   There is need for effective cooperation and coordination between security agencies in Nigeria in terms of information sharing.

iv.   Strengthening of regional security cooperation and coordination like Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), ECOWAS, etc is very paramount for counter-terrorism in Nigeria.

v.   There is need for adequate training and recruitment of security personnel in the rural areas because the Boko Haram now conducts its terrorist activities in these areas.

vi.   Nigeria government must adopt adequate strategies and policies on how to strengthen its borders against illegal movement of people and illegal goods.

vii.   There is an urgent need for cooperation and coordination between the government and network providers in terms of linking or sharing information needed for counter-terrorism.

viii.   There is need for Nigerian government to trace or identify the major financiers of Boko Haram insurgency and take adequate steps to stop them. This will help to reduce Boko Haram's purchase of weapons, goods and recruitment of personnel.

ix. The military must be proactive in responding to intelligence. This will help to avert so many attacks and save lives as well

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