CONSTRAINING NON-STATE ARMED GROUPS IN AFRICA
AN ANALYSIS OF LEADERSHIP AND SANCTIONS EFFECTIVENESS IN ANGOLA
Keywords:Non-state actor, Sanctions, Leadership, Angola, UNITA, leadership style
This article focuses on how leaders of Non-State Armed Groups (NSAGs) shape the effectiveness of sanctions. Causal determinants of sanctions effectiveness have been identified, including regime types, winning coalition, targeting, and vulnerability. The literature has ignored the relevance of NSAG’s leadership to sanctions effectiveness. Whereas sanctions seek behavioral change on the part of a target, the agency of the target’s leadership has not been emphasized. Explanations of sanctions effectiveness lack insight about the leadership style of actors who shape the policies and actions of NSAGs. Indifference to leadership style and how a leader is likely to behave under sanctions can hardly help the cause of sanctions effectiveness. The article relies on Hermann, et al (2001) leadership theory, and the qualitative database developed by the Targeted Sanctions Consortium (TSC) (2014) to explore the relationship between leadership and sanctions effectiveness. The analysis found that leaders of NSAGs took binding decisions and determined the reaction of the latter to sanctions. By their actions, the leaders of the NSAG determined the protraction of violent conflicts, and failure of sanctions. To design sanctions that effectively constrain NSAGs, sanctions senders need to understand the leadership style of the former in order to determine the appropriate policy tools to adopt.